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The American Communist movement, born out of a left-wing split from the 
American Socialist Party in 1919, was divided into several hostile organisations that 
understood very little about American politics, culture or society. In its early years, 
the Communist International (Comintern) repeatedly intervened into the American 
Party. Far from hindering the Party's understanding and appreciation of American 
conditions, this intervention helped transform the Party from a marginal sect of 
isolated immigrants in 1920, to an important part of American politics in the 1930s. 
This intervention stemmed from the desire of the early Comintern, under the 
leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, to create an international revolutionary Communist 
movement. However, in the mid- I 920s, as the leadership and ideology of the Russian 
Communist party changed. Under the rubric of building 'socialism in one country', 
the Comintem now intervened more and more to create a stable, Pro-Stalin leadership. 
The first portion of this thesis, comprising the first four chapters, illustrates 
how between 1919 and 1923 Comintern intervention was necessary to politically and 
organisationally construct a Party. The Comintern helped achieve unity amongst the 
competing groups; forced the Party to take advantage of the opportunities for legal 
work; compelled the Party to intervene into the labour movement. 
The next four chapters examine the change in Comintem intervention between 
1923 and 1929. During this period, internecine factionalism, increasingly devoid of a 
political basis, tore the Party asunder, and sapped its ability to intervene into society. 
The Comintern continued to intervene, but largely to play one faction off against 
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another. In the aftermath of the 1928 Sixth Congress, the Party leadership purged first 
its left, Trotskyist wing, led by James P. Cannon, and within the year, the right, 
Bukharnite, wing, led by Jay Lovestone. The Comintern then installed a pliant 
leadership that finally ended factionalism and carried the now Stalinised Party into the 
1930s. 
The final chapter analyses the changing Communist perspective on the 'Negro 
Question', from ignoring black rights to championing the right of Southern blacks to 
independence. Here, the Comintern, acting on pressure from pioneer black 
Communists, insisted that the Party address this important issue. At the Sixth 
Congress, the Comintern adopted the theory that blacks in the American South were a 
oppressed nationality, and had the right to form a separate state. Whilst this 
programme was not in accord with reality, it forced the Party to aggressively fight for 
black rights, so that by the 1930s it was well known for its stand for black liberation. 
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1. Introduction 
The historiography of the American Communist Party (CP) has been 
contentious. The classic debate, which is as much about politics as history, centres 
around how 'foreign' (i. e., dependant on the Soviet Union) or 'American' (i. e., firmly 
rooted in US radical and labour history) the party was. The standard, Cold War 
perspective on American Communism holds that the CP was almost entirely a 
creation of the Soviet Union, or at least quickly became a Soviet tool. An extreme 
example is the foremost American professional anti-Communist, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) head J. Edgar Hoover, who described the archetypal Communist 
militant in his classic Masters ofDeceit (1959): 'Even though he lives in the United 
States ... [he] is a supporter of a foreign power, espousing an alien line of thought. He 
is a conspirator against his country. " 
Of course Hoover's arguments were little more than ajustification for 
government repression against leftists. Former Daily Worker editor Theodore Draper, 
in a more literate and less rabid line of argument, holds that the Communist 
International and its Soviet leadership perverted American Communism from its 
origins in the American left and labour movement, and twisted the Party into a Soviet 
tool. This in turn hurt the CP's ability to speak to American. Draper-who left the 
party in 1940-wrote the standard twin studies of early American Communism, The 
Roots ofAmerican Communism (1957) and American Communism andSoviel Russia 
(1960). These are masterful pieces of historical scholarship that E. H. Carrjustifiably 
labelled as one of only two 'reasonably adequate' studies of Communist Parties 
1 J. Edgar I loover, Afaslers ofDeceit (New York: Pocket Books, 1959), 4. 
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throughout the world. 2 No other study of the Party has outlined in broad strokes the 
Party's history so well; nonetheless, they contain important weaknesses. 
In analysing 'the relation of American Communism to Soviet Russia', Draper 
concluded that 'this relation has expressed itself in different ways.... But it has 
always been the determining factor, the essential element' in the development of the 
Cp. 3 The conclusion of American Communism and Soviet Russia answers the question 
implicit in its title: 'even at the price of virtually committing political suicide, 
American Communism would continue above all to serve the interests of Soviet 
Russia. A Draper yearns for 'other forms of American radicalism such as the open, 
democratic, pre-World War I Socialist party, the fanner-labor movement, or the 
syndicalist movement, all of which were far more indigenous and independent than 
5 
the American Communist party'. 
Draper, then, erected a Chinese wall between 'American' radicalism and 
'foreign', i. e., Soviet-dominated, Communism. The latter was by-and-large imposed 
upon American soil, and ignored, or even disregarded, earlier American radicalism. 
That is, the Comintern essentially aborted the birth of an authentically American 
radical movement. Thus Draper rejects a priori the possibility that either the influence 
of the Communist International or the Soviet Union could have been anything but 
negative for the early Communist movement. In the 1980s, Harvey Klehr-with the 
help of Draper's research materials, but without his sympathetic or creative talents- 
2 Theodore Draper, The Roots ofAmerican Communism (Chicago: Elephant Publishers, 1985[1957]); 
idem., American Communism andSoviet Russia (New York: Vintage, 1986[1960]). E. 11. Carr, 
Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (London: Macmillan, 1964), v-vi. Carr also recommended 
Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party ofBulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 
3 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 5. 
4 Ibid., 44 1. 
3 Ibid., 446. 
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extended Draper's analysis, with a sinister edge, into the 1930s 'popular-front' era. 
For Klehr, searches for Soviet control and 'Moscow Gold' read like a lawyer's brief 
for attacking the Cp. 7 
Newer 'revisionist' or 'social' historians have downplayed 'Soviet control', 
arguing instead that the party sprouted largely from native soil. In a series of 
specialised monographs these historians focused on the rank-and-file effectiveness of 
the CP among certain constituencies such as blacks or immigrants. 8 Perhaps the most 
innovative attempt is by Robin D. G. Kelley, who, in examining the activity of black 
rank-and-file CP members in the South during the Great Depression, illustrates that 
while Moscow-influenced politics did play a role in setting CP policy, for the rank- 
and-file membership, there was much more localised autonomy. 9 
A third school of historiography exists, namely Communists' own attempts to 
review their history. By and large these studies are designed more as textbooks for 
Party cadre, and thus j usti fy whatever the current Party position was at the time of 
writing. The official CP view of its own history is, not surprisingly, more favourable 
to American Communism and hostile to Draper. From this perspective, the CP grew 
61 larvey Klehr, The Heyday ofAmerican Communism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic 
Books, 1984). 
See Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, 'Radical Ilistory', New Criterion 20 (June 2002): 10,17-23. 
Examples include Lowell K. Dyson, Red Harvest: 7he Communist Party andAmerican Farmers 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and 
the Autoworkers Union (New York: International Publishers, 199 1); Mark Naison, Communists In 
Harlem During the Depression (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983); more recently, Winston 
James, Holding Aloy? the Banner ofEihiopia (London: Verso, 1998) and Mark Solomon, The Cry Was 
Unity: Communists andAfrican-Americans, 1917-36 (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1998) 
examine key intersections between the CP and blacks. 
9 Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Kelley was not the first to argue that the American 
cadre had a degree of autonomy. Former CP leader J. B. Salutsky noted: 'The direction from the 
International Communist headquarters in Russia is held responsible for the inept tactics of the 
Communists in the United States. What Moscow has actually given its American followers is color, 
tone, and general direction, not detailed technique.... If some one must be blamed for the utter failure 
of the communist movement in the United States, that blame is to be laid at the door of the American 
performers.... Moscow's biggest sin was that of having too readily paid the traveling expenses of the 
American tacticians and strategists', J. B. S. I lardman, 'Postscripts to Ten Year of Labor Movement', in 
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almost organically out of the American class struggle and America's radical heritage. 
Instead of being foreign, American Communism was overwhelmingly an American 
phenomenon. As Earl Browder crudely put it: 'Communism is Twentieth Century 
Americanism"O Anybody who asserts the importance of the Soviet Union is therefore 
engaging in red baiting-an accusation, in many cases, all too true. As Rutgers 
historian Nonnan Markowitz has written in the CP's Political Affairs: 
For both the cold-war revival scholars and the makers of Reagan foreign 
policy, the standard of danger is how 'pro-Soviet' a party, movement, or 
organization is. A 'pro-Soviet' position is used as evidence that it is 'foreign' 
and 'controlled' by the Soviets, an 'anti-Soviet' position is used to portray it 
as indigenous, 'democratic', and in the U. S. context, 'American'. This, of 
course, attempts to reduce both the scholarly 'debate' and foreign policy 
questions to a renewed cold-war consensus based on the categories of the 
Smith and McCarran Acts. ' 1 
In the upshot, the official CP histories-especially those written by William Z. 
Foster-illuminate the political history of the Party about as much as Stalin's History 
ofthe Bolshevik Party (Short Course)-i. e., not much. 12 But the main point is that 
they, like their enemies in the Draper school, also accept that there is a Chinese Wall 
between American and foreign influence, and differ only in their contention that the 
CP's roots were in American, and not Russian, soil. The perspective that the 
American CPs political (as opposed to organisational) roots were firmly based in the 
Comintern and the impact of the October Revolution, and this gave the Party 
strength, is abscnt from the dcbatc entircly. 13 
J. B. S. Hardman, ed.,, fterican Labor Dynamics in the Light ofPost-War Developments (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928), 24-25. 
10 See Earl Browder, What is Communism? (New York: Vanguard Press, 1936), especially the first 
chapter, 'Who are the AmericansT. 
11 Norman Markowitz, 'The New Cold War "Scholarship", ' Polifical, 4ffairs, October 1983,6-7. 
12 See William Z. Foster, History ofthe Communist Party ofthe UnitedStates (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1968). For a fuller discussion of the CP's own historiography, see Jacob Zumoff, 'The 
Stalinization of the Communist Party, USA: James P. Cannon and William Z. Foster(BA dissertation, 
Rutgers University 1997), 5-7. 
13 The only scholarly treatment of the positive impact of Comintern intervention is Robert Jay Alperin, 
'Organization in the Communist Party, U. S. A., 1931-1938'(PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 
1959): 'Cominform [sic] advice sent Communists into unions, taught them to raise and struggle for 
immediate demands, form united fronts ... and focused for the first time the attention of the American 
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Even almost a decade after the end of the Cold War this debate still rages. 14 
The debate has lost none of its intensity, with each side reiterating the same 
arguments in an almost Sisyphusean procession. Indeed, especially now, with 
capitalism restored in Russia and East Europe, and with the chorus that 'Communism 
is dead' being sung from right-wing as well as erstwhile left-wing intellectuals and 
politicians, the controversy over Communism has achieved new vigour. It is now 
fashionable to tar-and-feather anything having to do with Marxism and the Soviet 
Union as great evils. Communism, we are told, was as bad, if not worse, than Nazism. 
One of the few benefits of the destruction of the Soviet Union, however, was that now 
there are more available sources--especially the former archives of the Communist 
International (Comintern) in Moscow. This is certainly no consolation to the workers 
of East Europe and Central Asia, nor does it offset the last decade's offensive against 
socialism and the working class; it does, however, allow historians to further expand 
our knowledge of early Communism. 
From its inception in 1919, the Comintem collected documentation relating 
not only to the central Comintem apparatus, but also to its member parties. For 
various reasons, the American files are among the best organised of extant files. 
Nonetheless, the issue is still not so much the facts about the CP but what these facts 
mean. 
Marxists (and Left generally) on the particular problems of the Negroes. From the point of view of the 
stated goals of the organization these would seem to be quite helpful suggestions' (26). Unfortunately, 
this line of analysis was not developed. 
14 See, for example, John Earl Ilaynes, 'The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of 
Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism'. Journal ofCold Irar Studies, 
2: 1 (Winter 2000); and the subsequent exchange between Ilaynes and Ellen Schrecker on the Harvard 
Project for Cold War Studies website, <http: //www. fas. harvard. edu/-hpcws/haynesforum. htm>. Cf. 
also Jacob Weisberg, 'Cold War Without End', New York Times Sunday Alagazine, 28 November 
1999. 
Jacob Zumoff II 
Some writers (represented in Yale University Press' Annals of Communism 
series), such as Klehr and his followers, 15 have seized upon the Soviet archives to 
prove, once and for all, that American Communism was nothing more than an 
appendage to Soviet totalitarianism. Others, such as Barrett and Johanningsmeier, 
have painted a more sympathetic portrait of American Communism. Several things 
need to be said about the utility of the Soviet archives. First, they cannot supplant the 
use of more traditional archival and documentary sources such as the papers of former 
Communists and Socialists, and the material collected by Draper. Unlike, say, China, 
Vietnam or Japan, where the Communist movement was often severely repressed and 
its leaders jailed or even executed, in the United States, Communists and former 
Communists have left a rich documentary record. The importance of the Comintern 
archives, above even the best archives in the US, is both their completeness, and the 
fact that they present a fuller picture of the back and forth between the Comintern and 
American leaderships. However, there is a danger in relying too much on the archives. 
First, one must take on face value the accuracy of the records in the archives. 
Ironically, those most likely to denounce Soviet treachery and deceit during the Cold 
War are also those most likely to hail the archives. While I do believe that the 
material contained in the archives are largely true, it must also be kept in mind the 
" See Harvey Klehr, John Earl I laynes and F. I. Firsov, The Secret World ofAmerican Communism 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995); Klehr, Haynes, and K. M. Anderson, The 
Soviet World ofAmerican Communism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). Other 
anti-Communist historians who use the Comintern archives include John Earl Haynes, RedScare or 
RedMenace? American Communism andAnti-Communism in the Cold World Era (Chicago: Ivan R. 
Dee, 1996); Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist, andSpymaster 
(New York: Random House, 1999); Vernon L. Pedersen, The Communist Party in Maryland, 1919-57 
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001). For examples who have used these archives 
for more sympathetic portraits of American Communists, see James R. Barrett, William Z Foster and 
the Tragedy ofAmerican Radicalism (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Edward 
P. Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism: The Life of William Z Foster (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994); James G. Ryan, Earl Browder. The Failure ofAmerican 
Communism (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Arkansas Press, 1997); Solomon, The Cry Was 
Unity. 
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conditions under which they were maintained. 16 by themselves they do not offer any 
social or historical context; thus Vernon Pedersen's The Communist Party in 
Maryland (2001), while based extensively on the Comintern sources, presents a very 
incomplete view of the Party. Second, while there are district and local reports in the 
archives, by and large they present a centralised, top-down view of the Party; it is 
hard to gather a picture of what the Party was like for most members (except to 
conf inn the fact that it consisted of many meetings), or what it actually did on the 
ground. 17 Nonetheless, for a historian of American Communism, it would be 
unthinkable to not use the Comintem archives. 
Focusing my research efforts on both these documents and more traditional 
primary sources, I call into question both the 'consensus' and the social historians' 
Grevisionist' writings, which each accept that there was a fundamental contradiction 
between the foreign, i. e., Comintern, and the American, trends within the CP. The 
chief difference of these schools lies only in the relative weight they assign to 
'foreign/Sovict/Comintcm' and 'Amcrican' aspccts of the CP. 'Orthodox Drapcritcs' 
argue that the CP's relationship to the Comintem and to the Soviet Union was the 
&original sin' that precluded its tapping into and making use of a more indigenous 
heritage of American radicalism. And, in fact, Draper is right that the historian must 
examine 'the interrelation between the American Communist party and the 
Communist International, and in the interrelation between the Communist 
16 According to Wolfgang Leonard, Child ofthe Revolution (London: Ink Links, 1979) during the 
Second World War, the Comintern archives were evacuated from Moscow. In 1943, upon the 
dissolution of the Comintern, they were quickly, if methodically, resorted. According to Leonard, who 
helped sort the American files, 'the Communist Party of the U. S. A. was readily conceded first place for 
chaos and confusion. The sacks belonging to my American comrades contained not only whole 
bundles of Party documents which had been simply stuffed in without even a file-cover being put 
round them, but also the remains of cinema advertisements, old numbers of the New York Times, 
broken pencils and every kind of rubbish that had not the slightest connection with the archives' (233). 
" The best use of the archives to present a local picture of the Party is Randi Jill Storch, 'Shades of 
Red: The Communist Party and Chicago's Workers, 1928-1939' (PhD thesis, University of Illinois at 
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International and the Russian Communist party. ' According to this view, Draper 
continued: 'We must study an American movement whose seat of power was not 
located in the United States. ' 18 Yet, Draper-writing from a Cold War perspective- 
failed to fully grasp the role that 'Moscow' played in the party. My research suggests 
that far from hindering the early American Communists' understanding and 
appreciation of American conditions, the Party's links to the international Communist 
movement provided indispensable assistance. 
Yet, the 'social historians' who took issue with Draper and his followers, 
accept his basic framework that Soviet 'domination' was the evil that was constant 
throughout the CP's history. They merely invert Draper's schema: they stress that the 
native radical traditions were much more prominent than Draper allows. 
19 The 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the Party was still bad-only, it was not so 
important in the Party's history, especially its cultural history, as Draper had argued. 
Many of these 'revisionist' studies are marked by their almost exclusive focus on the 
culture of American Communism instead of its politics. Some even go so far as to 
bemoan that, in Buhle's words, leftists in the immediate post-October Revolutionary 
period emphasised politics and 'culture vanished from the foreground of Marxists 
concerns. t20 
This narrowness can in part be explained by the fact that most of the social 
historians were influenced by the 'new labor history' which, following the lead of E. P 
Thompson and Herbert Gutman, examines history 'from the bottom up'. They argue 
that, in the case of the labour movement, the most important factor was not the 
Urbana-Champaign, 1998). Also, the papers of individual Communists are indispensable to penetrating 
the factions that riddled the Party in the 1920s. 
18 Drapcr,, 4merican Communism andSoviet Russia, 12. 
'9 See for example Naison's review of Klehr, Heyday ofAmerican Communism, in Radical History 
Review 32 (March 1985), 97-10 1. 
20 Paul Buhle, Afarxism in the USAfrom 1870 to the Present Day (London: Verso, 1987), 116 
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institutional lives of unions and their leaders, but the actual lives of the working class. 
It is indisputable that historians such as Naison and Kelley have contributed 
immensely to our understanding of the importance of the American CP, just as the 
'new labor' historians more generally have pushed the frontiers of labour and 
working-class history forward, and have certainly contributed to a fuller picture of 
American Communism. But there is another explanation for their emphasising 
6social' issues: it allows historians to de-emphasise the importance of the political 
dimension in the CP. This means that the actually-existing politics (Soviet-influenced) 
of the CP can be viewed as secondary to the lived experiences of American 
communists (American). One recent biographical study of a leading American 
Communist, for example, relegated a chapter on 'the politics of the CPUSA' to the 
last. 21 This accepts Draper's framework, but merely inverts the relationship between 
American and foreign. 
In reaction to the standard anti-Communist historiography, one scholar 
observed that 'it is possible to accept this portrait if one is so influenced by the anti- 
Communist atmosphere that one considers the men and women who worked in the 
plants and belonged to the Communist Party as abstractions rather than people. ' If 
'social history' re-humanises Communists, then this is significant. However, we must 
also remember the other half of the historian's warning: 'while there is no need to 
cannonize them, there is a real need to take them seriously as workers, as organizers, 
21 For Draper's critique of this perspective, see the afterward to the 1986 edition ofAmerican 
Communism and Soviet Russia, reprinted from two articles in the New York Review of Books. The 
seminal 'new labor history' are E. P. Thompson, 7he Making of the English Working Class 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) and Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture and Society In Industrializing 
America (New York: Vintage, 1966); Kathleen A. Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor: The Politics of the 
Personal in the American Communist Party' (PhD thesis, University of Washington, 1996). See also 
Kathleen A. Brown and Elizabeth Faue, 'Social Bonds, Sexual Politics and Political Community on the 
U. S. Left, 1920s-1940s', Left History 7: 1(Spring 2000), 9-45, for another example of trivialising the 
political aspects of the left in favour of personal relationships. James R. Barrett, 'Revolution and 
Personal Crisis: William Z. Foster, Personal Narrative, and the Subjective in the History of American 
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and as Communists. ' 22 Another biography of an American Communist heralds the 
'revisionist' historiography for 'examining the thoughts and actions of the men and 
women involved in the [Communist] movement'. It must not be forgotten, however, 
that the Communists' 'thoughts and actions'-which often brought discomfort, 
hardship, dislocation, unemployment, torture and beatings, arrest and even death- 
23 were conditioned by the politics of the Communist Party. By dismissing the politics 
that Communists, rightly or wrongly, struggled and sacrificed for, social historians 
often do their subjects a grave injustice. 24 
The Comintern and the American Party 
It is essentially this opposition between 'American' and 'foreign' in the 
historiography that is deficient about Draper's analysis. The original Comintem-led 
by Bolshevik revolutionaries such as V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky-sought to 
establish national sections that would be rooted firmly in both their own working 
classes and in the international Communist movement. Lenin outlined this perspective 
in a speech at the third Comintern congress in the summer of 1921 dealing with 
Italian Communism. He made clear that 'the revolution in Italy will take a different 
course from that in Russia, ' and that even though the Comintem's 'fundamental 
Communism', Labor History 43: 4 (November 2002), 465-82, at least attempts to integrate the political 
and personal dimensions of its subject. 
22 James Robert Prickett, 'Communists and the Communist Issue in the American Labor Movement, 
1920-1950' (PhD thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1975), 26-27. While both Prickett 
and I are critical of various CP policies and actions, this is often so from different directions. 
" Fletcher C. Smith, 'Clyde Johnson, American Communist: His Life in the Labor Movement' (PhD 
thesis, University of Arkansas, 1999), 2. 
"A quintessential example of the personal approach to Communist history, at the expense of the 
political, is Vivian Gornick, The Romance ofAmerican Communism (New York: Basic Books, 1977); 
a more recent example, which, using oral history, tells the story of Communists with very little political 
context is Joe H. Roach, 'Women in the American Communist Party and How their Party Activities 
Affected their Home Lives as Wives and Mothers' (PhD thesis, New York University, 2000). In a 
review of Gornick's book in the New York Times ('Real Beliefs, False Ideals', 12 February 1978), the 
social-democratic anti-Communist writer Michael Harrington illustrated how it is possible to pay 
homage to the humanity of Communists whilst denigrating their politics and thus demonstrated that 
while the new historians may have illuminating insights on individual Communists, they are less useful 
in analysing the Communist movement. 
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revolutionary principles' were the same everywhere, these 'must be adapted to the 
specific conditions in the various countries' by national sections of the Comintern. In 
fact, he stressed that it 'would have been stupid' for the Italian Communists 'to copy 
the Russian revolution'. 25 Later, Trotsky wrote in a similar vein: 'In politics, it is very 
important, and yet very difficult, on the one hand to define the general laws that 
determine the life or death struggle throughout the modem world; and on the other, to 
describe the special combination of these laws as they play out in each individual 
country. 26 
Lenin, Trotsky and the other Comintem leaders had explicit goals. Almost two 
decades before the Russian Revolution, Lenin had argued in What Is To Be Done? 
(1902) that the previously accepted social-democratic forms of working-class 
organisation were no longer sufficient. A motion at the 1904 Congress of the Second 
International, led by German Social Democratic leader Karl Kautsky, had outlined 
these traditional methods: 
In order that the working class may put forth all its strength in the struggle 
against capitalism it is necessary that in every country there exist vis-a-vis the 
bourgeois parties, only one socialist party, as there exists only one proletariat. 
Therefore, it is the imperative duty of all comrades and socialist organizations 
to make every effort to bring about this unity on the basis of the principles 
established by the international congresses, a unity necessary in the interests 
of the proletariat before which they are responsible for all fatal consequences 
27 of a continued breach. 
Against this view, Lenin argued for a revolutionary vanguard, made up of advanced 
workers and declassed intellectuals, which would lead the working class to socialist 
consciousness. Unlike most of the other left-wing tendencies within international 
social democracy, the Bolsheviks emphasised that the labour movement needed to be 
25 V. I. Lenin, 'Speech on the Italian Question', 28 June 1921, Collected Works, vol. 32,464-66. 
26 Quoted in Osvaldo Coggiola, Historia del trotskismo argentino, 1929-1960 (Bunes Aires: Centro 
Editor de America Latina, 1985), 11-12. 
27 Quoted in Joseph Seymour, Lenin and the Vanguard Party (New York: Spartacist Publishing 
Company, 1978), 4. 
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split, between its revolutionary and reformist elements. Famously, at a 1903 
conference in London, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party split into two 
factions, the Bolsheviks ('men of the majority'), lead by Lenin, and the Mensheviks 
('men of the minority'), lead by Jules Martov, over this very question. Lenin summed 
up his view of the differences shortly after the split: 
We argued that the concept Party member must be narrowed so as to separate 
those who worked from those who merely talked, to eliminate organisational 
chaos, to eliminate the monstrous and absurd possibility of there being 
organisations which consisted of Party members which were not Party 
organisations, and so on. Martov stood for broadening the Party and spoke of 
a broad class movement needing a broad-i. e., diffuse-organisation, and so 
28 forth. 
Lenin, although he did not fully realise it at the time, was attacking the essence of the 
standard social-democratic party. It was not until the world war and significant 
sections of social democrats in belligerent countries supported their own 
governments, that Lenin generalised this split and insisted that it was impossible to 
coexist in the same party as pro-war 'social-chauvinists I. 29 
Lenin and Trotsky saw the Comintern's goal as forging such parties 
internationally. This was integrally tied to the standard Marxist conception that it was 
impossible to build socialism in one country alone and that revolutions 
internationally, especially in the industrialised world, were necessary. This was the 
reason that the Comintern was founded in 1919, as a revolutionary replacement to 
Kautsky's 'social-chauvinist' Second International. Thus the Bolsheviks sought to 
establish the Comintern as a way of defending their revolution by extending it 
intemationally. 
28 Lenin, 'Account of the Second Congress of the R. S. D. L. P. ', Collected Works, vol. 7,27. Cf. also 
Isaac Deustcher, The Prophet, 4rmed. - Trotsky, 1879-1921 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 
75-85. 
29 See, e. g., V. 1. Lenin and Gregori Zinoviev, Socialism and War (1915), in Collected Works., vol. 2 1, 
295-334. 
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The Comintern sought to impart its conception of Leninist organisation to its 
international affiliates. Far from hindering the development of a strong American 
Communist movement as both 'Draperians' and his 'social history' adversaries have 
posited, this 'interference' by the early Comintem was the precondition for the 
development of a truly American Communist Party. In my thesis I trace this 
development in several ways. First I examine the relationship of early American 
Communism to its predecessors, especially the Socialist Party and the Industrial 
Workers of the World. The Comintern attempted fuse of elements of both these 
traditions into the early CP-i. e., tap into 'indigenous' American radicalism. This 
required not only organisational but political changes, especially in the seemingly 
endless attempts to finally unite the disparate revolutionary left into one party with a 
cohesive and collective leadership. Unlike in Britain, where the fact that large 
sections of the left-wing of the workers movement-especially Sylvia Pankhurst's 
group, the syndicalists around John MacLean in Scotland, and the Socialist Labour 
Party-remained outside of the new CP gave the party a stillborn character, American 
Communism sparkled with vitality, marked by many fights. 
Even after the American Communists had joined together into one party, they 
were still cleft by deep factional divisions as well as differing opinions of the 
Communist path in the US. By attempting to end this endless factionalism, creating a 
legal party apparatus, forcing the CP to pay attention to unionised English-speaking 
workers, the Comintem-counter to Draper's analysis-actually forced the American 
CP to 'Americanise'. The Comintem also made the early Party acknowledge the 
American trade-union movement as a way of gaining influence amongst the working 
class. It is in this context that the Comintern, acting on the pressure of black 
Communists such as Cyril V. Briggs and Claude McKay, forced the early CP to deal 
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with the 'American question' par excellence: the fight for black liberation, i. e., the 
'Negro question'. 
The oppression of black people, since the forging of the United States in the 
crucible of slavery, has been the bedrock of American capitalism. As has been 
demonstrated several times throughout American history, the struggle for black rights 
can act as a catalyst for fundamental social change, such as during the abolitionist 
movement, Reconstruction and the civil rights movement. Yet the early Communist 
Party, like the American labour and socialist movement in general, ignored the 'Negro 
Question' until prodded by the Comintern. The Comintern's emphasis on addressing 
this issue illustrates that only with such guidance was the Party able to sink deep roots 
in American soil. 
Without Comintern 'interference' it is quite likely that the CP would have 
remained several small, foreign-language, isolated sects with very little interaction 
with American reality-i. e., it would have remained stillbom, with no chance ever of 
revolutionising American society. Comintem intervention-'foreign domination'- 
did not create a party that was alien to American reality, but forced the Party to 
'Americanise'. Without Comintern aid, the early Party would have been unable to 
grapple with the reality of US society. Far from 'aborting' American Communism, the 
Comintem acted as its midwife. 
Against the simple schema presented by Draper, early Comintem intervention 
was also not entirely a one-way street. Although the American Communist movement 
was too weak and young to have much input with the Comintern, its opinions and 
ideas were solicited from Moscow and its members sat on such Comintem bodies as 
the Executive Committee (ECCI). Comintern representatives to the US were not all 
Russian, as the central apparatus of the Comintern drew upon Communist militants 
Jacob Zumoff 20 
from across the world. Americans also served as Comintern representatives in foreign 
parties. This reflected both the Bolshevik's deep-seated internationalism and the 
reality that Russia-a largely illiterate peasant society-could not provide the cadre 
to create a modem administration for either the Soviet state or the Comintern. 30 The 
sum of the Comintern's membership, i. e., the International itself, was designed to be 
greater than all its parts, i. e., its national sections. More broadly, as Trotsky had 
written in July 1920: 
By joining the ranks of the Third International, an organization of a given 
country not only becomes subordinate to the common vigilant and exacting 
leadership, but itself acquires the right to actively participate in the leadership 
of all other sections of the Communist International. 31 
Even when the Comintern made decisions about the American CP--such as whether 
the Party should seek to become legal--it was only after hearing arguments from all 
sides in disputes. The Comintem also made questions of policy for individual sections 
the purview of the entire International. This contrasted with the traditional method of 
the Second International which essentially allowed its constituent parties to follow 
whatever line they wanted to. The importance that Lenin attached to this 
internationalism can be seen by the fact that he took the time in the middle of the 
Civil War to write his polemic against 'ultra leftism, 'Left Wing'Communism: An 
Infantile Disorder. These were all part of the Comintern's plan to build a democratic- 
centralist international organisation. 
When discussing Tomintern control', it is important to keep a sense of 
perspective. Although international in scope, the Comintern was not omnipotent; in 
fact, it was hindered by financial, transport and communication difficulties. Although 
`rbe appendix to Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World ofAmerican Communism, contains a 
list of Americans who held Comintern offices or undertook Comintem assignments in foreign 
countries. 
31 Leon Trotsky, 'The French Socialist Party', 22 July 1920, in The First Five Years ofthe Communist 
International (London: New Park, 1973), vol. 1,112. 
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leading Bolsheviks played important roles in the Comintern, and at times participated 
in decisions affecting constituent parties, they often found their attention needed more 
urgently on Soviet affairs. 32 What time they had left over was often spent on the more 
important parties. 
By the mid 1920s, with Lenin's death, the increasing bureaucratisation of the 
Soviet Union and Stalin's ascension, the programme of the Comintem qualitatively 
changed, from 'revolutionary proletarian internationalism' to 'socialism in one 
country'. Instead of trying to forge parties that were capable of overthrowing 
capitalism as part of international revolution, the Comintern sought to create 
conservatising parties: 'socialism in one country' was translated as 'socialism in 
Russia only'. This framework rejects the traditional consensus that there is no 
qualitative difference between Leninism and Stalinism. 33 
Nonetheless, even though much larger or more immediately important parties 
such as the German KPD 34 may have experienced this changed Comintem 
intervention first and foremost, smaller parties like the American CP also were 
affected, although for a variety of reasons which will be examined, over a longer 
" On the limits of Comintern power over individual parties, see Andrew Thorpe, 'Comintern "control" 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 192043', in English Historical Review 113 (June 1998). 
33 For a 'revisionist' discussion on the historiography concerning the relationship between Stalin and 
Lenin, albeit largely in the context of internal Soviet politics, see Stephen F. Cohen, 'Bolshevism and 
Stalinism', in Robert C. Tucker, ed, Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: Norton, 
1977), 3-29. For a more traditional view that 'Stalin was a Leninist in that he faithfully followed his 
patron's political philosophy and practices, ' see Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 
1919-1924 (London: Harvill, 1994), 506-508. Of course Pipes argues also that in the rise of Nazism, 
'the influence of Marxism in both its original and Bolshevik guises was unmistakable' (259). 
34 Carr, in The Interregnum, locates the decisive moment in which-to borrow Lenin's term-'quantity 
became quality' in the role of the Comintern in the botched revolutionary situation in Germany in 
1923, in which Stalin and his allies heavily intervened in the KPD as a means of braking revolution. 
Trotsky, on the other hand, had stressed the importance of the KPD's preparing a revolutionary 
insurrection; articulated in his 1924 Lessons of October (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937), 
Trotsky's polemic was both directed against the Brandler leadership of the KPD and the Stalin- 
Zinoviev-Kamenev 'troika' leadership of the Soviet party. For an overview of the KPD and the 
Comintern, in light of documents from the Comintern archives, see Aleksandr Vatlin, 'The testing 
ground of world revolution: Germany in the 1920s', in Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, International 
Communism and the Communist International, 1919-43 (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1998). 
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period of time. As the latter chapters in this study demonstrate, manipulating feverish 
factional divisions that already existed within the top leadership of the CP, the now- 
Stalinist Comintern, in turn Stalinised the American party, creating in the process a 
servile leadership. This process did not occur overnight, but took several years. And, 
at least in the case of the American Party, this process was not merely a 'top-down' 
imposition by the Comintern leadership in Moscow. The conservatism emanating 
from Moscow resonated among sections of the American Party's leadership, 
especially that around Jay Lovestone, who increasingly despaired of the possibility of 
socialist revolution. Also, the change in the Comintern was also resisted by sections 
of the Party leadership, especially those around James P. Cannon. 
The Stalinisation of the Party, then, was a complex process that did not occur 
instantly or smoothly. Even in the late 1920s the Comintern's intervention had 
salutatory results at times. Stalinist efforts such as Bolshevisation, the Third Period, 
dual unionism and the Black Belt theory, although at odds with American reality and 
designed to increase the grip of the Stalinist bureaucracy on the American Party, 
resulted in gains as well as losses, often in ways beyond the imagination of their 
designers. This was most clear in the case of the 'Negro Question'. 
In researching his histories of the Party, Draper found Cannon's recollections 
of the early years of American Communism among the most useful of those he 
consulted. 35 Cannon observed, 'Between the early years of integrity and its later 
corruption there was a transition period of a transformation of the once revolutionary 
organization into its opposite. ' Cannon outlined three periods in the early CP's 
history. First, is its genesis from the left-wing of American social democracy and 
" These were published as James P. Cannon, The First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism: Report of 
a Participant (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962). See Draper's introduction for his account of the 
useftilness of Cannon's book. 
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syndicalism, when, prompted by the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
elements split from the Socialist Party in 1919. Second, from 1920-1923, the CP 
engaged in a process of orienting itself to American terrain through a series of 
factional debates. In both of these periods, the Comintem played a beneficial role, 
offering its own experience to help create an American Communist Party. But, in 
1924-1928, Cannon observed, 'Something went wrong, and the party began to gyrate 
crazily like a mechanism out of control. ' The creation of hard factional battles, 
consisting not of temporary debates over political issues but of permanent struggles 
for party power, inevitably created frustration, cynicism and demoralisation, even 
among pioneer Communists who had been able to withstand state repression. The 
post-Leninist Comintern, first under Zinoviev and then Stalin, encouraged this 
weakening of the Party, and then utilised it to ensure its own political and 
organisation hegemony. 36 
Thus, the dynamic of debate and discussion within the CP as the Comintern 
itself changed. Instead of free and open debate as earlier, the Comintem intervened 
into the internal battles-which were often predicated on the earlier factionalism-not 
to strengthen the party as before, but rather to eliminate all opposition to its course. 
The last portion of my thesis examines this process, which culminated in the 
expulsion of the party's right wing-led by Jay Lovestone, a sympathiser of Nikolai 
Bukharin-and its left-Trotskyists led by James P. Cannon-while a pliable pro- 
Stalinist leadership under Earl Browder was installed. 
The American Party and the Comintern 
If the history of the Communist Party must be viewed not only as part of the 
American labour movement, but also part of the Communist International, then I hope 
36 Ibid., 15-19. 
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that this study also contributes to broader historical debates about the Comintern since 
it is impossible to write coherently about the development of a national section of the 
Comintem without grappling with the development of the Comintem itself. The 
question of the relationship between the Comintern leadership and individual parties 
has been debated in many, many, national contexts. For example, one recent study of 
early Indian Communism argues that 'it was the highly centralized and erroneous 
policy of the Comintern which was a major factor in preventing the Communist 
movement from taking root in India', and which above all illustrated the 'complete 
alienation and ignorance that the Comintern leaders had of the developments on the 
ground in India', especially Gandhi and nationalism. The author's conclusions could 
would accepted by historians in many different countries: 
The success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and the creation of the 
Comintern, seem to have acted more as a handicap to the development of an 
indigenous communist movement in India rather than an effective aid. 37 
Of course, all Communist Parties were not the same. First, different parties had more 
or less centralised relationships with the ECCI, whose ability to control various 
parties was frustrated or aided by circumstances including language, geography, 
interest and importance. Various studies have noted that the Comintem could not 
automatically impose its decisions on all its member parties, especially in North 
America, for these reasons. 38 
Secondly, because the Communist Party was so marginalised in US society, 
the importance of focusing on its politics increases. In some countries, one can 
" Dushka H. Saiyid, Fxporting Communism to India: Why Moscow Failed (Islamabad: National 
Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1995), v. This is based on Dishka Hyder Saiyid, 'The 
Comintern and the Communist Party of India, 1920-1929 (Whil thesis, London School of Economics, 
1978); interestingly enough, in 1996 Saiyid was a fellow at the Salzburg Seminar where she helped 
develop a workshop on 'Radicalism in Interwar America' (see 
www. salzburgseminar. org/ASC/csacl/progs/refomi/radicalism. htm). 
39 Storch, 'Shades of Red', 17; CC Stanley Markotich, 'International Communism and the Communist 
Party of Canada' (PhD thesis, University of Indiana, 1992). These works reach similar conclusions 
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imagine that local and trade-union politics, family tradition and other more mundane 
concerns weighed more heavily in a party's ability to recruit, and therefore a social 
approach may be more valid than in the US, where joining the Party was, based 
almost entirely upon political commitment to Communism. The 'Red Clydeside', and 
certain areas in Italy and France have a much larger Communist history which could 
be fruitfully analysed socially than most similar US Party history. The very 
uniqueness of 'certain social groups', such as Finns and Jews, for whom, in Nathan 
Glazer's words, 'it was neither eccentric nor exceptional to become a Communist', 
indicate that such cases were the exception rather than the rule. 39 
With the opening of the Comintern's archives in the fonner Soviet Union 
40 beginning in the late- I 980s, this debate has assumed new intensity. Onehistorianof 
the Comintem recently identified what he sees as 'the major controversies in 
Comintem history': 
First, continuities and discontinuities between the Leninist and Stalinist 
regimes in the Comintern: was the latter the logical outcome of the former? 
Second, relations between the central Comintern authorities in Moscow and 
the national Communist parties: was the highly centralist Bolshevik model 
universalised or did parties retain a measure of autonomy? Third, the 
relationship between the Comintern and official Soviet foreign policy: was the 
Communist International merely an instrument of the Soviet state? And, 
finally, the crucial issue of the attitudes adopted by Communists towards the 
social democrats: how were they to win over a majority of the organised 
working class for revolutionary perspectives in an essentially non- 
revolutionary era? 41 
about the relationship between the ECCI and national sections, but from opposite ideological 
perspectives. 
39 See Paul C. Mishler, 'Red Finns, Red Jews: Ethnic Variation in Communist Political Culture during 
the 1920s and 1930s', YIVO Annual 22 (1995), 131-54. Quote is from Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis 
ofAmerican Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), 6. 
40 For an opening salvo of this new exchange, see Fridrikh Firsov, 'What the Comintern's Archives 
will Reveal', in WorldMarxist Review 32 (January 1989), 52-57. Firsov-then the 'section head at the 
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC CPSU'-has since the collapse of the Soviet Union switched sides, 
and is now a collaborator with Klehr. See Rees and Thorpe, ed., International Communism and the 
Communist International, for generally interesting, if uneven, articles on several different Communist 
Parties. 
41 Kevin McDermott, 'The history of the Comintern in light of new documents', in Rees and Thorpe, 
ed., International Communism and the Communist International, 31-32. 
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The first two questions my study speaks to directly, and the last two, at least 
indirectly. 
Of course, one must use caution in generalising too much from a study of a 
single Communist Party a pattern for the entire Comintern. This is especially true for 
the American CP, which was essentially on the periphery of the Comintem, while 
West and Central European parties-especially Germany-occupied the centre. And 
of course, throughout the 1920s, socialist revolution was more palatable in many 
countries than in the US. In 1921, James Ballister, representative from the US Party to 
the Comintern, used the parlance of the underground Party to note 'the little esteem 
that the general office has for the American business in general' and bemoan that 'the 
main office considers the American branch more as a nuisance than as a bona fide 
business institution. A2 
In 1926, of the 46 parties in the capitalist world, while the American CP was 
the sixth largest, its myriad members paled in comparison to the hundreds of 
43 thousands which the Perman. and Czechoslovak parties claimed . Furthermore, most 
of those countries had gone through near-revolutionary situations while the seemingly 
indestructible nature of American capitalism had American Communists speculating 
about 'American exceptionalism'. 
Communists in the US occupied a middle role in the Comintern solar system. 
Although very small both in absolute numbers and in relationship to the population of 
42 James Marshall [Ballister] to 'Dear Friends', 25 April 1921, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 39. Later, 
he complained that 'the honor conferred upon me turned out to be quite a tedious and disagreeable 
job', letter to 'Dear Friend', 4 May 192 1, in same file. On the other hand, leading British Communist 
J. T. Murphy recalled that 'leaders and would-be leaders were always streaming in from the U. S. A., 
lending life and colour to the proceedings, ' but of course he wasn't assigned to bring order to the chaos 
of the American Party (New Horizons [London: John Lane, 1941], 240). 
43 'Introduction' to Rees and Thorpe, ed., International Communism and the Communist International, 
2. According to official Comintern figures, in 1927 the American CP had 12,000 dues-paying (or 
14,000 'actual') members; in -comparison, the KPD had 124,720 dues-paying members; the CPGB 
9,000 (down from 12,000 in 1926); the PCF 52,370; and the Soviet CP, 1.2 million members. (The 
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the US, the obvious importance of ascendant American capitalism ensured that the 
Comintern leadership did not entirely ignore their American comrades as was the fate 
of smaller parties in less important countries far from Moscow (such as Canada). 
Speaking at the Petrograd Soviet in September 1919, Zinoviev noted this importance: 
the birth of a communist party in America, however young and weak it may 
be, is looked upon by the whole of the third International as one of the greatest 
events of world history.... The world revolution can be established only when 
it will be victorious not only in the European continent, but when it will also 
embrace America. The birth of the American Communist Party, and its 
growth, is the first swallow which foretells the coming of the world-wide 
spring. 44 
While the very early issues of the Communist International confined its coverage of 
the United States to essentially reprinting clippings from the North American left- 
wing press, by the mid- I 920s it was carrying articles written by leading American 
cadre . 
45 In the mid-1920s, Stalin and seven other important Soviet Communists were 
on the Comintern's American commission. As Stalin himself put it: 'The American 
Communist Party is one of those very few Communist parties of the world that are 
entrusted by history with tasks of decisive importance from the point of view of the 
revolutionary movement. 46 In 1928, at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Stalin 
chose the factional battles within the American Party to debut his model of the correct 
relationship between the Comintem leadership (i. e., him) and the individual partieS. 47 
It was over the question of American 'exceptionalism' that Stalin and Bukharin 
Communist International Between the Fifth and Sixth World Congresses, 1924-8 [London: Communist 
Party of Great Britain, 19281,30. ) 
44 Communist International, old series no 6, October 1919. 
4' For examples of the first coverage of the US, cf. 'The Social Revolution before the Courts' (about 
the IWW) and the American section of 'Chronicle of the Revolutionary Movement', in ibid, old series 
no 2,1 August 1919. The coverage of the split from the SP ('America: The Founding of a Communist 
Party', ibid., old series no 5, no date [September 1919? ]) is obviously based on a reading of the various 
manifestos and pleads ignorance of detail. 
4' The Communist, June 1930, quoted in Joseph R. Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 1943- 
1957 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1975), 44. 
47 Joseph Milton Kling, 'Making the Revolution-Maybe ... Deradicalization and Stalinism in the American Communist Party, 1928-1938' (PhD thesis, City University of New York, 1983), 142. 
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48 locked horns and the former eclipsed the latter. Of course, this importance had less 
to do with the role of Communism in American politics than with the role of the US in 
international politics. Or, as Jay Lovestone immodestly bragged in 1927: 'with 
America playing the role it plays today in world politics, finance and industry, it is 
obvious that the importance of building a Communist movement here is 
inestimable. '49Thus, ironically, the very features that decreased the Party"s 
importance in American politics-the strength of American capitalism and 
imperialism-magnified its importance in international Communism. 
One other characteristic of US society, reflected in its socialist movement, 
increased the importance of US Communism to the world movement. Since the US is 
an immigrant society, the ranks of immigrant socialists there often included figures 
who would play important roles in the international labour movement. If Russian 
socialists such as Nikolai Bukharin, Alexandra Kollontai and Leon Trotsky only spent 
a small amount of time in the US, some like Boris Reinstein, Max Goldfarb 
(Petrovsky) or V. Volodarsky (Moisey Goldstein) stayed longer before returning to 
Russia. Other foreign communists who had been active in the US include James 
Larkin, from Ireland; M. N. Roy, from India; Sen Katayama, from Japan; Giacinto 
Serrati, from Italy; and S. J. Rutgers, from Holland. 50 
48 Barrett, William Z Foster and the Tragedy ofAmerican Radicalism, 13 8; CE Stephen F. Cohen, 
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 294. 
49 Jay Lovestone, 'Toward Another Wave of Revolutionary Struggles', Communist, May 1927. 
50 On foreign Communists' activities in the US, see generally Draper, The Roots ofAmerican 
Communism, 73-79. On Bukharin's time in the US, see Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
43; on Trotsky, see Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 24243; on Serrati, see Mario de Campos, 'Storia 
del Movimento Socialista Rivoluzionario Italiano, La Parola del Popolo [Chicago] 9: 37(December 
1958), 136-63; on Katayama, see Hyman Kublin, Asian Revolutionary: The Life ofSen Katayama 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), chapter 12; on Larkin, see Emmett Larkin, James 
Larkin: Irish Labour Leader, 1876-1947 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), chapter 10; Emmet 
O'Connor, 'James Larkin in the United States 1914-23', Journal of Contemporary History 37 (April 
2002) 2,183-96; Claire A. Cullerton, 'James Larkin and J. Edgar Hoover: Irish Politics and an 
American Conspiracy', Eire-Ireland 35 (Fall-Winter 2000) 3/4,238-59; on Boris Reinstein, see 
William H. Siener, 'The Red Scare Revisited: Radicals and the Anti-Radical Movement in Buffalo, 
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Finally, since this thesis attempts to place examine not only the US Party, but 
the development of the Comintern itself, I have attempted to locate the development 
of the American CP within the context of the history of its fraternal parties. 
'Americanisation', Americans and the American Communist Party 
This topic also begs the question of what exactly 'American' radicalism is, 
since going back to at least Tom Paine it has been forged in the crucible of 
international events. The American labour movement-including both its right and its 
left wings-cannot be divorced from international events ranging from the Russian 
struggle against the tsar to the Irish fight against Britain and the Mexican struggle 
against US domination and more native tyranny. 5 1 The concept of 'Americanisation', 
like its cousin, 'American exceptionalism', has meant different things at different 
points to different people. The debate about, what, exactly is 'American'-and if such 
a beast really exists- is largely outside the scope of this thesis. Most concepts of 
'American' are essentially repressive and restrictive, and tend to be defined usually by 
what 'American' is not. Thus, for example, American is speaking English, and not 
Italian, Yiddish or Spanish. To many-including the House Committee on Un- 
American Affairs and the American Legion-American is decidedly not Communism. 
In 1920, the former mayor of Seattle summed up this perspective in a book called 
simply Americanism versus Bolshevism. 52 Due to the immigrant roots of American 
society, attempts to define what American is usually falter, since American staples 
such as Apple Pie, hamburgers and John Locke's liberalism and even the English 
1919-1920', New York History 79: 1(1998), 30,4748; Selig Adler and Thomas E. Connolly, From 
Ararat to Suhurhia: The History ofthe Jewish Community ofBuffalo (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society of America, 1960), 247. 
5' On this point, see for example Michael Miller Topp, Those Without a Country: The Political Culture 
ofItalian American Syndicalists (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 12- 
15. 
52 Ole Hanson, Americanism versus Bolsehvism (Garden City, New York and London: Doubleday, 
Page and Company, 1920). 
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language are actually rooted elsewhere and only tortured logic worthy of Bernard 
B ai lyn can render them 'American'. 
It should be kept in mind that one of the strengths of Communism to its 
supporters is that it is a universalising, catholic world view. By joining the CP, an 
immigrant worker in New York, a Chicago black intellectual or a former IWW 
militant did more than just join the American CP; he joined an international fraternity, 
dedicated to international unity and solidarity. Marxism is heir to a long tradition of 
Enlightemnent universialism. As Robin Kelley put it, 'Although the relationships 
have not always been comfortable, the Communist movement enabled many different 
people to identify with other oppressed peoples, and to reject patriotism and national 
identity. ' 53 
One Party leader, in an article called 'What Americanization means to our 
Party', after noting that the impetus for the CP came from the Russian Revolution, 
described 'Americanisation' as 'the application of Leninism to America', chiefly 
consisting of the necessity 'to win the leadership of the American working class. 54 
This answer is still vague. However, within the context of the study of American 
Communism, 'Americanisation' has usually meant several things-often, all at the 
same time. At various times, the Party, the Party members, or the Party ideology that, 
55 by turn, are 'Americanised' in the literature. Most basically, it has meant 
transforming the Party from an organisation with a foreign-born membership to one 
with a native-born, English-speaking membership. However, it has also intersected 
53 Robin D. G. Kelley, 'How the West Was One: On the Uses and Limitations of Diaspora', The Black 
Scholar 30 (Fall-Winter 2000), 32. Cf. Joseph Seymour, Enlightenment Rationalism and the Origins of 
Marxism (New York: Spartacist Publishing Company, 1997). 
54 Party Organizer, March-April 1928. 
55 Perhaps the most pertinent example is Buhle, Marxism in the USA, which at various times uses 
almost these senses of 'Americanisation' while making the strong argument that the '(inter)national 
question' has all too often been overlooked by historians in assessing the history of American 
socialism. 
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discussion of the 'Americanisation' of its foreign-bom membership-, or as Buhle put 
it, 'Communism provided a true Americanizing experience'. 56 It has also been applied 
to the 'Americanisation' of the Party's leadership in the same sense that mass 
Communist Parties spoke of 'Eurocommunism' decades later-i. e., becoming more 
responsive to domestic political considerations than Moscow orders. 57 
In this thesis, however, the term 'Americanisation' refers not to the 
background of the Party membership or leadership, but rather to the political 
relationship of the Party to American society. All Communist parties shared the 
programme of replacing capitalism with the rule of the working class as a step 
towards building a socialist society. 'Americanisation' consisted not in eschewing this 
goal in favour of a more realistic, 'American' one (as happened during the popular 
front in the 1930s), but learning how, given the unique historical development of 
American society, this goal could best be accomplished. 
While a key component of this was learning English-no small task for the 
early Party-it also required, to borrow from Jos6 Carlos Maridtegui, an interpretation 
of North American reality. Very often the political and theoretical tasks of 
Americanisation were integrally tied up with the organisational tasks, such as 
lessening the dependence of the Party upon foreign-language federations. This thesis 
argues that while the Comintern, thousands of kilometres away in Moscow, could not 
5'Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 123. For discussion of the 'Americanising' aspects of the Party, see Paul 
C. Mishler, Raising Reds: The Young Pioneers, Radical Summer Camps and Communist Political 
Culture in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Paul Buhle, 'Jews and 
American Communism: The Cultural Question', Radical History Review 23 (Spring 1980) examines this 
function of the Party in relationship to Jewish Communists. The Popular Front-by asserting that the Party 
was part of a long line of American Radicalism, extending to Thomas Jefferson and the American 
Revolution and that 'Communism is Twentieth Century Americanism'-also, whatever the political 
ramifications or historical accuracy, participated in the 'Americanisation' of its followers, as did its gung-ho 
support to the US during the Second World War. 
57 This tension lies at the centre of the book by former Party cadre Joseph R. Starobin, American 
Communism in Crisis. It is axiomatic for Klehr that the Party never thus became 'Americanised'; 
Draper ended his study before this tension became the most acute, in the post-war period. 
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know enough to do this itself, its political experience and organisational guidance 
enabled the American Communists to begin this process. 
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2. The Origins of American Communism 
In their attempt to forge a new, revolutionary international from the wreckage 
of the Second International, the Bolsheviks sought to tap into what they saw as the 
best elements of the working-class movement throughout the world. Indeed, the 
impact of the October Revolution was so great, especially after the betrayal of the 
Social Democracy in the face of World War I, that large sections of the socialist and 
labour movement rallied to it as in France or Italy. ' 
In the US, as well, the first supporters of Bolshevism and its new International 
sprang from the left-wing of the American labour movement, especially the Socialist 
Labor Party (SLP), Socialist Party (SP), and Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). 
This chapter examines how the American Communist movement developed out of 
these antecedents. In the early years of the American Communist movement, the 
Bolsheviks and the Communist International were invaluable in two different ways. 
First, they provided the ideological basis for the new movement, one which was often 
quite different from either the left-wing social-democracy of both the SLP and the SP 
or the syndicalism of the IWW. The early Communists had to learn what Communism 
was, and to assimilate Bolshevik politics. However, even after splitting from the SP in 
solidarity with the Russian Revolution, the would-be American Bolsheviks still 
needed to learn what it meant to organise themselves in a truly Bolshevik manner. The 
Comintern politically and organisationally helped the pioneer Communists, primarily 
encouraging them to unify into one Party instead of several smaller hostile groups, 
and to take advantage of democratic rights to organise. In these ways, the Comintern 
and the Bolsheviks acted as a midwife to American Communism; without them, the 
movement would have been stillborn. 
' See R. Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist 
Internationalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989). 
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American social democracy: 
The Socialist Labor and the Socialist parties 
Both native American and post- 1848 German 6migrd radicals helped 
developed American Marxism in the nineteenth century. Until the Civil War created 
the basis for industrial capitalism throughout the United States, what few socialists 
there were concerned themselves largely with the struggle against slavery. Labour 
radicalism took off amidst the tremendous class battles at the end of the century, 
including the 1877 Railway strike, the 1886 Haymarket 'riot', the 1892 Homestead 
strike and the 1894 Pullman strike. 2 
The first significant American socialist organisation was the Socialist Labor 
3 Party, founded in 1876, and which had 10,000 members by the end of that decade. In 
1890, Daniel De Leon joined the SLP and quickly became its most prolific writer and 
its general leader until his death in the early 20'h Century, leading the SLP in a more 
orthodox Marxist fashion. 4 
A former laws lecturer at Columbia University who had been radicalised by 
the industrial unrest in the late 1800s, De Leon was the first real American Marxist. 5 
He not only translated Marxist classics into English for the first time, but attempted to 
analyse the American labour movement from both an American and a Marxist 
perspective. Socialists, then as now, often criticised him for his sectarianism, 
2 Cf. Philip S. Foner, The Great Labor Uprising of 1877 (New York: Pathfinder, 1977), especially 
chapters 6-9, for the history of early American Marxism. The first chapters of Paul Buhle, Marxism the 
USA also discuss this. Cf. also, Draper, The Roots ofAmerican Communism, 11-35. Membership 
figures taken from Howard Kimeldorf, Battlingfor American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers, and the 
Making of the Union Movement (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 
1999), 1. 
3 Stephen Coleman, Daniel De Leon (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 
18. 
4 Ibid., 18-19. 
5 On De Leon's life, see Coleman, Daniel De Leon, and L. Glen Seretan, Daniel De Leon: The Odyssey 
ofan American Marxist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). Cf Carl Reeve, The Life and 
Times ofDaniel De Leon (New York: Humanities Press, 1972). 
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dogmatism, and large ego. 6 Although De Leon's thought would continue to play an 
important, although not always positive, role in American socialism, by the Bolshevik 
Revolution, the SLP was organisationally spent and had all-but hardened into a sect. 7 
Yet, as Stephen Coleman has noted, 'Most of the people who founded the 
Communist Party of the USA ... had, at some point in there political evolutions, been 
politically educated by De Leon. ' The most important example is Louis Fraina, the 
first theorist of American Communism, whom Paul Buhle labelled De Leon's 'most 
important protdgd'. A recent biographer of William Z. Foster claimed that, 'Foster 
was most impressed by the works of Daniel De Leon. ' Foster's later factional 
opponent, Jay Lovestone, was first attracted to the writings of De Leon. Communist 
organiser Ella Reeve Bloor, one of the Party's most famous women leaders, had been 
an SLP organiser before helping to found the Party. Caleb Harrison, an early leader in 
the Workers Party, had been a member of the SLP, and had used his contacts from the 
SLP to organise in the US as well as Canada, where a number of former SLPers 
joined the nascent Communist movement. 8 Boris Reinstein, a Russian dmigrd who 
had bean a leader in the Buffalo SLP, represented the US at the first Comintern 
congress and advised Lenin on American issues. 9 
Two important features of De Leon's thought pulsed through the blood of the 
American left even long after he died in 1914. The first was a refusal to fight for 
6 Buhle, American Marxism, 50; Coleman, Daniel De Leon, 151-52. 
'Among sections of the American left, the term 'De Leonist' is still used to describe a small sect with 
little interaction with the working class except to publish its paper. 
" Coleman, Daniel De Leon, 154; Paul M. Buhle, A Dreamer's Paradise Lost: Louis C. FrainalLewis 
Corey (1892-1953) and the Decline ofRadicalism in the United States (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1995), 5; James R. Barrett William Z Foster and the Tragedy ofAmerican 
Radicalism, 3 1. On Lovestone, see Morgan, Jay Lovestone, 9-10; On Bloor (who had also been a 
member of the SP), see Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor', 17,109,274; Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist 
Party in Canada: A History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 24. On Harrison, including his 
work in Canada, see Tim Buck, Yours in Struggle: Reminiscences of Tim Buck (Toronto: New Canada, 
1977), 91. 
' George Hardy, Those Stormy Years: Memories ofthe Fightfor Freedom on Five Continents (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), 135-36. 
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'minimum demands' or social reforms such as child labour laws and the 8-hour day, 
which De Leon viewed only as 'palliatives' granted by capitalists to dupe the working 
class. The second distinguishing feature about 'De Leonism' is the role he assigned to 
unions in the struggle for socialism. After Gompers expelled his followers in the early 
1890s, De Leon developed a theory of dual, revolutionary, unionism instead of 
working within the AFL, which was the basis of leftist labour activity for several 
decades. 10 
In 1900, a reformist right-wing left the SLP, led by New York lawyer Morris 
Hillquit and California attorney Job Harriman, in part in reaction against De Leon's 
dual-unionist perspective. A year later, this group merged with another small socialist 
group, led by Victor Berger and Eugene V. Debs, to form the Socialist Party (SP). The 
SP steadily grew, from its founding membership of less than 10,000, to its pinnacle in 
1912. That year it counted almost 118,000 members and polled nearly 900,000 
votes-6 per cent of the popular vote-for its presidential candidate, Debs. 
II By 1912, 
1039 SP members held office, including 56 mayors, more than 300 aldermen, several 
state legislators and one US Congressman. At the same time, the SP published five 
English and eight foreign-language dailies; 262 English and 36 foreign-language 
weeklies; and ten English and two foreign-language monthlies. 12 
10 See Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928 (New York: Rand 
School of Social Science, 1928), 182; Foster, The Bankruptcy ofthe Labor Movement, 26-27. On 
Gomper's antipathy to De Leon and the SLP, see David Nack, 'The American Federation of Labor 
Confronts Revolution in Russia and the Early Soviet Government, 1905 to 1928: Origins of Labor's 
Cold War' (PhD thesis, Rutgers University, 1999), 21-23. 
"Daniel Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 
33-36,61-64; Coleman, Daniel De Leon, 46-48; Hiliquit, History ofSocialism in the UnitedStates, 
294-3 10; David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party ofAmerica (Chicago: Quadrangle Publishers, 1967), 
5. 
12 On the Milwaukee SP, led by Berger, which came the closest of all SP locals to a mass labour party, 
see Charles Robert Leinenweber, 'Immigration and the Decline of Internationalism in the American 
Working Class Movement, 1864-1919', (PhD thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1968) 177- 
89; on number of SP office holders, see Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 214. On 
publication information, see Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States, 79. 
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The SP, which soon became the American section of the Socialist (Second) 
International, 13 at one time recruited many important American intellectuals such as 
Max Eastman, Upton Sinclair, Sinclair Lewis, Jack London, John Spargo and William 
English Walling. 14 The SP was the first socialist organisation not made up 
predominately by German or Jewish immigrants. 15 The SP's politics were more 
conservative than the SLP: its right wing supported reforms as well as the pro- 
capitalist AFL led by Samuel Gompers. Within the AFL, the SP had substantial 
support, although it never achieved the same organic links to the labour movement 
that its European cousins developed. 16 Yet its left-wing, grouped around Debs, 
opposed the AFL. This difference on the question of unionism pointed to one of the 
main weaknesses of the SP: it was extremely politically heterogeneous. The party 
included middle-class progressives, fanner populists, Christian socialists, trade- 
unionists, as well as revolutionaries and supporters of the IWW. 17 
American syndicalism: the Industrial Workers of the World 
Debs and De Leon, along with other left-wing socialists and radical unionists, 
founded the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or 'wobblies') in 1905 in 
Chicago. Its largest union component was the Western Federation of Miners (VYTM), 
which had split from the AFL in 1897, and whose militant leaders, including William 
'Big Bill' Haywood, Frank Little and Vincent St. John, went on to become leading 
wobblies. 
13 In fact, the Second International, in facing several countries with split socialist movements, seated 
both factions at its congress while stressing the need for socialist unity; the SLP had a minority of seats 
while the SP had more. See Coleman, Daniel De Leon, 71. 
14 Bertram D. Wolfe, A Life in Two Centuries (New York: Stein and Day, 1981) 186. 
15 Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties, 204. 
'6 Michael E. R. Bassett, 'The Socialist Party of America, 1912-1919: Years of Decline' (PhD thesis, 
Duke University, 1964), 328. 
" Cf Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties, 262-64, for some of the political differences between the left 
and right wings of the SP. 
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Unlike the narrow craft-based AFL, the industrially-organised IWW embraced 
unskilled, immigrant, black and Asian workers who were becoming increasingly 
important in American industry. At the same time, the IWW's goals were lotlier: 
nothing less, Haywood had declared in 1905, than 'the emancipation of the working 
class from the slave bondage of capitalism' to put 'the working class in possession of 
the economic power, the means of life, in control of the machinery of production and 
distribution, without regard to capitalist masters'. 18 Within the IWW, there was little 
agreement on how to accomplish this. De Leon-who advocated the industrial 
struggle as an adjunct to political action-soon split, 19 leaving the organization in the 
hands of syndicalists like St. John, who believed industrial unionism itself was 
revolutionary. Yet even then the lines between political action and unionism were 
somewhat fluent, as shown by the fact that the left-wing of the SP and the IWW 
overlapped, including Haywood himself. 20 
The fatal weakness of the IWW's syndicalism was that unions-even 
industrial unions-are not by themselves revolutionary. The lWW attempted to 
construct both a revolutionary organisation of dedicated militants, and a broad union 
encompassing all workers. The result was extremely unstable: thousands would join 
the IWW during strikes, only to fall away quickly, leaving a hardcore cadre. While as 
many as three million workers at one time held lWW cards, the average monthly 
membership figure was closer to 60,000-compared to the AFL's four million, much 
" Proceedings ofthe First Convention ofthe Industrial Workers ofthe World (New York: New York 
LaborNews, 1905), 1,247. 
19 See Daniel De Leon, As to Politics (Brooklyn: New York Labor News, 1966). For accounts of this 
split, see Coleman, Daniel De Leon, chapter 5, and Salvatore Salerno, Red November, Black 
November: Culture and Community in the Industrial Workers ofthe World (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 66,12 1. 
20 See William D. Haywood and Frank Bohn, Industrial Socialism (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1911), 
54; cf Vincent St. John, The L W. W.: Its History, Structure and Methods (Chicago: IWW, 1919 revised 
edition), 45. On Haywood's relationship to the SP and the IWW, see Melvyn Dubofsky, 'Big Bill' 
Haywood (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1987), 50-94. 
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more stable, members at the end of World War 1.21 Cannon located the IWW's major 
weakness in 'its attempt to be both a union of all workers and a propaganda society of 
selected revolutionists-in essence a revolutionary party' and that 'this duality 
hampered its effectiveness in both fields. 22 Nonetheless, the Wobblies' unique 
American radicalism-forged in strikes and class battles throughout the US-formed 
an important tributary to American Communism. 
The Socialist International and the American Socialist Party 
As European capitalism entered its imperialist phase in the late I gth and early 
20'hcenturies, international social democracy increasingly was unable to grapple with 
this, dividing the Second International into a revolutionary left wing and reformist 
right wing. With regional variation, the American socialist movement reflected these 
divisions as well, and, as the SP grew, its internal life became more turbulent, and real 
opportunities brought battles over opportunism. The first large fight within the SP 
centred around the issue of sabotage, and more broadly, the SP's relation to the IWW 
and syndicalism. The conservative AFL craft unions had used sabotage as much as the 
radical IWW, 23 but the wobblies hostility to the capitalist system itself made them 
seem more dangerous. A key skirmish involved the Party's reaction to the 19 10 
McNamara case-in which two Los Angeles AFL ironworkers leaders were convicted 
for bombing the Los Angeles Times building in the midst of a strike. Right-wing 
21 Kimcidorf, Battlingfor American Labor, 3. CE Leland Walter Robinson, 'Social Movement 
Organizations in Decline: A Case Study of the I. W. W. ' (PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 1973), 
54. For example, during the 1912 Lawrence, Massachusetts, textile strike, the IWW recruited some 
10,000 members, but by autumn 1913, that number had declined to 700 (ibid., 40). 
22 Cannon, First Ten Years, 287. See also, idem., 'The IWW Convention', Labor Herald, January 1924, 
reprinted in James P. Cannon, James P. Cannon and the Early Years ofAmerican Communism: 
Selected Writings and Speeches, 1920-1928 (New York: Prometheus Research Library, 1992), 192. 
However, the failure of the IWW must be seen in the context of the repression meted out to it by 
employers and the state, as well as its success in organising many workers whom the more stable AFL 
never touched. See Thomas McEnroe, 'The Industrial Workers of the World: Theories, Organizational 
Problems, and Appeals, as Revealed Principally in the Industrial Worker' (PhD thesis, University of 
Minnesota, 1960), 2; William Preston Jr, Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression ofRadicals, 
1903-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
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SPers, including Harriman, who lost his election bid for Los Angeles mayor in 1911 
partly due to the blowback over the case, openly attacked the McNamaras and their 
defenders as apologists for force and violence. 24 
The highpoint of this fight came when Hillquit attacked Haywood for 
advocating illegal, terrorist practices. 25 Yet Haywood was extremely popular in the 
Party, which, in 1911, elected him to its National Executive Committee (NEC) with 
more votes than Hillquit. 26 With the 1912 Lawrence, Massachusetts, IWW textile 
strike, the spectre of syndicalism began to haunt not only capitalists but the SP right- 
wing. The uneasy modus vivendi between the right and the left became increasingly 
untenable. 
27 
Hillquit amended the IWW's constitution to expel any member who 'opposes 
political action or advocates sabotage or other methods of violence as a weapon of the 
working class to aid in its emancipation'. When Haywood defiantly reaffirmed that 
the SP 'should say that it is our purpose to overthrow the capitalist system by forcible 
means if necessary', the party leadership recalled him from the NEC in February 1913 
23 See Louis Adamic, Dynamite: The Story ofClass Violence in America (New York: Chelsea House, 
1983). 
2' Bassett, 'The Socialist Party of America', 13; Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 45; Bell, 
Marxian Socialism, 73-77. On the 1911 SP in Los Angeles, see Daniel J. Johnson, "'No Make-Believe 
Class Struggle": The Socialist Municipal Campaign in Los Angeles, 1911% Labor History 4 1: 1 
(February 2000). Despite the controversy over the McNamara case, the SP still polled 37 per cent of the 
vote. 
25 See Ira Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1972), 382. See in general, chapters 17 and 18 for the broader struggle between the Left- and Right- 
Wings during this period. 
"' Deborah Mackson, 'Class-Struggle Defense Work in the United States', Women and Revolution 45 
(Winter-Spring 1996), 29-30. 
21 On the split between the Left and Right wings of the Socialist Party in this period, see Anthony 
Vincent Esposito, 'A Class to End Class: The Ideology of the Socialist Party, 1901-1917' (PhD thesis, 
University of Connecticut, 1992), 312 and passim. On Lawrence, see Joyce L. Kornbluh, ed., Rebel 
Voices: An L W. W. Antholosy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 158-197; Michael 
Miller Topp, 'Immigrant Culture and the Politics of Identity: Italian-American Syndicalists in the U. S., 
1911-1927' (PhD thesis, Brown University, 1993), 62-105. On the breach between the SP and Italian 
syndicalists during and after the Lawrence strike, see especially pages 86-94. 
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and effectively purged him from the party. 28 While the SP lost as many as 50,000 
members, the IWW gained members and popularity. 29 
The development of the 1919 left wing 
Domestic questions alone were not enough to fully splinter the SP. The 
combination of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution accomplished this 
although not so neatly as in Europe. Because of the official stance of the Wilson 
government, the SP at the onset of hostilities opposed the war, unlike most of the 
Second International . 
30 This was captured in the SP's famous 'St. Louis Manifesto', 
which 'proclaim[ed] its unalterable opposition to the war' and 'call [ed] upon the 
workers of all countries to refuse support to their goverrunents in their wars'. Instead, 
the resolution continued: 'The only struggle which would justify the workers in taking 
up arms is the great struggle of the working class of the world to free itself from 
economic exploitation and political oppression. 31 In 1915, the SP refused to continue 
its membership in the Second International because of its failure to act against the 
war. 
32 
For all its left-wing rhetoric, the St. Louis Manifesto was essentially a 
compromise, concocted by prominent right-wingers such as Hillquit, Harriman and 
Berger in collaboration with Cleveland left-winger C. E. Ruthenberg. 33 Both the left 
and the right were critical; only the centrist Hillquit came out the victor since, as 
Draper pointed out, his alliance with Ruthenberg split the leftists because it 'made it 
28 Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 42-46; Salerno, Red November, Black November, 78; 
Dubofsky, 'Big Bill'Haywood, 78-79. 
29 Bell, Marxian Socialism, 73-77; Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement, 418. 
30 Shannon, Socialist Party ofAmerica, 98. 
31 Class Struggle, July/August 1917. 
32 Shannon, Socialist Party ofAmerica, 86. 
33CIaSS Struggle, July/August 1917; Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States, 102. 
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impossible for the Left-Wing to emerge at the convention as a fully developed, 
independent political force. 34 
Nonetheless, after the US entered the war, the government swiftly cracked 
down on the party for its position on the war. Using the 1917 Espionage Act the post 
office refused to deliver leftist material, including the Masses, Appeal to Reason and 
International Socialist Review. The government arrested almost every single SP 
leader, left, right and centre. 35 
The party lost almost all its intellectual supporters, who quit en masse to 
support the war. 36 But the SP's posture of opposing the war was often more illusory 
than real. Hillquit, after his election campaign for New York City mayor centred on 
the slogan 'a vote for me is a vote against war', announced that if there were a 
national referendum on US withdrawal from the war that he 'would vote no'. Other 
prominent SP spokesmen urged US support to the allies. 
In the place of the intellectual deserters, the SP recruited thousands of 
members, largely younger Eastern Europeans in the large cities, who took the party's 
opposition as good coin. Within two months of the St Louis manifesto, the party 
recruited more than 12,000 new members. In New York City's mayoral election, 
Hillquit's vote increased almost 500 per cent since four years earlier: 22 per cent of 
voters in the five boroughs, and 31 per cent in the Bronx, cast Socialist ballots. 
Representative was Bertram D. Wolfe, who had joined the SP because it opposed the 
war, even though he 'knew nothing about socialism except that it seemed to stand 
34 Sally M Miller, Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910-1920 (Westport, CT 
and London: Greenwood Press, 1973), 166-7 1; Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 93. On the 
&superficial' nature of much of the SP leadership's opposition to the war, see Esposito, 'Class to End 
Class', 364-65,374 
35 Bell, Marxian Socialism in the UnitedStates, 103-105. The one exception was Hillquit, who spent 
1918-1919 in hospital for tuberculosis. 
36 Bell, Marxian Socialism in the UnitedStates, 8; Philip S. Foner, History ofthe Labor Movement in 
the UnitedStates (New York: International Publishers, 1988), vol. 8,237; Kathleen A. Sharp, 'Rose 
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solid and brave against the war, and base itself on a long anti-war and internationalist 
tradition'. 37 The foreign-language federations in 1919 constituted some 53 per cent of 
the I 10,000 party members. The Slavic federations alone made up 20 per cent of party 
membership. 38 As western and southern native-born Socialists left the party, 
immigrants joined in large numbers, shifting the party to the left politically and to the 
industrial, urban north demographically. 39 
An example of Eastern European immigrant socialists was the Boston-based 
Socialist Propaganda League (SPL), composed largely of Lettish Socialists. Paul 
Buhle described this as 'one of the smallest, most insular, and until the late 191 Os 
surely one of the least important of the language groups'. The founder of the SPL, 
Fricis Rozins, had been a Bolshevik in Russia before emigrating to the US in 1913. 
According to one history, the SPL had originated as the American section of the 
Latvian Party, and Rozins later briefly headed a revolutionary goverment in Latvia 
after the Bolshevik Revolution. Louis Fraina, who edited the SPL paper, later claimed 
that Russian dmigrds Nikolai Bukharin and Alexandra Kollantai were briefly 
members as well. 
40 
In July 1915, after these Lettish left-wingers had unsuccessfully attempted to 
gain control of the Massachusetts Socialist Party, they founded the SPL An October. 
open letter claimed that 'The Socialist Party, under present management, shows too 
great a tendency to drift away from democratic, revolutionary tactics and toward those 
of bureaucracy and refonn. ' The SPL's goal was, its founders declared, to win the 
Pastor Stokes: Radical Champion of the American Working Class, 1879-1933' (PhD thesis, Duke 
University, 1979), 130-32,136. 
" Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States, 99,102-103; Wolfe, Two Centuries, 162. 
38 Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States, 99; Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 94-95; 
Bassett, 'Socialist Party of America', 274-76. 
39 James Weinstein, The Decline ofSocialism in America, 1912-1925 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1967), 182. 
40 Buhle, A Dreamer's Paradise Lost, 66-67. On the relationship between Latvia and SPL, see 
Weinstein, Decline ofSocialism, 184. 
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party 'uncompromisingly for Revolution, Democracy, Industrial Unionism, Political 
Action in the full acceptance of the term, Unity of Socialist Parties, True 
Internationalism and Active Anti-Militarism' .41 Lenin, in a letter to the SPL, declared 
that their open letter 'corresponds fully with the position our party ... has taken from 
the beginning of this war and has always taken during more than ten years'. Yet, 
importantly, Lenin highlighted some political differences between the Bolsheviks and 
the SPL, especially the SPL's a priori condemnation of 'immediate demands' for 
reforms. Socialists should fight for reforms to help the working class, even while 
recognising that 'no refonn can be durable, sincere, serious if not seconded by 
revolutionary methods of struggle of the masses. ' Lenin admonished the SPL 'that a 
socialist party not united this struggle for reforms with the revolutionary methods of 
working-class movement can become a sect, can be severed from the masses, and that 
that is the most pernicious menace to the success of the clear-cut revolutionary 
socialism. 
42 
The SPL's November 1916 'Manifesto' 'strongly denounce [d] all brands of 
social patriots and social imperialists as opposed to the interests of the working class. ' 
They argued that: 'A true revolutionary spirit and action has never been less in 
evidence among party leaders than during the period of war.... Is it not high time for a 
thoro [sic] reorganization of our partyT Towards this end, they endorsed the 
European left-wing, and the creation of a revolutionary Third International. The 
manifesto ignored Russia, except to declare that there was no qualitative difference 
between tsarist Russia and the US. 43 Their last manifesto, written in January 1918, did 
41 On the founding of the SPL, see Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 68-69; letter is in Daniel 
Mason and Jessica Smith, eds., Lenin's Impact on the United States (New York: New World Review, 
1970), 149-50. 
42 Lenin to SPL, 13/22 November 1915, in Lenin's Impact on the United States, 146-49. 
13 'Manifesto of the Socialist Propaganda League of America', 26 November 1916, in International 
Socialist Review, February 1917. 
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hail the Bolshevik Revolution. On the question of its relationship with the SP as a 
whole, it was more ambiguous and committed to 'wag[ing] a struggle on two fronts, 
inside and outside of the Socialist Party'. 44 
On the other hand, Ruthenberg, a long-time SP organiser and perennial 
candidate for Cleveland mayor, represented the non-immigrant left-wing. In his 
election campaigns, Ruthenberg, no less than right-wing Socialists, had stressed better 
government. In fact, the Cleveland Press in 1911 had titled an article about him, ' 
"Municipal Ownership" is the Length, Breadth and Width of his Mayoralty 
45 Campaign' .A 1917 pamphlet also gives a sense of his Politics: 'By taking control of 
the police and military establishment [the working class] can wrest powerful weapons 
out of the hands of the capitalists, and the legislative powers of the government are 
also of utmost importance to the working class in shaping industry in harmony with 
their needs. 46 Yet Ruthenberg was steadfastly opposed to the war. In 1917, he 
received more than 20,000 votes for mayor of Cleveland, when he stood on an anti- 
war platfonn. 47 Along with fellow Ohio Socialists Alfred Wagenknecht and Charles 
Baker, he was arrested for violating the conscription laws for allegedly urging young 
men not to regis er. 48 
A key attempt to bring together these two trends in the left-wing occurred on 
14 January 1917, at the Brooklyn flat of Ludwig Lore, where Louis B. Boudin, Louis 
Fraina, Sen Katayama, Nikolai Bukharin, Leon Trotsky and Alexandra Kollantai, 
44 SPL, 'A Program for Revolutionary Socialism', January 1918, in Bernard K. Johnpoll, ed., A 
Documentary History ofthe Communist Party ofthe United States (Westwport, CT: Greenwood, 
1994), 7. 
45 ClevelandPress, 7 July 1911 (clipping is in C. E. Ruthenberg Collection, Ohio Historical Society, 
box 2, folder 1). 
"' C. E. Ruthenberg, Are We Growing Toward Socialism? (Cleveland: Local Cleveland Socialist Party, 
1917), 40. 
47 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 16 August 1934 (clip in Ruthenberg Collection, box 2, folder 2). 
49 See Gui4? Of What? Speeches before the Jury in Connection with the Trial of C. E. Ruthenberg, 
At(red Wagenknecht, Charles Baker (Cleveland: Ohio Socialist Party, 1917). The judge who sentenced 
them was the same judge who jailed Debs for his famous Canton, Ohio, antiwar speech. 
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among others, met and debated the future of the American left. Hopes ran high: 
Trotsky recalled that at the time 'America showed more steadfastness in this period 
than Russia, and many European countries as well. ' For the Russians, however, the 
only lasting result of the meeting was that it was followed several months later by a 
fruitful co-operation between Trotsky and the Bolsheviks. 49 Trotsky and Bukharin, 
along with other Russians, edited Novy Mir, a Russian-language paper which soon 
became the 'headquarters for internationalist revolutionary propaganda' in all 
languages in the party, according to Trotsky. 50 Shorn. of the Russians, this meeting 
would form the basis for the editorial board of Class Struggle, which was to become 
the focal point of the developing left wing. 51 
The impact of the Russian revolutions 
The February Revolution-which toppled the brittle tsarist autocracy and 
replaced it with the 'dual power' shared by the workers soviets and the capitalist 
Provisional government-was almost unanimously hailed by both liberals and 
socialists of all shades. Even pro-war socialists supported it, because, in one 
historian's words, the revolution 'purified the Allied cause' and 'removed what for 
49 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 24142; Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 80-86; Wolfe, Two 
Centuries, 182-83. Trotsky to Lore, 26 March 1930, in exile papers of Leon Trotskii, Houghton 
Library, Harvard University, reel 18 (document 893 8); Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
43. Bukharin's autobiographical statement, from a Soviet encyclopaedia, is printed in Georges Haupt 
and Jean-Jacques Marie, eds., Makers ofthe Russian Revolution: Biographies ofBolshevik Leaders 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 33; Kublin, Asian Revolutionary, 24044. In his 1919 preface 
to Results and Prospects Trotsky recollected: 'Having stood outside both of the two factions in the 
period of emigration, the author did not fully appreciate the very important circumstance that in reality, 
along the line of the disagreement between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, there were being grouped 
inflexible revolutionaries on the one side and, on the other, elements which were becoming more and 
more opportunist and accommodating. ' (Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and 
Prospects [New York: Pathfinder Press, 1969], 31-32. ) 
50 Leon Trotsky, My Life (Gloucester, Ma: Peter Smith, 1970), 274-76; Cohen, Bukharin andthe 
Bolshevik Revolution, 44. On Novy Mir, see Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 118-19. 
51 Weinstein, Decline ofSocialism, 188. 
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most liberals was the chief stumbling block to participation in the war on the side of 
the Allies', tsarism. 52 
Most liberals and leftists consequently perceived the Bolshevik Revolution in 
October as an extension of the February Revolution. Except for small circles of 
Russian dmigrds, most Americans, even socialists, were ignorant of Lenin or Trotsky 
and therefore saw Bolshevism 'in the image of more familiar kinds of radicalism'. 53 
For American socialists-even those closer to the Mensheviks than to the 
Bolsheviks-'for the first time in the history of American radicalism, all radical 
groups had a similar stand on a single issue: support of the Bolshevik Revolution'. 54 
Nonetheless, the Bolshevik Revolution instigated the final disintegration of the 
SP into mutually hostile left- and right-wings. What separated the left and right wings 
of the Socialist Party was not whether to support the Russian Revolution. Hillquit, 
too, supported the Bolshevik Revolution ... in Russia. They differed over the question 
of what the Revolution meant to American socialists. Even the socialists most 
sympathetic to the October Revolution tended not to see it as the modem-day 
equivalent of the Paris Commune, but as one of a series of anti-tyrannical revolutions 
and uprisings including the ongoing Mexican Revolution. Solidarity with the 
Bolsheviks-especially with such strong support amongst the Socialist rank-and- 
file-was relatively cheap; actually trying to seize power for the proletariat in the US 
was another story. 55 
52 Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1962), 26-29; On the AFL's attitude toward the February Revolution, cf 
Nack, 'The American Federation of Labor Confronts Revolution in Russia', chapter 3; Philip S. Forer, 
ed., 7-he Bolshevik Revolution: Its Impact on American Radicals, Liberals and Labor, A Documentary 
Study (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 15. 
53 Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution, 57,121-22. 
" Foner, The Bolshevik Revolution, 27. 
55 Foner, The Bolshevik Revolution, 23; For articles in support of the Revolution, see also Paul H. 
Andersom The Attitude of the American Leftist Leaders Toward the Russian Revolution, 1917-1923' 
(PhD thesis, University of Notre Dame, 1942); Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 
1917-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), chapter 6 and passim. On the impact of the 
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The workers movement and 1919 
The war had contradictory effects on the labour movement. Increasingly, the 
state assumed a more important role in the economy, planning and guiding 
development and production under the auspices of government bodies such as the 
Fuel Administration, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the War Trade Board, the 
Railroad Administration and the National War Labor Board (NLWB). To meet the 
demands of war, and transcend the challenges of labour shortages, the state offered 
the labour movement in effect either the carrot or the stick. Those unions who 
supported the war flourished, and NWLB intervention tended to favour these unions 
with recognition, equal pay for women, increased wages and a 44 hour workweek. 
Union membership swelled by almost one million during the war. On the other hands, 
the government repressed trade unionists such as the IWW, or radicals such as the SP 
and Debs, who opposed the war. 
After the war, workers and trade union leaders, including those who had 
supported the war, felt that not only should the pro-labour stance of the NWLB 
continue in the post-war 'Reconstruction' period, but that these gains should be 
expanded. 56 The stage was set for a showdown between labour and capital. In 1919 
more that four million workers went on strike-an increase of almost three million 
57 workers since 1917 . Meat packers, telephone workers, steel workers, streetcar 
conductors, textile workers, shipyard workers, and workers in many other trades and 
industries, struck throughout the country. 
Revolution on the American left and the left's response, see also Paul Le Blanc, Teninism in the 
United States and the Decline of American Trotskyism', in George Breitman, Paul Le Blanc and Alan 
Wald, Trotskyism in the United States: Historical Essays and Reconsiderations (Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ: Humanities Press, 1996), 169-71. 
56 See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils ofProsperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1958), 40,70; Andrew Strouthous, US Labor and Political Action, 1918-1924 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), 7-8. 
57 Foner, History ofthe Labor Movement in the United States, vol. 8,1-3 (quote). 
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The Russian Revolution also lent a sense of gravity to the strike wave. J. B. S. 
Hardman a decade later remembered that 'The year 1919 was the banner year of 
radicalism in the United States. Revolution was seriously discussed among honest 
people. 58 This strengthened the capitalist response. The Attorney General declared, 'I 
will use the power of the government to prevent the labor unions of the country from 
destroying the open shop. 59 The goverment also went after 'reds', arresting and 
often deporting immigrants. This soon drove Socialists and other radicals 
underground. 
Beginnings of American Bolshevism 
For leftists, the October Revolution demonstrated the possibility of socialist 
revolution. In November 1917, John Reed cabled the New York Call from Petrograd 
that 'This is the revolution, the class struggle, with the proletariat, the workmen, the 
soldiers and peasants lined up against the bourgeoisie. ' In the Liberator, he declared 
that 'The real revolution has begun. ' 60 Left wing socialist soon rallied to the new 
revolution. In November 1918, Louis Fraina founded the first American Communist 
journal, Revolutionary Age, and observed that 'Mighty cuffents of ideas and of action 
are pulsing through the party, the germinal sap of new ideas producing a new life'. 
This caused impatience with the although the Hillquit-Berger leadership for not 
f measuring up to the opportunity. 61 
When the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Third International in March 1919, the 
left wing rallied to it. John Reed's New York Communist, the 'official organ of the 
"J. B. S. Hardman, American Labor Dynamics, 9; Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism, 
88-149. On the importance of the 1919 strike wave on the formation of the CP, see the editors' 
introduction to Cannon, Early Years, 7-9; Foner, History, 8: 237-56. On the steel strike, see David 
Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1987). 
59 Leuchtenburg, Perils oftrosperity, 99. 
60 Eric Hornberger and John Biggart, eds, John Reed and the Russian Revolution: Uncollected Articles, 
Letters andSpeeches on Russia, 1917-1920 (London: Macmillan, 1992), 69,74. 
61 Revolutionary Age, 30 November 1918. 
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Left Wing, Socialist Party, Greater New York Locals', declared in its lead editorial in 
its first issue that: 'We take our stand with the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviki), 
with the Spartacides of Germany, and the Communists of Hungary and Bavaria, 
believing that only through the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can the Socialist order 
be brought about. 62 
As the left-wing's strength increased, the battles within the party deepened. 
Ame Swabeck recalled that the Revolution 'shook the Socialist Party to its foundation 
and brought new lessons and new inspiration to the left wing'. Wolfe and Reed in 
February 1919 drafted a left-wing manifesto that spelt out their opposition to party 
leadership and their determination 'to secure control of the Party, to conquer the Party 
for revolutionary Socialism and impose upon it a consistent proletarian-Bolshevik 
policy. ' 
63 
The struggle raged throughout the spring. In the mail-in elections for the SP 
NEC in March 1919, the left won 12 of 15 seats. Reed defeated Victor Berger for the 
position of international delegate, and the left defeated Hillquit in his bid for the post 
of international secretary. By April 1919, the Boston, Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens 
locals were solidly left-wing, and Seattle, Cleveland, Rochester and Philadelphia were 
also moving towards the left. In response, Hillquit pushed through a resolution at an 
Albany meeting of the New York State party to purge locals sympathetic to the Left 
Wing. In short order, the leadership 'reorganised' 16 Kings County locals and purged 
the Bronx and Buffalo organisations. 64 
62 Buhle, Fraina; Foner, History, 8: 240-4 1; Manus O'Riordan, 'Larkin in America: The Road to Sing 
Sing', 67; New York Communist, 19 April 1919. 
63 Arne Swabeck, 'Let's Re-Write History: When History Collides with Facts' (review of Weinstein, 
The Decline ofSocialism in America), Progressive Labor Magazine, May 1969,30; Revolutionary Age, 
8 February 1919; 22 March 1919; 17 May 1919. Cf. Bassett, 'Socialist Party of America', 297. 
6' Seyler, 'The Rise and Decline of the Socialist Party' 331-35; Bassett, 'The Socialist Party of 
America', 304. 
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In May, SP Executive Secretary Adolph Germer circulated a memo to the 
NEC, decrying the party's 'abnormal and unhealthy condition' because more than half 
of the membership was in language federations which he accused of organising a 
6concerted movement to capture the party and subject it to' the rule of the 
federations . 
65A few days earlier, right-wing leader Victor Berger had filed a 
complaint with the NEC against Ohio left-winger and SP national officer Alfred 
Wagenknecht for 'wilfully and maliciously' attacking Berger. 66 
Debs and the left-wing 
The left wing sought to convince Debs, the most authoritative national 
Socialist. At the time of the New York left wing convention, he described himself as 
'in sympathy with the radical tendencies in our party'. But, he continued: 
the changes that are necessary can all be made and should be made within the 
party. I am opposed to splitting the party and I refuse to get into the squabble 
the New York comrades may have between themselves. I have no time for that 
sort of business. 67 
The same month, leftists Jim Larkin, Rose Pastor Stokes, John Reed and Maximilian 
68 Cohen forwarded Debs a copy of their manifesto, seeking his endorsement. A few 
days later, Lewis Fraina and C. E. Ruthenberg cabled Debs urging him to accept their 
nomination as international secretary, claiming that 'the party's future demands it and 
you can also serve the radicals. ' 69 Yet Debs, true to form in ignoring internal party 
politics in favour of mass work, and hobbled by being in prison, merely stated that 'I 
have no stomach for factional quarrelling and I refuse to be consumed by it.... I can 
65 Adolph Germer to NEC, 24 May 1919, enclosed in Germer to Victor Berger, 26 May 1919, in Victor 
L. Berger papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, reel 15. A copy can also be found in the 
Socialist Party Collection, Taminent Library, New York University, IX: 9. 
66 Victor Berger to NEC, 22 May 1919, in Berger papers, reel 15. 
67 Eugene V. Debs to Julius Gerber, 27 February 1919, in Tamiment Library Debs collection, reprinted 
in Eugene V. Debs papers, microfilm edition, reel 2. 
68 Jim Larkin, Rose Pastor Stokes, John Reed and Maximilian Cohen to Eugene Debs, 28 February 
1919, in Indiana State University, Terre Haute, reprinted in Debs papers, reel 2. Stokes, who also been 
prosecuted for her anti-war agitation, had become quite close to Debs while be was being tried for his 
opposition to the war; cf. Sharp, 'Rose Pastor Stokes', 153-54. 
Jacob Zumoff 52 
fight capitalists but not comrades. -) 70 According to one future Communist, if Debs had 
thrown his weight behind the Left, then 'there is no doubt he could have carried the 
majority with him'. 71 
Throughout the early post-war period, the left pinned its hopes on Debs, who 
stood for President in 1920 as a federal prisoner. He spoke favourably of the 
Bolshevik Revolution during his 'campaign'. 72 When Ruthenberg visited Debs in 
prison in June 1920 to ask him to join the Communists, Debs declined. Until his death 
in 1926, Debs had a complicated relationship with the Party, at times hostile, at times 
friendly. As late as November 192 1, the Communists openly speculated that Debs 
might join them, although he did not break from the Sp. 73 By 1922, the Party and 
Debs had fallen out over the question of the policies of the Soviet regime and his 
former close comrade, Rose Pastor Stokes, declared that Debs 'is not a proletarian 
revolutionists' even if he had 'succeeded for many years in making a great many 
workers believe he was'; a year later the Party labelled Debs the 'revolutionary' wing 
of the Sp. 
74 
Hillquit 'clears the deck' 
Hillquit fought the growing left-wing in a fierce battle. Even while paying lip 
service to the Bolshevik Revolution, he derided the Left Wing as 'a sort of burlesque 
on the Russian Revolution' and advocated that the left and right 'separate, honestly, 
" Louis C. Fraina and C. E. Ruthenberg to Eugene V. Debs, 6 March 1919, Indiana State University, 
Terre Haute, Debs Collection, reprinted in Debs papers, reel 2. 
7' Debs to David Karsner, 30 April 1920, Labor Age, June 1920. 
71 James P. Cannon, The First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 267. 
72 Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography ofEugene Victor Debs (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1949), 396-98. 
73 See the New York Times, 27 November 192 1, for this speculation. 
74 Rose [Pastor Stokes] to Dan [Kiefer], I February 1922, in Rose Pastor Stokes Papers (Socialist Party 
Collection, Tarniment Institute, Bobst Library, New York University), XIX: 15F. See Arthur Zipser and 
Pearl Zipser, Fire and Grace: The Life ofRose Pastor Stokes (Athens and London: The University of 
Georgia Press, 1989), 233,263. On the Party's attitude in 1923, cf John Pepper, 'Underground 
Radicalism'. 4n Open Letter to Eugene V. Debs and to, 411 Honest Workers within the Socialist Party 
(New York: Workers Party of America, 1923), 3 5. 
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freely and without rancor'. Sensing that he could not defeat the left, whose support 
was growing, Hillquit declared that it was time to 'clear the decks' of the leftist 
menace. The right refused to accept the results of the NEC elections and began to 
expel the left. 75 
At an almost week-long meeting at the end of May, the NEC-split into a 
right-wing majority and leftist minority-began the wholesale purge. The NEC 
majority reorganised the Michigan local, expelling the leftists; suspended the New 
York City branches; 'suspended seven language federations; and refused to count all 
the ballots for the upcoming convention, claiming that the Left Wing was organising a 
parallel party. The only dissent on the NEC came from left-wingers Wagenknecht and 
Katterfield. These suspensions and expulsions eliminated one third of the party 
membership. 
76 
Extending the purge to the Massachusetts and Ohio branch, the Hillquit 
leadership had purged some two-thirds of the party by August 1919. The SP's 
membership declined from almost I 10,000 in January to less than 40 '000.77 A final 
split was all but inevitable. The question, however, was who was going to hold the 
75 New York Call, 21 May 1919; this editorial was reprinted as Morris Hillquit, The Immediate issue 
(New York: The Socialist, 1919), quotes are from pages 14 and IS; Norma Fain Pratt, Morris Hillquit. 
A Political History ofan American Jewish Socialist (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood, 1973), 
142. 
76 See the minutes of the SP NEC, 24-30 May 1919, in Johnpoll, ed., A Documentary History of the 
Communist Party, 75-12 1. The expelled foreign-language federations were the Russian, Lettish, 
Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, South Slavic and Polish; interestingly, as explained in the next 
chapter, the Finnish Federation--the largest SP federation and later a major part of the CP-stayed 
with the SP, although it did oppose the expulsions. For a detailed description of this purge, see Seyler, 
"Ibe Rise and Decline of the Socialist Party', 336-58. 
" Bel I, Marxian Socialism in the United States, I 11; Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 158; 
Foner, History, 8: 242; Wolfe, Two Centuries, 193,199; New York Communist, 19 April 1919. For the 
right wing's view of the split, see, in addition to the New York Call, the Socialist, a newspaper 
published in New York throughout 1919 and which was dedicated to attacking the left of the SP; 
Bassett, 'The Socialist Party of America', 315. 
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mop when the decks were cleared: to maintain control of their Party, the NEC 
majority was willing to trample any semblance of organisational democracy. 78 
Meanwhile the left-wing had also been organising. In June 1919, 'about 
seventy five delegates-some from as far west as the Pacific Coast 79-arrived in 
New York for a National Left-Wing Conference 'to create a revolutionary working 
class movement in America'. The delegates opposed parliamentary strategies, 
declaring that 'the workers can only win the state power by extra parliamentary action 
which must have its basis in the industrial mass action of the workers'. Similarly, they 
eschewed reformist strategies, arguing that when capitalists accepted reforms, they 
'have as their object and their result the further exploitation and deception of the 
workers'. 
80 
Yet, at this meeting, the left itself split over its relationship to the SP in what 
Ruthenberg described as 'a bitter fight about staying in the party in the convention or 
81 
organizing a new party at once'. One group pushed to stay within the SP, at least 
through the 31 August convention and avoid a premature split. As the Revolutionary 
Age argued in May 1919: 'We refuse to turn over the Socialist Party to the moderates. 
We shall not abandon the struggle to revolutionize the Party, for the bulk of the 
" See Miller, Victor Berger, 230-240, for an analysis of the right-wing perspective of the 1919 schism. 
See also the right-wing Socialist, published in 1919. For studies of how the 1919 split played out in 
individual locals, see Sally M. Miller, 'The Socialist Party Schism of 1919: A Local Case Study', 
Labor History 37: 4 (Fall 1995), 599-611 (on St. Louis); Ralph Edward Shaffer, 'Radicalism in 
California, 1869-1929' (PhD thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1962), 283-300, and Ralph E. 
Shaffer, 'Formation of the California Communist Labor Party', Pacific Historical Review 36 (1967), 
59-78; Daeha Ko, 'Rough Beginnings: The 1920s', on the website Communism in Washington State: 
History and Memory Project <http: //faculty. washington. edu/gregoryj/cpproject/> viewed 22 January 
2003. 
79 C. E. Ruthenberg to Rose Ruthenberg, undated letter, postmarked 22 June 1919, in Ruthenberg 
Collection, box 2, folder 3. Revolutionary Age, 5 July 1919, claimed 'over 90 delegates from 20 
different states'. Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 166, claimed 94 delegates. 
so 'Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party: report of the labor organization committee', 21 June 1919 
(John S. Reed papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, bms Am 1091: 1449). The Revolutionary 
Age, 5 July 1919, carries a detailed report on the convention. 
81 C. E. Ruthenberg to Rose Ruthenberg, op. cit. 
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membership is overwhelmingly revolutionary. ' 82 Virtually all the indigenous 
American Communists-and future CP leaders-had this position. 83 Another group 
led by the Russian federation, Isaac Hourwich, and the expelled Michigan branches, 
advocated organising a Communist Party immediately. Noting the NEC's 'expulsion 
of nearly half of the membership', the self-styled National Office of the Organization 
Committee issued a 'Call for a National Convention for the Purpose of Organizing a 
Communist Party in America' which argued that 'the time has passed for temporizing 
and hesitating' and urged 'those who realize that the capturing of the Socialist Party 
as such is but an empty victory [to] not hesitate to respond to this call and leave the 
"right" and "center" to sink together with their "revolutionary" leaders'. 84 To further 
complicate things, on 28 July, there was yet another reshuffling. A majority of those 
previously favouring going to the SP convention, including Ruthenberg, Fraina, 
Wolfe and Ballam, changed their position and agreed with the need for a new party, 
although Gitlow and Larkin still maintained their original position. 85 
At the September 1919 SP convention in Chicago, the NEC defended the anti- 
left expulsions as necessary to maintain a centralised and unified party as part of what 
it called 'our clear duty, as the trustees of the party, to do all we could to preserve the 
integrity of the Party. ' 86 After being denied their elected seats at the convention, the 
left met for the last time before once again splitting among themselves into Fraina, 
Ruthenberg and Wolfe's Communist Party of America (CPA), which opposed 
82 Revolutionary Age, 24 May 1919. 
" Supporters of this position included Cannon, Ruthenberg, Reed, Fraina, Gitlow, Ballam and Larkin; 
Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 168. 
84 Dennis E. Batt, S. Kopnagel, D. Elbaum, J. Stilson, O. C. Johnson, Alexander Stoklitsky and John 
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remaining within the SP, and Gitlow and Reed's Communist Labor Party (CLP) 
which advocated doing so. Even after the SP leadership, with the assistance of the 
Chicago police, prevented the CLP supporters from entering the convention, the two 
organisations hardened into mutually hostile groups. 87 'Few things', Draper argued, 
'left a deeper and more lasting mark on the American Communist movement than this 
seemingly unnecessary Split., 88 The main difference was not programme, but 
composition: the CPA consisted of mainly non-English speaking immigrants, largely 
from Eastern Europe, who had years of experience in the international socialist and 
labour movement but little connection to American reality. The smaller CLP was 
more native, less theoretically sophisticated, but more in tune with actual American 
society. 89 
The acrimonious nature of the split can be discerned from the first issue of the 
CPA's paper, the Communist. " It described the larger CLP as '[r]endered impotent by 
the conflicting emotions and lack of under-standing' of those who pursued the 
6centrist' policy of trying 'to capture the old party machinery and the stagnant 
elements which have been struggling for a false unity, who are only ready to abandon 
the ship when it sinks beneath the waves of reaction'. The CLP was, one article 
argued, a 'fetid swamp'. 91 
97 Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 15 8; C. E. Ruthenberg, 'Seven Years of the Communist 
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It is hard to overestimate the damage done by such a pointless division. First, 
it squandered thousands of sympathetic Socialists who, while dissatisfied with the SP, 
could make no sense of the division. As Cannon put it, 'Nobody knows how many 
thousands of American radical socialists-potential communists-were lost and 
scattered. ' While two thirds of the SP's 104,000 members supported the left wing, 
only a much smaller numberjoined either Communist organisation. 92 According to 
the CPA, in October-December 1919, average CPA membership was 23,744; by 
January-April 1920, it had dropped to 5,584.93 Of course, Red Scare repression 
against the left also weakened the early Communist movement, but this disunity 
wasted resources that should have been spent on more urgent tasks. 
The post-split SP 
Even after the Hillquit leadership expelled the soon-to-be Communists, some 
35 leftists continued to fight within the convention, versus more than 90 rightists and 
centrists. 94 And no matter how many times Hillquit swept the deck, there was still 
significant support among the rank-and-file for the newly-founded Comintern. 
Hillquit, a classical centrist, happily verbally endorsed the Russian Revolution and 
padded the SP programme with Marxist rhetoric, so long as he could maintain control 
of the SP in the USA. 95 For example, the convention's manifesto, written by Hillquit, 
opposed imperialist war, and 'declare[d] our entire solidarity with the revolutionary 
' See the editors' introduction to James A Cannon and the Early Years ofAmerican Communism, 8. 
Zinoviev, in a September 1919 speech to the Petrograd Soviet on the occasion of the founding of the 
Communist Party (he didn't indicate which) gave Party membership as 40,000, in Communist 
International, old series no 6, October 1919. Paul Buhle, without citing a source, estimated that the left 
wing was 90,000 strong. Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 126. Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 
158-59, indicates that some 'two thirds of the Socialist party was expelled or suspended' and that, in 
may 1919, 'the Left Wing could claim almost 70,000 members of sympathizers. ' He argued, thus, 'No 
new American radical movement had everjumped off to a more promising start. ' 
91 Report to Secretary of CPA, 10 [13? j July 1920, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 30; Cannon, First Ten 
Years, 5 0; James Oneal, et. al., 'Supplementary Report of the National Executive Committee', 2. 
94 Daniel Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States, I 11; John Perry Leavell, Jr., 'The Socialist 
Party Conventions of 1919 and 1920' (MA dissertation, Duke University, 1962), 28,29-30. 
95 Shannon, The Socialist Party ofA merica, 150-5 1. 
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workers of Russia in the support of the government of their Soviets, with the radical 
Socialists of Germany, Austria and Hungary in their efforts to establish working-class 
rule in their countries, and with those Socialist organizatons in England, France, Italy 
and other countries, who during the war as after the war have remained true to the 
principles of uncompromising international Socialism'. It ended with the call: 'Long 
, 96 live the international Socialist revolution, the only hope of the suffering world! . By 
a vote of 56 to 26, the convention declared that 'the Second International is no more' 
and threw its support to 'only such organizations and parties should be given 
representation which declare their strict adherence by word and deed to the principle 
of the class struggle'. While the resolution included the Bolsheviks and Spartakists in 
such a camp, it excluded any party which 'participates in a government coalition with 
parties of the bourgeoisie'. 97 
On 4 March 1920 the party, no longer affiliated to the Second International, 
applied for membership in the Comintern. Yet the Socialist Party still remained 
divided, despite its rhetorical endorsement of Bolshevism. In May 1920, a minority 
led by J. Louis Engdahl submitted another referendum to the party that 'the Socialist 
Party of the United States of America reaffirms its affiliation with the Third 
International. ' Another minority, led by Berger, advocated that the SP eschew the 
Comintern altogether. A centrist compromise, supported by Hillquit, was passed 
which advocated affiliation to the Comintern only if 'no formula such as "The 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the form of Soviets" or any other special formula for 
the attainment of the Socialist commonwealth be imposed or exacted as condition of 
affiliation with the Third International'. At the same time, however, Hillquit still felt 
" Morris Hillquit, typescript of Manifesto of the Socialist Party in Emergency Convention, 4 
September 1919, in Hillquit papers, reel 6, document 112. See also the 29 May 1919 statement of the 
SP NEC, document III- 
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the need to distance himself from the Second International, which he called 'morally 
bankrupt', and he pledged that the SP would 'work towards the creation of a larger 
International on the basis of the Third'. Ever the centrist, though, he also refused to 
'blindly accept every formula, every dogma coming from Soviet Russia as holy, as a 
Papal decree' whilst still proclaiming his support to Soviet Russia. 98 
In 1920, the Second Comintern Congress approved conditions for any party 
wishing to join it, the famous '21 Conditions'. The Bolsheviks designed these to split 
the international socialist movement and purge right-wing and centrist elements. 
Condition number 7, in fact, singled out Hillquit, along with other 'notorious 
opportunists' such as Rudolf Hilferding, Kautsky and Ramsay MacDonald as leaders 
who would need to be purged to join the Comintem. The Socialist National 
Committee declared that these 'conditions of affiliation are absolutely incompatible 
with the position of our party'. In November 1920, the Comintern rejected the SP's 
application for membership. As the SP continued to atrophy, increasing numbers of 
members left in sympathy with the Comintern, including the 'Workers Council' group 
which is discussed in the following chapter. 
99 
Leftists within other organisations, especially the IWW, also saw the 
Revolution as a justification of their struggles and a beacon arnid the wreckage of war. 
" Report by SP Committee on International Relations, September 1919, Morris Hillquit papers, reel 6, 
document 905. 
98 See Labor Age, June 1920. On the 1920 Convention dispute, see Virginia Ottini, 'Tbe Socialist Party 
in the Election of 1920' (MA dissertation, Stanford University, 1948), 56. Cf. Shannon, The Socialist 
party ofAmerica, 86, for the cessation of membership in the Second International; Pratt, Morris 
Hillquit, 165,167. On II October 1918, SP Executive Secretary Adolph Germer wrote to Hillquit: 'We 
have not paid International dues for several years. The reason for it is that the International has not 
functioned and if my serves me correctly, it was the understanding of the old N. E. C. that no payment 
should be made until a stable International Bureau was re-established', in Morris Hillquit papers, reel 2, 
document 803. 
9' On the SP's attempt to affiliate to the Comintern, see note by NEC on relations to Communist 
International, 1920, in Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, and Purpose and Tactics with an 
F, xposition and Discussion ofthe Steps Being Taken and Required to Curb: Report ofthe Joint 
Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, filedApril 24,1920, in the Senate ofthe State 
OfNew York (Albany: J. B. Lyon Co, 1920), vol. 2,1815-2 1. See also Bell, Marxian Socialism in the 
United States, 113-14; Degras, The Communist International, 170. 
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In 1919, the Bolsheviks, seeking to create the Third International, issued a call to 39 
left-wing socialist organisations to meet in Moscow. Four of these groups were 
American: the SLP; the SP lefts; the IWW; and De Leon's split from the IWW, the 
Workers International Industrial Union. 
Although elements of the SLP did join the Comintem the party as a whole 
maintained its distance from Bolshevism. In part this was because the SLP leadership 
rejected the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' as applicable to American conditions. 
Boris Reinstein, a former leader of the Buffalo SLP, joined the Comintern at its first 
convention, and Fraina, the first noteworthy American Communist intellectual, had at 
one time been a leader in the SLP. 100 The IWW had a more sympathetic response. 
The Comintern and early American Communism 
The early Comintem sought to unite all socialists who had broken from the 
Second International into a new revolutionary movement. In the US, this was no easy 
task: not only was the left splintered, but repression had driven it underground. 
Nonetheless, while evading repression was important, early Communists were most 
concerned with overcoming the split in their ranks. Faced with two competing 
Communist Parties, 101 many early sympathisers were unable to figure out the 
difference. 102 From 1919, the CLP campaigned for unity. An editorial titled 
'Communists UniteV in the CLP's Ohio Socialist noted that: 'The rank and file of 
both sections see no fundamental differences between the two parties' since the 
" See Robert H. L. Wheeler, 'American Communists: Their Ideology and their Interpretation of 
American Life, 1917-1939' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1953), 20. According to one observer, the 
SLP representative, Boris Reinstein, 'declined to act, except in a fraternal capacity, on the grounds that 
he had no credentials from his party' (Angelica Balabanoff, My Life as a Rebel [Bloomington and 
London: Indiana University Press, 1973], 214. ) Cf. Boris Reinstein, 'On the Road to the First 
Congress', Communist International, vol. 6 nos. 9/10 (1929), 429. 
'0' That is, two main organisations. In January 1920, the expelled Michigan Socialists split from the 
Communists, forming a small group, the Proletarian Party; see Draper, The Roots ofAmerican 
Communism, 2 10-11. 
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6programs of both parties are based upon the programs of the Third International 
formed at Moscow.... What differences exist in tactics and inner party construction 
are not of such nature as should create a permanent division of the two sections. ' 103 
One organiser predicted that 'unless unity between the two communist parties comes 
soon, we will loose all the membership' because of frustration. 104 
In 1920, the CPA split over these overtures. Its majority insisted that the CLP 
was centrist, and regarded their campaign for unity as 'deliberately started and ... being 
carried out in order to create discord and disintegration in our party'. A minority, led 
by Ruthenberg (Tamon'), which included many of the CPA English speakers, fused 
with the CLP to form the United Communist Party (UCP). According to the rump 
CPA, Ruthenberg-the national secretary of the CPA-took with him three other 
members of the 13-member Central Executive Committee and some 28 per cent of the 
membership. This only increased hostility between the two groups in what one 
participant later described as 'a most bitter factional battle'. For example, the CPA 
denounced the CLP's 'meaningless pleading for Communist Unity' and maintained 
that the 'Communist Labor Party has no vestige of principle, Communist or any other 
kind. ' The CPA also declared that 'Unity with the U. C. P. as a party of centrists is 
impossible' except 'on the basis of our principles, program, and tactics. "05 
Ruthenberg's letters to his wife show that he was increasingly frustrated at 
what he predicted would be 'nothing but personal squabbles for months to come'. 
Immediately before forming the UCP, he mused: 'I am sick and tired of the whole 
102 For an example of the convoluted nature of this split, see Alfred Wagenknecht's explanation of the 
actions of the Ohio delegation, minus Ruthenberg, its leader, at the time; A. Wagenknecht 'To all Ohio 
Locals and Branches', nd [ 1919], Ruthenberg Collection, box 2, folder 3. 
103 Ohio Socialist, 29 October 1919. 
" Quoted in a letter from EF to Damon. 24 April 1920, in Jay Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution 
Archives, Stanford University, Box 195, folder 11. 'EF' is Ed Fisher or Ed Five, pseudonyms of Isaac 
Edward Ferguson, CPA organiser in Chicago; Damon is Ruthenberg. 
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business and only wish I could drop out without leaving people who are depending on 
me in the lurch. ' Two months later, upon moving to Chicago, Ruthenberg described 
the situation as 'drifting and generally unsatisfactory. ' Not surprisingly, thousands of 
rank-and-file leftists did drop out. 
Mass action and action of the masses 
The lack of a political basis for this split is confusing. Trying to manufacture 
political differences to justify the split, the contending organisations debated whether 
Communists should support 'mass action' or 'action of the masses'. But, in fact, the 
difference between the two groups over this question was less than the difference 
between both and Lenin. 
'Mass action' was not a Leninist concept, but a cognate of left-wing European 
social democracy, especially from Germany and Holland. Yet the concept was vague 
enough to include anything either side wanted. Before the split from the SP, Fraina 
had defined 'mass action' as 'the end of the exclusive concentration on parliamentary 
tactics' which would result in 'awakening the industrial proletariat to action, the 
bringing of mass proletarian pressure upon the capitalist state to accomplish our 
purpose'. 106 For the left, mass action was almost mystical, and seemed to include 
anything-from strikes to even standing for parliament-so long as it was done from 
a revolutionary, and not opportunist, perspective. 'Mass action', wrote Fraina. in 1918, 
'is not aform of action as much as it is a process and synthesis of action. ' S. J. Rutgers 
in International Socialist Review elaborated the different forms of political mass 
action: meetings, street demonstrations, political strikes and revolts, which gives an 
opportunity to develop gradually into higher forms of mass action. ' Of course, most 
"' Communist (CPA), 4 October 1919,22 November 1919,1 May 1920,1 July 1920; 1 August 1920; 
Communist (CP), July 1921; Report to Secretary of CPA, 10 [13? ] July 1920, in Comintern archives 
515: 1: 30. 
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reformist social-democratic parties also carried out these actions, but by definition 
they could not be revolutionary. 107 
In fact, Lenin had frequently polemicised against the concept of mass action in 
his arguments against Rosa Luxemburg's 'mass strike'. She had argued that through a 
spontaneous uprising the working class would achieve revolutionary consciousness. 108 
Following the same trend as Luxemburg, the CPA's programme declared: 
Mass action is the proletarian response to the facts of modem industry, and the 
forms it imposes upon the proletarian class struggle. Mass action develops as 
the spontaneous activity of the unorganized workers in basic industries; its 
initial form is the mass strike of the unorganized. 109 
Lenin had argued against such a conception, in What is to be Done?, that the working 
class can only become socialist through the intervention of a revolutionary party and 
that although the workers will spontaneously struggle, their consciousness will remain 
'trade-union', i. e., bourgeois: 'There could not have been Social-Democratic 
consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from 
without. " 10 For Lenin the paramount question was the forging of a revolutionary 
party, which was the paramount purpose of the Comintern. 111 
Before bolting the CPA, Ruthenberg put forward a motion in the CEC of the 
CPA which advocated unity with the CLP, warned against becoming another sect like 
the SLP, and argued that: 
There never was any division between the C. P. and the C. L. P. on fundamental 
Communist principles.... The differences between the two party programs are 
differences merely in the form of expression.... 
Unity with the C. L. P would aid in bringing the Communist movement into 
contact with the American workers. For instance the CP[A] has hardly any 
106 Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 88, passim; Wolfe, Two Centuries, 194; Louis C. Fraina, 
'The Left Wing and the Revolution', New York Communist, 26 April 1919. 
107 Louis C. Fraina, Revolutionary Socialism: A Study in Socialist Reconstruction (New York: 
Communist Press, 1918), 178-197 (quotes on 195-96); S. J. Rutgers, 'The Left Wing Socialists: Mass 
Action', International Socialist Review, October 1916. 
log Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, in Mary Alice Waters, 
ed., Rosa Luxemburg Speaks (New York: Pathfinder Publishers, 1970), 202. 
109 The Communist Party of America, Manifesto and Program (Chicago: CPA, nd[ 1919? ]), 11 - 12. 
110 Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, in Collected Works, vol. 5,375. 
111 Trotsky, Lessons of October, 9 1. 
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English-speaking membershi and no prospects for doing any organization 
work west of the MiSSiSSippi. 
U 
In the spring of 1921, the UCP claimed 5927 members in 771 groups, of 
whom 3566 paid dues. It was organised into 14 districts with 12 paid organisers and 3 
paid sub-district organisers. It published 35 monthly journals in eight languages, 
including English, with a circulation of over 1.6 million. The CPA for its part claimed 
6328 dues paying members organised into 6 districts, each with a paid organiser, and 
4 paid sub-district organisers. It published, also in eight languages, 19 papers with 
almost one million monthly readers. 113 
Unity from the Comintern 
This split threatened to abort American Communism: left to their own devices, the 
two organisations would have found their existence solitary, nasty, brutish and short. 
Only the Comintern could force its American followers to transcend such personal 
squabbles, and provide a political basis for unity. In a letter to both parties, the 
Comintern complained that 'the split brings much harm to the Communist Movement 
in America' and could only 'lead to [a] division of revolutionary forces, to harmful 
duplication and unnecessary friction and unjustifiable waste of energy on internal 
struggles'. ' 
14 
Describing how a 'close study of the documents from both sides has 
convinced us that there are no serious differences in the programs of the two parties', 
the Comintern stressed that the division 'must by all means be liquidated'. 'Unity', the 
Comintem explained, 'is not only possible, but absolutely necessary' and the ECCI 
insisted on 'its immediate realization' since 'only by bringing [the parties] together 
will it be possible to create a strong Communist party in America'. ' 15 The ECCI 
Minutes of 17/18/19/20 March 1921 CEC of CPA, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 51. 
Communist (CP), July 192 1. 
Communist (UCP), 17 July 1920,15 August 1920. 
"'ibid., 15 August 1920. See also Degras, The Communist International, vol. 1,101-103. 
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demanded an immediate joint unity convention, and harshly noted that continued 
division was 'absolutely not allowed'. 
The role of the language federations in a unified party also divided the two 
groups. Since the CPA was largely made up of such federations, it wanted them to 
play an important role in any future unified Party, while the UCP had the opposite 
view. Perhaps drawing on the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Yiddish Bund, the 
ECCI insisted that the federations should 'amalgamate as closely as possible with the 
organization of the American workers' within the Party: 'The language federations 
may reserve their autonomy regarding the work of propaganda in their respective 
languages, but in the case of political and economic struggles they must be 
subordinated to the regular party organ. ' These issues were important to resolve, the 
letter concluded, because 'The victory of the International proletariat depends upon 
016 
the success of Communism in Amenca. 
Responding to Comintern prompting, the CPA and UCP convened a unity 
convention, which, after two days of debate, adopted a unity constitution. Ruthenberg 
noted that despite this wrangling, 'No compromise was needed on either side to reach 
agreement on principles. The discussion soon showed that on program there was 
practically unanimity of opinion. ' 117 
This unity was secured only, as the Party recognised, 'in accordance with the 
mandate of the Executive Committee of the Communist International'. The 
Communist announced that the 'Third International has spoken and its mandate could 
no longer be postponed. " 
18 The Comintern, then, not only provided the political 
programme for the early Communist movement, but what one veteran Communist 
called 'some effective prodding from the Communist International' proved necessary 
116 Ibid. 
"'Communist (CP), July 192 1. 
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for creating, on even the most basic organisational level, a Communist Party in the 
United States. 119 
1" Ibid. 
Swabeck, 'Let's Re-Write History', 3 8. 
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3. The Third Comintern Congress and the Fight for Legality 
Throughout the Communist International, the Third Congress (192 1) heralded 
the beginning of methodical work aimed at winning support from the majority of the 
working class. For the American Party, this meant forging a united Party capable of 
intervening openly in the American labour movement. This chapter examines the 
importance of the Congress on the Party, and argues that the fights at this Congress 
were integral to the CP's 'Americanisation'. 
The Third Congress took place within the context of the Bolsheviks' 
realisation that capitalism had managed to temporarily stabilise itself after the post- 
war wave of revolutionary upheavals. Soviet Russia had won, after tremendous 
hardship and devastation, its war against the forces of counterrevolution. But the 
economy was all but destroyed, and in 1921, amid the demobilisation of the Red 
Army, famine threatened the new Soviet Republic. The Bolsheviks saw their 
Revolution threatened from all sides: the economy was in shambles, famine 
threatened, sailors at the Kronstadt naval garrison had rebelled, and, above all, Soviet 
Russia remained isolated in a capitalist world. In response to this situation, the 
Bolsheviks compromised in order to buy time for a revolution in the West to come to 
their aid. The Soviet government introduced market mechanisms in the guise of the 
New Economic Policy; the Bolsheviks forbade party factions in order to avoid a split, 
and the dire situation gave rise to growing bureaucratisation of the party and the new 
state. With the increase in the importance of world revolution in the Bolsheviks' 
estimation, the Comintern-the leadership of international revolution-also became 
more important. 
1 
1 Lenin, 'Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the RCP', 13 June 192 1, Collected Works, vol. 32,453. 
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The 'Theses' of the Congress declared that since the Second Congress a year 
earlier, 'a series of working-class uprisings and battles have resulted in partial 
defeats'. As a result, the period of revolutionary ferment which had been initiated by 
the October Revolution had ended and capitalism had stabilised itself somewhat. 2 
Elsewhere Trotsky argued that 'Overthrowing the bourgeoisie, even though it has 
been condemned by history, is neither so simple nor so easy as it might have seemed. ' 
The Comintern resolution on tactics predicted 'a long period of revolutionary 
struggle' because 'the world revolution is developing even more slowly than 
expected', in part because of the treachery of the 'strong workers organisations and 
workers parties, namely the social-democratic parties and trade unions, which were 
created by the proletariat to fight the bourgeoisie' had turned into 'into organs of 
counter-revolutionary influence that ensnared the proletariat and are continuing to 
,3 hold it in their grip. 
In a letter to Zinoviev, Lenin observed that 'none of the Communist Parties 
anywhere have [sic] yet won the majority of the working class, not only as regards 
organisational leadership, but to the principles of communism as well. ' Consequently, 
Lenin argued, 'the tactics of the Communist International should be based on a 
systematic drive to win the majority ofthe working class, first and foremost within the 
old trade unions. ' Lenin utilised the phrase 'you have to step back to make a better 
jump' in order to note 'that this retreat must serve as a preparation for the offensive'. 4 
For Lenin and Trotsky, the Comintern needed to impart to the newly formed CPs not 
just the experience and lessons of the Bolshevik Party in making the October 
2 [Leon Trotsky], 'Theses of the Third World Congress on the International Situation and the Tasks of 
the Comintern', 4 July 192 1, in Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos ofthe First Four Congresses ofthe 
Third International (London: Inklinks, 1980), 184-85. 
' Leon Trotsky, 'A School of Revolutionary Strategy', July 1921, The First Five Years ofthe 
Communist International (London: New Park, 1974), vol. 2,6; 'On Tactics', in Theses, Resolutions 
and Manifestos, 274-75. 
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Revolution, but also understanding of the struggles to forge such a party-what 
Trotsky later termed the 'lessons of October'. 5 Central to this was the production of a 
manual, Guidelines on the Organizational Structure of Communist Parties, on the 
Methods and Content of Their Work, which detailed with painstaking care how a 
revolutionary party should be organised. Throughout this period, Lenin polernicised 
against what he saw as revolutionary impatience and the belief that a small parties 
could take power irrespective of their actual working-class support. 6 
Primarily, Lenin had in mind the disastrous 'March Action' of the German 
Communists (KPD) earlier that year in which the party attempted to stage a revolution 
without the support of the working class. Problems of the French and Italian Parties 
also occupied Lenin and Trotsky. In all three cases, the main question was how to win 
advanced sections of the working class from their traditional social-democratic 
leadership--i. e., completing the split in the workers movement between 
revolutionaries and reforraists. The united front, a tactic of winning over the rank-and- 
file of other organisations in the workers movement through proposing and carrying 
out joint actions was one solution offered by Lenin at the Third Congress. Whatever 
their differences, the French, Italian and German parties seemed, in the eyes of the 
Comintern, to be quickly approaching revolutionary opportunities. Since this was not 
true in the US, the need for painstaking preparatory work was even more important. 7 
4 Lenin to Zinoviev, 10 June 192 1, CW, vol. 42,320-2 1; 'Speech at a meeting of members of the 
German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Italian delegations, II July 1921, ibid., 327-28. 
3 Leon Trotsky, Lessons of October. 
6 The best translation is Guidelines on the Organizational Structure of Communist Parties, on the 
Methods and Content of Their Work: Resolution of the Third Congress of the Communist International, 
12 July 1921 (New York: Prometheus Research Library, 1988). An earlier, and much inferior, 
translation is also available in Decisions ofthe Third Congress of the Communist International 
(London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1922). The introduction to the 1988 translation situates the 
resolution in the context of the development of the Comintern. 
' See Trotsky, 'A School of Revolutionary Strategy', for his perspectives facing the Comintern in these 
three countries. 
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Open or underground party? 
One issue, examined in the next chapter, was whether to work within the 
established trade unions, or to continue emphasising only revolutionary unions. Lenin 
argued that in order to gain support amongst workers, the American Party must be 
present in the American Federation of Labor, however anti-Communist its leadership 
was. This was part of the Comintern's efforts to root itself within the international 
labour movement, signified on a global level by the strengthening of the Red 
International of Labour Unions (Profintern). 
The most fundamental concern in implementing the lessons of the Third 
Congress was the question of legality. The early CP was underground by necessity. 
Within a month of its founding in November 1919, the California Communist 
movement was all but crushed when the state arrested thirteen of its leaders- 
including Max Bedacht-under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. Nationally, 
the Labor Department declared, that 'it is mandatory upon [the Secretary of Labor] to 
take into custody aliens who are members' of the CP 'and deport them'. 8 Among 
those targeted were foreign radicals such as James 'Big Jim' Larkin, in the US after 
the 1913 Dublin transport strike as a union organiser, who had helped to found the 
Communist movement in the US. 9 In the first week of 1920, over 6000 Communists 
were arrested. Most of the early leading cadre of the movement spent time in jail in 
sHouse immigration and Naturalization Committee Hearings (Washington DC: GPO, 1920), 2,3. 
'Manus O'Riordan, 'Larkin in America: The Road to Sing Sing', in Donal Nevin, ed., James Larkin: 
Lion ofthe Fold(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1998); Emmet Larkin, James Larkin, chapter 10; 
Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 206. On state repression against blacks, see Theodore 
Kornweibel Jr., 'Seeing Red. - Federal Campaigns Against Black Militancy, 1919-1925 (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), chapter 5 for the government's repression against the 
radical black newspaper Messenger. On Hoover's obsession with black radicalism in general, in 
addition to Kornweibel, cf Mark Ellis, 'J. Edgar Hoover and the "Red Summer" of 1919', in Journal of 
American studies 28 (1994), 1,39-59. On accounts of the Red Scare in individual cities, see William H. 
Siener, 'The Red Scare Revisited: Radicals and the Anti-Radical Movement in Buffalo, 1919-1920', 
New York History 79 (1998)1,23-54; Shaffer, 'Radicalism in California, 1869-1929', 300-29;. 
Pedersen, The Communist Party in Maryland, , chapter one. 
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this period. Some, like Larkin, were deported; others, like Benjamin Gitlow, had their 
cases wind through the court system for years. ' 0 
This situation limited the ability of the Party to organise. Charles Wallace, a 
delegate to the Third Congress, reported back to the CEC that 'our comrades in 
Moscow are astounded at the meager results of the American movement' since the 
economic situation would apparently 'make the general unrest of the masses fertile 
ground for Communist propaganda. ' In fact, Wallace continued, Lenin himself had 
insisted on meeting the entire US delegation and told them (in Wallace's words) that 
in his 'opinion the American comrades do not utilize all the opportunities of struggle' 
and that he 'considers a daily legal newspaper in the English language as the most 
essential necessity for spreading our propaganda. ' Wallace continued that Lenin 
'advised us to take the necessary steps to establish a legal Communist organization' in 
order to recruit workers unable to join the illegal Party. ' 
Lenin did not advocate outright liquidation of the illegal apparatus, and it 
would have been foolhardy for the Party to insist on above-ground work at its 
founding. Nonetheless, socialists had always fought for the right to organise legally, 
and even Lenin, in tsarist Russia, had argued that Communists should take advantage 
of opportunities for legal work, including even standing candidates for the Duma. 12 
This perspective was maintained in the Guidelines voted at the Third Congress. They 
first criticised those parties which had neglected illegal work altogether, but also 
" See Mackson, 'Class-Struggle Defense Work in the United States'; introduction to James A Cannon 
and the Early Years of, 4merican Communim), 8; On California, see Shaffer, 'Formation of the 
California Communist Labor Party', 77-78. Two Supreme Court cases, Gitlow v. People ofState of 
New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), and Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) dealt with members of 
the Left Wing who were arrested under criminal syndicalism statutes; in both cases the convictions 
were upheld. Justices Holmes and Brandeis used both cases (dissenting in Gitlow and concurring in 
Whitney) to elaborate their 'clear and present danger' limitations on the First Amendment. 
" Undated report by Charles Wallace, attached to the 1921 minutes, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 5 1. 
According to Wallace, the US delegation was Andrew (Isaac Hourwich), Ballister (Robert Minor), 
Baldwin (Oscar Tynerovsky), Gorny (John Reed? ), Haywood, Marshall (Max Bedacht) and Wallace. 
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assailed the tendency in illegal parties towards 'often insufficient understandings of 
the possibilities for exploiting legal activity and for building a party organization in 
living contact with the revolutionary masses. In this case, party work shows a 
tendency to remain a fruitless Sisyphean labor or impotent conspiracy. ' 13 
An ECCI letter recognised that 'Under existing circumstances it is impossible 
for the Communist Party in the United States to be a legal party'. Nonetheless, the 
Comintem leadership stressed the need to establish a legal apparatus, especially an 
English-language press. ' 4 In early 1921, Zinoviev wrote a note to the CP leadership 
labelling any delay in the creation of a legal party 'a very great mistake .... We are 
very late with this matter in America, and every week of further tardiness brings the 
greatest harm. ' Although he agreed that it was impossible to create a legal party 
immediately, 'it is necessary to make use of every inch of the ground' towards this 
end. Otherwise, 'it would be the greatest mistake to lock ourselves in amongst 
ourselves. ' He noted that this was an 'unquestionable instruction of the Comintern' 
and threatened those, 'particularly the Russian comrades', who sabotaged it. 15 
Many US Party members, especially in the Lettish and Russian foreign- 
language federations, defended underground work in principle. But after the initial 
hysteria died down, repression subsided. In 1920, the Republicans won the White 
House, and the Democrat Palmer retired. 'Normalcy'-which was certainly pro- 
capitalist but also more respectful to civil liberties than Wilson's war-time 
progressivism-was on order. 
12 See A. Y. Badayev, Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma (London: Bookmarks, 1987) for a description of 
how the Bolsheviks used even this tsarist institution to propagate Communism. 
13 Victor Serge, What Everyone Should Know About State Repression (London: New Park, 1979), 44; 
Guidelines on the Organizational Structure of Communist Parties, 52. 
14 N. Bukharin, K. Radek and 0. Kuusinen for the ECCI, 'Concerning the Next Tasks of the CP of A', 
1921, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 38; also reprinted in CEC 'Special Bulletin on Party Situation', May 
1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 28. 
15 Zinoviev to CPA, marked 'NOT for publication', 9 February 1921, in Comintern archives, 515: 132. 
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Against the desire of the foreign-language federations to remain illegal, the 
CP's native-born cadre, including Browder, Cannon, Lovestone and Ruthenberg, 
sought to establish 'living contact' with the masses through increasing legal work. 
Legalisation became one of the first battlegrounds in the war to 'Americanise' the 
Party. Cannon recalled that the 'labor party policy, the development of the trade union 
work, and the whole process of Americanizing the party were subsumed under the 
overall issue of legalizing the party'. 16 Without a legal apparatus, almost no other 
work could be accomplished, and the Party would remain an isolated sect of 
foreigners. 
The Workers Council and the Workers Party 
The Party split into complicated groupings over the issue. The immediate 
cause was the Workers Council group, consisting of dissident ex-SPers such as 
Alexander Trachtenberg, J. Louis Engdahl, Moissaye J. Olgin and J. B. Salutsky. It 
had originated as a pro-Bolshevik formation within the Socialist Party after the 1919 
expulsions. Engdahl and Kruse had waged a fight at the 1920 SP convention to push 
the party to the left. By 1921, however, the SP was moving back to the right: when 
William F. Kruse submitted a resolution for Comintern affiliation, the delegates at the 
SP's conference voted, 31 to 8, against affiliation with any International. Then, the 
Council concluded that the SP could not be reformed and left, creating the 
'Committee for the Third Intemational'. Theirjoumal, The Workers' Council, argued: 
'The Workers' Council will stand uncompromisingly and unreservedly with the Third 
(Communist) International and its principles. It will attempt to carry agitation into 
16 Cannon, First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 58. 
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working class circles that have never been reached before. ' They were tireless 
advocates of creating a legal Party and remained aloof from the underground Cp. 17 
Seizing upon Lenin's attacks on ultra-leftism at the Second Comintem 
Congress, 'Left Wing'Communism: An Infantile Disorder, the Workers Council 
argued: 'The "Infantile Sickness" might have been written with the American 
Movement in mind, so well does it fit the mistakes made by the Left Wing. ' They 
described the CP's fetishisation of illegality as 'not only an obvious mistake, but a 
violation of the conditions laid down by the Communist International'. Rather than 
eschewing the official CP altogether, it stressed the need 'to combine their efforts in 
the building of a sound communist movement in harmony with the present conditions 
in this country'. The refusal to surface from the underground, in the eyes of the 
Council, meant that the 'revolutionary movement in the United States is not only 
18 
weaker than that of other countries, but ... is also hopelessly divided'. 
The Workers Council stressed that American Communism 'cannot, at present, 
enlist the support of the American working class unless it does so in the open'. It 
published two manifestos, titled 'The open Communist Party-The task of the hour' 
and 'We want an open Communist Party, ' which left no room for misunderstanding. 
For the official CP, the first argued, 'illegality becomes the end and aim instead of a 
necessity' so that 'the only question, ' the second stressed, 'that still divides these 
groups from complete amalgamation is the question of continued existence of a secret 
organization side by side with the open party. ' 
19 
" Workers'Council, I April 1921; Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 327-334; Pratt, Morris 
Hillquit, 170-73. On Kruse and Engdahl's position at the 1919 convention-of supporting the left but 
seeking unity-see Leavell, 'The Socialist Party Conventions of 1919 and 1920', 32; on their activities 
at the 1920 convention, see ibid., 48,50-53; on the debate to affiliate to the Comintern, see ibid., 44-46, 
54. See also Ottini, 'The Socialist Party in the Election of 1920', 3444,47-56. On the evolution of the 
SP in the aftermath of the expulsion of the left-wing, see Shannon, The Socialist Party ofAmerica, 
chapter seven. 
's Workrs'Council, I May 1921,15 June 1921. 
19 Ibid., 15 June 1921,15 October 1921,15 November 1921. 
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At first, the CP was somewhat stand-offish towards the Council. In November 
1921, the CEC drafted a letter to the Council which made clear the CP was the official 
Comintern party in the US and that unity could only be based on the CP's programme. 
However, Bukharin, Radek and Kuusinen sent a letter to the CPA that ordered the 
Party to begin the 'immediate construction of a legal political party on a national 
scale', even if this meant that 'the program of the legal party will have to be 
somewhat restricted. ' Yet, they emphasised, underground Party leaders must hold the 
key leadership positions in the legalised party as well. 20 In late 1921, a legal CP 'front 
group', the American Labor Alliance (ALA), and the Workers Council organisation 
negotiated forming a legal party. It was relatively easy to achieve unity by forming a 
legal party, called the Workers Party (WP), since the Workers Council and the CP 
shared the same programme but differed only in whether to have a legal party. The 
WP, with an estimated 25,000 members, was, in J. Louis Engdahl's words, dedicated 
'to wage the open struggle for communism in the United States. ' Yet, crucially, the 
WP was subordinated to the illegal CP, in keeping with the Comintern's 
instructions. 21 
Another ex-Socialist Party grouping that supported the Bolsheviks but 
opposed an illegal organisation was the Finnish Socialist Federation (FSF). By a 
peculiar combination of factors, socialism was extremely popular amongst many 
immigrant Finns. In the seven years after its founding in 1907, the ranks of Finnish 
Socialists swelled from less than 3 000 to almost 14,000. In 1914,25 to 30 per cent of 
Finnish-Americans were Socialists-roughly the same number as supported the 
20 Bukharin, Radek, Kuusinen, 'Concerning the Next Tasks of the CP of A', 192 1, in Comintern 
archives, 515: 1: 38. 
21 CEC minutes, 3-9 November 192 1, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 5 1; Cannon, First Ten Years, 44- 
45; J. Luis Engdahl, 'The Workers Party is Launched', Labor Age, February 1922; J. B. S. Hardman, 
'Postscripts to Ten Years of Labor Movement', in. Hardman, ed., American Labor Dynamics, 22. 
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Finnish-American Church. 22 The first language section to affiliate with the SP, the 
FSF had created an entire 'hall socialist' culture around the FSF's newspapers and 
meeting halls. Although a majority of the I 0,000-odd Finnish Socialists supported the 
Bolshevik Revolution early on, they, with few exceptions such as Santeri Nuorteva, 
maintained their distance from the Left Wing. 23 Instead, the Finns hoped to pressurise 
the SP to support the Third International and regain a Marxist programme. FSF 
leaders feared the illegal Party would both be ineffective and jeopardise FSF legality 
and assets, including its halls. Only at its December 1920 conference did the FSF vote 
to break from the SP; still, however, it remained aloof from the illegal Party. The FSF 
enthusiastically supported the foundation of the VvT and, in February 1922 the 
unanimously voted to join the new VvT, bringing almost seven thousand members. 24 
According to the CP's Communist, the CEC of the Party had voted, in the 
cryptic parlance of the underground: 
To organize No. 2 [the legal party] with the purpose of building a mass 
movement in this country and win the majority of the workers to our program. 
To maintain our No. I machinery [illegal party], making merely adjustments 
just now and final adjustments at our next Party convention. 
The motion continued by noting the importance of a legal party: 
With the more or less exclusive and static membership of No. I we can not 
reach out to the broad masses and exercise a directing influence over them.... 
The CP is underground and only reaches the outskirts of the Labor 
Movement. 25 
Along these lines, the CP sought discussions with 'those who state that they are 
willing to follow the direction of our Main Directing Body', i. e., the Comintern: 'The 
formation of No. 2 is in conformity with the needs of the workers of America. It is in 
11 John 1. Kolehmainen, 'The Inimitable Marxists: The Finnish Immigrant Socialists', Michigan History 
36 (1952), 396; Auvo Kostiainen, The Forging ofFinnish-American Communism, 1917-1924: A Study 
in Ethnic Radicalism (Turku, Finland: Turun Yliopisto, 1978), 32. The unique history of the Finnish- 
American Communists will be examined in the chapter on Bolshevisation, below. 
23 On Nourteva, see David John Ahola, Finnish-Americans and International Communism: A Study of 
Finnish-American Communisinfrom Bolshevization to the Demise of the Third International 
(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981), 6-13, and Auvo Kostiainen, 'Santeri Nuorteva 
and the origins of Soviet-American Relations', American Studies in Scandinavia 15 (1983), 1-13. 
24 See Kostiainen, Forging offinnish-American Communism, 70-127. 
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accordance with the instructions of our Main Directing Body. ' Equally important, the 
aims of the Comintem did not contradict the 'needs of American workers', but instead 
sought to foster them by creating a legal Party. 26 Far from hurting the Party, the 
Comintern greatly assisted early Communists to adopt their tactics to American 
society. 
Cannon presided over the formation of the WP and was is first chairman. His 
keynote speech at its founding in December 1921 stressed that the Workers Party 
'brought together into a convention practically every left wing element in America', 
although, he noted, 'we have come here from different roads. ' The founders 'fighting 
men and women from all fields, from all movements' who 'came to submit in the 
name of unity, and the sealed and guaranteed our pledge to present a unified 
movement to the workers of America'. If these delegates came, however, they came 
only because the Comintern had prompted them to do so. 'I think', Cannon continued, 
f every man and woman in this hall will say with me that we look for our guidance to 
the inspirer, the organizer and leader of the world proletariat, the Communist 
-)27 Intemational . 
Cannon urged his comrades to 'take out of our minds the last bit of small 
personal malice' and, 'in the true spirit of revolutionary comradeship, join together in 
. 
28 
-f this work' Nonetheless, the newly ormed WP was still fragile, as evident by the 
coverage of the unification in the CP's Communist. A front page editorial, 'Our 
attitude towards the Workers Party', declared the WP programme 'a revolutionary 
fighting program that needs only to be lived up to by a well organized and disciplined 
party to create the real beginning of an independent political movement of the 
" Communist (CP), January 1922. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Voice ofLabor, 6 January 1922, in James P. Cannon and the Early Years ofAmerican Communism, 
90-93. 
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American working class'. The editorial dubbed the ALA-i. e., the CP itself-'the 
moving spirit and backbone of the whole affair' and 'the most revolutionary'. Yet, it 
continued, 'Unfortunately the same can not be said about the Workers' Council group, 
particularly its leadership. We shall abstain for the present from mentioning their old 
sins against the Communist Party of America and the Communist International. We 
shall only do so when necessity shall compel. )29 
Fights over legality 
The creation of the WP did not end the intemecine warfare over legality. The 
former members of the Workers Council-now the 'Right Opposition' within the 
WP-continued to support total legality. But the 'Left Opposition', led by CEC 
members 'Henry, Curtis and Dow' (or rather, George Ashkenudzie, John. J. Ballam, 
and Charles Dirba, respectively), split to form an illegal party organisation. 30 
Their proclamation, published in yet another Communist, promised that the 
split had been part of 'a struggle to prevent the liquidation and destruction of the 
Communist Party as planned by those centrist and semi-centrist elements within the 
communist movement in this country'. The former Workers Council leaders were no 
better than warmed-over social democrats who had been 'for more than two 
years ... seeking to stab the young communist movement 
in the back'. The very act of 
fusion with the CP was their greatest treachery since it 'unit[ed] in one camp all the 
menshevik elements in the American movement'. For clarity, this organisation 
assumed the same name as the official CP-'the Communist Party of America, 
Section of the Third International'-and adopted the same constitution, with the 
addition of the proviso that 'The Communist Party of American is an underground 
28 Ibid., 94. 
29 Communist (CP), January 1922. 
Jacob Zumoff 79 
and illegal organization. ' They dedicated themselves to 'carry on the fight to expose 
and destroy the Workers' Party as completely as we smashed to bits the Socialist 
Party of America'. Time was short, they warned, since the majority's 'agents were 
busy in Moscow' duping the Comintern. 31 
Although tiny, this split once again threatened to sacrifice American 
Communism upon the altar of factionalism. And, once again, the Comintern rescued 
the Party. In November 1921, the Comintern cabled the CEC that: 'Full board 
directors yesterday officially unanimously confirmed president's stand unreservedly 
endorsing new corporation, demanding all salesmen immediately comply. ' When the 
opposition did not comply, they were suspended from both the CEC and the Party. 32 
In early March 1922, Kuusinen communicated the ECCI's agreement with the 
suspension of the minority, denouncing their 'serious and intolerable breach of 
discipline'. Nonetheless, he urged the CEC to create 'as little permanent 
disorganization as possible' by getting the opposition to return to the Party and Party 
discipline. 33 
Both the 'left opposition" and the 'right opposition' dispatched members to 
argue before the Comintem. The hefty composition of the American Commission- 
consisting of Comintern leaders Heinrich Brandler, Matyas Rakosi and Kuusinen, and 
later Boris Souvarine, among others-indicates the efforts that the ECCI expended on 
the American Party. 34 At first, Ballam-now using the name Moore-was 
" See the CEC minutes of 3-9 November 192 1, for the splitters opposition to legalisation, and their 
appeal to the Comintern; see the minutes of 28 November 1921 for their suspension from the CEC and 
the Party, and the Comintern's rebuke, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 5 1. 
31 Communist (LO), February 1922; See especially John More (Ballam), 'Tbe Communist Party of 
America and the Communist International', and 'Bluffing the Comintern', ibid., February 1922 and 
March 1922. 
32 CEC minutes, 28 November 192 1, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 5 1. 
33 O. W. Kuusinen for the ECCI to the CPA CEC, undated but received 9 March 1922, in Comintern 
archives, 515: 1: 128. 
34 'Report of the International Delegate to the Conference of the C. P. A. ', ibid., June 1922; Draper, 
Roots of, 4merican Communism, 356. 
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unrepentant. He fired off a missive, decrying the 'haphazard' nature of the 
commission, and claiming that the 'entire question has been misrepresented. 935 In his 
testimony to the commission, he claimed the support of 5000 comrades, and 
stubbornly announced: 'We will stay outside of the Communist International, if we 
must, but within one year the Communist Party will recognise the Communist Party 
of American which I represent, or they will recognise nobody. 36 Actually, in fact, the 
commission unanimously supported the 'right' leaders, Max Bedacht and Ludwig 
Katterfield, on the necessity of forging a legal party. The Commission stated that 
ECCI 'refuses recognition' to Moore's 'split-off faction', and 'demand [ed] of all 
members of the faction ... that they re-join the C. P. of A. as soon as possible, while 
promising 'full membership rights'. 37 The ECCI 'severely reprimand[ed] them [the 
opposition] for their refusal to abide by the decisions of the C. I. and their destructive 
breach of Communist discipline. ' If the opposition did not accept the this decision 
within thirty days, they would be 'expelled from the Communist International, and 
cannot be readmitted to any section of the Third International, except as new 
members. 
38 
The cryptic cable announcing the decision is worth quoting in full, if only to 
give a flavour of Comintem directives: 
HENRY CURTIS DOW COMPANY INSTRUCTED QUIT USING OUR 
FIRM NAME AND TRADEMARK STOP THEY MUST DISSOLVE AND 
REJOIN OUR COMPANY IMMEDIATELY OR LOOSE THEIR STOCK 
STOP JOHN [BEDACHT] IS WRITING THEM TO QUIT COMPETING 
AND ATTACKING OUR BUSINESS STOP YOU MUST ACCEPT THEM 
35 Moore's protest to ECCI, 18 March 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 128. 
36 Statement by Moore, 18 March 1922, ibid. 
" Letter from Matyas Rakosi for the American Commission of the CI to the American CP, Communist 
(LO), June 1922. 
39 'To All Members of the Communist Party of America', March or April 1922, in Comintern archives 
495: 1: 26, published in Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Kyrill M. Anderson, 7he Soviet World of 
, 4merican Communism, 
19. 
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WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND POSTPONE STOCKHOLDERS 
1F7 39 CONFERENCE UNTIL THEY CAN PARTICPATI- 
The Commission ordered that the 'left' opposition return to the Party, and instructed 
the Party to call a convention to work out the relationship between 'No. I' and 'No. 
2'. Within days, Moore decided to rejoin the Party and accept its discipline, declaring 
that 11 cannot oppose ... the policies of the 
Comintern. A0 He then attempted to 
convince his erstwhile followers to return to the Party. 41 
Although the Comintern had sided with the legalisers, it was not very happy 
with its American section. A year earlier, Ballister, then the US representative to the 
Comintern, noted in a letter to his comrades back home that 'it is considered a crime 
to only mention America in the presence of any of the responsible heads of the 
concern' and he rued that 'the main office considers the American branch more a 
nuisance than as a bona fide business institution. 
A2 Things had not qualitatively 
improved in the ensuing year. An ECCI letter to the CP noted that it had 'for the last 
two years ... been 
following with deepest concern the strife in the Party in America, 
which presents constant obstacles to the creation of a strong revolutionary Party. ' This 
letter, once again, 'reassert[ed] in the most emphatic manner' the ECCI's support for a 
legal party. It denounced the minority's conception of the Party as 'a religion for the 
chosen ones', and repeated the order for the opposition to return to the Party. Yet, the 
letter also introduced something new. Besides calling for a convention to hash out 
these differences, the Comintern also announced that it was sending a 'plenipotentiary 
39 R. M. Whitney, Reds in America (New York: Beckwith Press, 1924), 36. A copy of this telegram, 
signed 'Block and Company, is in the Comintern archives, 515: 1: 39. 
"' See Moore's letter to Zinoviev, 'In Re: American Situation', 24 March 1922, in Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 128; and J. Carr [Ludwig Katterfeld] and John Moore's 'Declaration' on the Party situation, 25 
March 1922, ibid. 
41 For evidence how this played out on the ground, see letter from L. C. Wheat [Lovestone] for the CEC 
to Curtis, Dow, Henry, II April 1922, inviting the minority back into the Party; the 'Special Bulletin 
on Party Situation' issued by the CEC in May 1922 and containing several relevant documents, all in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 128. 
42 Letters from James Marshall [Ballister] to 'Dear Friends', 25 April and 4 May 192 1, in Comintern 
archives, 5151: 39. 
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representative' to the conference, and warned: 'We already had to contend with even 
greater difficulties than yours in some countries, and have learned to overpower 
them. 9 
43 
This convention took place, illegally, at Bridgman, Michigan, in August 
1922.44 Ironically, the police raided the conference, seized many documents, and 
arrested leading CPers such as Ruthenberg and Foster. Despite this inauspicious start 
to legal work, this was the last of the overt repressive attacks against Communists 
during this period. Jacob Spolanksy, an early goverment spy against the Party, 
declared after the arrest that the raid had less to do with the threat posed by the Party 
than with the anti-radical panic caused by a national railroad strike at the same time. 
Nonetheless, virtually all the leadership of the Party faced arrest or indictments. The 
Party had to post $100,000 surety because of the raid. 45 
At the Bridgman convention, Ballam, Dirba and Ashkendzie resigned from the 
CEC and Robert Minor, Alfred Wagenknecht and Earl Browder took their places, thus 
46 
signalling the end of the struggle against 'Henry, Curtis and Dow' . But the 
relationship of the legal party to the illegal party had not been finally settled, and 
another factional battle was soon raging between two new factions, the 'geese' and 
the 'liquidators'. The 'geese' advocated, as a matter of principle, keeping the illegal 
party in charge of legal work, while the 'liquidators' sought to legalise the party and 
abolish the underground work. The 'geese' were centred in the foreign-language 
federations, while the 'liquidators' had the support of most of the native American 
43 IECCI to the Communist Party of North America', 30 May 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 128. 
44 For an analysis of the composition of the delegates to this conference, see Harvey Klehr, 'The 
Bridgman Delegates', Survey, Spring 1976. 
45 See The Menace of 'Criminal Syndicalism'(New York: Labor Defense Council, nd), for a 
description of the raid and the government persecution of the Party. Spolansky's own account of his 
activities for the state can be found in Jacob Spolansky, The Communist Trail in America (New York: 
MacMillan, 1951). 
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cadre, including Cannon, Lovestone, Ruthenberg and Foster. These American leaders 
understood that in order to be a factor among the United States labour movement, the 
Party would have to transcend its subterranean existence, and branch out beyond 
immigrants into the anglophone proletariat. The curious names came from each 
faction's insults about the other. Lovestone had once remarked that the 
undergrounders-on-principle cackled like geese about saving the underground party, 
while the 'geese' in turn sought to associate their opponents with the faction within 
the Bolshevik Party that wanted to abolish underground work after the defeat of 
47 1905. 
The 'liquidators' were not sanguine about democratic rights under American 
capitalism. Besides the fact that the convention itself was raided, one of the their chief 
spokesmen, Cannon, had just finished a prison sentence. Foster and Ruthenberg were 
both under indictment from the Bridgman raid. But they believed that, on the whole, 
inter-war America was not tsarist Russia, and that by dogmatically remaining 
underground the Party was letting opportunities slip by. 
The fight over legality can be seen by several documents from the 
48 
conference. The Geese submitted a 'Thesis on Relations of One and Two' which 
argued that the 'legal political party which such restrictions can not replace the 
Communist party'. For them, the 'underground machinery of the Communist party' 
should not be 'not merely a temporary device.... The underground machinery is for 
permanent use.... It is for constant use. ' To safeguard the illegal party, the 
underground should retain 'full control of such legal party' and the 'personnel of 
46 Whitney, Reds in America, 158. According to Benjamin Gitlow, I Confess: The Truth About 
American Communism (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co, 1939), 425, Ashkendzie eventually transferred 
to the Russian Party and by the late 1920s was working in the Comintern. 
47 Earl Browder, No Man's Land: A Political Autobiography (undated MS, Earl Browder Papers, 
Syracuse University), 167. 
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committees of Number Two should consist of its majority of the personnel of the 
corresponding committees of Number One'. " 
Against this, the liquidators argued 'that not only had the No. 2 absorbed 
almost all the ordinary tasks carried out through the C. P. in the workers' everyday 
struggle but these tasks are performed more efficiently by the No. 2' rather than the 
illegal party. In addition, it was hard to recruit workers to a completely underground 
organisation and a dual-party structure was chaotic. The document, by J. P. Collins 
(Joseph Zack), ended by urging the Party to 'get away from this hocus-pocus and on 
to the task of developing an open Communist Party'. Instead of creating a completely 
legal party overnight, Zack proposed that No. I 'carry out the many tasks that will 
develop during the struggle which cannot and should not be done in the open' but 
emphasised that 'No. I cannot remain the kind of organization it is now. '50 
The result of the convention was a 'compromise' resolution, developed by 
Robert Minor, that labelled 'open work' as 'the main task of the party', yet 
nonetheless asserted that 'the illegal Communist party must continue to exist' in order 
to 'direct the whole Communist work'. The resolution categorically stated, 'A legal 
Communist party is now impossible. ' Besides giving the illegal party control over the 
activities of the legal party, the agreement went so far as to posit that, 'in spite of all 
the differences, America belongs in the category of countries like Finland, Poland, 
Roumania, Jugoslavia, where the Communist party must be illegal. '51 
In order to understand the Bridgman convention, and also the relationship 
between the Party and the Comintern at the time, it is necessary to examine the role of 
" The main source of these seized documents is R. M. Whitney's Reds in America. Many of the 
documents were also printed in the Communist in 1922, although with modifications in order to make 
them more cryptic. 
"" Whitney, Reds in America, 225-30; see also, Communist (majority), July 1922. 
10 Whitney, Reds in America, 14-16. 
51 Ibid., 24-25. 
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the Comintern's representative. This was Henryk Valetski (or Walecki), a Polish 
mathematician. He was assisted by the Hungarian Joseph Pogany, and Boris 
Reinstein. 52 The delegation illustrated the internationalism of the Comintern. Valetski 
had seen internecine factionalism in the Polish movement, and the Bolsheviks no 
doubt expected him to be able to cut through the problems in the American Party with 
the assistance of Reinstein, who had much experience in the US. 53 
Luckily for the historian, Valetski detailed his services in a report back to the 
Comintern. He began by noting, that at the time of his arrival, 'The meetings of the 
family council were spent wholly on personal matters, [while] the big struggles which 
were going on outside never came up for discussion. ' Even though there existed only 
a 'slight difference of views' on serious matters between the factions, 
they have conducted their fight in such a way that the interests of the Party as 
a whole disappeared behind those of the factions, and because without the 
timely intervention of your representative and his two friends a new split 
might have taken place, the most senseless of all splits that ever took place in 
the American movement. 
The factions, he wrote, 'represented more different frames of mind than different 
tendencies'. Valetski immediately created an eight-person committee to reach 
agreement between the factions. And he also played a prominent role: 'I adopted no 
conciliatory attitude, did not pose as arbitrator; rather I fought openly every heresy, 
every false judgement of the political solutions in the published theses., 54 Despite his 
bragging, he hesitated to strongly take a side in the dispute, as shown by the 
compromise. The most important example of his intervention into the Party, however, 
was to safeguard Party unity, and prevent unnecessary splits, by flexing Comintern 
muscle. 
52 For the Comintern delegation, see Draper, Roots ofAmerican Communism, 363-65. 
" Cannon emphasised this point to Draper in his letter of 18 August 1954, in Theodore Draper papers, 
Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, box 3 1. 
34 Waletsky to Kuusinen, 8 October 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 128. 
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Valetski also met the Workers Council. Although he believed that some 
Council leaders-especially Salutsky-were more right-wing than others, he believed 
that they were being pulled to the left by the Workers Council as a whole. More 
importantly, he addressed a convention of the 'left opposition', representing some 
2500 people, and convinced them to return to the official Party. This meant swaying 
them from their more extreme positions, such as their labelling the WP a 'palpable 
fraud' and a 'centrist sect', and their demand that reunification be based upon the 
expulsion from the Party of Cannon, Beclacht, Ruthenberg and Lovestone-i. e., the 
entire leadership of the Party! 55 
After the Bridgman convention, the Party was at a crossroads. While officially 
accepting the Comintern's insistence on legal work, in practice its members still 
emphasised illegal activity. 56 But such a compromise was not tenable. In the summer 
of 1922, Ketterfeld, a Goose factionalist, and Cannon, a liquidator as well as WP 
chairman, travelled Moscow to attend the Fourth Comintern Congress. In a speech on 
the eve of the Congress, Trotsky argued that 'a revolution in the United States would 
be most advantageous' because it was 'the most independent' and 'the richest country 
in the world'. He continued, however, by noting that 'we must say that in this 
strongest, largest, and most decisive leading capitalist country, the political premises, 
i. e., premises on the plane of the creation of a systematic party and class 
organizations, are the least prepared'. Reflecting this importance, the Soviet delegates 
" For details of this convention, see the 'continuation of report' appended to ibid., and the 'Left 
Opposition' 'Manifesto of the Communist Party of America on the Workers Party', 1922, attached to 
report. Salutsky would later be expelled from the Party and, under the name J. B. S. Hardman, became 
the educational director, and, later, editor, for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. 
"' Ironically, the decisive vote in favour of maintaining the illegal apparatus was cast by one Fred 
Morrow, a government provocateur. See Browder, No Man's Land, 179; Draper, Roots, 366-69. 
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to the American Commission consisted of such heavy weights as Zinoviev, Radek and 
BukhaTin. 57 
Cannon and Alexander Bittelman (whose official remit was to present a report 
on the Jewish movement in the US) lobbied the Comintern leadership over the 
importance of legal work. Cannon recalled that he had spoken with Zinoviev, Radek, 
Bukharin, and the ECCI secretary, Kuusinen. They were 'extremely friendly and 
patient', but 'as though by a prior decision on their part, remained noncommittal'. 
Fearful of being associated with the 'liquidators' in the history of the Bolshevik Party, 
Cannon argued that while he supported Lenin in that historic fight, 'I thought there 
was a difference between Czarist Russia and Harding's America. 58 
This was the crux of the issue. Cannon and the liquidators desired to orient 
American Communism towards American reality, rooting it in the American labour 
movement. Beyond certain immigrant circles, the working class could not be 
convinced of the necessity of Communism by a small, underground organisation. The 
geese, however, believed that America was tsarist Russia. During the Congress, 
Cannon and Bittelman were frustrated in their quest, until Max Eastman-in Moscow 
to write a biography of Trotsky-arranged a hearing with his subject, the Comintern's 
second-in-command. Cannon, in his discussion with Trotsky, emphasised the political 
backwardness of the American working class, and the possibility of a legal party. He 
stressed 'the necessity of Americqnizing the party, of breaking the control of the 
foreign-language federations and assuring an indigenous national leadership'. 
Contrary to the common belief that this is exactly what the Comintern feared, Cannon 
57 Leon Trotsky, 'The Fifth Anniversary of the October Revolution and the Fourth World Congress of 
the Communist International', 20 October 1922, in The First Five Years ofthe Communist 
International, vol. 2,186; Cannon, First Ten Years, 70. 
5' Cannon, First Ten Years, 65-6. 
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later recalled that for the American party, this discussion 'changed everything 
ovemight'. 59 
Trotsky threw his weight behind the liquidators. He ordered Cannon to write 
its position on 'one sheet of paper-no more', to facilitate presenting them to the 
ECCI. In it Cannon argued that the 'illegality of the Communist Party of America is a 
major obstacle in its work'. Since 'American workers are still dominated by 
democratic illusions', the letter advocated 'a determined struggle for a legal 
Communist party'. It also highlighted the weakness that a majority of the Party's 
membership consisted of foreign-bom comrades 'who judge things not from the 
standpoint of objective conditions prevailing in America, but on the basis of their 
subjective conceptions, which are based on events in Europe'. 60 
The American Commission opened soon afterward, hearing from both the 
geese and liquidators, as well as the earlier splitters. According to Cannon, 'the big 
guns began to boom', as the Commission attacked the notion that a Communist Party 
must be illegal in principle. The Commission unanimously ordered the Party to 
become legal, work for a labour party, and tell the Left Opposition, once again, to 
rejoin the Party (and again, assure them full rights). 61 
Cannon, in an article afterwards, credited a 'long argument and a push from 
Moscow' for this new policy. 62 The Comintern's 'push' was indeed necessary for the 
Party to seize the opportunities for open work. However, Trotsky and the Comintern 
leadership did not just announce their position from Mount Olympus, but rather 
pursued a policy only after intense discussion with the leadership of the American 
59 Ibid., 68-69. George Hardy, a leader of the IWW who laterjoined the CP, wrote that he had a similar 
discussion with Lenin about the need for a legal Party in 192 1; Hardy, Those Stormy Years, 135-36. 
60 Cannon, Early Years, 95-97. The letter, whose original is deposited in the Comintern archives in 
Moscow, was signed by the 'Minority of the delegation to the Comintern', including Marshall, Cook 
and Lansing (Arne Swabeck, J. P. Cannon and Max Bedacht). 
6' Cannon, First Ten Years, 70-71. 
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Party. Two years later, Israel Amter noted that this legalisation 'widened the vista of 
the Communist movement in the United States to a degree hardly conceived by the 
American Communists. ' In a letter to Draper decades later, Cannon argued that 'a 
great problem of American communism, which it had not been able to solve by itself, 
was settled conclusively and definitely by the Comintem for the good of the 
movement'. 63 How American Communists learnt how to become legal offers perhaps 
the best illustration of the early, beneficial, relationship between the Communist 
International and its section in the United States. 
Cannon, Early Years, 117-23. 
Cannon., First Ten Years, 7 1; 1. Amter, 'The Communist International and the American 
Movement', Communist International, no 5 new series, 1924. 
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4. The Communist Party and the Labour Movement 
Most historians who study the influence of Communists in the American 
labour movement usually begin in the 1930s, skipping the Party's first decade. One 
such study simply called the 1920s a 'decade of failure'. ' While the early 1920s were 
not the most successful period of Communist work in the unions, they did help pave 
the road the Party would take later, especially since many of the trade union leaders in 
the 1920s, including John L. Lewis, William Green, Philip Murray and Sidney 
Hillman, played important roles in the 1930s. At its formation, the Party, believing 
revolution was near, all but ignored the organised working class, dismissing the 
unions as reactionary, and isolating Communists from the labour movement. Instead, 
the Party focused on the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Just as 
the Comintern had forced the Party to understand the need for unity and for legal 
organisation, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders intervened to make sure that the Party 
both recruited from the IWW and played a role in the much larger American 
Federation of Labor (AFL). This fonned a crucial part of 'Americanising' the Party, 
by forcing it to learn about the labour movement and recruit native-born workers. 
While the IWW as an organisation remained aloof from the Party, many rank-and-file 
wobbly militants joined the Party, and, along with a group of syndicalists around 
William Z. Foster, infused American Communism with important industrial 
experience and knowledge. These Communists, including Earl Browder, William F. 
Dunne, and James P. Cannon, in turn struggled to orient the Party towards the 
American labour movement. This chapter examines the interaction between the 
Comintern, the early Communist leadership, and the American labour movement in 
the first half of the 1920s. By the mid- I 920s, thanks to the Comintern's intervention 
1 Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that ShapedAmerican Unions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 20. 
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and Foster and Cannon's struggles, the Party was able to become a real, if small, 
2 factor in the labour movement, as described in the following chapter. 
The American Federation of Labor 
Under Samuel Gompers' leadership, the AFL was extremely conservative, 
eschewing radicalism or even class-based politics in favour of working within the 
capitalist system. This was compounded by the AFL's emphasis on skilled crafts. The 
AFL had a weak national structure, so there was room in the numerous local and 
international unions, and municipal and state labour councils, for a significant anti- 
Gompers opposition to develop. While the AFL as a national organisation had one of 
the most right-wing leaderships in the world at the time, many different radical 
tendencies could be found throughout it. John Fitzpatrick of the Chicago Federation of 
Labor and James Duncan from the Seattle Central Labor Council often opposed 
Gompers from the left; although not a radical, Lewis from the largest AFL union, the 
mineworkers, had challenged Gompers for leadership of the Federation in 1921.3 
Radicals had dealt with the AFL in two ways. Some worked within it by 
'boring from within'. Others, disgusted with Gompers, organised competing, radical 
unions through a policy of 'dual unionism'. Both positions were strongly rooted in the 
left by the 1920s. The Socialist Labor Party (SLP) had tried both policies, finally 
settling on dual unionism; the Socialist Party (SP) leadership favoured working within 
the AFL. In 1905, radicals from both the SLP and SP had come together to try to split 
the AFL through the organising the IWW. After this attempt failed, the IWW became 
' Cannon, The First Ten Years of, 4merican Communism, 89. 
30n the dangers of identifying the AFL leadership with its membership, see Strouthous, US Labor and 
Political. 4ction, 2 and passim. See also, John Howard Keiser, 'John Fitzpatrick and Progressive 
Unionism, 1915-1925' (PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 1965), 20,23,29,10 1. On dissent, 
socialist and otherwise, within the AFL, see Stanley Shapiro, 'Hand and Brain: The Farmer-Labor 
Party of 1920' (PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1967), 76-77; Melvyn Dubofsky and 
Warren Van Time, John L. Lewis: 4 Biography (Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 
1986, abridged edition), 57-58; David Montgomery, The Fall ofthe House ofLabor. The Workplace, 
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a rallying point for dual unionists. Still, by the 1920s, the AFL remained the largest 
trade union in the United StateS. 4 
Most early Communists, forged in the Socialist Left Wing, supported dual 
unionist IWW against the AFL. The June 1919 left wing conference declared that 'the 
American Federation of Labor, in its present organization and under its present 
leadership, is entirely reactionary, and cannot be ofany value in the workers' struggle 
for emancipation. '5 Interestingly, Irish syndicalist James Larkin, a founder of the 
Party, opposed dual unionism as part of his desire for American and English-speaking 
leadership. His experience in Ireland, and perhaps the fact that many Irish-American 
workers remained in the AFL, led him to advocate that Communists 'go into labor 
unions and try to revolutionize them'. Larkin, however, was arrested in 1919, and 
sentenced to five to ten years in prison for his role in initiating the Left Wing and 
played no significant role in the American left afterwards. (Al Smith pardoned him in 
1923, and he quickly returned to Ireland). 6 
The IWW and the CP 
While many early Communists were workers, they were not necessarily 
members of unions. Also, most were immigrant workers, and the Party had trouble 
recruiting English-speaking workers. In the automobile industry, for example, the 
Party recruited from the third of the auto workforce which consisted of immigrants, 
but had trouble in the other two-thirds. 7 Several early Communists had extensive 
the State and, 4merican Labor, 4clivism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
404406. 
4 David J. Saposs, Left Wing Unionism: 1 Study ofRadical Politics and Tactics (New York: Russel I 
and Russell, 1976 [1926]), 18-32; see also Philip S. Foner, History ofthe Labor Movement in the 
United States (New York: International Publishers, 1964), vol. 3,368-69; Bell, Marxian Socialism in 
the UnitedStates, 65. 
5 'Left wing section of the Socialist Party: Report of the labor organization committee', 21 June 1919 
(John S. Reed papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, bms Am 1091: 1449), emphasis added. 
6 Larkin, James Larkin, 234-43. See also, O'Connor, 'James Larkin in the United States', 183-96. 
7 Roger R. Keeran, 'Communist Influence in the Automobile Industry, 1920-1933: Paving the Way for 
an Industrial Union', Labor History 20: 2 (Spring 1979), 190,205-207. 
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experience in the labour movement. Some had been IWW militants, such as Cannon 
and Browder, who had been a part of the original left wing. 8 Other early recruits from 
the labour movement included William F. Dunne, who along with his brothers had 
been active in the Montana labour movement, and Arne Swabeck, a leader of the 1919 
Seattle General Strike, who were both charter members of the Party. 9 Another charter 
member was Ella Reeve 'Mother' Bloor, who had been a member of both the SLP and 
the SP and an organiser amongst women textile workers as well as a collaborator with 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn in the Workers Defence Union. 10 Rose Pastor Stokes, amongst 
the early SP leaders to join the left wing, had been active in strikes by garment, hotel 
and other workers, and had also been a socialist journalist and birth control 
advocate! 1 These members provided a cadre for the early Party to intervene into the 
American labour movement. 
Their first target was the IWW. In the immediate aftermath of the October 
Revolution, many wobblies sympathised with the Bolsheviks and, in late 1917, the 
IWW wrote to Lenin and the Bolsheviks as 'colleagues in the struggle for social 
revolution', to hail them for 'insPiring and accelerating a revolutionary movement, the 
like of which has never been seen before. ' 12 During this period Industrial Worker 
described the Revolution as achieving the IWWs goals. 13 In 1918, the IWW 
published a pro-Bolshevik pamphlet, Red Dawn, by Harrison George (who was in 
prison) which declared the Soviet regime 'pure and simple working-class rule' and 
' Cannon, First Ten Years, III- 
9 See Barrett, William Z Foster, 113. Dunne's interesting pre-Communist phase is described in Kurt 
Wetzel, 'Tbe Making of an American Radical: Bill Dunne in Butte' (MA dissertation, University of 
Montana, 1970). 
10 Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor', 221-222,280-86. On the WDU see Helen C. Camp, Iron in HersouL 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and the, 4merican Left (Pullman, Washington: Washington State University 
Press, 1995), chapter four. 
II On Stokes' activities in the labour movement, see Sharp, 'Rose Pastor Stokes', chapter 3. 
12 'Letter from American Workers to the Soviet Government', December 1917/January 1918, Political 
, 4ffairs, March 1970,27-28. 
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hailed the Bolsheviks as 'entitled to first place among the tacticians of the Modem 
Working Class'. In this way, the early IWW supporters of Bolshevism depicted the 
Russian Revolution as a reflection of the syndicalism of the IWW and not a political 
party. ' 
The IWW's New Solidarity in the spring of 1919 exhorted its comrades that 
'Russia has blazed the way, let us broaden the trail to make Freedom a fact and 
Industrial Democracy a reality thout [sic] the world. '15 In July 1919, another IWW 
newspaper, Rebel Worker, declared, 'The Soviet is One Big Union and nothing else' 
and urged its readers to 'Line up with the Soviet both in theory and in fact. ' 16 In late 
August, the GEB passed a resolution establishing a committee on international 
relations, that would 'provide for the representation of the I. W. W. as a constituent 
member of the Third International'. 17 
The Comintem wanted to recruit the IWW, and in January 1920 Zinoviev 
wrote a letter urging the lWW 'to rally to the Communist International, bom in the 
dawn of the World Socialist Revolution' and 'to take the place to which your courage 
and revolutionary experience entitles you to in the front ranks of the proletarian Red 
Army fighting under the banner of Communism'. Zinoviev appealed to the lWW as 
fellow revolutionaries 'to join the Communist International' and discard anarchist and 
syndicalist positions. Even though parliamentary cretinism as a hallmark of reformist 
Social Democracy, he stressed, revolutionary Communists could not ignore politics 
altogether. He also emphasised the need for a post-revolutionary state, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, instead of merely abolishing the state all at once. But while 
13 See McEnroe, 'The Industrial Workers of the World', 340-44, for the early reaction of the Industrial 
Worker to the Russian Revolution (quote on 343). 
14 Harrison George, The Red Dawn: The Bolsheviki and the L W. W. (Chicago: I. W. W. Publishing 
Bureau, nd [19181), 12,15-17. 
15 New Solidarity, I March 1919. 
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polemical, the letter was friendly and comradely. 'The Communist International 
extends a brotherly hand to the IWW', it ended. 18 
When the lWW finally received this letter, after more than six months'delay, 
members debated their relationship to the Comintern. 'Big Bill' Haywood, who like 
many IWW organisers faced repression because of his opposition to the war, read this 
declaration and decided that 'Here is what we have been dreaming about; here is the 
IWW all feathered out. 'The IWW endorsed the call for a Moscow meeting but was 
unable to send anyone. Many veteran wobblies had already left the IWW to organise 
the Party and many of those who remained distrusted the Comintern. When Haywood 
jumped bail (leaving the IWW to pay) and moved to Russia, Communist influence in 
the IWW declined more. " 
Unlike in Europe and parts of Latin America, the early Party did not quickly 
recruit many rank-and-file syndicalists, although not from the lack of trying. 20 John 
Reed, the Harvard graduate who had witnessed the Bolsheviks shake the world, and 
who had earlier helped Haywood organise the 1913 Patterson strike pageant in 
Madison Square Garden, attempted to recruit IWWers: 'if these men can be reached, ' 
he argued, 'if the position of the Communist can be explained to them in their own 
language, their native common sense will show them that we are right. And this must 
be done, for the I. W. W. is the advance guard of the American proletariat, and it is 
they who must lead the assault on capitalism in American. ' More proletarian 
"' Rebel Worker, 15 July 1919, quoted in Anderson, 'The Attitude of the American Leftist Leaders 
toward the Bolshevik Revolution', 53. 
Solidarity, 21 August 1920. 
Communist (UCP), 17 July 1920; Solidarity, 14 August 1920; cf also Degras, ed., The Communist 
International, vol. 1,71-74. 
" Solidarity, 14 August 1920; William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Big Book (New York: 
International Publishers, 1929), 360-61 
20 On the inability of the CP to recruit syndicalists at the same rate as elsewhere, see Larry Peterson, 
'Revolutionary Socialism and Industrial Unrest in the Era of the Winnipeg General Strike: The Origins 
of Communist Labour Unionism in Europe and North America', LabourlLe Travail 13(Spring 1984), 
128. 
Jacob Zumoff 96 
Communists with links to the IWW tried as well. Cannon spent hours to trying to 
recruit Vincent St. John, and, while coming close, failing in the end. Elizabeth Gurley 
Flynn, whose'Cottage in Staten Island was the setting for this debate, did eventually 
join the Party in the mid- I 920s. 21 
For the time being, wobblies were ambivalent towards Communism. In the 
autumn of 1920, the IWW's General Executive Board (GEB) rebuffed the UCP's 
appeals forjoint work . 
22According to George Hardy, a future Communist who was 
then General Secretary of the IWW, many wobblies disagreed with polemics against 
the lWW in the Party press. 23 An article in the Communist International by a former 
editor of the IWW Russian-language paper, regretted that 'all the distrust that the 
I. W. W. felt towards the Socialist parties, is transmitted to the Communist parties of 
America. ' Reed recalled being told 'I'm a Bolshevik, but not a Communist. A 
Communist is a member of a political party. 24 
Most wobblies supported the Russian Revolution, but not necessarily 
Bolshevism itself In The Red Dawn, Harrison George hailed the Bolshevik 
Revolution as an 'inspiring light that penetrates even the prison windows and floods 
my cell with the glory of the Red Dawn'. In 1920 the GEB expelled with 'horror and 
disgust' their Philadelphia dockers' union upon discovering that some members had 
helped load war materiel to be used against 'our brave fellow workers in Russia who 
have established the first working class government in the world': 
"On the Patterson Pageant, see Melvyn Dubofsky, 'Big Bill'Haywood (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1987), 78-79; for Reed's description of the IWW in 1918, see ibid., 118. 
On the Communist Reed's approach to the IWW, see John Reed, 'The Fighting I. W. W. in America', 
Communist International, old series no 13, [August? ] 1920; Cannon, First Ten Years, 305-306; On 
Flynn, see Camp, Iron in her Soul, 122. 
22 On the UCP overtures, see McEnroe, 'The Industrial Workers of the World', 3 64-65 
23 George Hardy, Those Stormy Years: Memories of the Fightfor Freedom on Five Continents 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), 13 1. 
24 V. Lossieff, 'Industrial Workers of the World', Communist International, old series vol. 3, nos. 16/17 
[ 192 1? ]; Reed, 'The Fighting I. W. W. in America. On Lossief, see McEnroe, 'The Industrial Workers 
of the World', 344. 
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We call upon the membership of our organization to use their utmost power to 
assist the Soviet government of Russia in fighting the world's battle against 
capitalism.... The IWW holds out the clean hand of brotherhood to the 
revolutionary workers of the world * 
25 
Lenin, the former syndicalist J. T. Murphy recalled, maintained 'an admiration for the 
Industrial Workers of the World as fine courageous fighters but thought that they 
would pay dearly for their mistaken attitude to politics'. 26 
The IWW and the CP in 1920 
Solidarity refused to take a position on Zinoviev's letter, but declared that 'we 
grasp the hand of brotherhood that the Communist International holds out the 
I. W. W. 927 Yet not all wobblies were so favourable. One former leading wobbly 
recalled that the Bolshevik Revolution split the IWW 'into antagonistic camps'. 28 In 
May 1920, the IWW held a General Convention. According to Hardy-who, upon 
returning from England, had been elected chairman of the meeting and would soon be 
voted General Secretary-the meeting approved affiliation with the Comintem 
unanimously, but with very little discussion. This merely allowed the divisions to 
fester, especially since the convention voted a new GEB. A combination of over- 
enthusiastic and maladroit attacks on the IWW in the Communist press and a similarly 
vicious anti-Communist campaign led by John Sandgren increased hoStility. 
29 A 
three-month debate on affiliation to the Comintern followed. Some lWW leaders, 
such as Sandgren, editor of the One Big Union Monthly, and H. F. Kane, editor of the 
Seattle-based Industrial Worker, bitterly opposed affiliation, as did the new GEB, 
25 Solidarity, 14 August 1920. The IWW union in question, Local 8 of the Marine Transport Workers 
industrial Union, was atypical in a number of ways. It consisted largely of blacks, and it also was much 
less politically motivated than many other IWW locals. See Kimmeldort Battlingfor American Labor, 
chapter two on the local's history and pp. 61-64 for the explosives issue. 
26 J. T. Murphy, New Horizons (London: John Lane, 1941), 129. 
27 Solidarity, 14 August 1920. 
29 George, The Red Dawn, 2; Cf. Hardy, Those Stormy Years, 82-83, for an account of the greeting of 
the Russian Revolution amongst IWW prisoners. 'Antagonistic camp' quote from Ralph Chaplin, 
Wobbly. - The Rough-and-Tumble Story ofan American Radical (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1948), 288. 
29 Hardy, These Stormy Years, 129-3 1. 
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largely on an anti-political impulse. 30 At the same time, the Chicago-based Solidarity 
supported affiliation so fervently that one historian has written that it 'seemed during 
this period to belong to a different organization'. 31 
The confusing nature of the debate can be seen by the motions the IWW 
passed. In late August 1920, the GEB defeated a motion to endorse the Comintern and 
moved: 'That we do not endorse the Third International officially, and that we notify 
the Third International that our position makes it impossible to endorse same as it is 
outlined in the Zinovieff appeal to the I. W. W., and that we are in favor of an 
Economic Industrial International. ' At the same time, the GEB passed another motion, 
declaring 'That we endorse the Third International with reservations, as follows, that 
we take no part in parliamentary action whatsoever and that we reserve the right to 
develop our own tactics according to conditions prevailing. ' Finally, the GEB 
unanimously decided to submit the three above choices to the general membership. 32 
'Unconditional affiliation' failed 602 to 1658, but affiliation conditioned on not 
having to participate in parliamentary action passed. 33 
As General Secretary, Hardy, after visiting Moscow and meeting Lenin, 
returned to the US via London, and organised a tour with Jack Tanner, a former 
British syndicalist who had just joined the British CP, to convince lWW members of 
the correctness of the Communist programme. 34 
The Comintern and the Profintern 
In 1921, the Party, while trying to recruit from the IWW, rejected dual 
unionism and began to work within the AFL. Like the attempt to legalise the Party, 
30 See New Solidarity, I February 1919, for Sandgren's anti-Soviet position. On the differences 
between the old and new GEB, see McEnroe, 'Industrial Workers of the World', 356-57. 
31 John S. Gambs, The Decline ofthe L W. W. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 80. 
32 Solidarity, 28 August 1920. Ironically, these conditions mirror those of the SP: a rejection of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and a condemnation of Moscow-domination. 
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this shift came largely from Comintern efforts to root American Communism in 
American reality and the American labour movement. This was part of the a broader 
shift at the Third Comintern Congress towards painstaking work to recruit amidst a re- 
stabilising capitalism; this was a reversal of the attitude at the First Congress, when 
the Bolsheviks had been so sure of imminent revolution that they largely neglected 
trade-union tactics and took no side in a debate over whether Communists should 
work within established unions. Ironically Boris Reinstein argued against dual 
unionism, and the German Eberlein-who had opposed the founding of the 
Comintern to begin with-believed the unions were hopelessly reactionary. 35 
The seeds of this new policy were planted the Second Congress. In preparation 
for that Congress, Lenin wrote 'Left Wing'Communism, An Infanlile Disorder as a 
polemic against those Communists who supported dual unions. An entire chapter 
answered the question, 'should revolutionaries work in reactionary trade unions? 06 
To win the masses to Communism, Lenin stressed, Communists 'must absolutely 
work wherever the masses are to befound. Lenin did not dispute that the trade-union 
bureaucracy was anti-Communist-in fact, he quoted favourably De Leon's 
6profoundly true' description of them as 'labour lieutenants of the capitalist class'- 
but argued that the best way to defeat them politically was inside the unions they 
37 led. 
During the Second Congress, English briefly replaced French as an official 
language to facilitate discussion because American delegates opposed the idea of 
" On the Zinoviev letter, and the debate and referendum in the IWW, cf. McEnroe, 'Industrial Workers 
of the World', 347-63. 
34 Hardy, These Stormy Years, 131,14 1. 
35 Albert Resis, 'The Profintern: Origins to 1923' (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1964), 14-15. See 
Pierre Broud, ed., Les Congres de lInternationale Communiste: le premier congres, 2-6 Mars 1919 
(Paris: Etudes et Documentation Interriationales, 1974), 81-85, for Reinstein's report 
36 ThiS Was first published in the US as N. Lenin, Should Communists Participate in Reactionary Trade 
Unions? (New York: Workers Party of America, [ 1922]). 
37 Lenin, 'Left- Wing' Communism, An Infantile Disorder in Collected Works, vol. 31,53. 
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working within the AFL and British delegates opposed Lenin's proposal to affiliate 
with the Labour Party. 38 This debate occurred in response to a report by Karl Radek 
on the trade-union question. Radek, a veteran Bolshevik, declared that the Communist 
Parties must not ignore the unions, and noted as an aside that since some 80 per cent 
of the US working class was unorganised, 'that it was necessary first of all to organize 
the active laboring class as far as possible and therefore to form new trade unions' to 
carry out this task. Fraina asserted that the IWW played this role in the US. In his 
summary, Radek strongly criticised Communists who left the AFL. 'We therefore, ' he 
thundered, 'should not only establish the definite position of the Communist 
International with respect to trade unions, but also we should emphasize a specific, 
supplementary amendment, that the revolutionary proletariat considers the position of 
our American comrades absolutely incorrect. 39 
John Reed vehemently opposed Radek's report. He agreed that the IWW 
would not soon supplant the AFL, and predicted that 'as an organisation, the I. W. W. 
will never be able to gain the majority of workers. ' However, unlike Lenin, Reed did 
not see this as the decisive question: 
But as a propaganda centre, as a destructive and revolutionary force, it is one 
of the chief agents in wrecking the great American Federation of Labour, in 
reaching and making class conscious vast proletarian masses, and for fifteen 
years it has held aloft with unflinching heroism the ideal of the overthrow of 
capitalism, an example to the workers everywhere. 40 
Since the AFL had itself not organised most American workers, Reed advocated a 
combination of independent unions and work within the AFL. He regard Radek's 
" James W. Hulse, The Forming ofthe Communist International (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1964), 195. 
39 Petrograd Pravda, 3 August and 7 August 1920, reprinted in the US State Department's dossier on 
the Congress, The 2"d Congress ofthe Communist International, as Reported and Interpreted by the 
0jf1cial Newspapers ofSoviet Russia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 60,68. 
40 Reed, 'The Fighting I. W. W. in America'. 
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position as contradicting the Bolsheviks' earlier overtures to the IWW. 
41 In a note he 
passed to Lenin, Reed wrote: 
I object to Radek's assertion that we have tried to sabotage the work of the 
Commission on Trade Unionism. That sort of remark takes the place of 
argument with Comrade Radek, because, knowing very little about Trade 
Unionism, he naturally has no attitude on the question. This is the real 
explanation. 42 
He told Alfred Rosmer, a former French syndicalist on the ECCI, that 'We cannot go 
back to America with a decision like that. In the [American] trade unions the 
Communist International has supporters and sympathy only among the Industrial 
Workers of the World, and you're sending us to the American Federation of Labour 
where it has nothing but implacable enemies. A3 In the end, although Radek conceded 
that building independent unions might be possible if the trade-union leadership 
refused to organise certain workers or expelled Communists, Reed lost the battle: the 
trade union commission endorsed Radek, 57 to 8.44 Opposing Radek meant opposing 
Zinoviev and Lenin. But rather than punish Reed his dissent, the Comintern's central 
leadership nominated him for the ECCI. At this point, the Comintern valued internal 
political debate and not rigid centralisation. Furthermore, Lenin's notes make it clear 
that he wanted to bend over backwards to ensure that British and American 
synclicalists 'should remain affiliated to the Third International', despite his 
differences with them. 
45 
At the Third Comintern Congress, Lenin and the Bolsheviks continued this 
trade-union fight. In a letter to Zinoviev, Lenin asserted that 'The tactics of the 
41 Resis, 'The Profintem', 54-55. 
4' Note from John Reed to Lenin during meeting of executive committee [nd, but during Comintern 
Congress], in John S. Reed papers (Houghton Library, Harvard University, fins AM 1091: 557). 
43 Alfred Rosmer, Lenin's Moscow (London: Pluto Press, 1971), 74. 
44 Robert A. Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionayr: A Biography ofJohn Reed (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1975), 373-76; Resis, 'The Profiritern', 56-59. Reed's support was centred among 
British syndicalists, who were also fighting against Lenin's insistence that British Communists affiliate 
to the Labour Party (cf Murphy, New Horizons, 148-50). 
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Communist International should be based on a steady and systematic drive to win the 
majority ofthe working class, first and foremost within the old trade unions. 46 To 
further this goal, the Third Congress organised the Red International of Labour 
Unions, or Profintem, to fulfil the previous Congress' call for 4an international centre 
for the trade union movement which, together with the Communist International, will 
make one whole, a single steel block'. 47 According to official sources, 380 delegates 
irst Congress in July 1921. from 41 countries attended the Profintern's f 48 
In one resolution, Losovsky, the head of the new formation, described the 
AFL's leadership as 'direct agents of capital' and 'a classic example' of the 'fusion of 
working-class leaders with the bourgeois state'. At the same time, he criticised the 
IWW as 'still too weak to replace the old unions', and imbued with 'purely anarchist 
prejudices against politics and political struggle'. For American Communists, the 
most acute task was 'to form revolutionary groups and cells in the heart of the AFL 
and independent unions' towards 'conquering the working masses in America' 
through 'systematic struggle in the hearts of these unions'. 49 Losovsky added that 'the 
more the IWW is isolated from the masses, the more aloof their organisations will be, 
the longer and slower the development class consciousness amongst the American 
proletariat. ' He continued that the 'coordination and unity of action with the AFL 
locals affiliated' to the Profintem was obligatory for the IWW. The lWW 
See Lenin, 'Material for the Second Congress of the Communist International', section 2, 'Re Jack 
Tanner's Speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern', 23 July 1920, Collected Works, vol. 42, 
202. 
46 Lenin to Zinoviev, 10 June 192 1, ibid, 320-2 1. 
47 'Manifesto to All Trade Unions on the Decision to found a Red Trade Union International', August 
1920, Degras, The Communist International, vol. 1,187. See Murphy, New Horizons, 157-58, for the 
early days of the Profintern. 
48 Degras, The Communist International, vol. 1., 274. 
49 A. Losovsky, 'Les taches et la tactique des syndicats', in Resolutions et Decisions du kr Congres 
International des Syndicats Revolutionnaires (Moscow: Internationale Syndicats Rouge, 1921), 24-25. 
Cf also, J. P. Morray, Project Kuzbas: American Workers in Siheria (New York: International 
Publishers, 1983), 76, for a partial English translation of this passage, as well as a discussion of the 
IWW's reaction. 
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representatives to the Congress resented this, decrying what they saw as the 
Comintem's desired 'liquidation of the revolutionary labor organizations into the 
50 
conservative labor bodies of the various countries'. 
Once again, the Comintern stressed the need for Communists to work within 
non-communist unions, and reiterated the differences between trade unions and the 
51 
revolutionary party and also stressed creating Party cells in the unions. Some 
delegates seemed too optimistic: Browder, in a letter to Trotsky, claimed that 'it is 
within the realm of possibility in the immediate future for the Communists of America 
to take over the direction of the labor movement. ' 52 However, most American 
delegates still opposed this perspective. Haywood argued that 'it is absolutely 
impossible to carry on any work inside the Federation [AFL], so reactionary is it. ' He 
even blamed 'the institutional paralysis which exists in Russia today' on the absence 
of an IWW-type group in tsarist Russia to train workers 'in the technical and 
industrial control of industry'. Haywood described the AFL as 'the buffer 
organisation of capitalism' and declared that 'Never during the nearly forty years 
existence of the A. F. L. has it done a single thing in the interests of the Working 
Class. ' Privately, he denounced this new perspective even more vociferously. He 
labelled the 'majority of the American Delegation' a (reactionary outpost, who 
dismissed the work of the IWW and were planning to 'return to the U. S. against the 
50 A. Lozovsky, 'La question d'organisation', Resolutions et Decisions, 50; Cf. Gordon Cascaden, Shall 
Unionism Die? Report on 'Red' Union International Congress (Windsor: Industrial Union League of 
Canada, [ 1922? ]), 34, for a partial English translation of the relevant section of Losovsky's report as 
well as a hostile account of the Profintern Congress by one of two Canadian delegates. Quote from 
IWW representative is from Morray, Project Kuzbas, 77. 
51 'Theses on the Communist International and the Red International of Labour Unions', 12 July 1921, 
in Degras, Communist International, vol. 1,277. 
52 Earl Browder to Leon Trotsky, 9 May 192 1, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 39. 
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I. W. W. ' Till his death in exile in 1928, Haywood remained opposed to boring from 
within. 53 However, the ECCI disagreed: 
It is unthinkable ... that a colossal trade union organisation such as the 
American Federation of Labor could be composed entirely of enemies of the 
working class, as are such organisations like the Ku Klux Klan or the various 
professional strike-breaking bodies. Here a strict distinction must always be 
made between the reactionary traitorous leadership and the unconscious petty- 
bourgeois-minded mass which we have to win. 54 
While the letter stressed the 'special duty' of American Communists to recruit 
'the best elements of the I. W. W. ', it described the Party's chief task as 'immediately 
advanc[ing] the slogan of a united front for Labour, as for instance, for the protection 
of the unemployed'. If Gompers opposed such a struggle, then this would undercut his 
authority. 55 The Party adopted a flexible approach, which Cannon described as 
working 'according to the concrete facts as it finds them, not according to a cut and 
dried fonnula'. The Party, Cannon wrote, should 'survey each industry separately, and 
in each case ask the question: "Where are the masses of the workers? ". ' 
Since the Party's goal was not to politically support the AFL leadership, but to build a 
base amongst the rank and file, 'its approach to the question in each case is practical, 
not just theoretical. 
956 
The Prorintern and the IWW 
The Party continued to work within the IWW to recruit out of it. In January 
192 1, the ECCI addressed a letter to the 'comrades and fellow workers' of the IWW, 
11 The Third Congress ofthe Communist International (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 
1922), 14142; William D. Haywood, 'Revolutionary Problems in America', Communist International, 
old series vol. 3, nos. 16-17, undated but published at the time of the Third Congress. 'Reactionary 
outpost' quote from WDH to Chas. E. Scott, 10 August 192 1, in Lovestone papers, Hoover Institute 
Archives, Stanford University, box 195, folder 12. On Haywood's opposition, see Edward P. 
Johanningsmeier, 'The Trade Union Unity League: American Communists and the Transition to 
Industrial Unionism, 1928-1934', Labor History 42: 2 (May 2001), 164-66. 
54 Bukbarin, Radek, Kuusinen, 'Concerning the Next Tasks of the CP of A', 192 1, in Comintern 
archives, 515: 1: 138. The letter also told the Party to pursue electoral activity, publishing a daily 
English-language paper, and take steps toward legalisation. 
55 'Theses on the United Front for Labour... ', Bulletin ofthe Executive Committee ofthe Communist 
International, no 5,7 July 1922. 
16 Cannon, 'The IWW and the Red International of Labor Unions', in Labor Herald, I December 1923, 
reprinted in Cannon, Early Years, 184. 
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asserting that 'our greetings to you is [sic] a recognition that your historic position 
entitles you to a place in the front ranks of the revolutionary anny of labor'. In a 
comradely fashion, the ECCI then took up the central disagreements with the IWW: 
the question of political action and the need for a proletarian state. The letter ended 
with the statement, 'You must dethrone the Gompers machine and drive them into 
oblivion. '57 The Communists tried to convince the lWW to affiliate with the 
Profintern, and, against Sandgren's opposition, the IWW voted to send a delegate to 
58 
the Profintem congress in 1921. Ironically, this hurt the Comintern's support within 
the IWW, because the IWW's delegate, George Williams, became a swom enemy of 
Bolshevism. He denounced as heavy-handed Comintern manoeuvres to guarantee 
Bolshevik domination and opposed the Communists' emphasis on political 
organisation, and their stress on working within established trade unions. He and other 
disgruntled delegates met in Berlin afterwards to establish a syndicalist bureau, 
counterposed to the Comintern and Profintern. Upon returning to the US, he carried 
out an anti-Bolshevik campaign within the IWW. 59 
Nonetheless, in a report to the ECCI in August 1921, the Party representative 
claimed that due to a 'special drive' in the IWW, the Party had 'succeeded in winning 
to the Party ranks almost all of the best known leaders'. He continued that 'The 
Communist nuclei are so strong in the I. W. W. that the capture of the organization is 
likely to come at an early date. ' 60 In November, the minutes of the CEC note that 
'7ECCI letter to 'comrades and fellow workers', 25 January 1921, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 38. 
58 Ibid., 14344. 
59 McEnroe, 'The Industrial Workers of the World', 375-78. See George Williams, The First Congress 
ofthe Red Trade Union Internaional at Moscow, 1921(Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, nd 
[ 1922? ]). Cf. Cascaden, Shall Unionism Die?, for another hostile report, from a similar perspective, 
from a Canadian delegate. For an account of the Berlin syndicalist bureau, cf Wayne Thorpe, 'The 
Workers Themselves'. - Revolutionary Syndicalism and International Labour, 1913-1923 (Amsterdam: 
International Institute of Social History, 1989). 
60 George Baldwin, 'Statement of the Communist Party of America to the ECCF, August 192 1, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 39. 
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some 25,000 copies of the Profintern's resolutions and appeals had been distributed 
amongst the IWW, and 'things coming to head in the 
IWW. i6l 
Not all former syndicalists reacted the same way as Williams. Foster and 
Bloor, as well as Haywood, all supported the Comintern. 62 Internationally, Larkin, 
Rosmer and Serge also threw their lots in with Communism, and Tom Mann, who 
attended the conference as well, soon joined the British Communist Party. 63 many 
left-wing social democrats and syndicalists saw Bolshevism as a way forward. 64 
However, the IWW as a whole did not follow Mann, Murphy, Larkin, Serge or 
Rosmer into the Communist movement for several reasons. First, the Communists' 
emphasis on winning the mass of workers through political action and work in trade 
unions with pro-capitalist leaders repelled many wobblies. Second, the lWW feared 
that affiliation with the Comintern would destroy their autonomy. Finally, the 
leadership of the post-war IWW, after unstinting government repression and the Red 
Scare, was a shadow of its former self and led by different leaders than in 1914 or 
1903. On 10 December 192 1, the GEB declared that it was not going to affiliate with 
the Comintern or the Profintem. It denounced working within the AFL and political 
struggle, and noted that since the Communists advocated 'liquidating' dual unionists, 
'the G. E. B. does not expect the I. W. W. will care to be a party to a carefully conceived 
plot for its own destruction. ' It announced that 'the IWW would find it impossible to 
cooperate with the Communist Party of America. ' The 13th Convention of the IWW, 
held in May 1921, rejected affiliation. 65 
61 CEC minutes 3/9 November 192 1, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 5 1. 
62 Foster's experience is recounted below; see Ella Reeve Bloor, We Are Many (New York: 
International Publishers, 1940), 172-75, for another favourable account of the Congress. 
63 Tom Mann, Tom Mann's Memoirs (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1967 [1923]), 270-71. 
64 For the development of this argument, see Peterson, 'Revolutionary Socialism and Industrial Unrest 
in the Era of the Winnipeg General Strike'. 
6' See Roy Brown, "'High Spots" of the Thirteenth I. W. W. Convention', Industrial Pioneer, June 
192 1. Joyce L. Kornbluh, ed., Rehel Voices, 324. For the CP's coverage of the debate, see for example, 
'Another Renegade' in the Toiler, II December 1920, reprinted in Cannon and the Early Years of 
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Even after the defeat, Communists continued to recruit IWWers. From 
Moscow, Haywood smuggled letters to his former comrades urging support to the 
Profintem. Although no longer in power, Hardy wielded his considerable prestige and 
authority within the IWW by touring locals to argue for affiliation with the Profintem. 
When the GEB forbade him from speaking he helped build a pro-Communist 
4minority movement within the I. W. W. ' and published Unity Bulletin to advance 
these view. According to Hardy, the anti-Comintern forces responded with violence 
and gangersterism. In January 1922 the GEB threatened to withdraw the bail money it 
had provided when he had been arrested along with other wobblies; this would have 
subjected him to immediate arrest and deportation. Finally, in early 1922, the IWW 
expelled Hardy, its former General Secretary, thus making it (according to Hardy) the 
first North American union to expel Communists. 66 
The defeat of the proposal to affiliate with the Comintern blocked systematic 
recruitment of IWWers into the Party. The divorce between the Communists and the 
IWW hurt both sides. The IWW entered a period of decline as it was poorly 
positioned between the shoals of state repression and the sirens of Communism. 
67 In 
1928, Cannon recalled that it was tragic that the Party 'allowed so many good 
proletarian fighters in the west fall into the hands of syndicalists and anarcho- 
syndicalists' because it 'had not learned to combine the ideological fight against 
syndicalism with the task of fighting side by side with the syndicalistic workers and 
winning them to the Party'. 
68 Still later, Cannon recalled that 'The failure of the main 
American Communism, 75; George Williams, The First Congress ofthe Red Trade Union Internaidnal 
at Moscow, 1921(Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, nd [1922? 1). 
66 Hardy, Those Stormy Years, 14547. On Haywood's letters, see Chaplin, Wobbly, 333. 
67 See Gambs, The Decline ofthe L W. W., for a study of the organisation from 1917 onwards; cf. Leland 
Walker Robinson, 'Social Movement Organizations in Decline: A Case Study of the I. W. W. ' (PhD 
thesis, Northwestern University, 1973), 66 for hostility towards Communism within the IWW, and see 
the thesis generally for the description of the IWW 'in decline' during this period. 
69 James P. Cannon at the Ninth W(C)P Plenum, 5 February 1928, in Jay Lovestone papers, box 213, 
folder 7. 
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cadres of the IWW to become integrated in the new movement for the Communist 
Party in this country' was 'a historical miscarriage which could have been prevented' 
since 'in their practice, and partly also in their theory, the Wobblies were closer to 
Lenin's Bolsheviks than any other group in this country. 69 
However, the repeated votes within the IWW indicated significant pro- 
Communist sympathies within the union despite the hostility of the leadership" The 
Party continued to organise nuclei within the IWW. In early 1926, for example, in the 
context of a Pan-American seamen conference called by the IWW, Harrison George 
described his continuing efforts to 'working within it to bring it closer to the Red 
International' . 
71 A TUEL National Committee meeting in September 1926 detailed 
the organisational disarray of the IWW and planned Party intervention in the IWW. 
Later, in early 1927, the minutes indicated that 'I. W. W. is so dead that it cannot even 
stir up an effective faction fight. 972 Still, through at least 1928, the Party kept nuclei in 
the IWW. 
73 
Enter William Z. Foster 
By 1932, one historian estimated that perhaps as many as 2000 IWW members 
had joined the CP, and that some 10 to 20 per cent of the Party membership had been 
in the IWW. These tended not to be rank-and-file wobblies, but lWW cadre. The list 
includes, besides Cannon, Foster and Johnstone, Harrison George, Vernon Smith, 
69 Cannon, First Ten Years, 302. 
" See for example, Cannon, 'The IWW and the Red International of Labor Unions', in The Worker, I 
December 1923, reprinted in Cannon, Early Years, 183-89, and idem., 'The IWW Convention', Labor 
Herald, January 1924, reprinted in Early Years, 190-95. See letter of James P. Cannon 'To all Party 
Editors' about a campaign to refute the IWW and Emma Goldman's attacks on the Soviet Union and 
the Comintern, 27 May 1922, in Com intem archives, 5 15: 1: 146. 
71 Harrison George to James N. Soger, 2 January 1926, in Bertram David Wolfe Papers, New York 
Public Library, box 4. 
72 TUEL National Committee minutes, 21 September 1926; ibid., 17 January 1927; both in Earl 
Browder papers, Syracuse University, series 2-150. 
73 Cannon, speech at Ninth Convention. 
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George Mink, Harold Harvey, George Hardy, Charles Ashweigh and Roy Brown. 74 
Finnish lWW leaders such as William Tanner and Leo Lauki along with between'a 
few hundred' and a thousand such Finnish wobblies joined the CP, although many 
ended up returning to Finland or going to the USSR. Vladmir Lossieff, one-time 
editor of the IWW Russian-language Vsermirny Souip, and cellmate of Haywood in 
Cook County Jail, defended the Bolsheviks in the Industrial Worker; by 1921 articles 
in the Communist International bore his by-line. 75 
The Profintern's greatest recruit to Communism was William Z. Foster, a 
former Socialist, dissident wobbly, and AFL organiser. In 1921, the Comintern. 
assigned its member parties to find suitable delegates for the Profintem Congress. in 
the US, the Party, at Cannon's suggestion, enlisted Browder for this task. Among the 
76 delegates was Bloor, amongst the Party's experienced labour organisers. But by far, 
Browder's most successful catch was one of the heroes of the left-wing of the labour 
movement, and possibly the greatest contemporary labour organiser, William Z. 
Foster. This quartet-Browder, Cannon, Cannon's associate William F. Dunne and. 
Foster-were to become instrumental in 'Americanising' the early Party by rooting it 
in the labour movement. 77 
Foster has long been a favourite of sympathetic historians of American 
Communism, and there has recently been a veritable deluge of books about him. 78 
Gambs, The Decline of the L W. W., 88-89. The estimate of membership was determined by 'guesses, 
based on conversations with members of both organizations'. 
" Kostiainen, The Forging offinnish-American Communism, 64,128-37. Tanner, for example, like 
Haywood, jumped bail and fled to Soviet Russia to avoid anti-radical repression. On syndicalists; 
joining the Communist movement, see Reiner Tosstorff s resume of his German thesis, ' "Moscow" or 
"Amsterdam"? The Red International of Labour Unions, 1920/21-1937, (PhD thesis, Johannes 
Gutenberg University, 1999) in Communist History Network Newsletter 8 (July 2000). 
76 Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor', 227,285. 
77 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 69. 
78 In addition to Barrett, William Z Foster and the Tragedy ofAmerican Radicalism, see Edward P. 
Johanningsmeier, ForgingAmerican Communism. On Foster's early life, see: William Z. Foster, From 
Bryan to Stalin (New York: International Publishers, 1937), 14; Johanningsmeier, Forging American 
Communism, 10-30. On Foster's early years, see Edward Johanningsmeier, 'Philadelphia "Skittereen" 
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In 1901, Foster joined the SP after an SLP soapboxer whetted his appetite the 
year before. 79 By 1909, in Seattle, he split from the SP along with a local leftist, 
Herman Franklin Titus, and later that year, joined the IWW and played an important 
role in the fight for free speech in Spokane. Soon Vincent St. John commissioned him 
to travel to Europe as a reporter for the Industrial Worker, where he absorbed the 
ideas of European syndicalism, especially the French CGT and the British Tom 
Mann. 80 From Mann, he developed his lifelong union philosophy: that leftist workers 
should 'bore from within' the conservative unions instead of forming more radical 
alternative unions. That way, he held, radicals would be able to influence the rank- 
and-file, rather than perpetuate their own isolation. 81 
Upon returning from Europe, Foster struggled within the IWW to (give up the 
attempt to create a new labor movement, turn itself into a propaganda league, get into 
the organized-labor movement, and by building up better fighting machines within the 
old unions than those possessed by our reactionary enemies, revolutionize these 
unions'. After failing to convince the IWW to renounce its reason for existence, in 
1913 he organised the Syndicalist League of North America (SNLA), which by 1915, 
had become the International Trade Union Educational League (ITUEL). 82 
and William Z. Foster: The Childhood of an American Communist', Pennsylvania Magazine ofHistory 
andBiography 117: 4 (October 1993), 287-308. 
Foster, From Bryan to Stalin, 19-20,23-24. 
ibid., 30; Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism, 37-47. On Titus, see Carlos A 
Schwantes, Radical Heritage: Labor, Socialism, and Reform in Washington and British Columbia, 
1885-1917 (Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho Press, 1994), 95-96 and passim. 
11 Cf. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, ISpeakMy Own Piece (New York: Masses and Mainstream, 1955), 160- 
63; On Mann, see for example Brian Pearce, Some Past Rank and File Movements (London: Labour 
Review, 1959), 12-17. See Mann's Industrial Syndicalist, July 19 10 and September 19 10, for examples 
of Mann's opposition to dual unionism. 
92 Foster quote from Industrial Worker, 2 November 1911, reprinted in 'Boring from Within: The 
Debate', in Anarcho-Syndicalist Review 31 (Spring 2001), 16; Johanningsmeier, Forging American 
Communism, 48 ff, 79; Brody, Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919,140. Foster gave contradictory 
dates for the formation of the ITUEL. In 1936, he described its founding as falling 'a few months after 
the beginning of the World War, in the midst of the 1914-15 industrial crisis' (William Z. Foster, 
American Trade Unionism: Principles, Organization, Strategy, Tactics [New York: International 
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He spelt out his political views in a pamphlet he co-wrote at this time, 
83 Syndicalism, much of this which is similar to the standard lWW perspective. He 
advocated a general strike to place society in the hands of the working class. After this 
revolution, he theorised, 'there will be no state' since 'the workers in each industry 
shall manage the affairs of their particular industry' with 'no need for any general 
supervisory body'. 84 
There are several notable features of Foster's politics. Like most syndicalists, 
he supported industrial struggle instead of political action. Foster elevated the union 
movement-at this time, albeit one which 'intends to overthrow capitalism'-as the 
only revolutionary force in society. He wrote that only 'one working class 
organization-the labor union-is necessary' and denounced 'working class political 
action' as 'even worse than useless'. 85 
Foster's writing tended to be anti-democratic and elitist: he directed 
Syndicalism to that rare 'American worker who arouses himself from the customary 
state of indifference characterizing workingmen'. He asserted that 'Syndicalism and 
democracy based on suffrage do not mix. ' Coupled with this was Foster's view of 
working-class 'direct action', based on the assumption that the masses of workers 
could not be won to revolutionary consciousness, but that only a 'militant minority' 
would lead the workers. Since sabotage-'all those tactics, save the boycott and the 
strike proper, which are used by the workers to wring concessions from their 
employers'--did not depend on organising the majority of the working class, it 
uniquely fitted Foster's perspective. 'Sabotage', Foster wrote, 'is peculiarly a weapon 
of the rebel minority. ' But even the general strike, which in Foster's view was 
Earl R. Browder, Trade Unions in America [Chicago: Daily Worker Publishing Company, (1925? )], 
15). 
" Earl C. Ford and William Z. Foster, Syndicalism (Chicago: William Z. Foster, [1913? ]). 
84 Ibid., 3,5. 
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destined to herald the end of the capitalist system itself, was to be a minority affair. 
'Great strikes break out spontaneously', he predicted, and thus 'they spontaneously 
produce the organization so essential to their success. 86 For Foster, the key task was 
for a militant minority to build the labour movement and manoeuvre to control it. The 
greatest sin of a radical, according to Foster, was to leave the ranks of organised 
labour, as De Leon and the IWW had, in the process because this deprived the 
movement of the input of radicals. 
For all his radicalism, Foster shared many positions with the right-wing of the 
labour movement. Like most AFL leaders and conservative Socialists, he believed 
that the majority of American workers were intrinsically conservative. He also shared 
with Gompers the view that organisation was more important than politics; in fact, in 
retrospect, Foster supported Gompers' expulsion of De Leon's followers from the 
AFL in 1890.87 Like Gompers, Foster was obsessed with combating dual unions. At 
bottom, Foster probably would have shared with Eduard Bemstein the view that the 
labour movement was everything, whilst the ultimate goal was nothing. Foster 
differed only by asserting that the movement was on a 'natural evolutionary course' 
towards revolution. The real difference between Foster and Gompers was that Foster 
spurred the workers towards increasing militancy; yet, whilst Foster was ensconced in 
the AFL, the differences between them blurred. 
War highlighted both the weakness and strength of Foster's approach. In 
Syndicalism, Foster had denounced militarism. Yet, during the war, he actively sold 
83 Ibid., 4,19,23. 
86 Ford and Foster, Syndicalism, 9,12,17. This aspect of Foster has been criticised by modem-day 
supporters of anarchism; cf. Jon Bekken, 'The Tragedy of Fosterism', Anarcho-Syndicalist Review3j 
(Spring 2001), 13-15. 
87Wil]iaM Z. Foster, The Bankruptcy of the Labor Movement (Chicago: Trade Union Educational 
League, [1922? ]), 26-27. 
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Liberty Bonds. 88 Most likely, like many in the labour movement-including non- 
AFL radicals such as Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union (ACW) leader Sidney 
Hillman-Foster realised that opposing the war would provoke draconian repression. 
According to Foster's logic of building the labour movement irrespective of political 
principle, supporting the war and exploiting the government's desire for labour peace, 
must have seemed logical. From this vantage point, Foster was successful since in the 
post-war period he made tremendous strides in organising workers. 89 
Foster's strategy first found success within the Chicago Federation of Labor 
(CFL), which, under the leadership of John Fitzpatrick, had a reputation for being 
more to the left than the AFL in other cities. 90 Foster became the business manager of 
the CFL's New Majority and the official CFL delegate to the 1918 AFL Convention. 
Along with Edward Nockels and Robert Buck, Foster played an important role in the 
CFL leadership in this period, even though the New Majority focused largely on 
organising the CFL-supported Chicago Labor Party. 91 
In quick succession, he organised massive strikes, under the auspices of the 
AFL-and with the close support of Fitzpatrick and the CFL-of Chicago meat 
packers, and after that, steel workers. Of all the strikes of 1919, these two perhaps 
" Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism, 80-83,88-90; Cannon, First Ten Years, 105-8. 
This did not stop Foster from later criticising those 'A. F. of L. leaders, as faithful labor lieutenants of 
capital, [who] were not slow to leap in as the recruiting agencies for the government'. Indeed, he 
claimed that 'As for my own attitude, I was, of course, opposed to the World War and also the United 
States' participation therein. ' Foster, From Bryan to Stalin, 86-87. 
89 Foster was not unique in his reasoning or decision; on the ACW and the war, see Steven Fraser, 
Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise ofAmerican Labor (New York: The Free Press, 199 1), 
114-17. Even the IWW, while not supporting the war, attempted to focus on organising workers instead 
of anti-war propaganda, although this did not save the union from repression. See Melvyn Dubofsky, 
We Shall Be All: A History ofthe IWW (New York: Quadrangle, 1969), 354-55. 
90 On Fitzpatrick and the radical nature of the Chicago labour movement, see Andrew Strouthous, 'A 
Comparative Study of Independent Working-Class Politics: The American Federation of Labor and 
Third Party Movements in New York, Chicago and Seattle, 1918-1924' (PhD thesis, University of 
London, 1996), 23-24,31-38,52-53. See also, Keiser, 'John Fitzpatrick'; On Fitzpatrick himself, see 
Keisser, 'John Fitzpatrick', 2-11; L. A. O'Donnell, Irish Voice and Organized Labor in America 
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Publishers, 1997), chapter 6. 
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captured best of all the restlessness-and power-of labour in the post-war period. 
Although both strikes were defeated, they catapulted Foster into the national 
imagination as a dynamic trade-union organiser. 92 
These strikes also seemed to confirm Foster's strategy. He had taken 
advantage of the opportunities created by the war in order to organise large numbers 
of workers. If he had either been in jail or outside the AFL, he probably would not 
have had the same success. Foster came out of these strikes more convinced than ever 
of his correctness. Several years later, Foster cited these struggles, 'the work of a mere 
handful of rebels' with 'no backing from the thousands of militants' outside the AFL, 
to illustrate 'the power of the militants among the organized masses'. 93 
The Steel Strike also confirmed Foster's belief in the inherently revolutionary 
nature of unions. His Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons (1920) criticised radical 
opponents of the existing labour movement and asserted that the trade unions were 
'directly anti-capitalistic'. The conservative slogans used by the AFL leaders, whether 
believed by the leaders themselves or not, were nothing more than 'a sort of 
camouflage layer or protective covering'. He continued: 
The trade unions will not become anti-capitalistic through the conversion of 
their members to a certain point of view or the adoption of certain preambles, 
they are that by their very make up and methods. The most that can be done is 
to clarify the aims and intensifying their efforts towards freedom. 
Dual unionism was a 'devitalizing drain' that 'must be stopped, and the great body of 
progressives and radicals won over to a whole-hearted support of the trade unions. 94 
In 192 1, Foster asserted that 'dual industrial unionism' was 'the principle ailment of 
91 Keisser, 'John Fitzpatrick', II- 14. On the New Majority, cf. Jon E. Bekken, 'Working-Class 
Newspapers, Community and Consciousness in Chicago, 1880-1930' (PhD thesis, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign, 1992), chapter nine. 
92 See Johanningstneir, Forging American Communism, 88-149; on the steel strike, see Brody, Labor In 
Crisis as well as Foster's own The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons (New York: Huebsch, 1920). 
91 Wm. Z. Foster, 'Dual Unions a Mischievous Idea', Labor Age, January 1922. 
94 Foster, The Great Steel Strike, 256-6 1. 
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American radicalism. ' Further, he added, 'If the trade union movement in this country 
is weak and conservative, the radicals are chiefly to blame. 95 
Shorn of his earlier rhetoric, Foster's perspective in the early 1920s was to 
build the labour movement through strengthening the existing unions in co-operation 
with their leaderships if possible. Towards this end, he and a small number of 
followers organised the Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) in November 
1920.96 The TUEL quickly became a vessel for Foster to fill: One contemporary 
remarked that 'not often does one find an organization so completely dominated by 
the philosophy and personality of one man as is found in the case of the Trade Union 
Educational League. 97 Foster stamped the TUEL with his conception of union 
organisation, and the early TUEL was peopled with his supporters such as Jack 
Johnstone and Earl Browder. Because of their investment of the AFL with 
revolutionary potential, one historian noted that 'without a scorecard it would have 
been hard to distinguish Foster's followers from other AFL trade-unionists. 98 While 
Foster's advocacy of working within the AFL found support within the SP, most 
Communists distrusted him. Haywood called the Steel Strike a 'dismal failure' 
because Foster had squandered an 'opportunity for revolutionary propaganda' and 
instead pleaded for national patriotism, even printing membership cards in red, white 
and blue. And the Party's few black members preferred the IWW over Foster because 
of the wobblies' better treatment of blacks than the AFL's. 
99 
"' William Z. Foster, 'What Ails American Radicalism, Socialist Review, April-May 1921. 
96 James R. Barrett, 'Boring from Within and Without, in Eric Arensen, et al, Labor Histories: Class, 
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Despite the gulf separating him from the Party, in 1921 Foster decided to 
become a Communist. ' 00 He claimed 'Lenin's stand on the trade union question' first 
attracted him. 'After more than twenty years of intellectual groping about', he added, 
'I was at last, thanks to Lenin, getting my feet on firm revolutionary ground. '101 
Certainly, without this shift in Communist policy away from dual unionism, Foster 
could not have conceived of becoming a Communist. Yet, by itself, this would not 
have turned Foster into a Communist, especially since the SP had long maintained a 
similar position. 
Foster, in fact, did not j oin the CP per se; instead, he saw himself as j oining 
the American section of the Comintern. No doubt, Foster sympathised with the 
Bolsheviks. In a pamphlet written upon returning to the US, Foster described the 
fledgling Soviet Republic as realising his own political perspectives. 'In my 
judgement, ' he wrote, 'the Russian revolution will live and accomplish its great task 
of setting up the world's first free commonwealth. ' 102 While their American followers 
may have been a bunch of insignificant, in-f ighting immigrants, Lenin and Trotsky 
were in 1921 amongst the most powerful forces in the international labour movement. 
Joining them, even more than joining the AFL, provided an avenue to power within 
the labour movement. In Russia, Foster was struck that the Bolsheviks were 
constructing an alternative to capitalism on the ground; their ideology was secondary. 
As Foster's biographer put it, 'The fact that the Russians seemed to have created an 
effective, exportable workers' system was what attracted Foster, not Marxist-Leninist 
theory. ' 103 Cannon suggested that Foster's trajectory was based on adapting to powers 
100 On the announcement of Foster's decision to ally himself with the Comintern, see Ballister to 
Lozovsky, Radek, Zinoviev, marked 'urgent and private', 26 September 192 1, in Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 39. 
101 William Z. Foster, Pagesfrom a Worker's Life (New York: International Publishers, 1939), 295. 
102 William Z. Foster, The Russian Revolution (Chicago: Trade Union Education League, 1921), 7. 
103 James R. Barrett, 'Revolution and Personal Crisis', 469. 
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stronger than himself, such as Gompers and the AFL bureaucracy, towards his own 
ends. After 'Gompers insisted on using the adaptation for his purpose-Foster could 
find an alternative field of operations, still within the labor movement, by adapting 
himself to Moscow. ' 
104 
With hindsight, it appears bizarre to join the Communist movement in order to 
avoid marginalisation. However in 1921, amidst a radicalisation in the US and 
Europe, it was not clear that the Conununists would not succeed in reconfiguring the 
American labour movement, but instead would with brief exceptions remain 
unwanted guests in the house of labour. Had Foster been French or Italian, his choice 
would not have appeared so quixotic. Again, there are striking parallels to ACW 
leader Sidney Hillman who, in his biographer's words, was drawn to Bolshevism 'less 
out of admiration for their tangible accomplishments than from his own magnetic 
attraction to power'. 105 One historian speculated that 'Perhaps Foster would not have 
turned to the Communist Party if the steel strike had succeeded and if the legitimate 
trade-union movement had offered a better outlet for his talents. ' 106 
In effect, Foster made a deal with the CP. He would (secretly) contribute his 
knowledge and connections in the labour movement, as well as the TUEL, to help the 
Party build a base amongst the working class. In exchange, his TUEL would have a 
near monopoly over the Party's trade union activities. Amter, in a report to the 
Comintern in 1923, described the early relationship between the Party and Foster: 
'The CEC, of which Foster is a member, lays down the general policy for the trade 
union work, which Foster is then free to carry out according to the methods best 
'04 Cannon, First Ten Years, 218-19. 
105 Steven Fraser, Labor W11 Rule, 184. Hillman would, for a period, ally himself with Foster and the 
Communists within the needle-trade union struggles. 
106 Keiser, 'John Fitzpatrick', 15. 
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suited, in his judgement. ' 107 Once again, the Comintern helped pave the way for the 
Party to break out of isolation and reach its desired constituency, the organised 
industrial working class. 
Early work of the TUEL 
At the underground Party convention in Bridgman, Michigan, in the summer 
of 1922, Foster (still not publicly a Communist) outlined his conception of how 
Communists should approach trade-union work. 'The fate of the party, ' he argued, 
'depends upon its control of the masses.... When we lay stress on the importance of 
this work, we realize we must capture the trade unions if we want to get anywhere. ' 
He asserted, 'it is absolutely impossible to have a revolution in this country unless we 
control the mass trade unions'. 
This was the goal of the TUEL. He sensed that the TUEL had already 
6 succeeded in making an inroad into a number of organizations', that 'the American 
trade union movement is very receptive to a great deal of the program' and that 
American workers 'are ready for new ideas', for Communism. 108 An advertisement in 
Foster's Russian Revolution (192 1) described the TUEL as 'an organization to carry 
on educational work in the trade union movement. It aims to infuse the mass with 
revolutionary understanding and spirit. ' The TUEL opposed dual unions, favoured 
'the closer affiliation and solidification of our existing unions until they have been 
developed into industrial unions' and advocated that 'all workers should stand 
together regardless of their opinions. Its ultimate goal was 'to bring the policies and 
the structures of the labor movement into harmony with present-day economic 
conditions'. 109 Despite Foster's previous history, the early TUEL emphasised winning 
107 1. Atnter, report to Comintem, 7 March 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174. 
" Whitney, Reds in America, 24-26. 
109 'Militants, Notice! ' in inside cover of Foster, Russian Revolution. 
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workers to its political programme, not merely wining power in the labour movement. 
The TUEL's early perspectives are spelt out in the Labor Herald, which Foster 
edited. In its first issue, Foster elaborated his views of the labour movement. The US 
was home to a 'very elaborate industrial system and the world's most militant and 
powerful capitalist class', yet, 'paradoxically enough', it also had 'a trade union 
movement which, for general weakness and backwardness, has few if any equals in 
the predominantly industrial countries'. In fact, American craft unions were 'at about 
the point of development that the European unions were 15 years ago', unique in their 
6unequaled lack of idealism and social vision'. So backward were American unions 
that they were not affiliated with either the Profintern or the Second International's 
trade-union umbrella organisation in Amsterdam, and were 'the laughing stock of the 
international labor world, revolutionary and reformist alike'. This emboldened the 
capitalist to attack the unions more ferociously than in any other industrialised 
society. Again, Foster blamed dual unionism for these weaknesses, dismissing the 
effects of a strong capitalist economy or a diverse workforce. Instead the 'prime cause 
of the stagnation of the American movement' was at bottom 'the wrong methods used 
by our progressive and revolutionary unionists' who 'systematically deserted and 
neglected the trade unions' through 'chronic secessionism'! 
10 
The TUEL fought to vanquish dual unionism and to organise a bloc of leftists 
and progressives within the unions. If the pre-Communist TUEL resembled Mann's 
early organising in Britain, the Communist TUEL resembled Mann's work in Britain 
for the Profintern. While the British Party supported the 'Minority Movement, and 
helped elect more left wing labour leaders within the unions, its American comrades 
110 Labor Herald, March 1922 
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were carrying out a similar plan. According to one early British Communist, this gave 
birth to 'a broad oppositional movement within the trade unions', with more than a 
quarter of million supporters and enough strength to help elect the left-leaning A. J. 
Cook as miners' leader. Under Mann, the British Party's supporters fought for 
amalgamation and industrial unions whilst condemning dual-unionism. 111 Foster 
shared this perspective as well. 
Labor Herald stressed that the TUEL 'is an informal grouping of the 
progressive and revolutionary elements throughout the entire trade union movement' 
and not a dual union. It was 'an auxiliary of the labor movement, not a substitute for 
it'. In his speech before the Bridgman convention, Foster described how, to avoid 
being labelled a dual union, the TUEL did not set up a membership structure parallel 
to the established unions. 112 The programme of the TUEL stressed amalgamation, 
attacked Gompers and criticised dual unionism. While affiliation to the Profintem was 
mentioned favourably, other aspects of the Bolshevik programme were not. Echoing 
his lines about 'camouflage' at the Bridgman convention, Foster, himself still a secret 
Communist, recalled: 'We did not dare say it was a Communist organization. It was 
necessary to camouflage to a certain extent, and for that reason it had to start 
differently. ' To have done otherwise, Foster maintained, would have invited 
repression by the Gompers bureaucracy. Only at Bridgman, after the TUEL had 
gained some respect in the labour unions, did Foster finally advocate that the TUEL 
(adopt a clear-cut revolutionary program'. ' 13 In April 1922, the Party leadership urged 
all members to 'become active at once' within the TUEL, as part of the Party's new 
III Murphy, New Horizons, 202-204. 
112 Labor Herald, March 1922; Whitney, Reds in America, 27. 
1" Whitney, Reds in America, 27-28. For advocacy of affiliating with the Profintern, see Earl Browder, 
'Which International? ', Labor Herald, April 1922. 
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turn towards the labour movement. 114 Simultaneously, the Party established a national 
industrial organiser, and demanded that members 'take active part in the trade union 
movement'. ' 15 
In 1921-23, the TUEL seemed to make headway. Hillman, after travelling to 
Russia with Foster to observe the Profintern Congress, decided (in the Party's words) 
to 'not formally affiliate with the International but to work out with the International a 
system of relationships by which the International could direct the crystalization of a 
left bloc in the American trade union movement'. ' 16 J. B. Salutsky (Hardman), an 
official in the ACW, briefly became a member of the Party's CEC after the 
regroupment with the Workers Council in 1921. Thus, in 1922 the Party reported to the 
Comintern that the ACW 'has a very able leadership which is moving quite readily 
towards the Left Position' and that the Party had 'a working agreement with the 
administration of the union against the reactionary elements' in the SP and around 
Abraham Cahan's Yiddish daily, Vorwaerts (Forward). ' 17 The Party hoped to use its 
relationship with Hillman as a springboard to influence in the needle trades, whose 
workers tended to be either Jewish socialists or Italian syndicalists. In November 
1922, the TUEL founded a needle trades section, with significant support amongst the 
AM the ILGW and the furriers, all of whom were historically connected to the 
Socialist Party. Benjamin Gitlow, the head of this work, later claimed that the Party 
had 2000 members in the needle trades in New York. ' 18 
114 James P. Cannon to all branch and local secretaries, 21.04.1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 146. 
13 See 25 April 1922 report on 21 April 1922 WP Administrative Council meeting; C. E. Ruthenberg 
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The TUEL also found support in other unions. In early 1922, Fitzpatrick's 
CFL 'indorsed the prominent features of the League's program', against the wishes of 
Gompers. 1 19 The Party also made headway in the machinist and miners unions. 120 In 
1923, Debs himself hailed the TUEL as 'the one rightly directed movement for the 
industrial unification of the American workers' . 
12 1 At its height in the early 1920s, the 
TUEL had as many as five hundred local industrial committees organised in forty-five 
to fifty cities and affiliated with fourteen national industrial groups. 122 In early 1923, 
then, both Foster and the CP seemed to have gained from their new association. 
While the Communists had fallen short of their original goal of creating a 
Revolution overnight, they had, in barely three years, gone from a marginal presence 
in the labour movement to growing influence. They had cohered an impressive cadre 
of labour leaders, with experience amongst almost all sectors of the organised 
working class, under the leadership of the perhaps the greatest living labour organiser, 
William Z. Foster. Other groups and personalities in the labour movement, whatever 
their opinion, saw the Party as a force to be reckoned with. Soon, in 1923, amidst 
tactical mistakes, principled political problems, and the growing anti-Communist 
mood in the country, the Party would once again find itself isolated. However, its real, 
if modest, success in its first several years illustrate the fact that the Comintern's 
interventions had helped the Communist in understanding American reality. 
ofDramatic Struggles andAchievement (Newark: Nordan Press, 1950), 124-26; Gitlow, I Confess, 
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5. Early Communist Trade Union Work 
In 1919, the American working class seemed increasingly militant: more man 
hours were lost to strikes than in the next six years together. Yet this militancy soon 
collided with a campaign of government repression and a business anti-union 
offensive. The govenunent repeatedly used the Shennan Anti-Trust Act against 
unions, and the Supreme Court outlawed minimum wage laws and legalised anti- 
union 'yellow dog' contracts. The 'roaring twenties' saw the rise of mass consumer 
culture and great strides in business profits, but a diminishing share for workers. 
While productivity rose 72 per cent between 1919 and 1929, real wages grew only 9.1 
per cent on average from 1923 to 1928. At the start of the decade AFL membership 
was 5 million; in 1929, it was less than 3.5 million. In 1920, some 20 per cent of non- 
agricultural workers were unionised; ten years later, barely 10 per cent were. Irving 
Bernstein, in his survey of the working class in the 1920s conveyed this by simply 
titling one of his chapters 'the paralysis of the labor movement'! 
The Gompers leadership in the AFL responded to this anti-labour onslaught by 
moving even further to the right. The same year, John L. Lewis, head of the United 
Mine Workers of America (UMW) and perhaps the strongest union leader after 
Gompers, launched a tirade at a January union meeting against Communist 'industrial 
buzzards' and ordered them to go to their 'beloved Russia'. 
2 After Gompers died in 
1924, his successor, former UMW leader William Green, remained hostile to 
Communism. 
The growing anti-Communism of the labour bureaucracy, combined with a 
general anti-union environment, limited the Party's opportunities whatever strategy 
'Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). 
2 Dubofsky and Van Tine, John L. Lewis, 75. 
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Communists chose. While Bert Cochran3 is probably correct that nothing the Party did 
could have lead to much success, the Party's particular course increased the isolation 
of Communists within the labour movement for much of the decade. This is 
particularly true of the disastrous efforts at forming a 'farmer-labour' party, which 
simultaneously left the Party with very few friends among organised labour and 
threatened to damage the political health of the Party. In the end, the Comintem 
leadership, particularly Trotsky, helped the Party navigate these dangers; however, by 
1923-25, the Comintem itself was already reflecting the process of Stalinisation going 
on in Russia. This chapter analyses the role that the Communist Party played in the 
labour movement in the mid 1920s, as well as the intervention of the Comintern into 
the Party's labour activities. First the chapter examines the participation of the Party 
in the political labour movement, specifically the Farmer-Labor movement and the 
campaign of Robert La Follette. Second, this chapter examines the Party's activities in 
specific industries to understand the work of the Party on the ground. 
4 By the time the 
chapter ends, in 1926, the Party was at its nadir of influence in the labour movement. 
Since in the height of the Party's industrial activities, in the late 1930s, Lewis was the 
head of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) and Green was the head of the 
AFL, the Party's experiences in the 1920s helped determine its activities a decade 
later. 
Campaign for a Labour Party 
After the First World War, important sectors of the labour movement sought a 
larger role in national politics, at the same time many Progressives, disillusioned with 
the two established parties, saw the working class as a progressive social force for 
3 Cochran, Labor and Communism, 45-46. 
4 For contemporary accounts of the Party's work in the unions, see Schneider, The Workers 
(Communist) Party andAmerican Trade Unions, and Beckner, 'The Trade Union Educational League 
and the American Labor Movement'. 
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post-war 'reconstruction'. 5 Although this reflected the growth of the Labour Party in 
Britain, it ran counter to the AFL's traditional 'non partisan' hostility towards a 
workers party. 6 
In the early 1920s, according to one historian, 'the AFL was riven by civil war 
to determine its political policy'. 7 The major advocate for a labour party was the 
Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL) led by John Fitzpatrick, an Irish-American radical 
8 
who had worked with William Z. Foster, and was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks. In 
November 1919, he helped organise the Chicago Labor Party which advocated 
'democratic control of industry and commerce for the general good by those who 
work with hand or brain, and the elimination of autocratic domination of the forces of 
production and distribution either by selfish private interests or bureaucratic agents of 
govemment'. 9 
The electoral showing of the Chicago Labor Party was disappointing, 
however: although the CFL had more than 300,000 members, Fitzpatrick received 
only 56,000 votes (8 per cent) when he stood for mayor in 1919, and his campaign for 
Senator in 1920 received only about 50,000 votes, less than 10 per cent from Cook 
County itself. This reflected both hostility by the Socialist Party, and the fear of many 
Progressives towards labour radicalism amidst the industrial unrest of 1919.10 Thus, 
by 1920, the Labor Party in a search for new allies had added 'Fariner' to its name, 
' On this trend, see Stanley Shapiro, 'Hand and Brain' (PhD), 29-3 1. 
6 Dubofsky and Van Tine, John L. Lewis, 83. 
' Andrew Strouthous, US Labor and Political Action, 1918-1924 (London: Macmillan, 2000), 2. See 
also Shapiro, 'Hand and Brain' (PhD), 69-77. 
g In fact, the November 1919 New Majority (the CFL's newspaper, briefly edited previously by Foster), 
published the entire Constitution of the Soviet Republic; see Jon Bekken, 'A Paper for those who Toil: 
The Chicago Labor Press in Transition', Journalism History 23: 1 (Spring 1997). 
9 Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 3 82-86. See James Henry Shideler, 'The Neo- 
Progressives: Reform Politics in the United States, 1920-1925' (PhD thesis, University of California, 
1945), 20-41. 
" In 1920, the SP candidate for governor received almost 40,000 votes (out of 59,000 statewide) from 
Cook County, i. e. almost 90 per cent more votes than Fitzpatrick. See Jon Bekken, 'A Paper for those 
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diluting its working-class emphasis, and attempting to court agrarian discontent. That 
year, they had even attempted to unite forces with Republican progressive senator La 
Follette who, repelled by the Labor Party's radicalism, refused. He said he was 
searching for a party with an 'advanced but not socialist' programme. " 
At the same time, labour leaders continued to feel dissatisfied by the capitalist 
Democrats and Republicans. In February 1922, the railway union leadership, 
traditionally very conservative, supported an independent, vaguely radical, party at a 
meeting of the Conference for Progressive Political Action (CPPA). The impetus for 
the CPPA was anger over the defeat of the union-supported 'Plumb plan' for the 
nationalisation of the railways. Unlike the AFL, whose membership plunged by a 
third between 1914 and 1920, the railway unions had grown almost six and half times. 
In 1922, the railway unions would also lead one of the most important strikes of the 
period-only to be met with draconian government measures essentially outlawing 
support to the strike. By 1922, then, they were looking for a vehicle to pressure the 
government towards enacting pro-labour bills, or at least defeating anti-labour 
legislation. 12 
The Socialist Party fonned the left wing of the CPPA, while a liberal- 
dominated 'Committee of Forty Eight' made up the right wing. Between these two 
poles were some fifty unions, labour leaders, and various liberal organisations. The 
CPPA was a liberal pressure-group upon mainstream politicians; instead of preparing 
for a labour party, it endorsed candidates such as Democrat Alfred Smith and 
"Shapiro, 'Hand and Brain' (PhD), 113; idem., 'Hand and Brain: TheFarmer-Labor Movement of 
1920, Labor History 26: 3 (Summer 1985), 415-20. 
11 On the railway unions, see Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties, 398; David L. Waterhouse, The 
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Republican La Follette, but along with the more radical CFL-led Farmer Labor Party, 
it crystallised the restlessness of labour. 13 
The Party and the labour party movement 
American Left Wing Socialists had a long history of dismissing such 
movements. Louis Fraina's left-wing Revolutionary Age had already declared in 1918 
that 'A characteristic of laborism is that it acts against the broad masses of the 
industrial proletariat, against the unorganized proletariat of unskilled labor. ' Thus, it 
denounced the growing movement for a labour party: 'The tendency and purposes of 
the Labor Party, should it eventuate, will express the reactionary tendency and 
purposes of the A. F. of L. This is hardly anything to jubilate about. ' 14 Absent entirely 
was any perspective of intervening into the labour party movement, much less 
polarising it and splitting its left-wing supporters from its AFL leadership. In part, this 
was due to the Communists' belief that revolution was around the comer, and that 
labour party politics were a diversion. Thus an August 1921 report to the Comintern 
denounced the Fanner-Labor Party as 'practically an expression of the mildest section 
of the oPposition to Gompers in the American Federation of Labor'. 15 
This disdain was the American counterpart to the British Communists' 
opposition to affiliating with the resurgent Labour Party. Lenin's 'Left-wing' 
Communism argued against this 'ultra-leftism' and advocated critical support to the 
Labour Party: to 'take part in the election campaign, distribute leaflets in favour of 
Communism, and, in all constituencies where we have no candidates ... urge the 
electors to vote for the Labour candidate and against the bourgeois candidate'. For 
13 See David A. Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 
60. On the CPPA, see also Kenneth MacKay, The Progressive Movement of 1924 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1947), 57-59; Murray B. Seidler, Norman Thomas: Respectable Radical 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1967), 60-62; Waterhouse, The Progressive Movement of 1924, 
8-10. On the Committee of Forty Eight, see Shapiro, 'Hand and Brain' (PhD), 55-68. 
14 Revolutionary Age, 18 December 1918. 
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Lenin desired not to enhance the power of the Labour leadership, but to expose their 
loyalty to capitalism, 'to support [Labour politician Arthur] Henderson in the same 
way as the rope supports a hanged man'. 16 
A consequence of Lenin's fight with the British CP was that leading cadre in 
the American Party began to re-examine the movement for a labour party. Cannon 
later recalled that 'the initiative for a positive attitude toward a prospective Labor 
party in the United States came from Moscow'. 17 This originally took the form of an 
orientation towards the CPPA and the railway unions. 
In early 1922, after the CPPA had announced it was going to meet in Chicago, 
the CEC passed a motion that the Party 'shall make every effort to participate in the 
Chicago conference thru regular delegates'. 18 In February, the VvT issued an open 
letter to the CPPA's Chicago meeting which, after denouncing the conservatism of the 
unions, called on them to 'form a united industrial front' and create the movement's 
(-own representatives, responsible to Labor alone'. The appeal ended by calling on the 
conference 'to move for a general Labor Congress to be elected by the rank and 
file'. 19 
Not surprisingly, the CPPA failed to heed the Communists' advise. 
Nonetheless, the Party reported to the Comintern, the actual 'results ... are of little 
importance' since what was important was that the Party 'took a very serious view' of 
20 
the CPPA . Instead, the 
CPPA issued an 'Address to the American People' which 
stressed its goal 'restor[ing] the government of the United States to the noble ends and 
15 George Baldwin, 'Statement of the Communist Party of America to the ECCF, August 192 1, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 39. 
16 Lenin, 'Left-wing'Communism, 90-9 1. 
17 Cannon, First Ten Years, 59-61. 
18 Undated [early 1922? ] CEC minutes, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 51: 125. 
19 James P. Cannon and Caleb Harrison, 'To the Conference', 20 February 1922, in Comintern 
archives, 515: 1: 146. 
20 Undated, unsigned 'Report on the United States of America' [1922], in Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 162: 80. 
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high purposes for which it was conceived'. While praising the 'splendid structure of 
the visible American government', this statement denounced that the interests of the 
people had 'been sacrificed on the altar of greed'. It offered the examples of the 
Federal Reserve System, the poverty of farmers, war profiteering, railway speculation 
and 'a campaign of ruthless imperialism' in the Caribbean. In the upshot, however, 
the CPPA promised only 'united political action suited to the peculiar conditions and 
needs of each section and state' and pledged 'to organize for the coming campaign in 
every state and congressional district, so that this may become once more in very truth 
a government of the people, for the people, and by the people. 
21 
Soon afterwards, the Party reassessed its labour party policy. The 'Theses on 
the United Front of Labor', declared that 'to oppose this tendency toward the 
formation of a labor party would be folly'. Instead, the Party membership was 
directed to be active in the campaign and 'to fight to make the labor party a real 
instrument in the class struggle'. 22 In November, the Party reiterated its support for a 
labour party, arguing that Communists needed to play an active role in the movement 
in order to fight for "a class program -) . 
23 
Meanwhile, when the CPPA held a conference in Cleveland in December, the 
Party sent four delegates to demand that the CPPA 'create a labor party'. 24 The 
conference itself excluded Ruthenberg from sitting as a delegate, out of anti- 
Communism, and, more importantly, indicated it did not want to form a new party 
" 'Address to the American People Adopted by the Conference for Progressive Political Action', 20-21 
February 1922, in Hiliquit papers, document no. 982, April 1922. 
11 'Theses on the United Front of Labor', undated [May 1922? ], in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 146. 
23 'The Workers Party and the Labor Party', 2 November 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 147. 
24 Press release by C. E. Ruthenberg, 28 November 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 147; see the 
CEC minutes, 5 December 1922, for the decision to send Dunne, Ruthenberg, Harrison and Lore to the 
Cleveland convention, in ibid., 515: 1: 144; see CEC minutes, 31 October 1922, for a motion to endorse 
the formation of a labour party at the Conference whilst seeking admittance to it, in ibid., 515: 1: 147. 
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soon. Fitzpatrick in response withdrew from the convention, and the Communists 
followed hiM. 25 
At this point, Fitzpatrick, already familiar with Foster, viewed the Party as a 
potential junior partner in his new labour party project. The Party, although it had 
previously declared 'that a Labor Party without the big unions in it will be a 
miscarriage', 26 saw in Fitzpatrick and his CFL a tool for increasing their influence in 
the labour movement. Thus the Communists hailed the Cleveland conference, 
declaring that 'The Workers Party, although barred from the Conference, came out of 
it a victor' since it had 'made its first appearance in the life of the American workers 
27 
and farmers as a definite political force'. And, this, the Party declared, 'was only the 
28 first skirmish in the battle for the Labour Party'. 
The Workers Party's Second National Convention, held in December, 
& greet[ed] with joy' the movement towards a labour party, and called on the Party to 
'actively participat[e] in this campaign'. It 'condemn[ed] the betrayal' at the 
Cleveland conference. The trade-union resolution, as well, called for the formation of 
a labour party based on the trade unions. 
29 After the Cleveland convention, the Labor 
Herald advocated (a general Labor Party' and criticised the CPPA for not organising 
one. 30 
The TUEL advocated a labour party which 'must be definitely rooted in the 
economic needs of the workers, it must be a party of the working class, yet it must be 
broad and inclusive enough to take in all the various political parties of Labor'. It 
should, above all, be a 'political United Front of Labor against the capitalists'. Since 
" Cannon, First Ten Years, 62; Draper, Soviet Russia andAmerican Communism, 29-37. 
26 I. Amter to Comintern, 7 April 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174. 
27 C. E. Ruthenberg, 'The Skirmish in Cleveland', Liberator, January 1923. 
28 C. E. Ruthenberg, 'Manifesto on the Cleveland Conference by the Central Committee of the Workers 
Party', nd, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 196. 
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'it is a desirable thing that the Labor Party shall not be a homogeneous mass', all 
tendencies within the labour movement should be allowed to operate within it. Its 
programme, Labor Herald continued, 'should challenge capitalism and hold up the 
ideal of a workers' society' while 'be[ing], essentially, a party of battle'. 
To achieve this task required two things, according to the TUEL. First, a 
labour party needed to 'fight and defeat' the Gompers bureaucracy in the AFL, which 
resolutely opposed working-class based politics and supported the two capitalist 
parties. Second, although the new party should support 'exploited small farmers', it 
stressed that 'actual workers ... must dominate the party' and 'fight for class 
independence and be a Labor Party in fact as well as in name'. 31 
Meanwhile, under pressure from Gompers. Fitzpatrick became increasing 
ambivalent towards forming a party. On 3 July, the FLP held a convention in Chicago 
and invited the Workers Party to attend. The invitation said nothing about a political 
party, but called for 'devising means for knitting together the many organizations in 
the country in such a manner that will enable the workers to really function 
politically'. 32 Fitzpatrick wanted to keep a foot in both camps, and neither antagonise 
Gompers (whose support, or at least neutrality, he needed in order to keep the CFL 
functioning) nor break with the Workers Party (whose organisers he respected and 
whose support helped him retain his leftist credentials). The Party was divided: the 
local Chicago leadership, consisting of Cannon supporter Ame Swabeck and Fosterite 
Browder, wanted to avoid antagonising Fitzpatrick. Yet the central Party leadership, 
especially Pepper, viewed the formation of a labour party as a get-rich-quick scheme 
" See resolution on labour party passed at Second National Convention of the Workers Party, and 
following resolution on trade unions, December 1922, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 141. 
30 Labor Herald, December 1922; January 1923. 
31 ibid., December 1922. 
32 J. G. Brown for the Farmer Labor Party to Workers Party, 9 May 1923, in Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 211. 
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and wanted to press the issue. In order to do this, they stacked the July meeting with 
Party sympathisers and supporters, often under the guise of fraternal organisations. 33 
After the Party outmanoeuvred Fitzpatrick at his own meeting, he walked out. 
Pepper glowed; 'like Zeus the son of Cronos', the Party had defeated Fitzpatrick, who 
'had entered the Ashland Auditorium as the future leader of the American working 
class, and left a politically isolated man'. 
34 The rump convention formed the 
Federated Farm-Labor Party (FF-LP: 'Federated' was added to indicate that it was to 
built through affiliation with trade unions, not individual membership). Besides 
angering Fitzpatrick, this split did not accomplish much. The actual political 
programmes of the FLP and the FF-LP were almost identical. 
35 
The Party bragged to the Comintern that the FF-LP executive committee 
6contains a majority of Party members representing various organizations'. The 
committee had seven members; three were members of the VvT and one was a 
sympathiser. The Executive Secretary, Joseph Manley, was not only a member of the 
WP but also Foster's son-in-law. Thus, regardless of the politics, the Party could brag 
that it 'has obtained the contact'and direction of a mass organization of workers and 
farmers'. In a report to the ECCI, Pepper and Ruthenberg described the FF-LP as 'a 
real mass party' led by the Communists. The Party tried to get left-wing union leaders 
" See the minutes of the WP Executive Committee in May and June 1923, in Comintern archives 
515: 1: 190, for the ongoing discussion regarding the convention. The estimated number of CP delegates 
vary. In his 7 April 1923 report, Amter claimed that there were 10 official WP delegates and 160 
Communist delegates attending in other capacities (Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174). At the time, 
Ruthenberg claimed that of the 539 total delegates, 10 were WP delegates and 180 were WP delegates 
in other auspices (ibid., 515: 1: 196: 3). Pepper claimed that there were 740 delegates, 10 officially 
representatives of the WP and 170 non-official representatives ('The First Mass Party of the American 
Workers and Farmers', 12 July 1923, ibid., 515: 1: 212). The WP Executive Council of 31 May 1923, 
passed a motion 'that we send as many delegates-party members whenever possible-from the Trade 
Unions and fraternal organizations and a party delegate' (ibid., 515: 1: 190). It is likely, then, that in all 
the confusion, the Party leadership didn't know exactly how many representatives they had. 
34 Pepper, 'The First Mass Party of American Workers and Farmers', 12 July 1923, in Comintern 
archives, 515: 1: 212. 
35 Introduction to Cannon, Early Years, 23-24; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 48. 
Cf MacKay, Progressive Movement of 1924,81-84, for a description of the convention and the 
aftermath. 
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to affiliate. For example, the Party asked Radek and Zinoviev to draft a letter to 
Sidney Hillman urging the ACW to affiliate. 36 
A report to the Comintem proudly declared, 'The Federated Farmer-Labor 
Party is a REAL entity. ' The Party claimed credit for momentous advance: 'The 
Workers Party was obliged to take the leadership in the fonnation of the party, 
otherwise there would have been no party. 
37 And for their part, the Comintern 
leadership also regarded the formation of the FF-LP as 'an achievement of primary 
importance' for the Party and the American working class. 38 
After the hangover, loneliness 
Lost in the jubilation was any sense that the FF-LP was an almost entirely 
Communist-controlled affair. By splitting with Fitzpatrick, the Communists had 
isolated themselves from their few allies in the labour movement. Foster, felt this 
isolation keenly. Not only did it break his alliance with Fitzpatrick and CFL, it made 
his strategy of building a base for Communist work in the unions much more difficult. 
A year later, Foster told the Comintern that after the split with Fitzpatrick, 'we lost 
contact with the trade unionists. 
09 Other Communists with roots in the trade unions, 
particularly Cannon and Dunne, had less illusions about the FF-LP than did the 
Ruthenberg, Pepper and Lovestone. The split with Fitzpatrick not only made the Party 
pariahs in the labour movement, but it created a deep split within the Party leadership. 
Forced to choose, non-communist 'progressives' who disliked Gompers and 
had supported a working- class party, withdrew from the FF-LP and, with Fitzpatrick, 
returned to the AFL fold. Yet, other than the fiat of the Workers Party, there was very 
36 I. Amter, report to the Comintern, 7 April 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174; Pepper and 
Ruthenberg, 'Report on the Creation of the Federated Farmer-Labor Party', to Presidium of Comintern, 
ibid, 515: 1: 199; Minutes of Political and Organizational Committee, 14 July 1923, ibid., 515: 1: 197. 
The same meeting, interestingly, expelled former CEC member J. B. Salutsky (Hardman), an official in 
the ACW. 
37 I. Amter, report to the Comintern, 7 April 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174. 
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little that politically distinguished the FF-LP from its predecessor, which enabled 
Fitzpatrick to red bait the Party as only interested in increasing its own power. He 
refused to work with 
any organization which advocates other than legal means to bring about 
changes or is affiliated with or which accepts the leadership of either national 
or international political organizations whose propaganda and doctrines 
advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States other than legal 
and constitutional methods, such as the Third International. 40 
This hostility left FF-LP and TUEL militants vulnerable to anti-Communist repression 
by the trade-union bureaucracy; soon the needle-trades unions and the UMW expelled 
TUEL supporters. 41 In August 1923, Foster was even shot at, in what he claimed was 
an attempt by the needle-trades bureaucracy to assassinate him. 
42 
The AFL anti-Communist campaign came to a head at the October 1923 AFL 
convention in Portland. The AFL leadership there expelled Communist leader 
William F. Dunne-an official delegate representing the Montana Silver Bowl Trades 
and Labor Council-simply because he was a member of the Workers Party. The 
AFL leadership denounced him as anti-labour, and amidst what one historian called a 
'lynch mob atmosphere', almost 28,000 delegates voted to expel him while barely 
more than 100 defended him. Mineworkers union leader Phil Murray, who several 
decades later would become famous for purging Communists from the CIO, 
according to one newspaper account, 'called upon the convention to eliminate a 
"traitor". ' Fellow UMW leader William Green, soon to be Gompers' successor, then 
declared that 'we should purge ourselves of this outspoken agent of the workers' party 
and the communists. ' After two hours of red-baiting, the convention not only expelled 
38 W. Kolarow for the ECCI to WPA, 7 December 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 164. 
39 Dorsey [Foster] to American Commission, 6 May 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 257. 
40 Labor Herald, August 1923. 
41 See the United Mine Workers of America, Attempt by Communists to Seize the American Labor 
Movement (Indianapolis: United Mine Workers of America, 1923;. 
42 Foster, et al, Trade Unions in America, 18,3 1. 
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Dunne but overwhelmingly defeated resolutions calling for industrial unionism and 
independent labour politics. 43 
In the American Federationist, Gompers advocated 'rid[ding] the trade union 
movement of the last remnants of destructive and revolutionary effort', complained 
that the AFL had 'been too tolerant' to Communists, and accused Dunne of having 
44 
purchased his delegate status. This is why former Workers Party leader J. B. S. 
Hardman later wrote that 'the revolution of 1919 was liquidated in 1923, ' as the Party 
became more isolated. 45 
The International Ladies Garment Workers (ILGWU) waged war on Party 
supporters, expelling activists and reorganising entire locals. Under the leadership of 
John L. Lewis, the UMW attacked the TUEL and the Party. Writing on the 
bureaucratic repression, David Saposs, then sympathetic to the Party, concluded that 
'Never before in the history of the labour movement has then been such a wholesale 
expulsion of members, ' based, moreover, on almost purely ideological grounds. 
46 
These battles would have ramifications for the Party in the 1930s when Lewis and 
Hillman formed the backbone of the CIO . 
47 
Factionalism and division 
43 Butte Daily Post, 8 October 1923 (quotes from Green and Murray; clipping in William F. Dunne 
papers, Tarniment Library, New York University, box 1, folder 1); Barrett, 'Boring from Within and 
Without', 323. Cf. Butte Bulletin, 19 October 1923 (in Dunne papers); See William F. Dunne, Win. F. 
Dunne's Speech at the A. F. ofL. Convention (Chicago: TUEL, 1923), for Dunne's speech precipitating 
his expulsion; Montgomery, The Fall ofthe House ofLabor, 433-34 (lynch mob quote on 434). For the 
UMW, Dunne was an enemy not just because of his Communism, but because of the Party's opposition 
to the Lewis leadership in the miners union; in fact, Dunne's attacks against Lewis were used by Green 
to justify the expulsion. Dunne, in his speech, began by noting that he did not 'worship at the shrine of 
John L. Lewis, Philip Murray, William Green and the rest of hierarchy. ' In a8 November 1923 note to 
Dunne UMW dissident Alexander Howat praised Dunne's speech as a 'masterpiece' and his actions at 
the convention as 'splendid' (Dunne papers, box 1, folder 18). 
44 American Federationist, November 1923. The William F. Dunne papers at Tamiment Library, New 
York University (box 1, folder 18) contains a letter of support, dated 3 November 1923, from the 
Bonzana Lodge of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers in Missoula, Montana, to 
Dunne. On Dunne's pre-Communist background in the Montana labour movement, see Wetzel, 'The 
Making of an American Radical. 
45 J. B. S. Hardman, 'Postscripts to Ten Years of Labor Movement', in J. B. S. Hardman, ed., American 
Labor Dynamics, 18. 
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The Party leadership was divided in its reaction to this hostility. Pepper and 
Ruthenberg saw this as a positive development, an indication of growing Communist 
influence. Taking Bela Kun's 'theory of the offensive' to absurdity, Pepper described 
the expulsion of Dunne as 'a Communist Bunker Hill': the Communists had 
ultimately lost, but had won the war of propaganda by making Communism a living 
issue. He called the expulsion of Dunne the 'greatest victory for the cause of 
Communism'. 
48 
Cannon and Foster sensed the Party's disastrous position, surrounded by 
hostile labour leaders and isolated from the organised working class. In the Party's 
public press, Cannon echoed Pepper: 'the real victor was the Communist movement' 
because 'it was raised there as a living issue of the labor movement'. 49 In an internal 
document, Cannon and Foster noted that after the split, 'the apparent break of the 
Communists with the progressive wing of the labor movement emboldened the 
reactionaries for a great counteroffensive against the Communists, which continues to 
be one of the most pronounced features of the current labor situation'. Communist 
supporters in the unions, they argued, 'were almost completely isolated'. " 
Seeking to maintain a toehold in industry, Foster advocated that TUEL 
supporters 'remain in the union regardless of whether they have to deny League 
membership or not'. Although leaving open the possibility of forming 'unions of 
expelled' TUEL members 'if expulsion takes on a mass character', supporters were 
instructed to fight this at all cost, including subterfuge and denying Leagued 
membership. The TUEL planned to 'develop a movement of sympathetic elements' to 
46 Saposs, Left Wing Unionism: A Stuqý of Radical Policies and Tactics, 56. 
47 CE Barrett, 'Boring from Within and Without' 323-24. 
48 Pepper, 'Portland-A Communist Bunker Hill! ', in Comintern archives, 5151: 213. 
49 Labor Herald, September 1923, October 1923; Browder, No Man's Land, 20 1; Cannon, 'What 
Happened at Portland? ', Worker, 24 November 1923, Early Years, 179. 
50 Foster and Cannon, 'Statement on Our Labor Party Policy', November 1923, in Early Years, 159-60. 
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stand for union office on an anti-expulsion platform. Rather than 'permit the 
reactionaries to make the League the main issue' TUEL supporters were instructed to 
'bring out new issues-of shop, of trade, and union' to battle the leadership over. 51 
Cannon and Foster saw the FF-LP as an albatross that soon had 'proved itself 
a failure', and emboldened the labour bureaucrats' attacks on the Party. The anti- 
Communists in the unions and the media had quickly succeeded in 'branding it before 
the labor movement as merely another name for the Workers Party'. Even in unions 
where Communist supporters were active, the FF-LP was unable to gain affiliates. 52 
Against Ruthenberg and Pepper, criticised the 'old sickness... to get unduly excited, to 
overestimate the radical development, and plunge into premature actions which bring 
disastrous defeats and paralysing reactions in our own ranks'. They identified a trend 
of 'progressivism' in the unions, 'a revolt against Gomperism that has not yet 
developed a systematic outlook' and which could be won to Communism-although, 
needless to say, not through actions like the split with Fitzpatrick. Cannon and Foster 
decried the split, and insisted that the Party eschew the illusion that the FF-LP was a 
mass party and instead begin to organise a real mass labour party. 53 
Not surprisingly, Ruthenberg and Pepper, who had developed the Chicago 
strategy, were more optimistic. Their 'August Theses' hailed the formation of the FF- 
LP and the split with Fitzpatrick as 'the greatest political advance which our party has 
been able to make so far' and 'a great victory'. They glibly predicted that by the end 
of the year some 250,000 workers and between 50- and 80,000 farmers would join the 
new party. The manoeuvre had 'put the [Workers] Party in a most favorable position' 
and made it 'a political factor'. The task at hand was to organise the FF-LP 'as a real 
51 Minutes of meeting of National Committee of TUEL, 5 December 1923, in Prometheus Research 
Library collection. 
52 Foster and Cannon, 'Statement', 161-63. 
51 Cannon, Early Years, 127-49,153-78. 
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party' and to 'transform the Federated to a Communist mass party'. In order to 
accomplish this transformation, Ruthenberg and Pepper argued, it was necessary to 
overcome the resistance of those 'party comrades who chiefly concern themselves 
with trade union problems' and who feared that the deepening split with Fitzpatrick 
and CFL might cause the Party to 'lose the support of those progressive [labour] 
leaders who until now supported the amalgamation campaign'. 54 
Soon the FF-LP's few non-Communist supporters deserted it. At the same 
time, with a national election approaching in 1924, the broader left-wing movement, 
including Farm-Laborites, trade-unionists and other restive radicals, began to pin their 
hopes on pressurising discontented bourgeois politicians to oppose the mainstream 
Democrats and Republicans. During this period, the FLP had essentially liquidated 
itself into the wider Progressive movement, therefore loosing what specifically 
working-class character it had in favour of a wider petty-bourgeois politics. Many 
Progressives saw La Follette, a maverick Republican Senator from Wisconsin, as a 
possible leader for a third party movement. La Follette sought to build a 'progressive' 
movement, incorporating support from labour unions, intellectuals, farmers and other 
groups angry at the dominant Democratic or Republican politicians. Yet he explicitly 
refused to call for even a third capitalist party, much less a labour party, out of fear of 
55 
harming progressive Democratic and Republican politicians. 
This meant that those few progressive trade-union leaders whom the Party 
sought to cajole into a new party where now looking elsewhere. Traditionally, the 
Communists had nothing but contempt for the progressive movement. 56 Nonetheless, 
54 John Pepper and C. E. Ruthenberg, 'Thesis on Labor Party Policy', 24 August 1923, PRL collection. 
" Bella C. La Follette and Fola La Follette, Robert M La Follette (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1953), vol. 2,1111. 
" in his study of the Bolshevik Revolution, for example, John Reed had compared the capitalist 
Constitutional Democrats (cadets), the 'Liberals from the propertied classes', with the American 
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almost the entire Party leadership, desperate for a chance to regain its lost allies, and 
having already supported the vague non-working-class progressivism of the FLP, saw 
opportunities in the La Follette movement. Pepper hailed the Ta Follette revolution', 
which he said was composed of 'elements of the great French Revolution, and the 
Russian Kerensky Revolution'. He continued: 'In its ideology it will have elements of 
Jeffersonianism, Danish cooperatives, Ku Klux Klan and Bolshevism. The proletariat 
as a class will not play an independent role in this revolution. ' In a meeting of the 
Party leadership, Pepper declared that 'we support the La Follette revolution at the 
same time criticizing and fighting for a Communist mass party. ' To explain how this 
exquisite corpse, in which the working class was not to be a leading factor, would 
advance the cause of proletarian revolution, Pepper offered his facile 'theory of two 
splits' in which the nascent Third Party would split the petty-bourgeoisie from the big 
bourgeoisie and then Communists would split the proletariat from the petty- 
bourgeoisie. 57 
in December 1923, Pepper pushed a motion through the CEC which 
committed the FF-LP to 'initiate a campaign to bring about a split of the La Follette 
forces from the Republican Party', implying that it would be principled to support a 
58 
non-Republican La Follette. A pamphlet by Ruthenberg, The Farmer-Labor United 
Front, described the farmer-labour movement as an opportunity to build 'for the first 
time ... a class party on a mass scale 
fighting against the parties of the capitalist class. ' 
This evidently went to Ruthenberg's head: 'There is probably not a Communist Party 
in the International except those that are face to face with the proletarian revolution 
which has the responsibilities and the opportunities of our Party at the present time. ' 
Progressives; John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World (New York: New American Library, 1967), 
20. 
57 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 83; Political and Organizational Committee 
Minutes, 19 September 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 197. 
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Although Ruthenberg claimed that the Communists' 'victory will be over the dead 
body (politically) of La Follette', he still advocated supporting La Follette since to 
split from him 'would mean that we would turn over the class Farmer-Labor Party 
movement to the Third Party movement'. The La Follette movement, Ruthenberg 
argued, would, despite itself, help to break people from the capitalist parties. 
59 
It was not just Pepper and Ruthenberg who advocated the Party's supporting a 
bourgeois candidate. Almost all the Party leadership, including Cannon and Foster, 
supported this perspective, if differing on its tactical application. Only M. J. Olgin and 
Ludwig Lore-of the Jewish and German-language federations respectively-fought 
this policy. They argued that, 'It is absurd to assume that we can have common 
campaigns with the third bourgeois party for its bourgeois candidates and at the same 
time conduct and independent campaign for our program. ' But while their criticism of 
the La Follette manoeuvre came from the left-a. defence of the political 
independence of the working class-it was rooted in their framework of the pre-war 
Social Democracy. In another context, this attachment could be played out in a rightist 
fashion as well-such as when Lore sympathised with Serrati in Italy or Paul Levi in 
Germany. Ruthenberg described Lore and Olgin as 'still strongly under the influence 
of the socialist traditions' whose 'attitude toward the main tasks of the Party was that 
the Party should devote itself to propaganda and organizational work. 60 Elsewhere, 
Ruthenberg criticised Cannon and Foster for their 'biased view' which 'overstress[ed] 
the industrial side of the party work' by 'giv[ing] the greatest weight to the effort of 
58 Executive Council of the WP minutes, 14 December 1923, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 190. 
59 C. E. Ruthenberg, The Farmer-Labor United Front (Chicago: Literature Department of the the 
Workers Party of America, [ 1924? ]), 2,22-26. 
60 Lore and Olgin quoted in Cannon, Early Years ofAmerican Communism, 196; Ruthenberg, 'From 
the Third Through the Fourth Convention of the Workers (Communist) Party', Workers Monthly, 
October 1925. 
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those policies upon the standing of the party in the trade unions'. Nonetheless, 
Ruthenberg favoured a bloc with Cannon and Foster against Lore. 61 
Cannon and Foster also advocated giving some support to La Follette. They 
criticised Lore and Olgin for their 'attempt to dump all non-proletarian grouping into 
one reactionary heap'. That Cannon and Foster believed La Follette's was not a 
bourgeois politician was spelt out in their criticism of Olgin and Lore's 'propos[al] to 
treat this movement, which is a revolt against big capital, precisely as we treat the 
Republican and Democratic parties, which are parties of big capital'. Cannon and 
Bittleman favourably cited a CEC resolution which argued that 'The third party 
movement accelerates the development of the class struggle, produces a clearer 
crystallization of political groupings on the basis of real economic interests, and 
weakens the united capitalist front against the working class. ' 
From Moscow in May 
The factional alliances did not reflect their leaders' positions on this issue: 
Cannon and Foster were in a bloc with Lore and Olgin, even though they had more in 
common on this issue with Ruthenberg and Pepper. 
62 In part this division reflected 
personal antagonisms, especially towards Pepper, but also the differing political and 
social origins of the trade unionists such as Cannon and Foster, and intellectuals such 
as Ruthenberg and Pepper. This helped give rise to the next five years of unprincipled 
factionalism. 
None of the factions saw a way out of this cul-de-sac except by appealing to 
the Comintern. This was reasonable, since in the recent past the Comintern had helped 
orient the Party's tactics, and resolve organisational disputes. However, what most of 
61 C. E. Ruthenberg, 'Our Party-Three Tendencies', typescript in C. E. Ruthenberg Papers (Ohio State 
Historical Society), box 7, folder 2; printed in the Daily Worker, magazine supplement, 19 January 
1924. 
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the leadership did not know was that in 1924, the Russian Bolshevik Party itself was 
already engaged in a fierce struggle over the future of the Revolution and the 
Comintern. Questions raised by the La Follette campaign, especially the relation of 
Communists to non-working-class organisations, formed a key part of the dispute. 
This affected the type of guidance the Comintem provided. 
The immediate question was posed by an upcoming Fanner-Labor conference 
in Minnesota. The Party and the Minnesota farmer labourites, led by William 
Mahoney, organised a conference for late May 1924 to nominate candidates for the 
upcoming Presidential election. At the same time the CPPA was building a campaign 
to stand La Follette for President and called a convention on 4 July, in Cleveland. The 
Minnesota FLP complained that under both the Democrats and Republicans, 'the 
condition of the masses of producers, the farmers and industrial workers, has not been 
benefitted [sic], but in fact has grown steadily worse' and announced that its goal was 
'disrupting private monopoly in the United States. ' 63 While radical, this perspective 
was standard agrarian radicalism and, one historian noted 'there was very little that 
had been in the previous political platforms of the past twenty years. 964 
This caused the Party, after some internal debate, to move the Minnesota 
convention up to 17 June, but it was clear that this convention was a formality, since a 
majority of FLP, not having the guidance of the Comintern, still wanted La Follette to 
stand for President. Even though in 1920 he had refused to have anything to do with 
the Farmer-Labor Party because he thought it too radical, and, now, he opposed the 
62 Cannon and Bittelman, 'Reply to the Thesis of Comrades Lore and Olgin', 12 April 1924, in Early 
Years ofAmerican Communism, 197,199-200; Browder, No Man's Land, 207. 
63 St. Paul Farmer-Labor Advocate, 9 February 1923; 12 June 1923. 
64 See Steven D. Jensen, 'Floyd Olson: The Years Prior to His Govemership, 1891-193 1' (PhD thesis, 
University of Kansas, 1985), 55. See pages 55-86 for a description of the FLP's local campaign in 
1924. 
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FLP as too close to the Communists, the farmer labourites continued to support him. 65 
In early May, Ruthenberg advocated that, if enough industrial workers and 
poor farmers were represented at the 17 June meeting, the Party should push for a 
National Farmer-Labor Party based on the FF-LP programme. If there was not enough 
support for this, 'then we should not make a fight for the organization of a party, but 
accept a loose coalition for the election campaign' and struggle for a 'clear-cut class 
program' at the convention. If, however, there was immense support for La Follette- 
which was expected-the Party would support La Follette 'but stating our Communist 
attitude toward La Follette'. The CEC unanimously supported this policy, but 
defeated, along factional lines, an additional strategy supported by Ruthenberg . 
Nonetheless, the defeated section is interesting. Ruthenberg advocated that the Party 
nominate a candidate against La Follette, but 
We must, however, be careful to see to it that manouver does not defeat La 
Follette, for to nominate another candidate and to permit La Follette to become 
the candidate for the July 40' [CPPA] Convention in opposition to our nominee 
would be to destroy the mass Farmer-Labor Party as a mass organization. 66 
Ruthenberg wanted the Party to appear to oppose La Follette, but not to actually 
threaten him. 
In Moscow, Foster also stressed the need to orient towards La Follette, and 
asserted that the La Follette campaign 'is much stronger than La Follette' because Ta 
Follette is not leading it, but being driven by the movement'. 67 But at the same time, 
Foster lashed out at Ruthenberg and Pepper for 'neglect[ing] the trade union work 
and ... even sabotaging 
it', and for 'spending too much energy in trying to organise the 
ty 65 MacKay, The Progressive Movement of 1924,58; Where La Follette Stands on Fif LivingIssues 
(Los Angeles: La Follette-Wheeler Headquarters, 1924), 7-8; for continued FLP endorsement of La 
Follette, see Farmer-Labor Advocate., 6 June 1923; Shideler, 'The Neo-Progressives', 223-35. 
66 CEC minutes, 2 May 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 270; cf Draper, American Communism and 
Soviet Russia, 104. 
67 Dorsey [Foster] to American Commission of ECCI, 29 April 1924, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 257. 
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farmers, and too little energy in trying to organise the workers'. This 'madness' was 
&opportunism pure and simple'. Predicting a lack of support at an upcoming farmer- 
labour convention in Minnesota, Foster predicted that the FF-LP would soon 
degenerate into 'just a small group of communists and communist sympathisers'. This 
would 'isolate our movement, not only politically but industrially as well, ' causing the 
Party to 'be discredited throughout the trade union movement of the United States. 68 
Yet, although he was less infatuated with the fanners than Pepper, Foster saw the non- 
working-class La Follette movement as a way out of the Party's isolation. 
Pepper stubbornly defended the split with Fitzpatrick, and argued for an 
orientation towards La Follette as well. This prompted Karl Radek to criticise 
Pepper's inclination to confound American farmers with Russian peasants, and 
speculate whether the split with Fitzpatrick had been ill conceived. Zinoviev stressed 
that 'we cannot support La Follette', but that the Party should advocate a independent 
labour party. Losovsky also criticised supporting La Follette, and argued that it would 
be better 'to receive three thousand or a hundred thousand' votes as an independent 
candidate 'instead of getting 2,000,000 for La Follette'. 
69 
The debate about La Follette intersected a major struggle in the Bolshevik 
Party. During this period, Stalin (then allied with Zinoviev) began to solidify his 
power in the Russian Party, based on the growing Soviet bureaucracy. A corollary to 
Stalin's theory of building socialism in Russia alone was the resurrection of key 
components of the Menshevism, especially-in what later evolved into the 'popular 
front' in the 1930s-the systematic collaboration between Communists and other, 
non-working-class, parties and forces. In the 1920s, the starkest example was China, 
where this policy meant the subordination of the young Communist Party of China to 
68 Dorsey [Foster], to American Commission of ECCI, 6 May 1924, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 257. 
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the anti-Communist Kournintang nationalists, but the La Follette alliance was cut of 
the same cloth. Although the mistakes of the American Party did not threaten the 
death of thousands of workers as in China, nonetheless it threatened the political 
health of the Party. Trotsky warned that '[flor a young and weak Communist Party, 
lacking in revolutionary temper, to play the role of solicitor and gatherer of 
"progressive voters" for the Republican Senator La Follette is to head toward the 
political dissolution of the party in the petty bourgeoisie. ' 
70 Unlike Stalin and 
Zinoviev, Trotsky believed this was a betrayal and fought against it because he saw it 
as undercutting the independence of the revolutionary working class from the 
capitalists. 71 Although Stalin and Zinoviev held the upper hand, at the Fifth Congress 
Trotsky had enough support to force the Comintern to criticise the American Party for 
tailing La Follette. 
The Comintern instructed the Party 'to strive by all means to enter the broad 
current of the masses in order to assist the masses of petty-bourgeoisie in detaching 
themselves from the capitalist class'. The Comintem also criticised the Party, 
asserting that it 'has not only drawn insufficiently the line between itself and the 
petty-bourgeois elements which endeavour to establish a petty-bourgeois Third Party, 
but the Workers Party has to a certain degree itself fallen under the influence of petty- 
bourgeois elements. ' Key to this was the upcoming FF-LP convention in St Paul. The 
Party was instructed to warn against a third, petty-bourgeois, party headed by La 
Follette, to call for the formation of the F-LP, and to stand candidates. 
The actual advice to the CP is worth quoting at length. The Party was to tell 
those farmer labourites who supported La Follette: 
69 Report of the American Commission in the Presidium of the ECCI, 20 May 1924, in Lovestone 
papers, box 2 10, folder 1. 
70 Leon Trotsky, 1924 introduction to First Five Years ofthe Communist International, vol. 1,13. 
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You have confidence in La Follette or other similar politicians; we have no 
such confidence in them. But we are ready to support such candidates if, 1) 
they will immediately break with the Republican Party after having issued a 
specific clear declaration; 2) if they will accept a properly worked-out 
programme of the farmer-labour bloc; 3)if they will come to this conference 
ready to assume specific obligations to work under the full control of the 
Farmer-Labour Party, and especially if they will accept the control over their 
campaign funds. 72 
At the same time, the Comintem did not rule out such an class-collaborationism in 
general. As Ruthenberg reported: 'The decision of the Communist International was 
not based on opposition to such a maneuver in principle. In fact, the decision of the 
Communist International was made on the basis of the situation of our Party ... but not 
because the maneuver was incorrect in principle. 73 
Sharp observers, such as Pepper, picked up on this tension, as well as the 
difference among the Bolshevik leaders. 74 Others, less knowledgeable about the 
internal politics of the Russians, complained that this ambiguity 'made the Party 
membership somewhat dizzy' and engendered an 'absence of hope' and 'skepticism 
and pessimism that are so poisonous to a revolutionary Party'. 
75 Browder, for one, 
could make no sense of the decision: 'The decision was a heavy shock to me 
politically, as it was to the whole movement.... I demanded explanation of this 
unavoidable contradiction. There was none. ' Nonetheless, the VVT changed its line on 
the La Follette campaign. Now the Labor Herald denounced 'the La Follette effort to 
destroy the Farmer-Labor movement' and insisted that Ta Follette is against the 
movement of the workers and farmers' and that he 'is acting today as the protector of 
the capitalist parties'. 76 Still, the Party posited that the way to 'break with the 
71 See Trotsky's discussion of the dispute over La Follette in The Third International After Lenin 
(London: New Park Publications, 1974), 91-92. 
72 ECCI to WPA, no date [20 May 1924], in Comintern archives, 5 15: 1: 164. 
73 Ruthenberg, 'From the Third to the Fourth Convention'. 
74 [John Pepper] to 'Dear Comrade', nd [May? 1924], Lovestone papers, box 196, folder 3. 
75 [Jay Lovestone? ] to 'Dear John [Pepper]', 24 August 1924, in Lovestone papers, box 196, folder 3. 
76 John Dorsey [William Z. Foster], 'Break with the Capitalist Parties', Labor Herald, July 1924. 
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capitalist parties' was to found a genuine Farmer-Labor Party, i. e., it still believed it 
was possible to have one party represent two classes. 
To Minnesota in June 
Prior to the convention, the CEC discussed its strategy for this meeting and 
decided that, based on the Comintern's instructions, the Party would stand candidates 
gas a demonstration' but if, as expected, pro-La Follette sympathies ran strong, the 
Party would conditionally support La Follette. The Party claimed that this offer was to 
be made only if 'there is a danger of a serious split and [as] a concession to safeguard 
the unity of the convention'. If, however, the convention rejected the Party's 
condition, 'we shall Split., 
77 
In the upshot, the Communists did not have to split quite yet: the convention 
nominated UMW official, ex-Socialist and head of the Illinois Federation of Labor 
Duncan MacDonald for president, and Washington State FF-LP member William 
Bouck for vice-president. (MacDonald, according to the minutes of the CEC 'had 
considered joining the Party' in February, and the Party had agreed to this with certain 
provisions, although there is no evidence that he actually joined . )78 The Party press 
hailed this as 'the biggest issue in the labor movement' which 'means class 
struggle'. 79 Nonetheless, although the FLP was willing to work with the Communists, 
and thus put up with constant red-baiting, their goal was to support La Follette, albeit 
preferably on a Fanner-Labor ticket. The St. Paul Farmer-Labor Advocate, in its 
coverage of the convention, described how 'it was conceded apparently by all-in fact 
it was specifically conceded in the adoption of the plan of organization-that any 
candidates the St. Paul convention might name would be subject to withdrawal if La 
77 CEC minutes, 8 June 1924, in Comintem archives, 515: 1: 270. 
78 See CEC minutes, 15/16 February 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 270; on MacDonald and the 
Labor Party, see Fine, Lahor and Farmer Parties, 3 80. 
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Follette should become a candidate. 80 When, as expected, on 4 July, the CPPA 
nominated La Follette for president, the Advocate urged 'complete, vigorous support 
of La Follette' and denounced the Communists for attempting to pass themselves off 
as the true FLp. 
81 
For his part, La Follette baited the Communists and denounced the St. Paul 
convention. He called the Communist goal of the dictatorship of the proletariat as 
'absolutely repugnant to democratic ideals and to all American aspirations', and 
counselled that 'all progressives should refuse to participate in any movement which 
makes common cause with any Communist organization. ' 
82 In response, anti- 
Communists within the Minnesota FLP became more vociferous. 83 
The 4 July CPPA banned Communist sympathisers or supporters of the earlier 
84 
FF-LP or the St. Paul convention, and vindictively refused to seat Mahoney. The 
CPPA endorsed La Follette (not nominated him), because he was adamant in his 
refusal to break organically with the Republican Party and form a new party. 
85 The La 
Follette campaign, like Roosevelt's 'New Deal Coalition' in the 1930s, was seen by 
many of its supporters as a tactic to pressure the mainstream parties to make them 
more responsive to the needs of labour, liberals and farmers. 
86 While the AFL, the 
Socialist Party, and many labour and agrarian radicals enthusiastically supported La 
Follete, the Communists alone criticised him from the left. 87 
Cannon, 'St. Paul-June 17'h', Labor Herald, 1924, also reprinted in Cannon, Early Years of 
American Communism, 207-12. 
80 Farmer-Labor Advocate, 30 June 1924. 
91 Ibid., 12 August 1924. 
82 Robert La Follette to Hen-nan Ekern, 26 May 1924, quoted in La Follette and La Folletteý Robert M. 
La Follette, vol. 2,1101-103. See also, MacKay, The Progressive Movement of 1924,86-88. 
8' Jensen, 'Floyd Olson', 63-64,69-73. 
84 La Follette and La Follette, Robert M La Follette., II 11. 
83 Shideler, 'The Neo-Progressives', 236-5 1. 
" This is essentially the argument made by Waterhouse, The Progressive Movement o 924. 
87 
if I 
La Follette and La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, 1124. For the AFL endorsement, see Fine, Labor 
and Farmer Parties, 411 and 'A. F. of L. News Budget, October 1923' (copy in Widener Library, 
Harvard University, US7124.700); Waterhouse, The Progressive Movement of 1924,12,32-35,39,66- 
68; David Karsner, 'The Passing of the Socialist Party' Current History, June 1924, reprinted in H. 
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On 8 July the Party withdrew its support from MacDonald, and stood its own 
candidates, Foster and Gitlow. The same day, Mahoney's Minnesota Farmer Labor 
Party endorsed La Follette. The National Committee of the FF-LP, controlled by Party 
supporters, withdrew its candidates. Cannon, in the Daily Worker, argued that since 
many FLP militants had joined La Follette's movement, the 'Farmer-Labor Party 
represents in reality nothing but the Communists and a circle of close sympathsizers'. 
Therefore, 'we are duty bound to raise our own revolutionary standard and fight in our 
own name in order that we may not be hampered in making the most out of the 
campaign for the Communist Party and the Communist principles. ' If the FLP had run 
candidates, he argued, 'there would have been no one to help us, no united front, no 
mass movement'. In the end, Foster received some 33,000 votes, compared with La 
Follette's 4.8 million, Davis' 8.3 million and Coolidge's 15.7 million. One of every 
six voters cast his ballot for La Follette, the best turnout to date for an independent 
presidential candidate. 88 
La Follette's defeat dampened liberal and labour support for a third party, and 
reinvigorated Gompers' traditional non-partisan P011CY. 
89 In 1925, the CPPA 
dissolved, its leadership either dead or unable to build a stable political movement. 
While the CP received many fewer votes than La Follette, its leaders had not expected 
to win. 90 Instead, the value of such a 'parliamentary' tactic for Communists was that it 
provided an opportunity to broadcast its politics nation-wide. At the Fourth National 
Convention of the WP, Ruthenberg claimed that the Party's open campaign, while 
attracting little votes, did put the Communist cause before the country. And Joseph 
Wayne Morgan, ed., American Socialism, 1900-1960 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 98; on 
the SP, see Shideler, 'The Neo-Progressives', 252-53. 
8' Cannon, Early Years ofAmerican Communism, 226-27; La Follette and La Follette, Robert M. La 
Follette, 1148. The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party's decision (wrongly dated 8 June) is in the Farmer- 
Labor Advocate, 12 August 1924; Waterhouse, The Progressive Movement of 1924,1. 
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Freeman later recalled that 'the conferences at which the fight for a labor party was 
carried on brought the Communists into national prominence as a serious party, rather 
than a mysterious sect. '91 This was all true-but it would have been true in any case. 
The Party's dalliance with La Follette only confused its supporters, and called into 
question its working-class centrality. 
The Party and the garment unions 
By 1925, the Party was increasingly isolated in the labour movement. The 
manoeuvres over the FLP and La Follette had shattered the TUEL's left-centre bloc 
with progressive union leaders; Fitzpatrick and the CFL split over the formation of the 
Federated Farmer-Labor Party. Sydney Hillman--only a few years earlier a valued 
Communist ally-finally ended his dalliances with the Party in favour of La Follette 
in 1924.92 Capitalising on the La Follette issue, Hillman went on the offensive against 
Party and TUEL influence in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. The union took 
steps to expel Benjamin Gitlow, a member of the cutters local, and the organiser of 
93 the Party's needle-trades work as well as its vice presidential candidate. . Other 
members, such as J. B. Salutsky (Hardman) split from the Party to remain in the 
ACW. 94 Hillman's biographer described the situation for Communists at the time: 
The party grew ever more isolated. Internally divided and politically 
excommunicated, the status of the party in the ACW was soon reduced to that 
of a sectarian clique. Its voice was headed by few as it enunciated the mordant 
'9 See Vaugn Davis Bornet, Labor Politics in a Democratic Republic: Moderation, Division and 
Disruption in the Presidential Election of 1928 (Washington: Spartan Books, 1964), 48. 
90 Seidler, Norman Thomas, 66-67. 
9' The Fourth National Convention ofthe Workers (Communist) Party ofAmerica (Chicago: Daily 
Worker Publishing Co., 1925), 9-10; Joseph Freemam An American Testament: A Narrative ofRebels 
and Romantics (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 193 6), 342. 
92 Fraser, Labor Will Rule, 194. 
9' Ibid., 203. Cf Gitlow, I Confess, 337. 
94 Salutsky, simultaneously a member of the WP leadership and the education director of the ACW, had 
been suspended over refusal to defend the Party at the Cleveland CPPA convention; he was soon 
expelled because he refused to subordinate his newspaper, the American Labor Monthly, to Party 
control. 
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jeremiads of a bygone era and the belligerent platitudes of a revolutionary 
future not many people though necessary any more. 95 
Or as one Communist active in the ACW recalled, with the expulsion of entire locals 
as well as individual members, 'by 1925 the persecution of militants was at its highest 
point. 96 It would be simplistic to blame this dire situation on the Party's position on 
the elections. Hillman was ultimately concerned that the Party's influence would 
hinder his goal, in Steven Fraser's words, of 'transforming the "new unionism" from a 
set of imaginative possibilities into an organization of more businesslike regularity'. 97 
As the twenties wore on, there was a move to the right in US politics, which Socialists 
and union leaders reflected. Like union leaders a quarter century later, when forced to 
chose between their Communist allies and control of their unions, most trade-union 
tops would chose the latter whatever the strategy the Party pursued. But the 
unprincipled nature of the Party's path, and its tactical ineptness, did not improve the 
matter. 
One union which the TUEL and Party, as part of a broader left-wing, still 
retained influence in was the New York based International Lady Gannent Workers 
Union (ILGWU). Like most of the garment industry's workforce, the ILGWU 
membership was largely Eastern European Jewish and sympathetic to socialism. The 
leadership staunchly supported the SP; until 1924, a member could not stand for 
political office except as a SocialiSt. 
98 The Bolshevik Revolution was popular 
amongst ILGWU members. Among the 100,000 odd workers in the union in the early 
1920s, the TUEL-whose New York leader, Charles S. Zimmerman, was a leader of 
the union-was popular. This was both because of its ties to Soviet Russia and 
95 Ibid., 201-205 (quote on 205). 
96 Anthony Bimba, The History ofthe American Working Class (New York: International Publishers, 
1936), 34 I. In the early 1920s, Bimba had been editor of Darbas, the ACW's Lithuanian paper (cf 
Fraser, Labor Shall Rule, 182). 
97 Fraser, Labor Shall Rule, 202. 
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because its programme spoke to the daily needs of this oppressed and militant 
workforce. Zimmerman, years later, recalled how the TUEL had successfully cohered 
non-Communist supporters and 'took in all ... [and] formed one group'. Ruthenberg 
was able to speak to the 1922 ILGWU convention, as an open Communist just 
released fromjail. He asserted: 'the Workers Party is in your unions, part of your 
unions, fighting with the very members of your unions.... Their purpose is to build a 
stronger organization of the workers in your industry. ' Additionally, Ruthenberg 
called for an industry-wide trade union in the needle trades. More important than what 
he said, however, is that the union leadership felt enough pressure from its base to 
invite him to speak. Thus, Foster's perspective appeared to be successful. The 
Socialist Party-affiliated leadership was quite hostile to the TUEL, however, and in 
August 1923, they began removing leftist local leaders, and at the 1924 International 
convention, denied seats to elected delegates who supported the TUEL. Nonetheless, 
these moves were rebuffed and the TUEL and the Party, by 1924, the Party appeared 
to be quite strong in the New York City locals, where Communists led several 
locals. 99 
However, in 1925 and 1926, the Socialist leadership of the unions attacked 
Communists so savagely to make the earlier Socialist Party purge look benign. The 
ILGWU leadership, the right-wing Socialist Yiddish daily Vorwaerts, the fraternal 
Arbeiter Ring (Workmen's Circle) and the SP leadership formed an interconnected 
anti-Communist network with cultural and political links to the Russian Mensheviks, 
who saw New York City as their base and wanted to secure it against Communist 
'8 Arthur Liebman, 'The Ties that Bind: Jewish Support for the Left in the United States', in American 
Jewish Historical Quarterly, December 1976, reprinted in Ezra Mendelsohn, ed., Essential Papers on 
Jews and the Left (New York and London: New York University Press, 1997), 334. 
99 Gurowsky, 'Factional Disputes in the ILGWU', 103-105,150; James Robert Prickett, 'Communists 
and the Communist Issue in the American Labor Movement, 1920-1950' (PhD thesis, University of 
California at Los Angeles, 1975), 62-65; Ruthenberg's speech is in the Worker, 20 May 1922. 
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encroachment. In the summer of 1925, the International leadership-the General 
Executive Board (GEB)-begun, in one historian's words, 'a policy of unprecedented 
repression' against leftist local leaders, suspending them from their positions, and 
seizing the locals' assets and property while reorganising the locals themselves. 
Together, these locals made up nearly 50 per cent of union membership. The pretext 
for this was that the left-wing had organised a May Day rally which featured Olgin. 
With massive rank-and-file support, the left-wingers refused to give up, and in 
June formed the Joint Action Committee; they strongly denied the charges of dual 
unionism and fought to be reinstated. The GEB tried to paint the left-wingers as 
splitters and wreckers, alien to the union, and supported by 'the entire machinery of 
the Communist Party ... maintained 
by the funds of the Russian Communist 
government'. When the union upheld the action against the leftists, the left-wing, in a 
massive show of strength, rallied 20,000 in a half-day strike. This forced the GEB to 
retreat; on the advice of the editor of Vorwaerts, Abraham Cahan, they allowed the 
left-wing to maintain control of several New York locals, with the expectation that the 
left would loose its support through ineptness. The SP right-wing controlled the 
International GEB while the left-wing controlled the largest locals, in New York. 100 
In November 1925, at the ILGWU Convention in Philadelphia, the tensions 
almost reached a breaking point, as the right and left battled constantly. Through a 
rotten borough system, 
101 the right-wing Vorwaerts menschen had a majority of 
delegates but represented a minority of members. Frustrated pro-Communist 
delegates, led by Zimmerman, stormed out of the convention and appeared to be on 
the road to forming a dual union. Only intervention by CEC member William F. 
" Gurowsky, 'Factional Disputes in the ILGWU', 161-80; Prickett, 'Communists and the Communist 
issue', 67-69. 
'0' Delegates were elected by local. Thus, although the left-wing controlled the largest locals, the right- 
wing was able to control more, albeit smaller, locals, and hence, more delegates. 
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Dunne, who was observing the conference for the Daily Worker, convinced the leftist 
delegates to return to the ILG)NU. At the end of the Conference, the left-wing still 
controlled the majority of the membership because of its base in New York, but the 
right-wing still dominated the GEB. 102 
In 1926, however, this all changed. Ben Gold, a Communist, led a hard-fought 
furrier strike which won a 40 hour week and a 10 per cent wage increase. This also 
served to whet the militancy of ILGWU workers, who were being squeezed as the 
standards of the industry declined. In July 1926,40,000 workers struck, under the 
leadership of the left wing. This strike lasted for 28 weeks; at the end, the union 
accepted a compromise which was in essence what was on offer at the beginning, and 
the left-wing control of New York was shattered. Although the charges of corruption 
and ineptness levied at the left by the GEB right-wing were unfair, the left was 
damaged by the result of the strike. And the union itself, led by the GEB, continued to 
decline, having lost some 15,000 members in six years. But, for our study, what is 
important is that the CP was, once again, isolated. Only in the furriers among the New 
York needle trade unions did it retain influence; the once-promising needle trades 
section of the TUEL was now frozen out of the ILGWU and ACVX. 
103 'So effective 
and widespread has the union ban against communists become', Saposs wrote in 
1926, 'that they have become forced, in the main, to operate underground. ' The 
purging of Communist supporters devastated the unions as well; in 1929, the 
ILGWU's membership had shrunken to 32,000 from 104,000 in 1920.104 
"' Gurowsky, 'Factional Disputes in the ILGWU', 195-216; Prickett, 'Communists and the Communist 
Issue', 74-87. On the importance of Vorwaerts in the struggle against Communists in the ILGWU- 
and, after World War 11, internationally-see Seth Lipsky, 'Did Jay Lovestone Win the Cold War? ' 
(review of Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist and Spymaster), in 
the Forward, 23 April 1999. 
103 Gurowsky, 'Factional Disputes in the ILGWU', 236-75; Prickett, 'Communists and the Communist 
Issue', 83-95. On the furrier strike, see Foner, The Fur and Leather Workers Union, 179-246, which 
describes the strike in painstaking detail. 
'0' Saposs, Left Wing Unionism, 57; Gurowsky, 'Factional Disputes in the ILGWU', vi. 
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In the mid- I 920s, the Party's influence in the working class and the labour 
movement in general reached a low point. In part, this reflected the conservative 
nature of the period: a capitalist offensive against unions, and an anti-Communist 
offensive by the labour leadership. Factionalism within the Party itself, in which every 
issue became a factional issue, also greatly hindered the Party's ability to grapple with 
this changing reality. Soon the Party would be presented with the opportunity to 
recoup its losses in the labour movement, through the International Labor Defender 
and the Passaic textile strike. Yet, the pointless factionalism would hamstring the 
Party once again. 
However, the Party was not left to its own devices. While in years past, the 
leadership of the Comintern would have intervened in the Party to ensure its health, 
the relationship between the Party and the labour movement became intertwined in 
the ongoing struggle over the course of the Bolshevik Party. This meant that the 
Comintern's interventions into the Party were less straightforward. The next two 
chapters explore these changes in the Comintern in more depth. 
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6. The Double-Edged Sword of 'Bolshevisation' 
In July 1924 the Fifth Congress of the Comintem adopted its 'Theses on 
Tactics' that made 'the bolshevisation of its sections' the 'most important task'. What 
exactly this meant, however, was anybody's guess. Zinoviev defined Bolshevisation 
vaguely: it meant 'utilizing the experience of the bolshevik party in the three Russian 
revolutions (and the experience of the best Comintern sections) in its application to 
the concrete situation of the given country'. The Communist International admitted 
that 'Any attempts to give Bolshevisation a kind of inclusive formula, embracing all 
the tasks facing our brother parties of the West, has been of schematic nature. ' 
Usually, historians describe Bolshevisation as 'Stalinisation'-the domination of 
national parties by the ECCI central apparatus, itself quickly coming under the power 
of Stalin. In their history of the Comintern, Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew 
describe Bolshevisation as 'a trend towards Russian dominance of the Comintern and 
its member sections', both ideologically and organisationally. It can also be defined, 
they argue, as 'Russification in an embryonic Stalinist form'. ' 
In a general way, Zinoviev's campaign did amount to eliminating political 
opposition throughout the Comintem, something that figured in his and Stalin's 
campaign against 'Trotskyism' after Lenin's death. A key aspect of Bolshevisation 
was the creation of a monolithic party that hewed to Comintern prescriptions. In this 
sense, the Bolshevik party itself had to be 'Bolshevised' before they could proceed to 
the rest of the Comintern. But this was not clear at the time to most foreign 
I 'Theses on Tactics', adopted at the Fifth Comintern Congress, July 1924, in Degras, ed., The 
Communist International, vol. 2,153. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A 
History ofInternational Communisinfrom Lenin to Stalin (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 
4245. Zinoviev's definition of Bolshevisation is quoted in Degras, Communist International, vol. 2, 
188; cf. also the theses on Bolshevisation adopted at the Fifth ECCI plenum, April 1925, in ibid., 188- 
200. For a model for a Bolshevised party's organisational rules, proposed by the ECCI's organisation 
department in January 1925, cf. ibid., 172-79; D. Manuilsky, 'The Bolshevisation of the Parties', 
Communist International, new series no. 10[ 1925? ], 52. 
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Communists. In fact, most American Communists preferred a monolithic Party over a 
pointlessly divided one. 
Bolshevisation was more than Stalinisation; most of the Western Communist 
Parties retained remnants of their social-democratic origins that needed to be removed 
before they could become genuine Communist Parties. Lenin believed that 
recruitment to a Communist programme was only the initial step in creating a 
Communist Party out of a social-democratic one: the entire organisation had to be 
recast into a party based on Communist principles. The American Party, with roots in 
federated language groups, isolated from the organised working class, and ignorant of 
black America, was no exception. Thus, most American Communist leaders 
advocated Bolshevisation, including those, like Cannon, who later rebelled against 
Stalin. 
This chapter first examines the political significance of the Fifth Comintem 
Congress and Bolshevisation, both on the International as a whole and on its 
American section. Tben, it examines some of the problems suffered by the Party- 
especially the foreign-language federations and factionalism-and the, ultimately 
illusory, solutions Bolshevisation appeared to offer. The question of the Party's 
intersection with the larger labour movement-both the trade unions and the reformist 
left-is dealt with in the following chapter. 
According to the Fifth Congress, Bolshevisation consisted of five inter-related 
tasks. First, a section needed to become 'a real mass party' with 'the closest and 
strongest contacts with the working masses'. Second, a Communist Party needed to be 
ficapable of manoeuvre' and 'not sectarian or dogmatic'. Third, it must be 
6revolutionary, Marxist, in nature'. Fourth, It must be a centralized party, permitting 
2 James P. Cannon, 'The Bolshevization of the Party,, Workers Monthly, November 1924. 
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no factions, tendencies, or groups; it must be based in one mould'. Finally, it must 
carry out work in the army. 3 
For the American CP, Bolshevisation had three official purposes: educate the 
membership in basic Marxism-Leninism; reorganise the Party on the basis of shop 
nuclei; and end the Party's reliance on foreign-language federations. Given the 
political backwardness of the American working class, the federal nature of the Party, 
and internecine factionalism, Bolshevisation seemed attractive to many Communists. 
As had become ordinary, each faction sent delegates to the Fifth Comintern 
Congress in 1924. In his memoirs, Browder described how at this time he and other 
Party leaders were 'caught in a web of factional struggles from which I could see no 
escape, and which there seemed no end'. For this too the leadership looked to 
4 
Moscow to 'help break us out of this web'. He and other Communists hoped this 
breakthrough would come at the Congress; this desired predisposed them to 
Bolshevisation. 
The importance of the Fifth Comintern Congress 
The Fifth Comintern. Congress was the first post-Lenin Congress. Following 
Lenin's death in January 1924, there was a fierce battle within the central leadership 
of the Bolshevik Party. The leadership of the Party-and also the Comintern-was 
assumed by a 'troika' of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin (in that order), who formed a 
bloc against Lenin's assumed heir apparent, Trotsky. Even though Trotsky maintained 
strong support among the urban working class and the Red Army rank-and-file, the 
troika conspired to lessen his influence, for example rigging the voting for the 
Thirteenth Party Congress in January 1924. 
3 'Theses on Tactics', adopted at the Fifth Comintern Congress, July 1924, in Jane Degras, vol. 2,153- 
54. 
4 Earl Browder, No Man's Land (unpublished autobiographical MS, Earl Browder Papers, Syracuse 
University), 207. 
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The political issues were not clear, especially from afar. Most Communists 
viewed Zinoviev, then head of the Comintern and better known and respected than 
Stalin, as a leftist; his main support was within the Leningrad working class. Stalin's 
base was within the growing Soviet bureaucracy and the Party apparatus. Never 
considered much of a theoretician, Stalin was far from the obvious choice for leader 
of the Party. By 1924, however, he was increasingly responsive to the mood among 
large sections of the bureaucracy and Party which wanted to slow down the 
revolutionary process after the Civil War, and emphasise constructing socialism at 
home instead of revolution abroad. This conservatism and pessimism grew after the 
dashing of revolutionary hopes in Germany in 1923. As Trotsky put it, 'The leaders of 
the bureaucracy promoted the proletarian defeats; the defeats promoted the rise of the 
bureaucracy. ' In December 1924, Stalin crystallised this in his idea of 'socialism in 
one country', which he counterposed to Trotsky's orthodox stress on international 
revolution and 'permanent revolution'. Led by Stalin, in an alliance with Zinoviev and 
Kamenev, the Russian Revolution, the Bolshevik Party and the Communist 
International by 1924 had undergone a severe degeneration. 'Socialism in one 
country '7, at first a blind alley of impossible economic autarky and isolationism, 
became the ideological justification for transforming the foreign Communist Parties 
into bargaining chips in an illusory search for 'peaceful coexistence' with 
intemational capitalism. 5 
This process of political counterrevolution, which Trotsky later termed the 
'Thermidor', was complex, and its ramifications dispersed throughout the Comintern 
at various rates. This took even longer throughout the Comintem, especially in distant 
sections like the American. Trotsky fought to return the Soviet party, and the entire 
5 Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed., What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going? (New 
York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937), 90. 
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Comintern, to what he saw as its Leninist foundations. And, if Trotsky was, in Isaac 
Deutscher's words, a 'prophet disanned', he still had considerable support within the 
Soviet Union and the Comintern; Zinoviev had to take him seriously at the Fifth 
Congress in a way that was not true at the Sixth Congress four years later. Stalin and 
Zinoviev launched an international anti-Trotsky and anti-'Trotskyist' campaign to 
purge the Comintern. Inevitably, this merged with the Bolshevisation campaign. The 
ECCI's theses on Bolshevisation posed, as the primary task of Bolshevising the RCP, 
'the final liquidation of Trotskyism within the party'. In January 1925, the CC and 
CCC of the RCP condemned Trotsky's 'attacks on bolshevism', and the April 1925 
Fifth ECCI plenum labelled Trotsky's efforts 'an attempt to revise Leninism' which 
was f supported by all the forces hostile to bolshevism'. 
6 This of course carried over 
into the American Party . In February 1925, Lovestone, then in Moscow, counselled 
his co-factionalists to 'take the initiative on Trotzkyism' as a factional cudgel; at the 
same time, Max Bedacht, writing in the Daily Worker described 'the recent discussion 
in our International against Trotskyism' as 'a phase in the process of the 
Bolshevization of the Intemational. 97 
Bolshevisation and anti-Trotskyism 
This campaign did not proceed at the same pace throughout the International. 
The American Party assimilated this anti-Trotskyist campaign slower than, for 
example, the German and the Chinese Parties, which experienced revolutionary 
situations in the 1920s and adopted ritual anti-Trotskyism much more quickly. The 
Polish Party had to be purged several times to eliminate 'Trotskyism'. 8 
6 'Theses on Bolshevisation', Degras, The Communist International, vol. 2,195; 'Resolution on the 
Discussion in the Russian Communist Party', ibid., 205-6. 
7 'Jack' [Lovestone] to 'Dearest Friends', 21 February [1925]; Bedacht in the Daily Worker, special 
magazine supplement, 21 February 1925. 
8 See Robert J. Alexander, International Trotskyism: A Documented History (London and Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1990), 647. 
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The American far left had long respected Trotsky. In 1917, leftists saw 
Trotsky as the leader of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the left-wing of the SP 
published Trotsky's writings before Lenin's. In his 1921 pamphlet, The Russian 
Revolution, Foster had described Trotsky as 'next to Lenin, the biggest figure of the 
revolution'. And it was not only Trotsky, but the ideas that would later form the basis 
of his fight against Stalin, which were widely accepted by all American Communists. 
In the same pamphlet, Foster noted that 'When they carried out their uprising in 1917 
the Russian Communists had been long convinced that in order for a proletarian 
revolution to be successful it would almost necessarily have to extend over several big 
countries simultaneously. ' In words that would be heresy less than a decade later, 
Foster stressed 'that the possibility of a working class republic maintaining itself in 
one country, while the rest remained capitalist, was almost negligible'. It is not that 
Foster was unique in such views, but rather that they were widely held amongst all 
Communists, in Russia as well as throughout the Comintern. 9 
Nonetheless, elements of the Party leadership jumped on the anti-Trotsky 
bandwagon early on, even before its full significance was evident. Leading the charge 
was Pepper, who nurtured a hatred of Trotsky going back to Hungary. In March 1924, 
Pepper submitted a motion to the CEC to 'endorse the position taken in the Russian 
Communist Party Congress on the controversy in the Russian Party'. Foster countered 
by temporising. Since the dispute in the Russian CP had already been settled, his 
motion read, 'it is not called upon at this time to take a position on the merits of the 
controversy. ' Instead, the Party press would reprint relevant documents to inform the 
membership, and 'The CEC will condemn any attempt to make a factional issue of the 
matter in the American Party. ' Predictably, the counterposed motions were voted 
9 Foster, The Russian Revolution, 90,108. 
Jacob Zumoff 162 
along factional lines; six members voted for Foster's. 10 Soon, Trotskyism, as with 
almost all other issues, was used to incriminate one or another faction of disloyalty to 
the Comintern. Despite the note, the next week Ruthenberg cabled the Comintern in 
support of the anti-Trotsky 'Old Bolsheviks'. Although Ruthenberg admitted he had 
no authority to do so, the CEC fell in line with the anti-Trotsky campaign. Foster 
proposed a motion that the CEC 'endorses the position of the [RCP] majority and 
supports the leadership of the old guard Bolsheviks and instructs the secretary to 
immediately convey this decision by cable'. This passed; only Lore voted against it. ' 
Still, what the debate over Trotsky's ideas meant to the International was not well 
known. As Browder put it, to probe further 'threatened to unleash a veritable 
Pandora's box of issues quite beyond our comprehension or control'. 12 
The anti-Trotsky campaign most damaged Lore. His politics were, in essence, 
social-democratic, having been formed in the German-language socialist movement, 
although he had long been a maverick within the socialist movement. For example, in 
1919, whilst editing Class Struggle with Fraina, he had opposed the formation of left 
wing groupings within the SP, although he later helped found the Party. In 1924, he 
was censored by the CEC for criticising Zinoviev in the Volkszeitung. 13 More 
immediately, his main base of support was among the foreign-language federations, 
which the leadership sought to reduce in power. The Ruthenberg minority put forward 
a motion at the Fourth Convention which argued that 'the hesitancy and vacillation 
which the C. E. C. majority [Foster] showed on the question of Trotskyism was an 
CEC minutes, 18 May 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 270. 
CEC minutes, 7 June 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 270. Both Cannon and Abern voted for 
Foster's motion. 
12 Browder, No Man's Land, 22 1. 
13 See Lore to Eugene V. Debs, 3 March 1919, in Debs Collection, Indiana State University, Terre 
Haute, reprinted in Eugene V. Debs papers, microfilm edition, reel 2; for the CEC's censoring Lore, 
see minutes of CEC, 17 May 1924, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 270. 
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expression of its relation with the chief defender of Trotskyism, Comrade Lore'. 14 
Ruthenberg would continue to use Lore as a hammer to bash Foster and Cannon. 
The Comintern's American Commission met in Moscow in late April and 
early May 1924, to discuss the factional situation, including Lore. In addition to 
leading American comrades, the commission consisted of such Comintern 
heavyweights as Karl Radek, Klara. Zetkin, Otto Kuusinen, Matyas Rakosi and 
Abraham Losovsky. 15 Radek declared that Lore's 'centristic tendency' represented 
German social democracy within the American Party, and told the Party that it 'must 
oppose Lore in the press' and 'must attack him'. Although Radek had, less than a year 
earlier, infamously eulogised the German fascist Schlageter, he still denounced Lore 
for advocating 'compromises with petty-bourgeois parties'. 16 Zinoviev, for his part, 
asserted that 'Lore proves that he is in no case a Communist' and argued that the 
Party should publicly attack him and remove him from the CEC. 
In 1925, the Comintern demanded that Lore be removed from the CEC; 
dutifully, the August, 1925, Fourth National Convention of the Party expelled him 
because he had 'embarked upon a course of open opposition and hostility to the party 
and to the Communist International'. 17 The 'Resolution on Loreism' stated that 
Toreism is opportunism' that 'must be relentlessly combated'. Because both Lore 
and Trotsky had (for different reasons) opposed the Party's manoeuvres about La 
Follette and the 'third party' movement, the Party leadership labelled him the 
American variant of Trotskyism. 
14 Daily Worker, 19 May 1925; The Fourth National Convention ofthe Workers (Communist) Party of 
, 4merica, 66,93,96-98. 
For the tying of the anti-Lore struggle to the Bolshevisation of the Party, see 
Max Bedacht, The Menace of Opportunism: A Contribution to the Bolshevization ofthe Workers 
(Communist) Party (Chicago: Daily Worker Publishing Company, [ 1926? ]). 
15 See minutes of the American Commission, 30 April 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 257. 
16 'Excerpt from the Report of the American Commission in the Presidium of the ECCF, 20 May 1924, 
in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 257. See Helmut Gruber, ed., International Communism in the Era of 
Lenin (New York: Fawcett, 1967), 436-37, for the history of the 'Schlageter line'. 
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Like all else, 'Loreism' became a factional issue. Since Foster and Cannon had 
depended upon Lore's vote in the divided CEC, Ruthenberg denounced them for 
having 'secured a majority in the national convention of the Party through the support 
of the right-wing sectarian elements' and having 'repeatedly refused to adopt 
proposals of the minority of the Central Executive Committee to expose Lore before 
the Party and to correct his erroneous policies'. Only 'after after the second decision 
of the Communist International categorically condemned Lore and directing his 
removal from the Central Executive Committee' did the Foster-led CEC finally 
struggle against Lore. ' 8 Foster and Cannon for their part 'endorse [d] fully and 
pledge[d] our most active support' for the campaign for 'the liquidation of Loresim in 
our Party. ' 19 
With Lore gone, the fight dealt more with the struggles in Russia. In late 1924, 
Fosterjoined Ruthenberg in sending anti-Trotsky cables to the Comintern. Cannon, an 
able factionalist, joined in the campaign, and along with Martin Abern, Browder, 
Bittelman, William F. Dunne and Foster, wrote a December 1924 Daily Worker 
article that hailed 'the powerful speeches by comrades Kamenev and Stalin against 
Trotskyism. ' These speeches were reprinted in a pamphlet, Bolshevism or 
Trotskyism?, with an introduction by Bittelman. He argued that 'the controversy 
between Trotskyism and Leninism is not a new thing in the Russian Communist 
movement, ' and added that 'Comrade Trotsky's struggles in the Russian party are a 
constant danger to the integrity of the Communist movement. 
20 
17 See Daily Worker, 19 May 1925; The Fourth National Convention ofthe Workers (Communist) Party 
ofAmerica, 66,93,96-98 
18 Ruthenberg, 'From the Third to the Fourth Convention'. 
19 The Fourth National Convention, 63. 
20 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 107-13; James P. Cannon, James P. Cannon and 
the Early Years ofAmerican Communism: Selected Writings andSpeeches, 285; Alexander Bittelman, 
introduction to G. Zinoviev, J. Stalin and L. Kamenev, Bolshevism or Trotskyism? (Chicago: Daily 
Worker Publishing Company, 1925), 1-2. 
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Each faction depended upon its own Russian 'expert' who scoured the latest 
papers from Moscow for new arguments against the other faction. Bertram Wolfe 
fulfilled this role for Ruthenberg's faction-who were also helped by Pepper's 
connections to the Comintern-and Bittleman did it for Foster and Cannon. Yet even 
Wolfe, then a central leader of the Mexican Communist Party, continued to write pro- 
Trotsky articles in Mexico. Where they echoed the dominant position in Moscow, the 
Americans attacked Trotsky as a parvenu against the 'Old Bolsheviks" of the troika 
and for his emphasis on 'permanent revolution' and the question of the peasantry. The 
concept of 'socialism in one country' had not yet gained any significant importance. 21 
The tentative nature of this struggle against 'Comrade Trotsky' can be seen by 
the fact that members of both factions continued to write articles favourable to 
Trotsky, even as the anti-Trotsky campaign increased. Throughout 1924, the Daily 
Worker published several articles by Trotsky, especially on the Red Army. In 
February 1925, as the anti-Trotsky storm built in Moscow, the Jimmie Higgins 
Bookshop, a Greenwich Village store affiliated with the Party, began publicising a 
new book by Trotsky. Even articles harshly critical of Trotsky, could not denounce 
him entirely. Thus an unfavourable review of Max Eastman's apologia for Trotsky, 
Since Lenin Died, reprinted from the British Communist Party's paper, attacked 
Trotsky's 'anti-discipline, anti-Party attitude' yet concluded: 'Still, Trotsky has 
rendered great services to the revolution since 1917, and there is ground for hope that 
he will still give up this futile policy and buckle to again. ' A Daily Worker editorial 
by Ruthenberg, while denouncing Trotsky's arguments, also conceded that despite his 
erroneous course, 'Comrade Trotsky approaches genius in many ways., Not only did 
International Publishers, the CP's publishing company, issue Trotsky's Literature and 
Cannon, First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 128; Wolfe quoted in Daniela Spenser, The 
Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia and the United States in the 1920s (Durham and London: 
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Revolution in 1925, but Moissaye J. Olgin declared Trotsky 'a rare master' who was 
'intense with thought and astir with theoretical passion'. (Olgin, who had edited a 
volume of Trotsky's writings in 1918, would, of course, go on to publish the classic 
anti-Trotskyist tract, Trotskyism: Counter-Revolution in Disguise in 1935 . )22 
However, this feigned praise for Trotsky's 'genius' and 'greatness' was a 
double-edged sword. It subtly painted Trotsky as an arrogant intellectual, who, while 
gifted intellectually, threatened the honest proletarian core of the Party. This same 
6anti-theoretical and consciously anti-intellectual' perspective, wielded in the British 
CP, one historian has noted, 'appeal[ed] to the more backward elements of the CPGB 
still at a trade union level of consciousness to contrast the proletarian common sense 
of Stalin to the instability and divisive methods of the middle-class intellectuals'. 23 
In September, accompanying an article celebrating the seventh anniversary of 
the CP, Workers Monthly ran a cartoon that depicted a speaker at a lectern, under 
pictures labelled Trotsky, Marx and Lenin, with the caption 'the Platform at the 1919 
Convention of the Communist Party'. 24 The point is that while in this period the CP 
dutifully echoed the anti-Trotskyism emanating from Moscow and the troika, this was 
nonetheless tinged with ambiguity and respect towards the man who was, after, co- 
founder of the Soviet state and the Comintern as well as leader of the Red Army. 
Duke University Press, 1999), 118; see also Wolfe, Life in Two Centuries, 307,323. 
22 For examples of Trotsky's articles in the Daily Worker, see 18 October and 15 November 1924; for 
the Jimmie Higgins bookshop, see Elmer T. Alison to 'Comrade Editor', 25 February 1925, in Jay 
Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 196, folder 6; C. M. Roebuck, 'Since 
Eastman Lied', Workers Monthly, June 1925, review of Max Eastman, Since Lenin Died (London: The 
Labour Publishing Company, 1925); Ruthenberg editorial is in Daily Worker, 8 December 1924; M. J. 
Olgin, 'World's in the Making', Workers Monthly, September 1926, review of Leon Trotsky, 
Literature and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1925); Leon Trotzky, Our Revolution: 
Essays on working-class and International Revolution, 1904-1917, M. J. Olgin, ed. and tr. (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1918); M. J. Olgin, Trotskyism: Counter-Revolution in Disguise (New York: 
Workers Library Publishers, 1935). 
23 Michael Woodhouse, 'Marxism and Stalinism in Britain, 1920-1926', in Michael Woodhouse and 
Brian Pearce, Essays on the History ofBritish Communism (London: New Park, 1975), 74-75; cf Brian 
Pearce, 'Early Years of the Communist Party of Great Britain', ibid., 174-76. At the same time, it must 
also be admitted that Trotsky was rather arrogant. 
24 Workers Monthly, September 1924. 
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The foreign-language federations and Bolshevisation 
In 1924, the Party, even after five years, remained dominated by semi- 
autonomous foreign-language federations that hindered the centralisation of political 
leadership and blunted the Party's intersection with the anglophone working class. 
These federations had their origins in the foreign-language federations of the SP. 
Between 1904 and 192 1, eleven federations joined the SP, although their relationship 
to the larger movement was always uneasy, and often they were affiliated directly to 
the national organisation instead of to the local or state branch. 25 
In 1908,71 per cent of SP members were native-born Americans and an 
additional 17.5 per cent were from Northern or Western Europe; by April 1919,53 
per cent of the SP's 108,000 dues-paying membership belonged to one or another 
language federation. The federations had not always been on the left-wing of the SP, 
although they were often closer to orthodox Marxism due to their European origins. 
Along with the right-wing SP leadership, future Communist Party leaders Ella Reeve 
'Mother' Bloor and C. E. Ruthenberg attacked the federations for hindering a unified 
socialist movement. Only the Russian Revolution made the federations solidly left- 
wing; when the SP split in response to Bolshevism, many of these federations, 
especially the Eastern European ones, re-affiliated with the nascent Communist 
26 
movemen. 
25 William C. Seyler, 'The Rise and Decline of the Socialist Party in the United States' (PhD thesis, 
Duke University, 1952), 34142. 
26 The Worker, 22 December 1906, quoted in Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor', 164. Buhle, Marxism in the 
USA, 112; Leinenweber, 'Immigration and the Decline of Internationalism in the American Working 
Class Movement, ' 203-10 (Ruthenberg quote on 205); Harvey Klehr, Communist Cadre: The Social 
Background ofthe American Communist Party Elite (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 21. See 
Adolph Germer to NEC, 24 May 1919, enclosed in Germer to Victor Berger, 26 May 1919, in Victor 
L. Berger papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, reel 15, for a description of the strength of the 
language federations in the SP; see James Oneal, A. Shiplacoff, Victor L. Berger, George H. Goebel, 
Dan Hogan, John M. Work, Seymour Stedman and Frederick Krafft, 'Supplementary Report of the 
National Executive Committee' to the Special 1919 Convention, in the Socialist Party Papers, Duke 
University, series 1, part D, for the justification for the expulsion of the left-wing language federations 
in 1919. 
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American leftists such as Ruthenberg, Reed and Cannon only made common 
cause with the federations in the 1919 split because the federations were amongst the 
most ardent supporters of the Bolsheviks. Thus the seeds of American Bolshevism 
were sown by organisations that were neither American in their membership 
composition nor Bolshevik in their organisational methods. The foreign-language 
federations essentially demanded what the Yiddish Bund had demanded from the 
Russian Social Democracy: a monopoly over work amongst their particular ethnic or 
language group. However, given the realities of the North American left at the time, 
this was unavoidable. Yet the Comintern, and more far-sighted American leaders, 
recognised the danger in this situation. In 1921, Bukharin, Radek and Kuusinen noted 
that 'As long as the Party does not possess at least one or two legal dailies in the 
English language, it is still crawling around on all fours. 27 At the time, the Ukrainian, 
Polish and Lithuanian federation newspapers had as large or larger circulation than 
the official English-language journal. In 1922, the Finnish Federation published three 
daily papers. In 1925, there were 6,500 Finnish Communists, of 16,300 total Party 
members. 28 Only in 1924 did the Party create a regular English-language theoretical 
journal, by merging the Liberator with the TUEL's Labor Monthly and Russia 
Pictorial to create the Workers Monthly. 
In effect, the CP had to face the same question that right-wing Socialist leader 
Adolph Germer had posed in 1919: whether to 'remain the organization of the 
Socialist movement in the United States, including the various nationalities which 
make up the population of the country, or ... be reduced to the tail of certain Foreign 
27 ECCI letter, 'Concerning the next tasks of the CP of A', nd [1921? 1 in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 38; 
also printed in the CEC's Special Bulletin on the Party Situation, May 1922, a copy of which is in the 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 28. 
28 George Baldwin, 'Statement of the Communist Party of American to the ECCF, August 192 1, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 39; Finnish Federation information from 'Report of Secretary [Ruthenberg] 
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Federations, engaged in a special form of propaganda made to suit the peculiar 
conditions of the countries of their origin. '29 The terms of the UCP-CPA merger, 
discussed in a previous chapter, further institutionalised the language federations to 
which the majority of the membership belonged to. Thus, because of the federal 
nature of the Party, as well as the question of language, the Finnish Federation's 
thousands of members were able, to borrow Luther's phrase, be in but not of the 
Party. One study concluded that before Bolshevisation, 'Instead of being integrated 
individually into the WP, the Finns maintained their foreign-language federation 
status unchanged except in name from the old days' in the SP. The federation was 
essentially autonomous, and ignored Comintern or Party directives as it saw fit. 
30 
Since this was essentially the same relationship that the Finnish Federation had 
maintained towards the Socialist Party, 31 Communist leaders worried about the 
Party's stability. That the Party needed the federations' dues in order to finance its 
work was also worrying. 
32 
This relationship was true for the other federations in the mid 1920s as well. 
Their insular membership often saw themselves first as members of a particular 
federation, and only second as members of a common Communist movement, and 
they resisted attempts to alter their relationship to the Party. In 1920, an underground 
organiser complained that the Akron German federation 'want[s] to act for a while as 
to CEC', Fall 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 143; 1925 membership from Glazer, The Social 
Background ofAmerican Communism, 39-4 1. 
29 Adolph Germer, Report to the NEC, 24 May 1919, in Socialist Party Collection, Tamiment Library, 
New York University, IX: 9. 
30 Michael Gary Kami, 'Yhteishya-or, for the Common Good: Finnish Radicalism in the Western 
Great Lake Region, 1900-1940' (PhD thesis, University of Minnesota, 1975), 225. 
31 Auvo Kostiainen, The Forging offinnish-American Communism, 86. 
32 Leinenweber, 'Immigration and the Decline of Internationalism', 205. As early as 1912, the Finnish 
federation had substantial financial resources. It had more than 11,000 members in 223 locals, and took 
in $200,000 annually as well as owning property worth more than $500,000 (ibid., 207). In 1929, the 
Cooperative Central Exchange, run by Finnish Communists, sold more than $1,750,000 to some eighty 
member stores who in turn sold more than $6,000,000 worth of goods, Dyson, Red Harvest, 52. Cf. 
also, Auvo Kostiainen, 'Radical Ideology vs. Ethnic Social Activities: The Finnish-Americans and the 
Communist Party of the United States, 1923-1932', American Studies in Scandinavia 21 (1989), 34. 
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a legal, neutral organization outside of all party activities' and described its leaders as 
6 33 stand[ing] between the Schneidermans and Centrists' in the SPD . Even if the 
federations maintained friendly relations to the Party, they did not see themselves as 
an integral part of it. A congratulatory motion passed by the CEC in 1924, and sent to 
the Lawrence, Massachusetts, German branch, captured this by noting that it 'has 
been in existence as a branch for the past fifty years and functioning as part of the 
revolutionary movement of this country in its various manifestations in the SLP, SP 
and Communist Party. 34 Many members centred their political commitments around 
issues relating to their homelands instead of the work of American Party, and much of 
their political activities consisted of what Paul Buhle termed 'fraternal style activity at 
the fringes of the Party'. 35 
In 1922, only 10 per cent of the organisation were in English-language 
branches. 'This is the most serious problem which we face', the CEC reported at the 
Second WP convention: 'It affects all our work. 936 At that convention, there were 16 
language federations, many of which published newspapers whose circulation not 
only rivalled the English-language Party press, but also was disproportionate to the 
federations' own size. Thus, the thirty branches of the Hungarian Federation, with 
only 600 members, published both a daily and a weekly paper with a combined 
circulation of 13,500. The Italian Federation, with the same number of members, 
published 9000 copies of its weekly paper, and the Greek Federation, with less than 
3 00 members, circulated 2000 issues of its paper. The I 100 Jewish Federation 
J. E. Wood to 'Dear Comrade', I April 1920, in Jay Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution Archives, 
Stanford University, box 195 folder 10. 
" CEC minutes, 2 May 1924, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 270. 
35 Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 129-30. 
36 'Report of the CEC to the Second National Convention' December 1922, in Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 141. 
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members, organised into 66 branches, distributed 30,000 issues of Freiheit daily. At 
this time, the Party optimistically estimated only 20,000 members in all. 37 
These numbers highlight both the strength and weaknesses of the federation 
system. Through the federations the Party reached tens of thousands workers and 
established itself a major political force in certain immigrant milieux. 'Transnational' 
socialists were able to draw on experiences in the class struggle internationally, which 
strengthened the Party. Yet, at the same time, the federated structure hindered the 
Party's going beyond ethnic enclaves and reaching the English-speaking labour 
movement. To speak to American workers required consistent English propaganda. 38 
In 1922, Ruthenberg bemoaned that 'our party is still almost exclusively a 
federation group membership', and noted that only 2000 members were not in a 
federation and that '[a]ll these, even, are not American members. 39 The 1922 
convention resolved that the Party needed 'a greater centralization of the language 
sections'. In fact, Cannon complained that the Party's central office didn't even 'have 
a complete list of all the foreign language papers' owned by or sympathetic to the 
Workers Party. 40 In May, 1923, the ECCI again wrote to the Party, criticising its 
federal composition, and called for a daily English paper to be published by the 
anniversary of the October Revolution. 41 Another letter from the same time demanded 
that the Party 'supersede the language structure and ... draw immigrants into the 
37 Ibid. 
38 On the role of Russian workers in the US, see V. I. Lenin, 'Capitalism and Workers' Immigration', 29 
October 1913, in Collected Works, vol. 19,456. On 'transnational' radicalism, see Topp, Men without a 
Country). 
39 'Report of Secretary[Ruthenberg]' to CEC, Fall 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 143. 
40 'Resolution on Language Sections', in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 141; Cannon letter to 'all 
Federation Secretaries', 23 May 1922, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 46. 
41 ECCI letter to 'WPA and all its language federations', undated; German copy dated 19 May 1923, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 164. 
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general American work', and ordered that Federations have no function other than 
tagitation and propaganda'. A similar ECCI directive was sent in late July. 42 
Although the foreign composition of the Party has been conflated with its 
supposed 'un-American' nature, in reality the federations were rooted in the multi- 
ethnic nature of American society. As far back as the nineteenth century, the US 
section of the First International had been organised into national groups, with the 
German section the strongest. Engels had observed in 1893 that because of mass 
immigration to the US, 'to form a single party of these [immigrant groups] requires 
quite unusually powerful incentives', and that even then 'the dissimilar elements of 
43 
the working class fall apart again' . The IWW, 
in 1906, had also experimented with 
foreign-language federations and locals as a way to organise immigrant workers, and 
these grew through 1912-13 as the IWW organised immigrant textile workers. The 
IWW took its name seriously, and at various times published propaganda in almost 
every major European language. But just as in the SP, these federations were attacked 
for being divisive and creating ethnic, instead of class, identities. 44 Even the post-split 
SP depended on Eastern European immigrants for funding, especially the Yiddish 
Vorwaerts and the needle trades union. 45 
The strange career of Finnish-American Communism 
The Finnish section alone comprised as much as 40 per cent of the total Party 
membership, and had its own journals, leaders and distinctive political culture, to 
which its members were loyal. There was even a term, 'hall socialism', to describe the 
loyalty that Finnish Communists felt to their federation. In Superior, Wisconsin, 
42 ECCI letter, 'only for use of C. E. C., not to be published', nd [early 1923]; ECCI letter to CEC of 
WPA, 23 July 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 64. 
4' Friedrich Engels to Friedrich Sorge, 2 December 1893, reprinted in Science andSociety 2: 3 (1938) 
44 See McEnroe, 'The Industrial Workers of the World'. 425-28; Leland Walter Robinson, 'Social 
Movement Organizations in Decline', 3942. 
45 See Seth Lipsky, 'Did Jay Lovestone Win the Cold WarT, Forward, 23 April 1999. 
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according to one official Party report, 'the local Finnish Branch with 150 members is 
the largest single branch in the local, they maintain headquarters and have an 
orchestra, dramatic club, male choir, brass band and athletic club', as well as a daily 
newspaper. In contrast, the English-language branch had only 30 members. Finnish 
Communists built not only strong cultural apparatuses, but also a multi-million dollar 
co-operative agricultural empire among Finnish farmers. 46 
For a sense of perspective, it is useful to recall that in 1920, some 250,000 
people in the continental US had been bom in Finland or had at least one Finnish-bom 
parent, out of a total population of almost 106 million people. In contrast, there were 
1.7 million German- and 1.6 million Italian-born residents. And, while more than ten 
million Americans were defined as 'Negro' in the census, the Party's black 
membership was extremely small. 47 The influence of Communism amongst Finnish- 
Americans was entirely disproportionate to the influence of either Finns or 
Communists in American society as a whole; in 1923, according to one historian, 
more than 5 per cent of Finns in the US were members of the Workers Party, and an 
46 'Report on Administrative Council Meeting [of WPA] of 21 April', 25 April 1922, in Comintern 
archives, 515: 1: 146; on the agricultural strength of Finnish American organisation, see Dyson, Red 
Harvest, chapter 3. As late as the late 1990s, a survey of retired Finns in the Northern Midwest found 
that 78 per cent considered 'Finish American buildings' an important symbol of Finnish identity, 
slightly higher than those who considered the church important. Cf. Chris Susag, 'Ethnic Symbols: 
Their Role in Maintaining and Constructing Finnish American Identity', SiirtolaisuuslMigration, 4 
(1998). For a description of the New York City Finnish labour hall, built at a cost of $300,000, see 
Arne Halonen, 'The Role of Finnish-Americans in the Political Labor Movement' (MA dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1945), 103-105. For a description of the social and cultural apparatus of the 
Finnish Clubs, see ibid., 118-28. 
47 The total US population is from the Fourteenth Census ofthe United States (Washington: General 
Printing Office, 1921), 1,13; national figures are from ibid., 11,690-91,893. Other Eastern European 
nationalities were more common: 1.4 million Russian- and 1.1 Polish-born residents, and some 3.75 
million people born in Russia or with at least one Russian-born parent. According to the Fifteenth 
Census ofthe United States (Washington: General Printing Office, 1933), 11,228,270, the Finnish 
population was essentially unchanged in 1930. However, from the point of view of Finland, emigration 
to North America was substantial. From the mid-nineteenth century to today, estimates Dr Olavi 
Koivukanagas, the director of the Institute for Migration at the University of Turku, some 1.2 million 
Finns left Finland, largely to Sweden or the US and 'if they had not left the population of Finland today 
would be 7 million instead of 5. F million. See Olavi Koivukangas, 'Finns Abroad', essay on the 
Institute of Migration's web page, < http: //www. utu. fL/erill/instmigr/art/koivuk. htm>, viewed 26 
February 2002. 
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equal number could be counted as Communist sympathisers. 48 While Jews (and, 
occasionally, West Indians) are often considered the most radical of immigrant 
groups, in fact the Finns had a much higher proportion of radicalism; some 25 to 30 
per cent of Finnish immigrants, according to one study, could be considered radical at 
this time, active in Socialist, IWW, Communist and Co-operative movements . 
49 But 
because Finns tended to live in rural areas, or to keep to themselves in ethnic 
neighbourhoods, their radicalism was less visible to non-Finns. 
Studies have indicated that this disproportionate Finnish-American radicalism 
stemmed from a combination of Finnish and American politics and society. At the 
time of massive Finnish immigration in the first quarter of the twentieth century, 
Finnish socialism was developing and many migrants-including leading socialists- 
brought their radical politics into North America. Thus, earlier immigrants, who left 
Finland before socialism became strong there, tended to be less radical in their new 
homeland than their later counterparts. Similarly, immigrants from more left-wing 
regions of Finland tended to be more radical in North America as well. A related 
explanation is that the Finland from which earlier-i. e. religious, non-radical-Finns 
emigrated was marked by pre-capitalist agricultural relations whilst later Finns 
emigrated from a capitalist Finland and were therefore more prone to labour 
radicalism. At the same time, the exploitation, brutality and misery at the heart of 
industrial capitalism radicalised many immigrant Finns. Compounding this was that 
Finns-because of their unique language, their culture and where they migrated to- 
tended to stick together and isolated themselves from American society as a whole. 
48 Kostiainen, Forging ofFinnish-American Communism, 14245. 
49 Karni, 'Yhteishya', 19. One rather improbable study even went so far as to argue that there was a 
direct correlation between Finnish immigration and an area's radicalism, and that the lack of Finnish 
immigration to the American South was responsible for the weakness of the left there. See Rodney 
Stark and Kevin I Christiano, 'Support for the American Left, 1920-24: The Opiate Thesis 
Reconsidered', Journalfor the Scientific Study ofReligion 3 1.1 (March 1992), 62-76. 
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Consequently, Finnish institutions of all types-from the local church to the 
cooperative-played an important role in immigrant societies. The Socialist 
Federation for Finnish immigrants fulfilled many of the same roles for its supporters 
as did religion for more conservative 'Church Finns': not only did it provide a 
coherent world view, but also recreation, camaraderie, diversion, and education. 
Finnish-American cultural institutions, whether in the service of religion or socialism, 
helped cohere a Finnish American identity. Thus leftist Finnish newspapers not only 
contained political analysis, but community news. 50 
For Finns, political radicalism was integrally connected with ethnic identity to 
an extent only matched by certain Jewish socialists. Like Jews, who also were 
represented in large numbers amongst American socialists, Communists and trade- 
unionists, Finns found in socialism a method of maintaining their ethnic identity 
against both a hostile American society and right-wing elements within Finnish 
culture, especially when the Finnish Civil War exacerbated divisions between 'Red' 
and 'White' Finns. However, unlike Jewish immigrants, whose leftist Yidishkeyt was 
a method of assimilation into the American working class, leftist Finns remained 
much more insular, and also used their radicalism as a dike against American culture. 
50 Reino Kero, 'The Social Origin of the Left-Wing Radicals and "Church Finne' among Finnish 
immigrants in North America', Publications of the Institute of General History, University of Turku 7, 
(1975), 55-62; idem., 'The Roots of Finnish-American Left-Wing Radicalism, ibid, 5 (1973), 45-55; 
P. G. Hummasti, 'Ethnicity and Radicalism: The Finns of Astoria and the Toveri, 1890-1930', Oregon 
Historical Quarterly 97 (Winter 1996), 362-93; Al Gedicks, 'The Social Origin of Radicalism Among 
Finnish immigrants in Midwest Mining Communities', Review ofRadical Political Economy 8: 3 (Fall 
1976), 28-29; Richard Hudelson, 'Duluth's Scandinavian Left, 1880-1950', Swedish American 
Historical Quarterly 53: 3 (July 2002); idem, 'The Scandinavian Local of the Duluth Socialist Party, 
1910-1924', Swedish American Historical Quarterly 44: 4 (October 1993); idem, 'The Ideological and 
Cultural Roots of Karelian Fever in the Western Lake Superior Region' available on 
<frontpage. uwsuper. edu/hudelson/karelianfever. htm>, viewed 9 February 2003. For a short, if 
somewhat dated, survey of the Finnish immigrant experience, see John 1. Kolehmainen, The Finns in 
America (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968). 
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This also explains why radicalism was not so widespread amongst assimilated 
Finnish-Americans as amongst their Jewish counterparts. 51 
A resolution adopted by the Organisation Department of the Comintern in 
1927 about the Bolshevisation of the American Party described the pre-Bolshevised 
Party as '19 separate federations, each of which constituted, so to speak, a party of its 
own'. In the Summer of 1923, Otto Kuusinen, a very senior ECCI leader as well as 
Finnish Communist, wrote specifically to the Finnish Federation urging them to use 
their considerable resources-especially their co-operative organisations and their 
printing presses-to help the Party as a whole. He admonished the Finns, 'that your 
membership from a agitational standpoint does not amount to much, despite the 
strength of their organisation, because of the Finns' insularity and lack of English- 
capacity. 52 
Working-class organisations in other societies with large-scale immigrant 
working classes had similar situations. The Communist Party of Canada had a greater 
percentage of its membership in such federations. As late as 1929, some 95 per cent of 
the CPC membership belonged to Eastern European language groups, primarily 
Yiddish, Ukrainian and Finnish. There as well, the relationship of the anglophone 
central party leadership to the language federations proved to be tricky and, again, the 
Finnish federation was loathe to surrender control of its cultural and political 
apparatus. (In March 1930, the situation was so dire that the ECCI sent Kullervo 
Manner, former head of the Finnish Communist Party, to investigate the troubles . )53 
51 For an interesting comparison of Finns and Jews in the Communist movement, see Mishler, 'Red 
Finns, Red Jews', 147-49. On the role of Communism in the 'Americanisation' of Jewish immigrants 
see Buhle, 'Jews and American Communism; for a view that argues that Communism was a way to 
construct a distinctive Jewish identity, see Bat-Ami Zucker, 'The "Jewish Bureau": The Organization of 
American Jewish Communists in the 1930s', in Michael J. Cohen, ed., Modern History (Ramat-Gan, Israel: 
Bar-Ilan, 1991), 135. 
52 aw. Kuusinen to Finnish Federation of WPA, 3 August 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 164. 
53 International Press Correspondence, 9 August 1929, cited in Avakumovic, The Communist Party in 
Canada, 35; Markotich, 'International Communism and the Communist Party of Canada', 63,72,75, 
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Further South, the Communist Party in Argentina-another country with a large 
European-derived working class-had a largely Eastern European membership and 
established nineteen language groups. 54 To a lesser degree, Communists in Brazil and 
Uruguay also organised by language or issued propaganda in foreign languages, most 
often Italian, Yiddish or Gennan. The French Party, between 1924 and 1945, 
organised fifteen language groups. In the mid- I 960s, the Israeli Communist Party 
55 
published papers in Hebrew, Arabic, Yiddish, Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian. 
In these countries, federations were a response to the immigrant composition of the 
working class and the labour movement. The case of South Africa starkly illustrates 
the danger that a large immigrant membership could blunt Communists' 
understanding of social reality: in the early 1920s, the CPSA consisted largely of 
Jewish 6migr6s and while it 'had only one black member and did not circulate its 
publications in African translation, it did publish early leaflets and hold some street 
56 
meetings in Yiddish' . 
108-113. See also Auvo Kostiainen, 'Contacts Between the Finnish Labour Movement in the United 
States and Canada', in Michael G. Karni, ed., Finnish Diaspora (Toronto: Multicultural History 
Society of Ontario, 1981), vol. 1,33-48. Quebecois and other firancophone members were also 
organised into separate federations. In fact, the Montreal CPC faced if anything a more difficult task 
than their US counterparts: not only was a large basis of Communist support in Quebec Eastern 
European immigrants, usually Jewish, but the Party had the additional handicap of being isolated from 
the Quebecois working class by the paucity of francophone members. (See Bernard Dansereau, 'Le 
Mouvement Ouvrier Montrealais, 1918-1929' [PhD thesis, Universite de Montreal, 2000], 260,3 51- 
57. ) 
34 Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Breve Historia de las Izquierdas en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Claridad, 1990), 45-46; Pedro Roma, 'Informe del Comite Ejecutivo del Partido Comunista de 
Argentina', November 1925, in Emilio J. Corbiere, Origenes del Comunismo Argentino: El Partido 
Socialista Internacional (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1984), 13 1. The latter cited 
Lithuanian, Armenian, Yugoslav as well as Italian and Jewish groups. It is unclear the role that these 
&agrupaciones de propaganda' played in the CPA as a whole. 
55 For information on this dimension of Latin American Communism, I am grateful for the assistance of 
Christine Ehrick, University of Louisville; Adhemar Lourenqo da Silva Jr, Universidade Federal de 
Pelotas; Silvia Schenkolewski Kroll, Bar-Ilan University. Information on the Israeli Party is from 
Hyman Lumer, Which Way Israel? An Eye- Witness Account by a Marxist Educator (New York: New 
outlook Publishers, 1966), 3. On France, see Annette Aronwicz, 'Haim Sloves, the Jewish People, and 
a Jewish Communist's Allegiances', Jewish Social Studies 9: 1 (Fall 2002), 97. 
56 Mark Israel and Simon Adams, "'That Spel Is Trouble": Jews and the Communist Party of South 
Africa', Journal ofSouth African Studies 26: 1 (March 2000). 
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A 1924 pamphlet on the membership of the Workers Party noted that even by 
October 1923 the English-speaking membership had comprised 'at least' 50 per cent 
of the total membership, but even many of these members were organised in the many 
foreign-language federations. Jack Stachel recalled later that 'so-called English 
branches included many elements that could hardly speak English. ' And this was an 
improvement from the Autumn of 1922, when only 318 of the Party's 12,394 
members were not affiliated to a language federation. Even leaving aside the question 
of language, so long as the Party was organised along ethnic and neighbourhood lines, 
its work in the trade-unions was hindered since different members belonging to 
different federations yet working in the same factory or trade union could not co- 
ordinate political activity. As one fonner leader of the Finnish Federation recalled, 'it 
seemed an impossible task to convince Finnish communists to leave their Finnish 
halls in convenient meeting places and go to meet in inconvenient meeting places 
[with] other nationals and use English [that] they did not fully understand [and] in 
which they were unable to exPress themselves. ' 57 On a larger scale, since many 
foreign-language newspapers had a larger (and more loyal) readership than the official 
English-language central Party organs, the ability of the Party to centralise its 
activities was hindered. Many Communists who wanted to 'Americanise' the Party 
would have sympathised with the ECCI's statement that 'The Language federations 
constituting the Party are a necessity and yet are a hindrance to unification of the 
membership. ' 
58 
57 John Wiita [Henry Puro], 'The Crisis in the Finnish American Left, 1925-193 0', 7, in John Wiita 
Papers, immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, box 1, folder 2. 
58 The Second Year ofthe Workers Party ofAmerica (Chicago: Literature Department of the WPA, 
1924), 29-30,58. Stachel quoted in Klehr, Communist Cadre, 22. In March 1923, the Party 
representative to the Comintern complained of the effect of the federated membership upon entering 
the unions, in 1. Amter, 'Report to Comintern', 7 March 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174. 
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In the summer of 1925, the ECCI wrote yet another letter to the leadership of 
the American Party. The Party's weakness 'lies in the defects of the organisational, 
structure of the Workers Party, which are greater than in any other party'. The Party 
had 'no single guiding Party centre', decisions were made on a federated basis and 
'each of its 17 national sections represents almost a separate and independent Party 
within the Workers Party, enjoying a large degree of independence in isolation to the 
leading organ, the Central Committee. ' However undesirable this situation was, the 
ECCI stressed, it could not be reversed merely by administrative fiat. The ECCI 
suggested several practical measures. First, instead of national leadership bodies, there 
should be pan-national local and district committees not based on proportional 
representation; dues, instead of going through the national federations and then to the 
Party, must be collected by the Party and then distributed to the federations; the Party 
must centralise control of the various papers; membership should be based on factory 
nuclei and neighbourhood groups instead of language federations. In this way the 
foreign-language membership could begin to be integrated into the Party as a whole. 
'To break ... one organisation without creating something 
in its place would be 
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS', the letter argued . 
59 This, however, was not how 
reorganisation proceeded. In part this is because of the fierce resistance by the 
federations themselves, and also in part because how the reorganisation of the Party 
intersected factionalism. 
Reorganisation also targeted political dissent and opposition, as bom out in the 
fight against Lore, who was able to gain sympathy from his own German-language 
comrades as well as the Finnish Federation. The Fourth Convention's resolution on 
Bolshevisation made this connection explicit: 'the Federation form of organization is 
59 Letter from ECCI to Central Executive Committee of the Workers Party, not dated, date stamped 20 
June 1925, in Jay Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 208, folder 18. 
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a most fertile soil for factionalism. ' In the mid- I 920s, Henry Puro recalled, both 
factions courted the Finnish leaders in order to gain power in the Party. In February 
1925, leaders of the Ruthenberg faction complained to the Comintern that Foster's 
supporters in the Russian Federation were unfairly manoeuvring against them . 
60 The 
switch from a federation-based membership to a factory nuclei membership, in which 
members who worked together formed a party unit, regardless of whether they could 
speak to one another, while never so successful as desired, was more than an attempt 
to focus the Party's energy on the working class. It also represented an attempt to 
atomise and disperse the membership, blunting the growth of any political 
opposition. 61 
Reporting to the American Commission of the ECCI after the beginning of 
Bolshevisaton, Ruthenberg declared that 'naturally, this reorganization was a great 
shock to the language federations and particularly so the Finnish section. 
62 Ame 
Halonen, a former leader of the Finnish Federation who opposed Bolshevisation, 
recalled that, 'as a rule, the Finnish members scorned the ridiculous ultra- 
revolutionary doctrine of the Comintern. ' Gitlow, who was responsible for 
Bolshevising the New York local, recounted that 'Bolshevization meant a death-blow 
to branches and [language] federations.... By securing the Bolshevization task, our 
faction had the opportunity to build its support among the membership anew from 
ground up. ' Thus, ironically, if it ended language- or ethnic-based dissent, 
' Max Bedacht, Benjamin Gitlow, J. Louis Engdahl to ECCI, 23 February 1925, in Jay Lovestone 
papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 209, folder 1. 
" On the shop nuclei, see Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 192-93. 
62 Browder, No Man's Land, 209; The Fourth Convention, 87; 'Resolution on the Results of the 
Reorganization of the Workers (Communist) Party of American', adopted at the Seventh Comintern 
Plenum, Party Organizer (Chicago), April 1927; Wiita, 'Crisis in the Finnish-American Left', 6; 
Transcription of the American Commission of the ECCI, 16 February 1926, in Prometheus Research 
Library. On the Finnish section, see Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 113. 
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Bolshevisation itself, in Gitlow's words, 'became a factional football'. 63 The extent of 
this is illustrated by an internal Ruthenberg faction letter. Surveying the seventeen 
federations in 1925, the letter indicates that reorganisation would hit hardest those 
who supported Foster. Thus in the Finnish Federation, there was a 'decisive majority 
against us' so it 'will loose almost 50% thru reorg'; yet the Hungarian federation was 
'solidly for us.... [and] will not lose many thru reorganization'. Similarly the 
Czechoslovak and Slovak federations had sided with Foster and would lose many 
members, but the Lithuanian and South Slav federations were largely pro-Ruthenberg 
strongholds and would be minimally damaged. 64 
The 'Americanisation' of the Party through the dismantling of the language 
groups met mixed success. While membership turnover was a constant problem, the 
decline after the 'Americanisation' was drastic. In September 1925 there were 14,037 
members, but only 7,215 in October. 
65 Most of the attrition came from Finns, of 
whom only 1500 individuals out of the Federation's some 6000 members re-enrolled 
66 
in the Party. Over the next two years, some three-fourths of the Party's Finnish 
67 
members quit. By 193 1, many leading Finnish cadre had quit or been purged. Paul 
Buhle described this process: 
Half the Finnish membership disappeared.... Other, smaller groups fared even 
worse. Hardly a fraction of the syndicalist-minded Italian group survived. 
Districts rich in mass industry but poor in English-language Communists 
practically ceased to function, some never to return to their strength of the 
mid- I 920s. In a few cases (notably the aging German group), there was a mass 
exodus from the Party with former quasi-Party institutions intact. In general, 
63 Halonen, 'Role of Finnish-Americans in the Political Labor Movement', 99; Benjamin Gitlow, I 
Confess, 229-30. 
6" [Jay Lovestone? ] to John [Pepper], 8 October 1925, in Jay Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution 
archives, Stanford University, box 197, folder 1. 
65 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 187. 
66 Klehr, Communist Cadre, 22; J. P. Morray, Project Kuzbas: American Workers in Siberia, 1921-1926 
(New York: International Publishers, 1983), 39; Ahola, Finnish-Americans and International 
Communism, 34,8 1. However, it is also important to note that this membership loss may be 
exaggerated by a concurrent change in the way membership dues to eliminate the 'dual stamp' process 
6Z, 
which both husband and wife would jointly be members. b 
6 Kostiainen, 'Radical Ideology vs. Ethnic Social Activities', 32-33. 
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individuals left one-by-one, tired of the trouble and disillusioned with the 
internal life of the left. 68 
Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, much of the Finnish-American 
community was tom asunder by internecine fighting over the ability of the 
Communist leadership to control the resources of the Finnish membership. Much of 
the once-strong pro-Communist membership of the Central Co-operative Exchange 
(CCE) deserted the Party when the leadership insisted that the CCE make available its 
substantial financial resources to the Party. When the CCE leadership, including many 
Party members, refused, the Party and the CCE began attacking each other. When the 
dust settled, they found themselves divorced and not on speaking terms. Although the 
CCE continued, it did so not as a part of an organised political movement . 
69The 
Comintern gave enough weight to the Finnish question within the American Party that 
it dispatched Aino Kuusinen-Otto Kuusinen's-to the US to sort through the 
wreckage. 70 
Some language groups declined because tens of thousands of ethnic radicals- 
especially Russians and other Eastern Europeans-returned to their homelands after 
the Revolution, either through free will or deportation. 71 An American delegate to the 
Second Comintern Congress may have been exaggerating, but nonetheless captured 
something in an article he wrote at the time: 'At the present moment a whole million 
of former Russians would like to come back to Russia; of every 100 Russian 
workmen in America, 99 wish to return to Russia. ' 
72 The CP several times had to pass 
resolutions condemning unauthorised return, although immigrants with skills were 
68 Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 135. 
69 See Dyson, Red Harvest, chapter 3; Halonen, 'The Role of Finnish-Americans', 111-18; Wiita, 
'Crisis in the Finnish-American Left'. 
70 See Aino Kuusinen, The Rings ofDestiny. - Inside Soviet Russiafrom Lenin to Brezhnev (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1974), 82-102. For a broader view of Aino Kuusinen's role in the 
Party in the early 193 Os, see Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World ofAmerican Communism, 
176-80. 
71 Klehr, Communist Cadre, 24. 
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often encouraged to return. Between five and ten thousand North American Finns, 
encouraged by the American and Canadian Parties, as well as the Soviet government, 
emigrated to Soviet Russia, especially the Karelian region on the Finnish-Russian 
frontier, to help develop the Soviet timber industry. 73 In the late 1920s and early 
1930s, the Party also helped co-ordinate Jewish emigration from North America to the 
eastern Soviet Union to form a Jewish socialist republic in Birobidzhan. 74 
However, many ethnic ex-Communists stayed in the periphery of the Party, 
usually through the Intemational Workers Order (IWO), a fratemal organisation that 
began as a left-wing split from the social-democratic Arbeter Ring (Workmen's 
Circle) Yiddish fratemal society. Although the IWO was led by Communists- 
including, for many years, Max Bedacht-it was not a typical 'front' group. Amongst 
its roles was providing low-cost insurance and benefit schemes to workers, including 
blacks. Like the early CP, however, the IWO was organised into ethnic fraternities, 
and the immediate precursor to the IWO, the Jewish People's Fraternal Organization, 
was formed in 193 0 during the 'Bolshevisation' campaign. A former Communist 
leader captured the essence of the IWO when he labelled its members 'those 
sympathizers who still clung to ethnic allegiances'. 
75 Until New York State revoked 
72 Petrograd Pravda, 18 July 1920, in the US State Department's The 2"d Congress ofthe Communist 
International, 145. 
73 See Ahola, Finnish-Americans and International Communism, 175-80; Hudelson, 'Roots of Karelian 
Fever'; Reino Kero, 'Emigration of Finns from North America to Soviet Karelia in the Early 1930s', in 
Micheal G Kami, Matti E. Kaups and Douglas J. Ollila, Jr., eds., The Finnish Experience in the Great 
Lakes Region: New Perspectives (Vannala: Institute for Migration, 1975), 212-22 1. Many of these 
Finns, however, were to fall afoul of the Stalinist purges in the late 1930s. See Klehr, The Soviet World 
ofAmerican Communism, 22743; Arvo Touminen, The Bells ofthe Kremlin: An Experience in 
Communism (Hannover, NH and London: University Press of New England, 1983), 70-7 1. 
74 Henry Srebmik, 'Red Star Over Birobidzhan: Canadian Jewish Communists and the "Jewish 
Autonomous Region" in the Soviet Union', LabourlLe Travail, 44 (Fall 1999), 129-47. 
75 See Zucker, 'The "Jewish Bureau.. for a discussion of the maintenance of a distinct Jewish 
Communist identity, especially in the 1930s. The case for the IWO's being a repository for 
Communists disgruntled by 'Bolshevisation' is made by Mishler, Raising Reds, 65 and passim. A more 
extensive study of the IWO's later years by Arthur J. Sabin, Red Scare in Court: New York versus the 
International Workers Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), does not cover 
this aspect of the IWO in its first chapter examination of the origins of the IWO. Quote from Starobin, 
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its charter to sell insurance during the McCarthy period, the IWO was quite 
successful: its membership had increased from 3300 in 1933 to some 50,000 in 1950, 
and its members helped finance the publication of the Daily Worker and the Yiddish 
Freiheit. 76 
Even the thousands of ex-Communist Finns did not leave the Party's orbit 
altogether. In 1925, to safeguard their property from Party control, dissident Finns 
established the Finnish Workers Federation (FVvT) as a separate entity. Open to Party 
members as well as non-members, the Federation, however, offered a refuge for 
77 
radical Finns who did not, or could not integrate into the American Party. Henry 
Puro convinced the Party leadership that since less than a third of members of the 
former Finnish Federation joined the reorganised Party, the FWF would offer a home 
for 'the others [who] were still close to the Party and could be kept as Party 
sympathizers, given leadership by their own central organization'. The FWF was, one 
author maintained, 'a mass organization of the Communist Party in the truest sense' 
since it combined Communist and non-Communist members under the general 
political direction of the Party. The Federation, in fact, affiliated with the IWO in 
1941.78 
Yet, even in the newly 'Americanised' Party, shom of the language- 
federations, all was not always well from the point of view of the leadership. Once 
again, in 1927, the national leadership, needing to secure money for the Daily Worker, 
76 Arthur Liebman, 'The Ties That Bind', 331-32. This success was one reason that New York State 
attacked the IWO. Cf. Thomas J. E. Walker, 'The International Workers Order: A Unique Fraternal 
Body' (PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 1982), 16-27; Roger Keeran, 'National Groups and the 
Popular Front: The Case of the International Workers Order', Journal ofAmerican Ethnic History 14: 3 
(1995), 23-25. 
77 Karni, 'Yhteishya', 239; Kostiainen, 'Radical Ideology vs. Ethnic Social Activities', 33; Halonen, 
'Role of Finnish-Americans in the Political Labor Movement', 10 1. 
78 Wiita, 'Crisis in the Finnish-American Left', 10; Ahola, Finnish-Americans and International 
Communism, 230-32. 
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attempted to tap into the language federations' coffers. 79 Given the realities of the 
American working class in the 1920s, nothing the Party could have done would have 
made the problem disappear. Jack Stachel, admitted in 1927 that since immigrants 
made up the bulk of the working class, and since 'the great bulk of them must still be 
reached thru the propaganda in their own language, and since there is lacking trade 
union organization in most of these industries they are to be found in the different 
fraternal organizations. ' Yet, Stachel complained, these organisations 'must pay more 
attention to America' instead of emphasising the 'home country'. 80 
In the spring of 1928, the Party Organizer outlined a campaign to increase 
readership of the Daily Worker amongst Party members because 'the greatest majority 
of our Party members are still filled with the Federation ideology and are supporters 
of their language papers, while reading the Daily Worker is only a secondary matter. ' 
In one New York City sub-district, the article detailed, only 35 per cent of members 
read the Daily Worker, while 70 per cent read the Freiheit. The next month, the Party 
Organizer complained that 'there still are Language Federations in our Party' but 
'they only carry other names. In 193 0, the same j ournal again complained that 'in 
reality most of our language comrades work isolated-more or less-from the general 
Party work'. 'Their main activity, ' the author continued, 'is concentrated in the 
language field. 98 1 Throughout the late 1920s, the Party held English classes for its 
members. 82 
The Party, then, remained overwhelmingly a Party of immigrants. In 1929, the 
membership of five representative districts was 88 per cent foreign-born. In 1935, the 
"' PC minutes, 22 March 1927, in PRL collection. 
80 Jack Stachel, 'How Communists Work Among Foreign Born', Daily Worker, 2 February 1927. 
11 Party organizer, March/April 1928; May/June 1928; March 1930. 
" See for example, the Daily Worker, 21 January 1929, for an description of these classes. 
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Party membership was still more than 60 per cent foreign-born. 83 However, how 
much of this relative decline was due to Bolshevisation and how much was merely a 
reflection of the changing reality of the American working class is unclear. New 
immigration law of 1924, which severely restricted immigration, contributed to the 
diminishing importance of immigrants in the Party, as new recruits through the 1930s 
often tended to be the assimilated sons and daughters of immigrants. But as late as 
2000, the Party was led by a Finn, Arvo Holberg (Gus Hall). But this must be taken in 
perspective, since a large portion of the American population, especially workers, 
consists of immigrant or first-generation Americans. Thus even Klehr admitted that 
'As a party of immigrants, the CPUSA was not necessarily unrepresentative of the 
American working class. ' 84 In fact, when the Party attempted to organise largely 
immigrant workforces, the language federations proved helpful. For example, Passaic, 
New Jersey, was almost entirely foreign-bom when Albert Weisbord organised a 
spectacular textile-workers strike there in 1926; he credited the federations for 
facilitating the Party's work there and their papers as 'a power in educating and 
solidifying the masses -) . 
85 
Factional gang warfare 
Factionalism continued unabated throughout the 1920s, although now the line-ups 
became more hardened. Increasingly, Cannon and Foster opposed Pepper, Lovestone 
and Ruthenberg. This factional line-up formed during the dispute about the Farmer- 
Labor and La Follette movements, which is explained in the previous chapter. 
However, by 1925 and 1926, the original political differences underlying the factions 
83 Klehr, Communist Cadre, 22 (1928 figures); Alperin, 'Organization in the Communist Party, U. S. A., 
64 (1935 figures; in 1936, the foreign-born comprised only 52.2 per cent of the membership). 
84 Klehr, Communist Cadre, 35. 
85 Vera Buch Weisbord, A Radical Life (Bloomington and London: University of Indiana Press, 1977), 
101,135. Albert Weisbord quoted in Paul L. Murphy, ed., The Passaic Textile Strike of 1926 (Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1974), 143. 
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had largely been displaced by the desire of each group to gain control of the Party. 
'Upon what principled platforms these groups rested', Vera Buch Weisbord 
remembered, 'never became clear in the Harlem English branch. -)86 Cannon and Foster 
accepted the Comintern's labour party policy while Ruthenberg accepted Foster's 
trade-union policy. Important political motions passed unanimously, and factional 
warfare made no sense. When Wolfe returned from Mexico, he asked each factional 
leader to explain the root of the problem. He recalled that 'each explanation, filled 
with factional bitterness, left me more bewildered than before, ' although this did not 
stop him from becoming a leader in Lovestone's faction. Cannon later wrote that 
despite this unclarity, 'The factional struggle raged more fiercely than ever before in 
the history of the party-over the issue of party control. ' For his part, Browder wrote 
that, 'As the unity resolution grew in the "parity commission", the distance between 
the factions widened in the Party districts and branches. Although the commission 
produced a completely "unanimous" resolution, the Party membership was 
completely divided into hostile factions in preparation for a split-with not a single 
issue defined. ' 87 
Browder recalled that 'over-all political confusion had the consequence to 
engulf any achievement the Party made in this period, and factionalism made Party 
work a Sisyphusian task. 88 In such a situation, Comintern intervention could have 
been of great help to focus the Party on its political tasks instead of cannibalistic 
factionalism. Politics, and not 'party control', should have been placed in command- 
and only the Comintern had the authority to do this. Yet, while the Comintern had no 
compunction in intervening in the internal life of the Party, it did so not on this basis 
of political clarity, but to play one faction against another. This reflected the 
" Weisbord, A Radical Life, 95. 
17 Wolfe, A Life in Two Centuries, 378; Cannon, First Ten Years, 134; Browder, No Man's Land, 228. 
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degeneration-Stalinisation-of the Comintem itself. Increasingly, the Comintem 
sought not to support a leadership with the authority and programme to guide the 
Party, but instead wanted a pliant bureaucracy responsive to its changing tactics. 
Political dissent and independence were rooted out, while within the Party a 
conservative, pro-Stalin leadership emerged. 
In 1925, both the Cannon-Foster group and the Pepper-Ruthenberg-Lovestone 
faction sent delegates to the Fifth Comintern Congress. The Comintern gave political 
support to Ruthenberg, labelling La Follette a petty-bourgeois 'standard bearer against 
89 big business'. Yet, organisationally the Comintern decreed that 'the new Central 
Committee is to be so elected at the Party Conference so that the Foster group obtains 
a majority and the Ruthenberg group is represented proportionately by at least one- 
third. '90 
Understandably, Ruthenberg was not satisfied with this configuration. 
Zinoviev, weakened by Stalin's ascendancy and having more pressing concerns than 
the American Party, did not force the issue. The Comintern ordered a 'firm 
consolidation of communist forces', ordered that factionalism cmust now absolutely 
cease' and 'demand[ed] the unconditional cessation of Party warfare'. It ordered a 
National Conference 'at an early date' and in the interim created a 'parity 
commission' which was divided evenly between minority and majority supporters, 
'under the chairmanship of a neutral comrade'. This effectively dissolved the Party 
leadership and handed power to the 'neutral comrade', one Gusev, an Old Bolshevik 
and stalwart supporter of Stalin. Cannon, a member of the parity commission, recalled 
that 'the elected Central Committee and its Political Bureau, as such, virtually ceased 
to exist. ' Instead, 'Questions of policy, organization, convention preparations and 
88 Browder, No Man's Land, 220. 
89 Ibid. 
189 Jacob Zumoff 
everything else were decided by the Parity Commission, with Gusev casting the 
deciding vote in case of any disagreements'. 91 
The Fourth National Convention and the Parity Cable 
The Party held its Fourth National Convention in Chicago in late August 1925. 
With little political differences between the factions, the delegates unanimously 
passed a general task and perspective document, 'The Present Situation and 
Immediate Tasks of the Party' along with specific resolutions dealing with work 
among women, unions and blacks. Nonetheless, the internecine factional strife 
continued unabated. The Cleveland and Philadelphia locals effectively had already 
split into two different organisations. At the Daily Worker editorial offices, Max 
Shachtman and other Cannon and Foster supporters had barricaded themselves in their 
offices, refusing entry to Ruthenberg supporters, including J. Louis Engdahl, the co- 
editor of the paper. 92 
Because Foster and Cannon had almost twice as many delegates as 
Ruthenberg, they maintained control of the Party. Then the Comintem intervened and 
sent a cable on 27 August declaring that 'it has finally become clear that the 
Ruthenberg Group is more loyal to decisions of the Communist International and 
stands closer to its views' and that 'Foster group employs excessively mechanical and 
ultrafactional methods'. The cable demanded that Ruthenberg and Lovestone, 
supporters comprise no less than 40 per cent of the CEC; Ruthenberg remain Party 
secretary; Lovestone be co-opted onto the CEC; the Foster-Cannon majority not target 
the minority for 'removals, replacements, dispersions'; Ruthenberg's faction retain 
90 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 13 8; Cannon, First Ten Years, 132. 
91 Daily Worker, 19 May 1925; Cannon, First Ten Years, 133-34. 
92 The Fourth National Convention ofthe Workers (Communist) Party ofAmerica (Chicago: Literature 
Department, Daily Worker Publishing Company, 1925), 72-86; Draper, American Communism and 
Soviet Russia, 143. 
Jacob Zumoff 190 
co-editorship of the Party's central organ; and mandated the 'maximum application of 
parity on all executive organs of the Party'. The cable ended on an ominous note: 
If majority does not accept these demands then declare that, in view of 
circumstances of elections, unclear who has real majority and that methods of 
majority raise danger of split and therefore Communist International proposes 
that now only a temporary Parity Central Executive Committee be elected with 
neutral chairman to call new convention after passions have died down. Those 
who refuse to submit will be expelled. 93 
In his autobiography, Wolfe recalled that after Gusev showed the Party the cable, 
'Gusev sat at the front of the table among [Ruthenberg] caucus leaders as if he were 
one of them and a member of our group.... He had always seemed more at home in 
our caucus anyway. 94 
The Cannon-Foster alliance split over how to respond. Foster argued that the 
majority should refuse to accept the cable, hand the minority complete control of the 
CEC and refuse to participate in it. That is to say, he wanted to boycott the Party 
leadership and appeal directly to the Comintern. Cannon, a self-described 'convinced 
"Comintemisf', ' wanted to accept the cable and divide the CEC evenly between the 
factions. 95 
In the end, the Parity Commission ordered 'that the Central Executive 
Committee be constructed on the basis of an equal number from each group, with a 
neutral chairman. ' This merely codified the power of the Comintem as a factional 
player in its own right, or as the Parity Commission spelt it out: 'the representative of 
the C. I. shall be given power by a resolution of the convention to participate in the 
93 The telegram is in the Jay Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 196, folder 
11; cf, C. E. Ruthenberg, 'From the Tbird through the Fourth Convention of the Workers (Communist) 
party,, Workers Monthly, October 1925. 
94 Wolfe, A Life in Two Centuries, 384. 
9' Cannon, First Ten Years, 136; see Cannon's speech to the second session of the American 
Commission of the ECCI, 18 February 1926,21-24, for his description of the extent of this split within 
the Cannon-Foster faction. 
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C. E. C. meeting and to cast a deciding vote and act as chairman. 96 At the meeting of 
the reconstituted CEC, Gusev explained his support to Ruthenberg: 
Of course we now have a parity C. E. C. but it is not exactly a parity C. E. C. 
With the decision of the Communist International on the question of the 
groups in the American Party there goes parallel instructions to the C. I. 
representatives to support that group which was the former minority. If the C. I. 
continues this policy, that will always be the case, that is, the C. I. 
representative will be supporting that group and therefore altho [sic] we have a 
nearly parity C. E. C., we have a majority and a minority in the C. E. C. 9' 
Although the factionalism had indigenous roots, the Comintern encouraged factional 
control and not political programme to be the centre of factional disputes, made 
control dependent on Comintern support, and then doled out support not based on 
politics but on organisational questions. This accelerated the political degeneration of 
the American party. The role of the Comintern was recognised by the leadership; in 
fact there was a joke which captured both the situation and the cynicism of much of 
the leadership. Why is the Communist Party like the Brooklyn Bridge? It is suspended 
by cables. 
98 
Unlike years past, what was on offer was something new. Comintern 
intervention could have once again salvaged the Party from the shoals of factionalism. 
Cannon later wrote that 'we could have solved our problem had we been able to get 
the help we needed. That is, the help of more experienced and authoritative people. 
The problem was too big for us. '99 This is why Party leaders like Cannon supported 
the Bolshevisation campaign: they saw it as a way out of the impasse of endless 
apolitical factional struggle. The entire leadership respected the Comintern, not 
because in the Communist world all power emanated from Moscow, but because they 
saw in the International the only power with the experience and authority to orient the 
Party correctly. 
96 Fourth National Convention, 165. 
11 Daily Worker, 3 September 1925; Ruthenberg, 'From the Third to the Fourth Convention'. 
91 Wolfe, Two Centuries, 374; Giflow, I Confess, 187. 
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The Comintern's intervention, far from 'Bolshevising' the Party, reinforced 
this situation. In the coming period, the Party, bereft of needed guidance, drifted 
rudderless. Thus at sea, it was subject to both the tides of Comintem policies and the 
winds of American politics in the anti-radical 1920s. For its part, the 'Bolshevised' 
Comintem, increasingly under the sway of Stalin, began to intervene more and more 
heavily into the Party, disfiguring its politics more and more as the factional battles 
became less political and more brutal. 
" Cannon, History ofAmerican TrolsAyism, 33-34. 
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7. Endless Factionalism 
Outwardly, between 1925 and 1927, the Party reoriented itself and tried to 
regain the ground it had lost following the Fann-Labor and La Follette debacles. In 
this period, the Party again established itself in the labour movement, including the 
Passaic, New Jersey, textile strike, and the struggle to free Sacco and Vanzetti. 
Interrially, however, persistent factionalism undercut these advances. This factional 
struggle, as Cannon later wrote to Theodore Draper, 'must present far more 
difficulties for the inquiring student than all the preceding years put together' since in 
this period it 'became bankrupt for lack for real political justification for the existence 
of factions. " The Party needed to transcend these differences through common 
political work. Given the rancour between the different leaders, forged in half a 
decade of bitter animosity, this unity could have been effected only by Comintem 
intervention. However, while the Comintem did not shy from intervening in the Party, 
it increasingly did so not to create a healthy Party, but rather to construct a leadership 
subservient to the increasingly Stalinised Comintern. It did this by playing one faction 
off against the others, and keeping the factionalism boiling. As the (prosperous 
twenties' wore on, the factionalism and the apparent strength of American capitalism 
created a sort of cynicism amongst many cadre. This chapter examines this process 
over these two years. 
Factionalists courted the Comintern by pitching themselves in terms of the 
current political situation in Moscow. Because Stalin, in an alliance with Bukharin, 
denounced the 'left danger' posed by Zinoviev and Trotsky, both American factions 
accused each other of being leftists. In his autobiography, Browder recalled how one 
of his co-factionalists drove this point home: 
' Cannon, The First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 148. 
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Bittelman ... took up my political re-education, telling me that he and Foster had learned in Moscow that we had made a big mistake in America... when we 
judged the Pepper-Ruthenberg policy as a 'right-opportunist deviation, marked 
by leftist phrases'. It had been a natural mistake in America, but we had not 
realized that this would only strengthen our opponents in Moscow, where 
4ultra-leftism' was now being stressed as the main danger. Foster and 
Bittelman had, therefore, made a right-about-face on this matter, and returned 
to our 1923 formula ... that Pepper and Ruthenberg were authentic ultra-leftists. 
This judgement, said Bittelman, was proved to be correct by the fact that it 
would be most favorably considered in Moscow. 2 
However, the factions were not definite ideological groups: the real issue was which 
faction would control the Party. The Comintern encouraged such confused 
speculation. This naturally bewildered Party members. One example is Joseph 
Manley, Foster's son in law and comrade from his early syndicalist days, who quit the 
Party in 1925 dispirited with the never-ending factionalism. 3 
After the Comintern's 'parity commission' cable, the three factions in the 
continued intact, but shifted their alliances. Cannon and Dunne broke from Foster and 
Bittelman, and briefly united with Ruthenberg and Lovestone. This new bloc accepted 
the Comintern's cable, and described their alliance as 'a unification of all those who 
follow and fight for the political line of the Communist International'. 4 
Ruthenberg's lieutenant described Cannon as 'the most effective opponent of 
Fosterism'. 5 However, while Cannon had not abandoned factionalism, his outlook had 
changed. Above all, he wanted to abolish the factionalism, not to merely improve his 
standing in the line-up. As he put it at a Moscow meeting of the American 
Commission at the Comintern's Sixth plenum in February 1926, 'we must have peace 
2 Browder, No Man's Land, in Browder Papers, part two, 2. 
3 There are two statements on Manley at the time of his death in an industrial accident: C. E. 
Ruthenberg for the Central Committee, Daily Worker, I September 1926; and a longer obituary by 
Alex Bittelman in the 'New Magazine' supplement to the Daily Worker, II September 1926. 
4 'Unite the Party! ', 16 November 1925, in Cannon, Early Years, 363-64. 
Jack Stachel to 'Dear Comrades', nd [1925? ] in Jay Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution archives, 
Stanford University, box 288, folder 5. 
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in the Party; we must have unity in the party-at all cost, we must have unity in the 
Party and have an end to the faction fight 9.6 
After the Sixth plenum, Cannon and his supporters remained separate from 
both of the contending factions, and voted with whichever faction they agreed on a 
particular issue. He began to construct a 'faction to end factions', and recruited two 
long-time Ruthenberg supporters from the New York apparatus, Jacob 'Jack' Stachel 
and William Weinstone, and made overtures to Ruthenberg. In the unsigned notes of a 
meeting between Cannon, Bedacht, Lovestone and Ruthenberg, the stenographer, 
Henry Puro, noted that Cannon 'Believes that factionalism is played out' and 
disagreed 'that [the] party is facing the alternative of the Ruthenberg group or the 
Foster group'. Instead, Cannon advocated 'collective leadership'. Factional divisions 
in the Political Committee, Cannon noted, had frustrated him since it meant that he 
'he must always convince four [members] or loose. ' Cannon told the meeting: 'I 
cannot conceive a party leadership without you three comrades' and advocated 'a 
fusion of all those qualified for leadership in the party'. 7 Ruthenberg appeared open to 
such a perspective, and in his response he set forth 'two roads before the party', either 
the 'test of power' or the 'group working together'. While he warned that he was 
prepared to slug it out, he also thought 'it would be good idea to have you, Foster, and 
myself get together before a Polcom meeting and lay a basis of agreement. ' 
8 
While Ruthenberg himself may have been sincere, internal Ruthenberg 
factional correspondence, however, indicates that Lovestone was more interested in 
consolidating his faction on the bones of the Cannon group. 'The rank and file of our 
new roommates is far above in intelligence than some of their corporals, colonels, 
" Minutes of the First Session of the American Commission of the Communist International, 16 
February 1926, in Prometheus Research Library Collection. 
7 Henry Puro (John Wiita), notes on 7 February 1927 meeting, in Cannon, Early Years, 3 87-9 1. Cannon 
did note that Robert Minor and J. Louis Engdahl were 'negative elements' in the Lovestone group. 
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generals and field rats', Lovestone wrote in January. He wanted to marginalise 
Cannon and annex his membership in order to prevent Cannon (and his ally, Martin 
Abern) from establishing an independent base: 'I am working overtime to make it 
impossible for the development of a sort of puppet-republic called Abernia or 
Cannonia', Lovestone wrote, and predicted that 'the unity question is no longer a 
question-it is an objective condition that none of us can get out of. '9 Yet, Lovestone 
could not rest easy; already in March he railed against the possibility of a separate 
Cannon group as 'the very essence of Charlatanism in its lowest degree'. ' 0 This 
attitude contributed to the failure of Cannon's plan. By June, Cannon had become 
seriously disaffected by what he saw as the continuation of factional antics by the 
Ruthenberg group within the CEC. 11 By September, Lovestone was denouncing 
Cannon and Dunne's 'policy of destructive factionalism'. 12 
Factionalism and the trade unions 
Factional ire seeped into every nook and cranny of Party activity. Perhaps the 
most contentious arena was trade-union work. Not only was this the bread-and-butter 
of a Party claiming to lead the working class, but it also had heightened stakes for 
Foster, whose authority was based on his trade-union expertise. The opening shots 
were fired into the Party's New York City needle trades work. The leading 
Communists in the ILGWU, Charles Zimmerman and Rose Wortis, along with 
Benjamin Gitlow (a member of the ACTWU), supported Ruthenberg's faction. In the 
summer of 1925, there was a dispute within the Party over how to approach the 
a Ibid. 
9 [Jay Lovestone] to 'Dear Boys', 12 February 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 4. 
10 T [Lovestone] to 'Dear Comrades', 22 March 1926, Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 5. 
" See anonymous letter dated 25 June 1926 which contains the minutes of a meeting held the day 
before between Cannon and Dunne and Ruthenberg and Lovestone; Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 
7. 
12 [Jay Lovestone? ] to 'Dear John [Pepper], 8 September 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 9. 
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upcoming ILGWU conference. 13 Foster's ally, Jack Johnstone (who was running the 
TUEL since Foster was in Moscow appealing to the Comintern about the results of 
the parity commission), advocated a policy of playing portions of the social- 
democratic Sigman leadership against one another in order to 'negotiate for 
organizational guarantees, which will completely protect it in the control of its present 
conditions'. For Cannon and Dunne, this emphasised organisational power instead of 
political struggle. Accordingly, the CEC issued a 'statement on the needle trades 
situation' which attacked the TUEL for allowing Communist politics to recede so far 
that it only had 'secondary importance and is fast becoming a memory'. 14 At the 
convention, the Party's militants in the ILGWU had all but split from the union, 
inflaming Foster's fear of dual unionism. 
This fear grew in January 1926, when a Ruthenberg supporter, Albert 
Weisbord, organised a strike of 16,000 textile workers in Passaic, New Jersey, against 
a threatened wage cut. ' 5 The almost year-long Passaic strike captured the imagination 
of liberals and the labour movement. The Party's leadership of the struggle by 
immigrant, unskilled workers for basic survival against violent police and company 
officials, placed Communism in the centre of the effort to re-energise the trade union 
movement amidst the anti-labour 1920s. The strike demonstrated both the ability of 
Communist organisers, and the failure of AFL craft unionism, to confront new 
industrial conditions. Cannon recalled that 'the strike really put the party on the labor 
map' and 'revealed the Communists as the dynamic force in the radical labor 
movement and the organizing center of the unorganized workers disregarded by the 
13 See chapter 5, above. 
14 Johnstone quoted in Cannon, Early Years, 3 59-60; CEC quoted in David Gurowsky, 'Factional 
Disputes in the ILGWU', 176-77. 
'5 See Albert Weisbord, Passaic (San Francisco: Germinal Press, 1976 [1926]); Cannon, 'The United 
Front at Passaic', Labor Defender, June 1926, in Early Years, 3 75-8 1. On the Passaic strike in general, 
see Morton Siegel, 'The Passaic Textile Strike of 1926' (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1952). A 
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AFL unions'. ' 6 The Party's isolation from the labour movement, engendered in the 
split with Fitzpatrick and the AFL's anti-Communist crusade, began to end. 
It also complicated the internal factional situation, even though none of the 
factional leaders could claim credit for the strike, especially since most of their 
leaders were in Moscow when it began under Weisbord's leadership. While 
Ruthenberg's faction sought to claim credit for the it, 17 what was most conspicuous 
was that Foster, the traditional trade-union expert in the Party, played no role in what 
was becoming the Party's most important labour battle. 18 Foster was particularly upset 
not by Weisbord's alliance with Ruthenberg, nor by his failure to work with the 
TUEL, but because Weisbord's success demonstrated the limitations to Foster's 
strategy of boring from within. Weisbord established 'United Front Committees' 
(UFC) whose stated purpose was to amalgamate the 16 existing unions and to force 
them to organise the largely immigrant and female workers instead ofjust skilled craft 
workers. Although in early January 1926 the Party decided that the workers should 
attempt to join the AFL-affiliated United Textile Workers (UTW), 19 the UFC soon, 
issued membership books and dues stamps-moves, that to Foster, seemed like 
organising a new union. 20 So, even as the AFL made it abundantly clear that it wanted 
nothing to do with the Passaic strike, Foster increasingly resented Weisbord. 
good documentary source is Paul L. Murphy, ed., The Passaic Textile Strike of 1926 (Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1974). 
16 Cannon, The First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 142. 
17 'Dear Comrades' Lovestone circular, II June 1927, PRL collection. 
18 Siegel, 'Passaic Textile Strike', 151. 
19 See minutes of District Industrial Committee, 8 January 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 
2. 
20 Siegel, 'Passaic Textile Strike', 163; Draper, American Communism andSoviet Russia, 223-26. 
However, according to Vera Buch Weisbord, Albert's wife and assistant in organising the strike, with 
the exception of Gitlow, none of the factions' leaders visited during the strike, and 'their non- 
appearance seemed to support Albert's contention that they were indifferent, if not hostile, toward the 
strike'(Vera Buch Weisbord, A Radical Life [Bloomington and London: University of Indiana Press, 
19771,114. Cf. also ibid., 12 1, for the factional significance of the strike. ) 
199 Jacob Zumoff 
At the same time, Foster felt that his base in the TUEL was under seige. In 
mid-January 1926, the ECCI sent a cable to the CEC that 'demand[ed] cessation [ofl 
factional struggle'. Specifically, the ECCI sought to counter factional attacks on the 
TUEL, by telling the party to 'strengthen [the] TUEL and its development into [a] 
mass movement of [the] left wing in [the] trade unions' and explicitly denying 
rumours that the ECCI was critical of TUEL . 
21 Although Lovestone and Ruthenberg 
were disappointed by this cable, because it would, they thought, in the words of 
Ruthenberg, only 'encourage Foster caucus to intensify destructive factional fight', 22 
they increased their attacks on the TUEL and Foster. Ruthenberg explicitly advocated 
dissolving the TUEL, which he attacked as a sectarian group 'made up of our Party 
members with only a few additional members'. Since the League shared much of its 
programme, leadership, journal, and even office space, with the Communist Party, the 
TUEL lacked an independent existence. For Ruthenberg, then, the TUEL had already 
served its purpose and should be replaced with a 'new broad left-wing organisation' 
with I the right programme and the right tactics' to absorb the remnants of the TUEL 
and win new allies in the labour movement. It was obvious, however, that this new 
organisation would also need a new leader. 
23 
Cannon agreed that the 'TUEL is not in any sense of the word a broad Left- 
Wing movernent, ' and that 'the National Committee of the TUEL is nothing but a 
sub-committee of the CEC. ' To avoid union bureaucratic repression, the Party should 
'legalise' the TUEL by changing the League's name and programme. Furthermore, 
the 'program of the TUEL should not be a political program; it should bear no party 
characteristics' because 'the TUEL is a united front organ; its program must therefore 
21 Cable from Presidium of ECCI to CEC of Workers Party, 15 January 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 
197, folder 3. 
22 [Jay Lovestone? ] to 'Dear John [Pepper]', 17 January 1926; 'Deferred Cablegram' from Ruthenberg 
to Pepper, 18 January 1926; both in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 3. 
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be broad enough for all the left wing elements. ' Primarily this meant emphasising 
class struggle, a labour party, organising the unorganised, and union democracy. 24 
Foster retorted that the TUEL still had a mass base, and highlighted the 
inexperience of Ruthenberg's followers in the trade-union field and the 
inability of the present Central Executive to conduct any kind of mass 
struggle. They have no experience with the masses. They do not understand 
the first thing about mass work. 
Foster highlighted the factional basis for the attacks on the League; since 'to destroy 
us, they had to destroy theTrade Union Educational League ... the policy of the 
Central Executive Committee has been to liquidate the TUEL. ' He advocated that the 
Party 'stick to the basic policy of the Trade Union Educational League'. 25 
Comintern decision 
At first glance, the Comintern's decision on Foster's appeal makes no sense 
since it solidified the organisational position of Ruthenberg but politically endorsed 
Foster. This could not but aggravate factionalism and destabilise the Party even more. 
It was, however, but one of many attempts by the Comintern under Stalin to play one 
faction against another to increase his authority and power. The Comintem refused to 
give Foster a majority of the CEC, and declared that 'there can be no question of a 
change in the composition of the C. C. at its party conference. ' Nevertheless, the 
Comintern kept Foster in the leadership of the TUEL, endorsed his trade-union policy 
and declared that 'secessional movements and the formation of parallel trade unions 
should not be instigated or encouraged in any fonn. 
26 
In Passaic, this policy meant that the UFC sued for unity with the UTW. The 
AFL, already none too happy about having to deal with the entire situation, only 
23 Ruthenberg, speech to American Commission of Comintern, 16 February 1926, in PRL collection. 
24 cannon, Early Years, 367. 
25 Foster, speech at first session of the American Commission of the Comintern, 16 February 1926, in 
Comintern archives, PRL. 
26 Quoted in Draper, American Communism, 228-29. 
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accepted the textile workers upon the condition that Weisbord end his involvement. 
Even though Weisbord opposed this, the Party agreed to this condition and forced him 
to quit the strike. 27 The Party labelled this 'a great victory', and, publicly, Weisbord 
claimed that, 'The union had become so strong that, once it secured settlement or 
affiliation it would carry on without [Weisbord]. So the United Front Committee 
declared it was ready to accept even the humiliating conditions laid down to affiliate. 
This forced the hand of the AR of L. bureaucracy. They were compelled to take in 
the strikers. ' For the strikers, this meant that their struggle was now in the hands of a 
leadership that had opposed it from the beginning. Within four months, the AFL had 
strangled the strike, and in 1928, the UTW expelled the Passaic local, thus leaving the 
workers little better off than two years earlier. 28 
For the Passaic workers, this strike was a failure. For the Party and the labour 
movement at large, it demonstrated the power of unskilled, immigrants workers 
struggling under Communist leadership. 
29 Shortly after the Passaic struggle, Party 
organisers in the Furriers, and then the ILGWU, led bitter strikes in New York City. 
Lovestone wrote in September 1926 that 'We have broken quite well the isolation we 
were in' and 'the trade union movement looks with increasing favor upon us and is 
steadily loosing its suspicion Of US. 
00 Although only the furrier strike was successful, 
the CP had once again become a factor in the American labour movement. More 
negatively, the outcome demonstrated the damaging nature of factionalism. When the 
entire factional leadership was in Moscow arguing amongst themselves, the strike 
17 Siegel, 'Passaic Textile Strike', 250. 
" Weisbord, Passaic, 58; Draper, American Communism, 23 1. On the humiliating end of the strike at 
the hands of the UTW, see Siegel, 'Passaic Textile Strike', chapter nine. Joseph Zack also opposed this 
policy; see his statement attached to the 8 May 1927 PC minutes, in PRL. 
" See Vera Buch Weisbord, A Radical Life, 135. 
30 [Jay Lovestone? ] to 'Dear John [Pepper], 8 September 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 9. 
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began well; when the leaders returned to the US, and fought over control of the work, 
the strike went poorly. 
The International Labor Defense 
Equally important for reinvigorating the Party's ties with the labour movement 
was the International Labor Defense (ILD). Under Cannon's leadership, the ILD 
defended 'class war prisoners'--victimised workers and socialists who had been 
targeted by the state for persecution, including scores of former wobblies and other 
militants still behind bars from the Red Scare. Besides demonstrating Communist 
solidarity with other radicals, and therefore establishing the Party's legitimacy as part 
of American radicalism, the ILD also demonstrated how a Comintern perspective, 
when developed by American Communists, helped Americanise the Party. 
The ILD was an extension of the Comintern's International Red Aid (IRA), 
founded in 1922 to aid victims of counterrevolution internationally. The Comintern 
desired the IRA to be, in one historian's words, 'a world-wide organization with 
branches or sections in various sections under the leadership of a central apparatus', 
and by 1928 Sixth Congress, the IRA had sections in 43 countries. 
31 
In late 1923, the Central European Bureau for International Red Aid, in Berlin, 
wrote to their American comrades: 
We deem it desirable, if in any way possible, to create there a Bureau for 
International Red Aid, on which will sit representatives not only from the 
Workers Party, but from all the left-Socialist and radical organizations that are 
willing to form a united front on the question of International Relief to Class 
War Prisoners, and whose combined actions may reach a wider public and 
larger funds than a purely party organization could achieve. 32 
3' For a history of the International Red Aid, see James Martin Ryle, 'International Red Aid, 1922- 
1928: The Founding of a Communist Front Organization' (PhD thesis, Emory University, 1967). Quote 
is on page 8; on the early disputes over the purpose of the IRA, see especially page 14; for a list of 
countries with member organisations, see pages 262-63. Many of these were founded late in the 1920s, 
and there is no indication of how large any was. 
32 L. Wilhelm to Executive Committee of WPA, 4 November 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 164. 
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The ILD itself, however, did not get underway for more than a year. While in 
Moscow in 1925, Cannon and Haywood-who understood intimately the question of 
state repression of labour radicals--came up with the idea of the ILD. 33 They saw it 
also as an extension of the old IWW slogan that 'an injury to one is an injury to all. ' 
According to Cannon, the early ILD was 'a non-partisan body which could defend 
any member of the working class movement, regardless of his opinion or affiliation, if 
he cmne under persecution by capitalist law'. 34 Upon returning to the US, Cannon 
discovered that the Party had already started to organise an affiliate of the IRA, one 
which was, in his words, 'a very quiet, inoffensive organization'. Cannon, however, 
sought to involve non-Party activists, especially former wobblies such as Ralph 
Chaplin. Soon, the ILD also subsumed another Party-organised group, the Friends of 
Soviet Russia, whose original purpose had been to raise money during the Soviet 
35 famine of 1921. 
The ILD also built upon the foundation of the Workers Defense Union 
(WDU). In 1918, at the urging of the National Civil Liberties Bureau (a precursor the 
American Civil Liberties Union), ex-Wobbly Elizabeth Gurley Flynn organised the 
WDU to build support in the labour movement for victims of the Red Scare. In the 
WDU's words, its objective was 'to work for an amnesty for all industrial and 
political prisoners convicted during the war' by 'emphasizing the class struggle as the 
cause of this oppression, and recognizing that, if other means fail, it will be necessary 
for the workers to use their organized power in industry to bring about the release of 
their comrades and fellow workers'. The WDU had the support of hundreds of local 
33 In 1925 a similar organisation, the Canadian Labour Defence League, was organised by the Canadian 
CP. See Ivan Avakumovic, 34; Bernard Dansereau, 'Le Mouvement Ouvrier Montrealais', 359-60. 
34 Cannon, First Ten Years, 163. 
33 Syd Stapleton interview with James P. Cannon, 29 October 1973, in James A Cannon: A Political 
Tribute (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), 24-26; Chaplin, Wobbly, 333. 
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and national unions (including the ILGWU, the ACVX and sections of the IWW), as 
well as left-wing organisations. 36 
Out of an office in the Rand School, Flynn worked with another future 
Communist, Ella Reeve Bloor, and others including Eugene Lyons to garner support 
for Russian radicals slated for deportation, jailed wobbl ies and others victimised for 
their politics, including Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, two Italian anarchists 
convicted of murder in Boston because of their politics and ethnicity. During the 
Passaic strike in 1926, Flynn drew closer to the CP-and had a short-lived affair with 
Albert Weisbord-and, in the fall of that year, became the titular head of the ILD. She 
soon joined the CP as well, although illness prevented her from playing a major role 
in the Party until the 1930s. 37 
The ILD was a good example of the united front: through it, the party joined 
with non-Communists to defend the common interests of the working class. In fact, of 
the 106 militants whom the ILD defended, none was a Communist. They included 
famous prisoners such as Sacco and Vanzetti, Mooney and Billings, McNamara and 
Schmidt, the Centralia IWW prisoners, as well as more obscure labour organisers 
throughout the US. The ILD organised a monthly stipend programme, publicised their 
cases, and helped provide legal defence. 
The ILD was not merely a radical public defender's office. In fact, that niche 
was already taken by what would become the ACLU, and on the international level, 
by the International Committee for Political Prisoners. Both of these organisations, 
36 See the pamphlet, Workers Defense Union (New York: Workers Defense Union, 1919? ), a copy of 
which is in the Ella Reeve Bloor papers (Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College Library), box 10, 
folder 19. According to the notation by Bloor's son, Communist Carl Reeve, the founding secretary, 
Fred Biedenkapp, also was an early Communist. 
37 See Camp, Iron in Her Soul, chapter four; Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor', 221-222. For Flynn's account 
of her moving closer to the Party via the ILD, see her II September 1926 letter to Mary Heaton Vorse, 
reprinted in Rosalyn Fraad Baxandall, ed., Words on Fire: The Life and Writing ofElizabeth Gurley 
Flynn (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 14345. Flynn of course would 
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built largely through the efforts of Roger N. Baldwin (and with the support of Flynn), 
publicised political persecution. 38 What distinguished the ILD was its Marxist belief 
that the state was the repressive apparatus that the capitalist class used to repress the 
workers. While willing to work with non-Marxists, the ILD sought to bring to bear the 
power of the organised working class on behalf of class-war prisoners. They had no 
illusions that the US justice system could be made 'fair' for the workers and 
oppressed; Cannon described this 'policy of the class struggle' that, 'while favoring 
all possible legal proceedings ... calls for agitation, publicity, demonstrations- 
organized protest on a national and international scale. 39 
The ILD's first breakthrough was the campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti. 
The ILD built an international campaign, bringing their struggle beyond the Italian 
radicals who first took it up. Although the ILD failed in preventing their execution in 
August 1927, it made the names Sacco and Vanzetti synonymous with American 
capitalist injustice, and the names of the ILD and American Communism synonymous 
with the struggle for the rights of the entire working class. In time, the ILD would be 
one of the more popular CP organisations, taking a leading role not only in Sacco and 
Vanzetti's struggle, but also the Scottsboro campaign to defend black youths accused 
of rape, as well as other causes which resonated throughout the labour movement. 40 
later go on to be a high-level CP leader, including as head of the Party after Foster's death in 1961. 
Bloor would become important in the ILD as well, especially after Cannon was expelled. 
38 A description of the ICPP can be found in Roger N. Baldwin and Eleonore von Eltz to W. E. B. Du 
Bois, 23 March 1925, in W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (W. E. B. Du Bois Library, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst), reel 15, file 749. See the ensuing correspondence for a dispute between the 
CP and the ICPP over the question of prisoners in Russia which would abort its collaboration with the 
Party (and Du Bois as well). 
31 James P. Cannon, Notebook ofan Agitator (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1993), 5. 
40 For a description of how the ILD carried out this work, see the New York City edition of the Daily 
Worker, from June to II August 1927, which describes the interaction of the ILD's work within the 
broader labour movement, including the SP and other anti-Communist currents. On the ILD more 
generally, see Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 180-82; Charles H. Martin, 'The 
International Labor Defense and Black America', Labor History 26 (1985), 165-97. 
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The ILD illustrates how the Comintem forced the American Party to build 
upon its roots in American radicalism, and deepen its connection to the American 
labour movement. Cannon provided the early ILD the benefit of his previous work 
within the radical labour movement, especially the IWW. Several ex-wobblies, 
including Flynn, served on its executive board. Without these roots, and this non- 
sectarian approach-both of which the Comintern had forced the Party to nurture- 
the ILD would have been stillborn, or at least much weaker. 4 1 The ILD indicated the 
counterpart to the factionalism of the Party: a potential to powerfully intervene in the 
labour movement and win workers to struggle behind the Party's leadership. Not only 
was the idea of the ILD developed by the Comintem, the Party would have been 
unable to grasp its basic premise had not the Comintem intervened in the early 1920s 
to make the Party appreciate the necessity of defending its rights to organise legally. 
The ILD also illustrated the dangers of factionalism. Although, Cannon sought 
refuge from factionalism by building the ILD, it, like Foster's TUEL, soon became 
embroiled in infighting which nearly destroyed it. Since at the ILD's inception, 
Cannon was still allied with Foster, Ruthenberg opposed Cannon's leading it. 42 Yet, 
after Cannon split with Foster and temporarily aligned his faction with Ruthenberg, 
this alliance shielded the ILD from attack. In 1926, Lovestone defended the ILD from 
Foster's supporters who were 'trying to make a factional issue of the defense society' 
in order 'to kill Cannon'. He promised, however, to 'go out of my way to defend the 
general line of the ILD at the same time working for its improvement. 
A3 By the time 
Cannon was again independent, the ILD was sufficiently well-established to survive, 
despite criticism of factionalism. Even amidst the Sacco and Vanzetti campaign, the 
41 CE the introduction to Cannon, Early Years, 4 1. 
42 Minutes of Political Committee, 26 June 1926, in Cannon, Early Years, 330. 
43 fiji [Lovestone] to 'Dear Comrades', 3 February 1926, Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 4. 
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ILD became a factional football. 44But by then, it had begun to flourish. For example, 
the ILD's Labor Defender reached a circulation of 22,000 by mid- 1928. Not only was 
it read by more people than many other Communist journals, it was more 
typographically pleasing, since it pioneered the use of graphics and photographs. 45 
The death of Ruthenberg and the ascension of Lovestone 
On 2 March 1927, Ruthenberg: suddenly died of acute appendicitis, at the age 
of forty four. Ruthenberg had been a respected leader: he had been a leader in the SP's 
left wing, and a founder of the Party, as well as its perennial head. His death left a 
void, disrupted what factional equilibrium had existed, and created an even stronger 
46 factional whirlpool. It undid the progress that Cannon had made towards collective 
leadership, and pushed Lovestone to the leadership of the former Ruthenberg faction. 
For Lovestone, Ruthenberg's death was convenient, and he seized upon the 
opportunity it offered. First, he helped create a cult-of-personality around Ruthenberg, 
and then, similar to Stalin and Lenin, depicted himself as the natural heir to 
Ruthenberg's legacy. " 
When the majority of the CEC, made up of Cannon, Foster and Weinstone, 
advocated that Weinstone assume power temporarily, and that the CEC meet within a 
week to prevent a 'disastrous' prolonged factional battle, 
48 Lovestone's right-hand- 
man Gitlow immediately nominated Lovestone for Party leadership. Lovestone 
" Cannon, First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 160; statement by Max Bedacht attached to II 
July PolCom meeting, in Comintern archives, PRL; see 'Dear Comrades' Lovestone factional circular, 
II June 1927, in PRL collection. 
" Peter Drucker, Max Shachtman and His Left: A Socialist's Odyssey through the 'American Century' 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1994), 27. 
46 Cannon, First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 166. 
47 See the Ruthenberg papers, box 8, folders I and 2, for examples of this. In 1928, Lovestone wrote a 
biography, Ruthenberg. - Communist Fighter and Leader (New York: Workers Library, 1928) and 
edited a collection of Ruthenberg's writings, C. E. Ruthenberg, Voices ofRevolt: Speeches and Writings 
of Charles E. Ruthenberg (New York: International Publishers, 1928). The nature of the adulation can 
be determined by examining a list of other 'voices of revolt' pamphlets: Robespierre, Marat, Lasalle, 
Karl and Wilhem Liebknecht, Danton, Bebel, Lenin and Debs. 
48 Weinstone's statement in Political Committee Minutes, 23 March 1927, in PRL. 
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advocated a later CC plenum, followed by national convention, in order to allow 
himself time to consolidate his power. The Comintern supported Lovestone, opposed 
an American delegation to Moscow, and ordered the upcoming plenum not to debate 
who would follow Ruthenberg. Lovestone's supporters positively crowed. Gitlow 
demanded: 'Comrades: Close your ranks! We must have full faith in the C. I. The 
Comintem will guide us well in our difficult moments. 49 Thus Lovestone's power 
came only because he was anointed by the Comintern. 
Lovestone's rise was not due to his personality. Like Stalin, Lovestone saw in 
the Communist movement a chance to advance his own career, and was at the same 
time extremely ambitious and manipulative. Gitlow recalled that Lovestone 'was a 
veritable Tammany chieftain among us Communists' and that even his followers 'did 
not trust him and did not like him'. He regularly manipulated and blackmailed both 
supporters and enemies. 50 His letters to supporters are full of invective not only 
against his opponents, but his own allies. 'Altogether too many of our boys are lazy, 
irresponsible and stupid' he wrote in 1926. Several months later he bragged how, after 
becoming angry with one of his supporters for not coming into the office when she 
51 
was ill, 'I bawled her out to the weeping point'. 
Lovestone's origins were not unique. He was a product of the radical Jewish 
milieu in New York City, and became radical during the war while he was at City 
College, where he joined the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, along with Weinstone. 
He split from the SP in 1919, joining Ruthenberg's UCP, and followed Ruthenberg up 
49 Draper, American Communism andSoviet Russia, 255. 
'0 Giflow, I Confess, 320-25. 
51 [Lovestonel to 'Dear Boys', 6 March 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 5; Lovestone to CE 
[Ruthenberg], 26 October 1926, in Lovestone papers, box 197, folder 9. He seemed to particularly 
dislike Robert Minor and John Ballam. 
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to the leadership of the Party. 52 Because of this trajectory from university to Party 
leadership, factional opponents with more working-class roots derisively labelled 
Lovestone and his followers 'City College boys'. 
Weinstone had been prescient: the frenzied factionalism did nothing but stir up 
ill will amongst the leadership of the Party, obstructing collective leadership. The 
tactics of the factions were not particularly honourable, either: in April, Jack 
Johnstone complained to the Political Committee that his personal factional files-in 
his locked office in Party headquarters-had been riffled. The factionalism also seems 
to have angered the Comintern. In early April, the Comintern. sent a curt cable to the 
Party denying the factions' request to once again send delegates to Moscow, pointing 
to 'the urgent necessity' of opposing US imperialism in China and Nicaragua, as well 
as fighting against attacks by the AFL and goverment. 53 The Party had real work to 
do; factionalism only hindered constructive activity. 
The Party held a CEC plenum in May. Cannon (then allied with Weinstone 
and Ballam) argued that the capitalist offensive on the unions, and the union 
leaderships' attacks on leftists, marked 'a turning point in the American labor 
movement, and consequently a turning point in our party work in the unions. He 
criticised those communists who pessimistically assumed that right-wing labour 
leaders such as John L. Lewis would be able to stabilise their relationship with the 
employers, and argued instead that 'some of the bureaucrats, under the pressure of the 
masses, will be compelled to take part in the fight against the bosses to maintain the 
unions and even to help us organize the unorganized, ' and thereby 'create new 
alig=ents, new problems for our work, and new possibilities'. 
52 On Lovestone, see Morgan, A Covert Life; the first chapter deals with his early political history. Cf. 
also, Robert J. Alexander, The Right Opposition: The Lovestoneites and the International Communist 
opposition ofthe 1930s (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1981) 14-16. 
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While in some aspects Cannon was prescient since Lewis would eventually do 
this, his main point was that with this turmoil in the labour movement, the Party 'did 
not have sufficient orientation on these new tasks'. The reason, Cannon argued, was 
that 'the unstable situation in the party and the unstable leadership ... cannot provide 
normal processes of discussion' due to the 'factional situation in the party'. 
He warned of 'factional bankruptcy' and 'factional corruption and 
unprincipledness' inherent in 'the heterogeneous composition of the factions and the 
stubborn maintenance of permanent factional organization': 'It is anomalous' Cannon 
stressed, 'for a Bolshevik Party to have factional groupings within which there are 
political divisions on issues of prime importance, while the groups cross each other in 
support of major political questions, and yet these groups retain their separate 
factional identity, cohesion and discipline. ' For Cannon, however, the solution was 
not that one faction gain hegemony over the others, or that two factions combine to 
subdue the other, but rather 'the liquidation of factions' and true unity of the Party. 
Again and again, arguing that 'Party leadership must replace factional leadership' 
Cannon proposed several measures to dismantle them, but in essence he believed that 
the leadership of all the factions should be drawn into the Party leadership in a 
constructive way. 
Cannon spoke at length about the TUEL. He argued that 'the TUEL is too 
narrow from the standpoint of the labor movement at present' but also 'too narrow 
from the standpoint of the party'. That is, factionalism hurt the TUEL because, one 
the one hand, some comrades had 'a monopolistic attitude' towards the TUEL, while 
others maintained 'factional passivity'. Instead of being destroyed by factionalism, 
53 Both Johnstone's statement and Comintern cable included in Political Committee minutes, 8 April 
1927, in collection of Prometheus Research Library. 
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'the TUEL and its apparatus, as well as the trade union apparatus of the party, must 
become more the concem of the party as a whole'. 54 
Both Foster and Lovestone reacted angrily, and sought factional victory at the 
other's expense. Foster railed against the 'insincerity, double dealing, campaigns of 
personal vilification and downright treachery' by Lovestone and his followers, but 
also attacked Cannon's 'total political bankruptcy'. Foster claimed to support 
f collective leadership', too ... on the basis of the Foster faction. For Foster, the main 
danger facing the Party was isolation from the working class, and his opponents either 
had no experience in mass work (Lovestone) or had 'an appreciation for mass work 
55 
but exhibit[ed] rightist deviations' (Cannon). Wolfe dismissed Cannon's proposals 
as 'empty speech absolutely devoid of content' and as nothing more than 'goody, 
goody "sugar and spice and everything nice", ' because Cannon had emphasised unity 
and not the triumph of one faction over the others. 
When Lovestone's aims were frustrated at the plenum, he sneaked away in the 
middle of night to go to Moscow. While Lovestone was probably justified in his 
decision to leave for the immediately upcoming Comintem plenum-after all, he was 
a member of the ECCI-his histrionics seemed designed only to enrage his 
opponents, who hastily followed 
him to Moscow. 56 
In Moscow, again 
The Eighth Comintern plenum, held in May 1927, focused on questions more 
pressing than the US section. In China, the popular front between the CPC and the 
Kournintang had been destroyed when nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek massacred 
54 James P. Cannon, 'For the Liquidation of Factionalism', 6 May 1927, in Cannon, Early Years, 392- 
426. 
55 William Z. Foster, 'Analysis of the last plenum of the CEC and the conclusions we must draw from 
it', 12 May 1927, in Bertram David Wolfe papers, New York Public Library, box 4. 
56 For the Lovestoneite view of the plenum, see Wolfe's speech on factionalism, 14 May 1927, in the 
Wolfe papers, folder 4; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 255. To be fair, Wolfe was 
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tens of thousands of Communist workers. In Britain, police had raided the Soviet 
trading company and the government had broken diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. Internally, the Comintern leadership was finishing up the purge of Trotsky and 
his followers from its ranks. Trotsky made his last speech, before being expelled, at 
this plenum. 
Amidst this, the American Party was far from the top of the agenda, especially 
since the Comintem had already told the leadership to stay home. In a letter to 
supporters in New York, one Lovestoneite in Moscow complained that 'up to this 
point it has been absolutely impossible to see the biggest fellow or even to talk at 
length with Bookman', and that the 'main office was totally uniformed' about the 
American Party. Still, the author advised his co-factionalists back home what 
positions to take on debates in the Comintern to gain favour with the Moscow 
leadership. 57 
Throughout May and June, each faction's leaders remained in Moscow, 
discussing their positions with various Comintem officials, and reporting their 
progress to their supporters in the US. Each faction seemed to think it had the wind in 
its sails. When Stalin granted Lovestone and several followers a private Kremlin 
58 
meeting, they took this as an indication of his approval. Lovestone, however, was 
especially taken by Stalin's co-factionalist, Bukharin, who had recently succeeded 
Zinoviev as leader of the Comintern, and was second-in-command of the Russian 
Party. 59A Lovestoneite letter reported a 'talk with Steelman' who 'said after long 
session with him that even with his eyes closed one can see the political weaknesses 
merely reciprocating Cannon's denunciation of Wolfe's plenum speech as 'one of the worst speeches I 
have listened to since the foundation of our party' (Cannon, Early Years, 407). 
57 Jacko [Lovestone? ] to 'Dear Boys', 22 May 1927, in Wolfe papers, box 4. The 'biggest fellow' and 
'Bookman' probably refer to Stalin and Bukharin, respectively. 
58 Cj itlow, I Confess, 43 1. 
59 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 259. 
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of Zigzag. 60 The Cannon-Weinstone group's letters reported that Kuusinen 'said 
Lovestone could not take the place of Ruthenberg and that collective leadership must 
now be established' and that in general there was 'much sentiment here for a bloc' 
with Foster in order to form a majority and take over the Party. 61 
The factional circulars represent the aims of the factions. Cannon and 
Weinstone's told of their efforts to lobby for a '3-3-3' leadership (i. e., inclusive of all 
three factions' leadership). Lovestone's circulars were much more scurrilous, with 
titillating titles promising inside scandals and gossip. 62 
The Weinstone-Cannon bloc and the Foster faction began to come closer 
together in Moscow. 63 Both opposed Lovestone's plans to bring John Pepper back 
into the Party's leadership. In late June, the Political Committee voted to recall Robert 
Minor to the US 'for Party work' and voted that Pepper (act as representative of the 
American Party to the ECCF. 64 Foster and Cannon saw this attempt to 'inject 
Comrade Pepper actively into the American situation' as 'a clear declaration of 
uncompromising war against all the opposition groups' because he has 'persistently 
kept alive factionalism I, . 
65 
In mid-June, Cannon, Weinstone and Foster submitted a document to the 
American Commission that responded to criticisms of the TUEL, especially in light of 
the Passaic strike. The letter criticised the lack of attention paid to 'the task of giving 
organised form to the left wing in the TUEL'. It called for a broadening of the TUEL 
60 Jacko to 'Dear Boys', 13 June 1927, Wolfe papers. Steelman is probably Stalin (man of steel in 
Russian) and Zigzag is most likely Foster. 
61 Cannon-Weinstone circular to 'Dear Boys', 26 June 1927, in Prometheus Research Library 
collection, reprinted in Cannon, Early Years, 452. See also 'Dear Comrades' Cannon faction circular, 
quoting from a Moscow-based supporter's 28 June 1927 letter, in PRL collection. 
62 For example, see Lovestone circular, 'Very Latesffl! Most Important! H', 7 July 1927, Prometheus 
Research Library. 
63 See Lovestoneite letter to 'Dear Comrade', 21 June 1927 in Wolfe papers, NYPL, box 4, 'position 
papers'; and untitled 23 June 1927 Fosterite document, in box 5, 'Pepper document'. 
64 polCorn minutes, 20 June 1927, in PRL collection. At this time, Pepper was working in the 
Comintern apparatus in Moscow. 
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beyond 'Party members and close sympathisers' to embrace 'all honest elements 
willing to fight and preserve the unions as organs of struggle' to organise the 
unorganised, democratise the unions, amalgamate the craft unions, form a labour 
party and struggle against capitalism. Interestingly enough, given Foster's signature, 
the letter advocated a flexible approach to forming new unions. It warned against 
lightmindedly fonning such unions in light of bureaucratic expulsions, and advocated 
that expelled militants and locals should struggle for unity with their unions. Yet it 
also warned against illusions in the existing unions and concluded that 'The actual 
formation of independent organisation in such cases has to be determined according to 
concrete circumstances. ' It ended by calling for a 'collective leadership ... which 
includes the strongest forces of the three groups', concretely in the form of a nine 
member political bureau evenly divided amongst the three factions. Lovestone's 
followers, the document concluded, were the biggest obstacle to Party unity. 66 
At this point, the Comintern, had it been the same as during Lenin's time, 
would have sought to clarify the political issues at hand. Instead, while it did try to 
lessen the factionalism wracking the Party, it did so only on the basis of loyalty to the 
increasingly Stalinised Comintern. 
On I July 1927, the American Commission issued its resolution on the 
American question, which was divided into four sections. The first, 'the struggle 
against imperialism and the war danger', noted that the 'task of the Workers 
(Communist) Party is to form a broad united front to intensify the struggle against 
American imperialism', which was 'the mightiest imperialist power' in existence. The 
second section, 'the development of the revolutionary movement in America', 
attempted to explain why this process was proceeding so slowly. It cautioned that 'a 
Unsigned 'Pepper document', 23 June 1927, in Bertram David Wolfe papers, NYPL, box 5. 
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great rise [in class struggle] is not to be expected in the nearest future. However 
strikes and mass struggles of a predominantly economic character are occurring. ' 
Although the existence of the Soviet Union was a counterbalance to American 
imperialism, US capitalism still provided workers 'a comparatively higher standard of 
living' than the rest of the world, and was 'still on the upward grade of development'. 
This posed the danger of the 'bourgeoisification' of sectors of the working class, 
which must be fought through a struggle against the AFL bureaucracy. The document 
noted, however, that it was impossible for even the American bourgeoisie to corrupt 
the entire working class. Ultimately, this period only marked time before a world 
crisis that would hurt US capitalism as well as its international counterparts. Given the 
relative stabilisation of capitalism reduced the chances of an immediate revolution, 
the main task of the Party was to 'create the basis for a Communist mass Party. ' 
The third section declared that trade union work-which was Foster's 
speciality-as 'the most important work of the Party'. Much of the final resolution 
seems to have been taken from Cannon, Foster and Weinstone's letter: 'The Party 
must support the Trade Union Educational League to a much greater extent than 
hitherto. The Party should do everything in its power to help build up the Trade Union 
Educational League. ' Instead of discarding the TUEL, the Party should broaden it, 
and attract all 'Left Wing and genuine progressive movements'. The resolution 
declared that 'The Party should not limit itself only to the work in the existing trade 
unions', while noting that 'every effort must be made to link these [independent 
unions] up with the existing trade unions and the at the same time to insist on the right 
J. P. Cannon, Wm. Z. Foster, William W. Weinstone, 'Letter to the American Commission', 16 June 
1927; in Lovestone papers, box 211, folder 1. 
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of the workers themselves to administer the unions'. This decision thus shored up 
Foster's power, since it reiterated the importance of his work and the TUEL. 67 
The fourth section dealt with 'the inner Party situation', marked above all by 
factionalism, 'the existence and intensity of which we seek in vain to explain through 
serious differences of principle'. It ordered that '[t]he opposition must cease their 
factional methods' and instead 'facilitate unity with the majority of the Political 
Committee before and at the Party Convention. ' The resolution ordered: 1) an August 
convention; 2)a 'commission for the preparation the Party convention' comprising 
three members of both factions as well as a 'neutral comrade', of which Foster and 
Lovestone were to be co-chairmen; 3)the election of a 'broad Party executive' with 
'important representation' for Foster; 4) naming Lovestone and Foster as co- 
secretaries and Gitlow and Foster as co-heads of the trade-union work; and 5) that the 
headquarters be retumed to New York, Lovestone's base, from Chicago where Foster 
was strong. 
68 
Attached to the resolution, but not publicly circulated, was an agreement 
signed by the leadership of all the factions. This declared unity 'now more than ever a 
imperative necessity' that could only be got through 'liquidation' of factions, 
6cessation' of factionalism, 'and the amalgamation of the Party into one unified 
whole'. The agreement provided for a convention soon, and proportional 
representation in the Party's leadership. 
69 
67 Draper argues (American Communism and Soviet Russia, page 260) that the openness to new unions 
was meant as criticism to Foster. While Foster was known to emphasise the AFL, it should be noted 
that in the above cited letter to the American Commission, he had already capitulated on this question, 
at least abstractly, in principle, for certain situations. 
69 Daily Worker, 3 August 1927. Copies also in Wolfe papers, box 4. 
69 'Agreement for the carrying out of the resolution on the American Question adopted by the 
Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern', signed by A. Braun [Arthur Ewert, head of 
the American Commission], Jay Lovestone, Benjamin Gitlow, John Pepper, James P. Cannon, William 
Z. Foster, William Weinstone, Wolfe papers, box 4. 
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All three factions supported the decision, at least on paper, although they were 
still incapable of passing a common motion to this effect in the political committee. 
The Lovestone majority voted its 'complete acceptance' of the ECCI resolution, and 
asserted that it 'does not hold the decision of the Communist International to be a 
victory of any group or combination of groups', which conveniently ignored the trade- 
union section of the decision. 70 The Cannon-Foster-Weinstone minority's motion also 
endorsed the ECCI decision 'without any reservations', and denounced the 
Lovestoneite's 'ultrafactional practice' aimed at 'permanently maintain[ing] itself as a 
closed faction and... excercis[ing] "hegemony" over the Party. 01 
This did not bode well for achieving Party unity. Even worse, on the same day 
that the decision came out, Foster and Cannon's supporters began to organise 'the 
National Opposition Bloc' (NOB). Its leaders, Fosterites such as Bittelman and 
Johnstone, and Cannonites such as Abern, Shachtman and Swabeck, viewed the ECCI 
decision as a mandate not to dismantle the factions, but to wrestle control from 
Lovestone. 72 Forming the NOB was a particularly ill-advised manoeuvre since at the 
same time the Bukharin-Stalin leadership in the Russian Party were battling Trotsky 
and Zinoviev's opposition. 
Needless to say, the Lovestoneites seized upon this as an opportunity to paint 
themselves as the Comintern's loyal followers. In a cable to the Comintern, they 
claimed that the Opposition was trying to split the Party and requested the ECCI 
intervene against the NOB. 73 It tipped the Comintern towards support of Lovestone, 
70 'Declaration of the Political Committee on the American Question Adopted by the Presidium of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International', [July 1927], in Wolfe papers, NYPL, box 5. 
See also Daily Worker, 3 August 1927. 
71 'Statement of the Minority of the Political Committee on the Resolution of the ECCI and the 
Question of Party Unity', [July 1927], in Lovestonc papers, box 211, folder 5. 
72 Alex [Bittelman] and Jack [Johnstone] to 'Dear Comrade', [I July 1927], in Lovestone papers, box 
211, folder 5; see also statement by 'National Committee of the Opposition Bloc', I July 1927, in 
Wolfe papers, NYPL, box 4, 'position papers'. 
73 Max Bedacht cable to Comintern, 5 July 1927, in Wolfe papers, NYPL, box f, 'position papers'. 
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and provided Lovestone a pretext to seize power. On 7 July, the ECCI Presidium once 
again cabled the Party: 
The Comintern is categorically against the sharpening of the fractional [sic] 
struggle .... The 
Comintern recognizes that in many political questions the 
Ruthenberg group followed a more correct line in the past than the Foster 
group. On the other hand the executive [of the Comintem] is of the opinion 
that Ruthenberg group had not understood how to estimate sufficiently the full 
significance of the trade union forces in the party and that Foster at the time 
was more correct on trade union question.... 
In general, however, the C1 had supported the Ruthenberg faction, provided it 
corrected its trade-union errors and moved to include Foster in the leadership. But, it 
continued: 
Now the previous political and trade-union differences have almost 
disappeared. The Comintern condemns most categorically every attempt 
towards the sharpening of the situation as exemplified by the formation of a 
national committee of the opposition bloc. The Comintem considers factions 
without political differences as the worst offence against the party. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, the ECCI ordered the Party press to reprint this. 74 
Yet the factional bitterness only increased. The CEC majority 'call [ed] upon 
the membership of our Party to support the decision of the Communist International to 
close the ranks of our Party. ' This statement closed by appealing to Ruthenberg's last 
words: 'Tell the comrades to close ranks, to build the Party. The American workers 
under the leadership of our Party and the Comintern will win. Let's fight on. 75 
Privately, Lovestone's followers greeted the decision as 'a complete POLITICAL and 
ORGANIZATIONAL VICTORY FOR THE RUTHENBERG GROUP 9.76 
At aII July Political Committee meeting, Bedacht warned that 'our Party has 
never been nearer a split than it is at present'. He claimed that Foster and Cannon 
'deliberately lie[d] to the C. I. and deliberately misrepresent [ed] C. I. decisions to the 
' Cable from ECCI presidium, 7 July 1927, attached to PolCom minutes, 7 July 1927, in Comintern 
archives, [2A]; also in Wolfe papers, NYPL, box 4, 'position papers'; reprinted in Daily Worker, 8 July 
1927. 
75 Daily Worker, New York City Edition, 9 July 1927. 
76 Lovestone factional circular, 21 July 1927, in PRL collection. 
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membership. 77 The Comintern tried to prevent such a split and sent another cable 
announcing that 'Our cable of July 7th did not aim to support the hegemony of one 
group in the Workers Party but the merging of all groups. ' It reminded the Party that 
the leaders of the three factions had agreed in Moscow that 'the opposition shall also 
have the right to express and to defend in a non-factional comradely way its opinion 
in all meetings of the party units. 78 
The Foster and Cannon groups claimed that they had dissolved the opposition 
bloc, and that the Tovegroup is only party section which maintained hidebound 
faction since convention ... We reaffirm uncompromising stand for unity and collective 
leadership. 79 Foster's supporters complained, cabling the Comintern: 'With an 
arrogance only explainable by the petty-bourgeois intellectual composition of its 
leadership, [the Lovestone group] seeks to give the impression that it has been 
selected by the Comintern as the permanent leadership of our Party. ' Lovestone in 
turn cabled Moscow, livid over being attacked as a petty-bourgeois intellectual. 
Finally, the ECCI resorted to another telegram: 
ECCI considers such methods as opposition group uses in state impermissible 
factional. Such expressions styling majority of Polcorn 'petty bourgeois 
intellectuals' as 'clique leadership' are opposed resolution of ECCL ECCI 
most decisively opposes these faction methods. On the other hand ECCI 
declares against any disciplinary measures against opposition. 80 
The Daily Worker dutifully published this cable on its front page, without even 
turning it into literate English .81 The opposition responded by formally agreeing with 
the Comintem's decision to place Lovestone in power and claimed that 'our views are 
in full accord with the line of the resolution. We accept it without any reservation and 
"' Statement by Max Bedacht, attached to II July 1927 motion on factionalism, in Comintern archives, 
[2A]. 
7" ECCI cable, in PolCom minutes, II July 1927 in Comintern archives, PRL; printed in Daily Worker, 
New York City Edition, 12 July 1927. 
79 Aaronberg, Abern, Bittleman, Dunne, Johnstone, Krumberlin, Reynolds, Swabeck statement, in 
PolCom minutes, II July 1927, in PRL. 
'0 PC minutes, 27 July 1927, in PRL. 
" Daily Worker, New York City edition, 20 July 1927. 
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urge the entire party to do likewise. ' It continued, however, to paint Lovestone as the 
real anti-Comintern force in the Party: 'the main obstacle to the unification of the 
party on the basis of collective leadership has been the theory of hegemony' though 
which 'the Lovestone group has claimed the right to permanently maintain itself as a 
closed faction and to exercise "hegemony" over the party. ' 82 
The next round was over the cables themselves. Johnstone argued that both 
chainnen, Foster and Lovestone, must sign cables; Lovestone asserted that only one 
signature was necessary, 'especially the signature of comrade Lovestone, who is 
named first in the order of the secretaries by the C. I. ' This motion passed, but only 
with a vote split along factional lines. Lovestone thus anointed himself 'first 
secretmy'. 
83 
Even with Lovestone in place, the Party still needed to go through the 
formality of a National Convention. According to Draper, since Lovestone's grip on 
the apparatus was firm, and most importantly, the Comintern's preference for 
Lovestone was now known, this Convention was one of the most democratic in the 
history of the Party. 84 The 'Committee for Preparation of the Party Convention' 
established strict guidelines for open discussion in the Daily Worker, as well as set-up 
full membership meetings in ten major cities that allowed each faction to freely 
present its case. The Committee also created a fair way of voting. 
85 Lovestone's 
message was that a vote for him was a vote for the Comintern, and a vote for the 
minority was a vote against it. 
86 According to a Foster-Cannon caucus memorandum, 
in August 1927, Lovestone received some 59 per cent of votes cast, while the 
opposition claimed 41 per cent. Yet, out of 3015 eligible voters in several large locals, 
92 Daily Worker, New York City edition, 6 August 1927. 
" PC minutes, 28 July 1927, in PRL. 
84 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 265. 
93 Daily Worker, 5 August 1927; New York City edition, II August 1927. 
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some 400 members (13 per cent) did not vote or abstained. The caucus circular 
claimed that these were votes of no confidence in Lovestone's leadership, although 
more likely they were more a vote of no confidence in either faction, and a desire to 
end factionalism itself. 87 
American Exceptionalism 
The political character of Lovestone's reign was marked by what was later 
termed 'American exceptionalism'. Like observers going back to the early Republic, 
socialists have argued over how much American society has conformed to European 
models. Among industrialised countries, the US has a weaker trade-union movement, 
and no working-class political party which reflects, even in a distorted way, the 
division of society into hostile classes. Historians have long debated why this is so; 
socialists have argued about what this implies for the viability of socialism in 
America. In periods like the 1920s, when the US economy prospers in comparison to 
the rest of the world, there is a tendency to claim that the general laws of capitalist 
society do not apply to the United States, a position that has come to be known as 
'American exceptionalism'. 
Lovestone developed his theory of exceptionalism, adding to his own 
impressionism a liberal mix of ideas from his international patron, Bukharin. He 
asserted that American capitalism was different, more vibrant and youthful, than 
international capitalism in general. Ever since Lenin's Imperialism: The Ultimate 
Stage of Capitalism, Communists have held that capitalism was moribund, and if not 
replaced by socialism, could only lead to misery, poverty, war and death. Capitalism 
could not be reformed, but had to be uprooted and smashed through socialist 
revolution. In 1919, the Comintern had predicted that capitalism was in its death 
86 Cannon, First Ten Years, 173-74. 
87 'Dear Comrade' minority circular, 8 August 1927, in PRL collection. 
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throes, exhausted and bled white from the war. 88 However, in the mid- I 920s, through 
American aid and investment such as the Dawes plan, US capital bailed out European 
capitalism, providing a partial stabilisation. This made US imperialism hegemonic, 
and increased tensions between European (especially British) and American 
imperialism. The Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924 had analysed this development, 
even if, at the same time, the Comintern predicted economic collapse almost annually 
from 1922 till 1929.89 
The idea that American, unlike European capitalism, was still growing was not 
Lovestone's own concoction, but came from the Comintern. It was also not entirely 
unrealistic: compared to Europe, in the 1920s, American capitalism was doing well. 
One historian described how Americans at this time 'achieved the highest standard of 
living any people had ever known'. 90 With hindsight it is easy to point out the 
weakness in the economy-for blacks, workers and farmers-but this was harder to 
see at the time. 
As early as 1925, Soviet economist Eugene Varga, in surveying the condition 
of international capitalism, wrote that capitalist Europe was in decline, but that 
'America is still rising upon a capitalist basis'. Arguing that the US, and not Britain, 
'was the counter pole of Soviet Russia in the capitalist world', he observed that 
American capitalism 'finds itself-like Soviet Russia-in an economic and world- 
political ascent, but on a capitalist basis'. Therefore, he predicted, 'in the future the 
final struggle between [the] bourgeoisie and the proletariat on an international scale 
will be carried out under the leadership of the United States and the Union of Soviet 
88 CE Trotsky's 'Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletariat of the Entire World', 6 
March 1919, in Degras, ed., The Communist International, vol. 1,3 84 8. 
89 Robert H1 Wheeler, 'American Communists: Their Ideology and their Interpretation of American 
Life, 1917-1939' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1953), 75-80. However, in dismissing as absurd the 
Communists' predictions, Wheeler paints a much too rosy picture of American capitalism in the 1920s. 
90 See Leuchtenburg, The Perils ofProsperity, chapter ten. 
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Republics. '91 Already, in 1926, Ruthenberg had to argue against 'party members who 
are making excuses for lack of progress on the grounds of the existing economic 
conditions and the refusal of the workers to carry on fights' as 'trying to excuse their 
own pessimism and lack energy in the struggle by a theory which has no basis in 
fact'. 92 
Lovestone went beyond recognising the momentary strength of American 
capitalism and generalised it, in the process justifying the weakness of American 
Communism. While agreeing that capitalism internationally was headed towards 
another inter-imperialist conflagration, he argued that 'American capitalism is still on 
the upward grade-still in the ascendancy. ' He continued: 'American capitalism much 
more than any other capitalism in the world, is on the upward trend. ' Because of the 
ability of American capitalism to 'exploit its colonial resources' and 'arm itself for a 
military struggle with other imperialist powers', Lovestone added, 'the peak of 
American capitalism-of American imperialist development-has not yet been 
reached. 93 This explained the lack of appeal of socialism amongst US workers. 
Several years earlier, Lovestone had written that the strength of US imperialism-'a 
world unto itself-laid the basis for the 'great influence and power of the 
bourgeoisified strata of the American working class' having 'infiltrated the ranks of 
and manifested itself in countless ways in the activities of nearly every section of the 
American working class'. 94 With such a situation, it was no wonder that the CP 
remained a party of thousands in a country of hundreds of millions. 
91 E. Varga, 'Ways and Obstacles to the World Revolution', Communist International, nos. 18/19 
(1925), 77-9. Cf Harvey Klehr, 'The Theory of American Exceptionalism' (PhD thesis, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1971), 97-100. 
92 C. E. Ruthenberg, 'Do We Believe in the Theory of Misery? ', Daily Worker, 3 September 1926. 
93 Jay Lovestone, 'Perspectives for Our Party', Communist, June 1927. 
94 Jay Lovestone, 'American Imperialism To-Day', Communist International, no. 14 (1925), 4,12. 
Harvey Klehr, 'Leninism and Lovestoneism' Studies in Comparative Communism 7: 1/2 
(Spring/Summer 1974), argues that 'behind the theory of American exceptionalism ... stood the 
theoretical bulwark of orthodox Leninism, the theory of imperialism' (7) because Lovestone based his 
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American exceptionalism represented an impressionistic acceptance of the 
might of American imperialism by the Lovestone leadership. Given the political 
backwardness of American workers and the strength of American capitalism, the 
Party needed to patiently maintain its revolutionary programme, without being either 
unduly pessimistic or nSfve about the immediacy of revolution. This was Lenin's 
attitude in 1908, when revolution appeared quite distant in Russia. Lovestone's 
ultimate conclusions were social democratic, pessimistic, and anti-revolutionary. 95 
Instead of redoubling the efforts to position the Party favourably for the inevitable 
crisis, Lovestone made excuses for the Party's weaknesses. 
Lovestone's perspective was the American counterpart to Bukharin's general 
prognosis for international capitalism. Reacting to the apparent distance of 
international revolution in the 1920s, Bukharin had moved from the extreme left of 
the Bolsheviks to the far right. His growing conservatism based itself on his belief that 
revolution in the west was increasingly unlikely, and that therefore within Soviet 
Russia the task was to build socialism 'at a snails pace'. Against Trotsky and other 
left-wing Bolsheviks such as Preobrazhensky, who advocated a rapid industrialisation 
of Russia, Bukharin asserted that the peasantry was the basis for the development of 
socialism. Thus he urged the peasants to 'enrich' themselves. This gave flesh to the 
concept of building 'socialism in one country'; domestically, it meant the increase of 
power for the 'kulak' or rich peasants, and the increase of counterrevolutionary 
pressures. 96 Abroad, this conservatism played out in a disarming of the foreign parties 
since their role was undercut if they were to be unable to lead revolutions in the near 
view on the strength and vitality of US imperialism; however, a key point of Lenin's theory is, as his 
title indicates, that imperialism is the final, unstable, stage of capitalist development and whilst an 
imperialist society may immediately gain from imperialism, the internal contradictions of capitalism 
are not removed. 
95 See Klehr, Teninism. and Loreism', 10- 12. 
96 Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, chapter 6. 
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future. Cannon captured the relationship between this in Soviet Russia and its US 
counterpart: 'The party became receptive to the ideas of Stalinism, which were 
saturated with conservatism, because the party cadres were unconsciously yielding to 
their own conservative environment. 97 
Entering 1928, then, the Party found itself in a quandary. Its external work-to 
free Sacco and Vanzetti, to lead massive working class struggle-seemed to be going 
well. While the future was not all rosy, there was the promise of increasing influence 
in the labour movement. However, this was hamstrung by factionalism that was 
beginning to disillusion even leaders in the Party. The way out-unifying the 
leadership, and increased attention on meeting the challenges the period posed-could 
not be achieved by the Party leaders themselves. Instead, they needed help from the 
Comintern. However, given the degeneration of the Comintern, such assistance was 
not on offer. 
" Cannon, First Ten Years, 25. 
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8. The Elimination of Opposition and the Third Period 
The Sixth Comintem Congress, held in 1928, heralded the leftist 'Third 
Period' perspective of imminent world-wide capitalist collapse and revolutionary 
upsurge. ' It denounced traditional social-democratic and trade-union labour leaders 
not just for being props of the bourgeoisie, active 'social fascists', often worse than 
outright fascists. Given the urgency of revolution, Communist compromise with the 
bourgeoisie or their social-fascist allies was out of the question; instead, Communists 
should prepare the final conflict under the rubric 'class against class'. In practice, 
Communists split from established trade unions to form 'red' unions. In some places 
this policy would have disastrous results: in Germany it meant refusing to form united 
fronts with Social Democracy against the Nazis, and in China it led to adventurist 
tactics that further decimated the weakened Communist movement. 
While Bukharin (since 1926, the head of the ECCI) remained an important 
Communist leader, this left turn, and the Russian initiative towards forced 
collectivisation and rapid industrialisation, both led by Stalin, undercut his base within 
both the Russian and Comintern leaderships. 2 Now, throughout the Comintem, 
official pronouncements warned against the 'right danger', and most Communists saw 
Bukharin as the pre-eminent rightist. In the early summer of 1928, Bukharin, along 
with allies Rykov and Tornsky, unsuccessfully opposed this left turn. At the same 
time, Stalin skilfully adopted certain aspects of the left opposition's programme in 
order to co-opt certain leftists, and marginalise the others, most importantly Trotsky. 
1 The first period, according to this view, was immediately after the October Revolution when their was 
an upsurge in the labour movement internationally; then, the second period, around the time of the 
Third Congress, when the Russian Revolution was isolated and imperialism had temporarily stabilised. 
For Bukharin's periodisation, see the 'Theses of the Sixth Comintern Congress on the International 
Situation and the tasks of the Communist International', in Degras, ed., The Communist International, 
vol. 2,455-56; for the programme passed at the Congress, see, ibid., 471-525. 
' Eric D. Weitz, 'Bukharin and "Bukharinism" in the Comintern, 1919-1929', in Nicholas N. Kozlov 
and Eric D. Weitz, eds., Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin: A Centenary Appraisal (New York: Praeger, 
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While Stalin's power within Russia and the Comintern surged, it did so only on the 
back of eliminating any internal democracy within the Communist Party and creating 
chaos within Soviet agriculture that damaged the USSR for decades afterwards. 
The Congress came at a moment when Stalin was consolidating his power but 
could not openly break with Bukharin, still officially the leader of the Comintern. 
While it denied Trotsky's appeal to reverse his expulsion from the Communist 
movemene, it also subtly undercut Bukharin's power. Since most foreign 
Communists were ignorant of these Russian disputes, one historian labelled the 
Congress 'in reality the occasion of two congresses'. 5 Speculation over the falling out 
between Stalin and Bukharin reached such heights that the Russian Politbureau, which 
included Stalin and Bukharin, issued a statement to 'protest most vigorously against 
the circulation of rumours; to the effect that there are divergences of opinion among 
the members of the Polit Bureau of the CpSU. '6 Although this debate was not open, it 
was the last time that there was such a major struggle within the Soviet leadership; 
after defeating Bukharin in 1929, Stalin felt free to hold only one more congress in the 
fifteen years before he dissolved the Comintem altogether 
The Sixth Congress and its aftermath completed the early history of the 
American Party. Only in 1928-29 did the CP leadership fully assimilate the lessons of 
the Russian 'Thermidor' four years earlier. This Stalinism provided the ideology upon 
1990) argues, instead, that Bukharin's role in the Comintern has been both misrepresented and 
underestimated. 
3 On the power struggle within the Soviet Party, see Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet 
Economic Debatesfrom Bukharin to the Modern Reformers (Princeton and London: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), chapter one. On the effect of this on undercutting the left, see for example 
M. M. Gorinov and S. V. Tsakunov, 'Life and Works of Evgenii Alekseevich Preobrazhenskii', Slavic 
Review 50: 2 (Summer 1991), 292-93. 
4 See the 'Resolution of the Sixth Comintern Congress on the appeal of Trotsky, Sapronov, and Others' 
in Degras, vol. 2,549. 
5 On the Sixth Congress and Stalin's struggle against Bukharin, see Cohen, Bukharin, 292-93. 
6 'To the Standing Committee of the VI Congress', signed by J. Stalin, N. Bukharin, K. Voroshilov, Y. 
Rudzutak, V. Molotov, A. Pykov, M. Tomsky, I. Kalinin and V. Kuibsyov, 30 July 1928, in Jay 
Lovestone papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, box 213, folder 18. 
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which the Comintern finally consolidated a stable, non-factional American leadership. 
After the Congress, the Party expelled Cannon, for supporting Trotsky, and 
Lovestone, for supporting Bukharin, and replaced the quarrelsome leadership with a 
ideological and personnel configuration that would last until the end of the second 
world war. This chapter examines this process. 
While the rise of Stalin sapped the Party of its original revolutionary vitality, 
the Third Period at the same time appeared to many Communists to strengthen the 
Party. The elimination of factionalism allowed the Party to turn outward and intervene 
into the black, labour and unemployed movements. While they may appear daft today, 
Third Period revolutionary pronouncements rang true to many at the time. This, and 
the prestige the Party claimed from the Russian Revolution, helped root the Party 
more deeply in the American working class than ever before. From 1930 to 1933, the 
Party doubled its membership from 7500 to almost 15 000.7 
The birth of American Trotskyism 
Until 1928, the Party had remained aloof from the factionalism ravishing the 
Russian and other sections of the Comintern, only using it as fodder in its own less 
political, if no less bloody, American wrangling. 
8 Thus, in early 1928, despite the 
factional hyperbole, the only significant US supporter of Trotsky was Max Eastman, a 
rather marginal fellow traveller. 
9 The former Masses editor had only joined the Party, 
in 1923, before attending the Twelfth Bolshevik Party conference. In Moscow he 
begun a biography of Trotsky and became convinced of the correctness of Trotsky's 
struggle, making him persona non grata in Communist circles. Trotsky had used him 
7 Klehr, The Heyday of. 4merican Communism, 9 1. 
8 See 'The Situation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', Daily Worker, 6 October 1926, for 
examples of the anti-Trotsky mood in the Party, including an official statement by Ruthenberg, for the 
CC against Trotsky and Zinoviev. 
9 For an example of Communist attacks on Eastman, see the Daily Worker, 19 October 1926; ibid., 20 
October 1926. 
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to transmit Lenin's suppressed Testament to the Western press, and then denounced 
him. 10 
American Communist leaders saw the struggle amongst the Bolshevik leaders 
not so much a vital question for the international Communist movement, but as an 
opportunity to curry favour with Moscow. The Lovestoneites, friendly with Bukharin 
internationally and dependent on the good graces of the Comintem for their power, 
led the anti-Trotsky campaign. Their pessimism regarding the struggle for socialism 
in the US dovetailed with Bukharin's right-wing prognosis for constructing socialism 
in Soviet Russia, as Max Bedacht spelt out in an article in the Workers Monthly: 'The 
difficulties of socialist construction in Russia are naturally closely connected with the 
relative stability of capitalism in the rest of the world. The partial stablization puts the 
whole burden of the socialist construction in Russia upon the shoulders of the Russian 
revolution. ' 
And not, Bedacht implied, on the shoulders of the International, including its 
American section. Echoing Bukharin and Stalin, Bedacht claimed that the primary 
responsibility for this construction within Russia fell on the working class, but that 
Trotsky effed in his placing it on the peasantry. This confusion, along with 'the 
inability of the revolution to solve its problems in a short time creates doubts as to its 
ability to solve them at all. The opposition in the C. P. S. U. makes itself the spokesman 
of these doubts. It develops a theory about them and systematizes them. ' Thus, 
Trotsky, and not Bukharin and his Lovestoneite allies, who was pessimistic, according 
to Bedacht: Trotsky 'loses hope in the possibility of success, for the Russian 
10 See Draper, American Communism andSoviet Russia, 359-62; Frank A. Stricker, 'Socialism, 
Feminism and the New Morality: The Separate Freedoms of Max Eastman, William English Walling, 
and Floyd Dell, 1910-1930' (PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1974), 108-109; John P. Diggins, Up 
From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual Development (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), chapter 1. 
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revolution.... Under imperialism the theory of permanent revolution becomes the 
theory of hopelessness. ' II 
After constructing this theoretical edifice, polernicists such as Wolfe fitted the 
American 'opposition' into it. Resurrecting the Farmer-Labor corpse, he wrote that 'In 
the matter of the farmer, our party is still filled with the American form of 
"Trotskyism7' which consists in the underestimation of the fanner and even ignorance 
of the importance of rural conditions and class divisions'. 12 In other words, the 
American 'Trotskyists' underestimated American farmers just as their Russian leader 
underestimated Russian peasants. That this facile analogy was built on a triple 
distortion-Trotsky did not underestimate the peasantry, there were no American 
'Trotskyists', and Lovestone's opponents were not guilty as charged regarding the 
farmers--did not undermine its effectiveness as a factional weapon. 
Pepper played a special role, since his position in the Comintern apparatus 
allowed him to inform his factional comrades of the latest developments in Moscow. 13 
In September, Pepper, then the Comintern representative to the CP, sent a letter to the 
American leadership criticising the lack of an anti-Trotsky motion from the CEC or 
Party Convention. 14 Less than a fortnight later, the ECCI presidium expelled Trotsky 
from the ECCI-15 A political committee meeting in October 1927 passed unanimously 
a motion by Wolfe favouring 'a strengthening of the criticism of the opposition of the 
CPSU' by Americans in Moscow. Wolfe's other 'resolution on the opposition in the 
CPSU and Comintern', 'approve[d] wholeheartedly the recent actions of the ECCI in 
removing Comrades Trotsky and Vuyovitch from the Executive Committee of the 
II Workers Monthly, January 1927. 
12 Ibid. 
13 In the fall of 1926, for example, articles and statements from Pepper, then chief of the Agitprop 
(Agitation and Propaganda) department of the Comintern appeared in the Daily Worker. 
14 Letter from Pepper to CEC, 26 September 1927, attached to PC minutes, 16 November 1927, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 981. 
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Comintern' and denounced Trotsky's supposed moves to split the Comintem and 
form a 'fourth international'. 16 
Lovestone moved to issue a bulletin against the Russian opposition. Foster 
responded with a motion to print Stalin's speeches against Trotsky. Wolfe then moved 
that the Political Committee issue a signed anti-Trotsky article. The CEC passed all 
three motions and 'welcome[d]' the expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky from the 
Soviet Party. A fortnight later, the Political Committee sent a letter to the Fifteenth 
Soviet Party Congress calling for this. 17 
Even though they did not fully understand the issues, both factions used Anti- 
Trotskyism to gain support in Moscow while denouncing the other faction for being 
soft on the Russian opposition. The fate of the 'Trotskyist' Lore induced all to play 
along, including Cannon who voted for both the PC motions described above, 
although his anti-Trotskyism, was passive. The combination of anti-Trotskyism and 
such incessant factionalism began to disillusion and cause him to withdraw from 
hyperactive factionalism. He recalled later that 'I felt great dissatisfaction. I was never 
enthusiastic about the fight in the Russian party. I could not understand it. '18 As he 
withdrew from this fight, he focused more on the ILD. 
The Central Committee held a plenum in February 1928 to discuss the 
expulsions of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Russian Party. Wolfe, for two hours, 
attacked Trotsky; then, one-by-one, the Party's leaders, Fosterite and Lovestoneite 
alike, denounced Trotsky. Cannon however, remained silent, although he had voted in 
November to call for the Bolshevik leaders' expulsion. He later stressed that this 'was 
'3 See ECCI presidium motion, 28 September 1927, in Degras, ed, The Communist International, vol. 
2,403. 
" PC minutes, 7 October 1927, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 981. Trotsky, of course, did not advocate 
a Fourth International until 1933 (when the Comintern did nothing to stop the rise of Hitler), and in the 
interim oriented towards the Comintern's various sections and appealed his expulsion. 
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not an anticipation of the future at all. It was simply a mood, a stubborn personal 
feeling that I had on the question. We didn't have any real information. We didn't 
really know what the truth was-'19 Yet Cannon's bernusement did prepare the 
ground-if not map out the path-for his future development, since it meant that he 
had not already been sealed off from Trotskyism. 
When the American delegates travelled to Moscow for the Sixth Congress, 
they did so not to participate in an international meeting of revolutionaries, but to 
argue their factional grievances. Cannon, by this time already less than enthusiastic 
about factionalism, and who had to be convinced by his co-factionalists to attend in 
the first place, did not look forward to his assignment to the programme 
commission. 20 However, it was in this capacity that Cannon first appreciated 
Trotsky's struggle when the commission distributed his 'Draft Programme of the 
Communist International: A Criticism of Fundamentals'. Later published as The Third 
International after Lenin, this document appealed his expulsion, criticised Stalin and 
Bukharin's concept of 'socialism in one country', and the degeneration of the 
Revolution. 
Trotsky outlined a view of the Comintem that was new to Cannon. The 
Bolsheviks had organised the Comintem, Trotsky argued, out of the recognition of the 
necessity of extending the Revolution abroad. Since Lenin's death, however, the 
programme of building socialism in one country had vitiated this purpose. This was in 
response to the rise of a conservative bureaucratic caste that arose out of the 
backwardness and isolation of Soviet Russia. Now it sabotaged the world revolution 
11 PC minutes, 16 November 1927, and PC minutes, 30 November 1927, in Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 981. 
" James P. Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), 42. 
19 James P. Cannon, Notebook ofan Agitator, 45. 
20 See minutes of Political Committee, 13 June 1928, reprinted in Cannon, Early Years ofAmerican 
Communism, 506. 
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needed to sustain the October Revolution. To Cannon, this explained the 
schizophrenia that marked the Comintern's intervention into the American Party, and 
which rendered it unable to end the factionalism. Cannon, therefore, found himself 
agreeing with Trotsky's call for a struggle to return the Comintem to its Leninist 
fundamentals. 
While Trotsky had little hope of converting Stalin or Bukharin, he did not 
write off the possibility of winning members of the Comintern in Russian or abroad, 
such as Cannon and his Canadian comrade, Maurice Spector. Cannon recalled that 'It 
was clear that as daylight that Marxist truth was on the side of Trotsky. We made a 
compact there and then-Spector and I-that we would come back home and begin a 
struggle under the banner of Trotskyism. 21 Unlike Cannon, Spector, a leading 
member of the Canadian Party, had already had misgivings about the rise of Stalin. 22 
That Cannon, a veteran of the Party's warfare, became Trotsky's first 
significant American supporter, may appear strange. However, by 1928, Cannon 
believed that endless factionalism, and the Comintern's failure to end it, had led to a 
dead end. Trotsky's document explained the Comintern's behaviour, which was so 
unlike its role in the early 1920s, in the context of political developments in the 
Russian Party. Cannon was especially impressed with the section that denounced the 
Fanner-Labor Party as opportunist and anti-Marxist. 23 At bottom, Cannon believed 
that remaining true to what he saw as the programme of revolutionary Bolshevism 
was more important that securing a position in the Comintem leadership. 
Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism, 50. 
Alexander, 1nternational Trotskyism, 144. The basis for Alexander's discussion is a 1958 interview 
he carried out with Spector, who had by then quit the Trotskyist movement. For a (biased) description 
of the rise of Trotskyism in Canada under Spector's leadership, see Tim Buck, Yours in Struggle: The 
Reminisces of Tim Buck (Toronto: New Canada, 1977), 13 1. Cf. Avakumovic, Communist Party in 
Canada, 54-55. 
23 Introduction to 'Dog Days. James P. Cannon vs. Max Shachtman in the Communist League of 
America, 1931-1933 (New York: Prometheus Research Library, 2002), 3 8. 
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Although Cannon later remembered that after reading Trotsky's document, he 
considered himself, 'without a single wavering doubt thereafter, a disciple of 
Trotsky', this choice could not have been easy. To fight under Trotsky's banner not 
only risked expulsion from the Party, his political home for almost a decade, but it 
also meant abandoning the chance at factional power just when this appeared 
imminent. Neither Lovestone nor Foster could lead the Party in the wake of the Sixth 
Congress. Lovestone was weakened because of his support to Bukharin, and Foster's 
position was weakened by his opposition to the new revolutionary unions. Already, 
Foster's supporters had jettisoned him in preference to Browder, Bittelman and 
Johnstone. Since none of these could lead the Party, Cannon seemed well positioned 
to assume power within the Party. 24 Foster had approached Cannon to form an 
alliance, and Cannon's own supporters, worried at his aloofness during the Congress, 
25 
urged him to position himself to take over once Lovestone was deposed. Spector 
also faced similar considerations: already the editor of the CPC's Worker, he joined 
the ECCI during the Congress. 26 Yet to achieve this power, they needed to firmly 
support Stalin against Trotsky. Both chose their principals, their support to Trotsky, 
over their political careers with the Party, knowing they would soon face expulsion. 
Upon returning to the US, Cannon carefully showed Trotsky's draft to select 
comrades. After convincing his wife, Rose Karsner, Cannon recruited a small number 
of his co-factionalists, especially Ame Swabeck, Max Shachtman and Martin Abern. 
Soon rumours circulated amongst the Party leadership. Lovestone sought to use these 
to undermine Cannon's factional ally, Foster. 27 For his part, Foster, already burnt by 
" Cannon, First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 213. 
25 Ibid, 211; Charles Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution: Memoirs ofan American Radical (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 173. 
2' Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 367. 
2' According to Gitlow, Bukharin had informed Lovestone in Moscow of G. P. U. evidence of Cannon's 
Trotskyist sympathies, yet had counselled Lovestone to use this for his own factional advantages; 
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his previous alliance with Lore, downplayed these rumours. Lovestone, however, had 
a strong reason to uncover the truth in order to vanquish his enemies. 
After Lovestone obtained proof of Cannon's sympathies, Foster's supporters 
could no longer temporise. As a pre-emptive strike, they expelled Cannon and his 
supporters from the joint caucus and raised charges of Trotskyism against Cannon, 
Abern and Shachtman in the Political Committee. The Lovestoneites, however, 
gleefully called a 'trial' at which they allowed Cannon to speak freely in the hope he 
would discredit Foster. At this point, Cannon and his supporters openly announced 
their support for Trotsky and the Left Opposition. 28 In response, on 27 October, the 
Party leadership expelled Cannon and his supporters, and convened national branch 
meetings to denounce them. The leaderships gave them a week to prove their 
innocence, then and then expelled them summarily if they objected. Unlike previous 
political fights, Cannon was unable to explain his politics to the rank and file, and 
many members leamt of his expulsion through a notice in the Daily Worker. 29 In total, 
some hundred members were expelled, for either supporting Cannon, or merely 
questioning his expulsion. 30 
North of the border, Spector too fell under suspicion. Already suspect for a 
public speech he had made that criticised the Soviet leadership, Spector refused to 
endorse Cannon's expulsion at a5 November Canadian Political Committee meeting; 
the next day he openly declared his support for the Left Opposition, and, on 11 
November, he was expelled. From the beginning, Spector-whose support was 
Giflow, I Confess, 558. (However, several pages earlier [page 491], Gitlow claimed that 'Cannon's 
conversion to Trotskyism was a complete surprise to us. ') 
" See James P. Cannon, The Left Opposition in the U. S., 1928-31 (New York: Pathfinder, 1985), 3 1. 
"Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution, 174. 
30 For a description of the expulsions, see statement by Ame Swabeck and Albert Glotzer (two Cannon 
suppers in the YCL who themselves were soon to be expelled) on expulsion of Cannon, Abern and 
Shachtman and in solidarity with Trotsky, 22 November 1928, in Albert Glotzer papers, Hoover 
Institution, Stanford University, box 1. A month later, Cannon, writing to Glotzer (20 December 1928), 
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weaker in part because he did not have Cannon's factional apparatus-I inked 
Canadian Trotskyism to the Opposition in the US. 31 
Immediately after their expulsion, the American Trotskyists, isolated from 
Trotsky's supporters elsewhere, began to organise. 32 On 15 November, they published 
the first copy of the Militant, put out on credit and financed in part by Max Eastman. 33 
Like Trotsky, they first targeted the Communist Party. Seeking to recruit Communists 
disaffected by Lovestone, they pledged 'that our struggle, like the struggle of the 
Russian Opposition, will be conducted solely on a party basis' and appealed their 
expulsion. 34 At a Central Committee plenum on 17 December 1928, Lovestone, again 
for factional reasons, allowed Cannon about two hours to speak, and then, as 
expected, denied his appeal. 35 
Then, with some expelled Boston Communists led by Antoinette Konikow, 
and in alliance with Italian-American sympathisers of Bordiga, they organised an 
American Left Opposition. In May 1929, the Communist League of America 
(Opposition), representing some 100 members determined to regain entry into the 
official Party, held its first convention. 36 
Not surprisingly, the Party reacted with fury, fearing both a growth of 
American Trotskyism and the wrath of Stalin. Gitlow recalled that: 
The leaders of the Communist party had promised that under no circumstances 
would they permit the Trotskyites to get a foothold in the United States. They 
claimed that some 70 members had been expelled from the US and about a dozen from Canada; in 
Glotzer papers, box I- 
31 William Rodney, Soldiers ofthe International. - A History ofthe Communist Party of Canada, 1919- 
1929 (Toronto: University of Toronto: 1968), 14244. 
" Only in 1930, when Shachtman travelled to Prinkipio, did Cannon's group meet with Trotsky; 
Alexander, International Trotskyism, 771. 
33 Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism, 54-58. Despite Trotsky's denouncing Eastman over the 
publication of Lenin's Testament, Eastman still sympathised with Trotsky enough to help finance 
Cannon; eventually, however, Eastman would break with Marxism altogether, becoming the editor of 
Readers Digest. Eastman also proved one of the better translators of Trotsky's writings, including his 
History of the Russian Revolution 
" Cannon, Left Opposition in the US., 37. 
33 Cannon, History ofAmerican TrotsAyism, 67. 
36 Alexander, International Trotskyism, 766. 
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swore that they would treat the Trotskyites like rats and traitors. They did just 
that, turning many a Trotsky public meeting into a bloody battleground. 37 
The Party leadership slandered Cannon, and forbade members from even talking with 
'Trotskyites'. Almost all Cannon's friends-including his best, William F. Dunne- 
abandoned him. 'A wall of ostracism separated us from the party members', he 
recalled. 'People whom we had known and worked with for years became strangers to 
us overnight. 38 The Daily Worker ran articles denouncing the Cannon 'renegades'. 39 
But the 'cold shoulder' was the mildest of the Party's anti-Cannon activities. 
Gitlow later recalled the anti-Cannon -'campaign of violence' which 'repeated the 
40 
stupidest errors of the most provincial police department'. In December, Party 
loyalists attacked an all-female sales-team outside the Party headquarters in Union 
Square. 41 In Cleveland, district organiser Amter (a Lovestone supporter) led an 
attempt to prevent Cannon from holding a meeting. 
42 Charles Shipman, a former 
supporter of Cannon (under the name Manuel Gomez), described how shortly after his 
former comrades' expulsion he attended a Cannon meeting at Irving Plaza to 'break it 
, 43 up . 
Jacob Stachel, a powerful Lovestone lieutenant and organisational secretary of 
the New York branch, directed this campaign. He organised a burglary of Cannon's 
flat, which stole the Opposition's correspondence and subscription records. He 
37 Benjamin Gitlow, 7he Whole of Their Lives: Communism inAmerica-A Personal History and 
Intimate Portrayal of its Leaders (Boston: Western Islands, 1965[1948]), 238. 
38 Cannon, History ofAmerican TrotsAyism, 63-64. When he later broke with Manuel Gomez, another 
comrade and close friend who was growing ftwther from the Party, Dunne wrote that 'In that sector of 
the barricades where I command you will be shot on sight' (Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution, 203- 
204). Dunne's younger brothers, however, remained close to Cannon and the Trotskyist movement for 
decades. 
" See, for example, Ella Reeve Bloor, 'Close the Ranks against the Cannon Renegades', Daily Worker, 
II January 1929. 
40 Gitlow, I Confess, 491-92. 
41 Militant, 15 December 1928. 
42 Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism, 70. 
43 Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution, 174. 
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bragged about this raid to the Political Committee, which later used the stolen 
information to expel Cannon supporters within the Party. 44 
The sensational coverage of Cannon's expulsion in the international 
Communist press, including in Russia, meant that, for the Left Opposition, 'overnight, 
the whole picture, the whole perspective of the struggle changed'. The Russian 
Opposition, wom down after five years of Stalinist attacks, and with its leaders in 
prison or exile, greeted the news joyfully. 'I have always thought of this as one of the 
most gratifying aspects of the historic fight we undertook in 1928', Cannon boasted" 
'the news of our fight reached the Russian comrades in all comers of the prisons and 
exile camps inspiring them with new hope and new energy to persevere in the 
struggle. 45 
Cannon and his followers bolstered the ranks of the international Left 
opposition. For example, Cannon's contact with members of the Argentine 
Communist Party laid the basis for Trotskyism in Argentina, where it would grow. 46 
When Trotsky organised the Fourth International in 1938, Cannon and his followers 
played an important role, which they continued until the Fourth International was 
destroyed in the aftermath of World War II. Until his assassination by agents of Stalin 
in 1940, Trotsky also nurtured the American Trotskyists, and while he was alive, his 
supporters in the US were the largest part of the international Left Opposition. 
47 Peng 
Shu-tse, an early Chinese Communist who sided with Trotsky, recalled that 'The 
44 Stachel's report is reprinted in Cannon, The Early Years ofAmerican Communism, 562-63. On the 
burglary of Cannon's flat, cf. 'Papers Stolen 70 Years Ago Tell Story of Communist Movement in 
United States', Militant, 26 May 1997. 
45 Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism, 61-62. 
46 Osvaldo Coggiola, Historia del Trotskyismo, Argentino, 13. Cannon had at one time been scheduled 
to tour Latin America for the US CP; the Argentine Communists (actually, British immigrants) whom 
Cannon corresponded with had split from the official Party in 1927. Argentina was the first Latin 
American country to have a Trotskyist organisation. 
47 Barry Lee Woolley, Adherents ofPermanent Revolution: A History ofthe Fourth (Trotskyist) 
International (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1999), 22. Of course, other sections 
were relatively stronger. 
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Militant and other publications of the American Trotskyists were the educators and 
organizers of Trotskyists around the world, ' and Ted Grant recalled that for dissidents 
within the South African CP in the 1920s, the Militant 'was a revelation that changed 
our lives completely'. 48 Even in Britain, where Cannon has been particularly reviled, 
his followers were largely responsible for providing literary and other assistance to 
British TrotskyiSM. 49 
At first, Cannon was optimistic. Ironically, one strength of American 
Trotskyism was the weakness of the official CP. Although the CP brought its full 
weight to bear against Cannon, who suddenly became persona non grata in many 
radical circles, the Party did not have so much weight to throw around as in other 
countries. 50 Also, Cannon left the Party with an organised group of supporters, unlike 
other countries, such as China, where equally important Communists were expelled 
but who lacked Cannon's organisation. 51 
Furthermore, many Party members were disgruntled with Lovestone- 
especially as he moved further to the right-and Cannon painted his struggle as a 
continuation of the fight against him. Thus the early Militant serialised the Foster- 
Cannon document, 'The Right Danger in the American Party'. 52 Since most of 
Cannon's supporters were already against Lovestone, this limited the chances of any 
48 'Tribute to Cannon from Peng-tse and Chen Pi-Lan', in James A Cannon: A Political Tribute, 11; 
Ted Grant, History ofBritish TrotsAyism (London: Wellred Publications, 2002), 32. 
49 For a sense of both the revulsion felt by British Trotskyists towards Cannon (because of his role in 
the international Trotskyist movement after the Second World War) and their debt to him, see for 
example, Jim Higgins, review of George Breitman, et. al., TrotsAyism in the UnitedStates, in 
Revolutionary History 6: 4 (1997), 259; Martin Richard Upham, 'The History of British Trotskyism to 
1949' (PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1980), chapter 2. 
'0 See interview with James P. Cannon by Sidney Lens, 16 July 1974, in James P. Cannon: A Political 
Tribute, 38. 
51 on the early years of Chinese Trotskyism, see Gregor Benton, China's Urban Revolutionaries: 
Explorations in the History ofChinese Trolskyism, 1921-1952 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press, 1996), 33ff 
11 This was serialised in the Militant between 15 November 1928 and 15 January 1929. 
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alliance between the Right and Left Opposition, something that led to the 
disintegration of opposition groups in Europe. 53 
Cannon optimistically expected support to come from Foster's supporters or 
former Cannonites like Dunne. In November 1928, Shachtman wrote to a comrade 
'that we have established fairly good contacts with some of the best New York 
comrades, formerly in our group, upon whom we are exercising a growing 
influence. 54 In the autumn, Cannon described 'a new group of supporters working 
within the party', including Hugo Oehler, one of the leaders of the 1929 Gastonia 
textile strike. 55 In late September 1929, the National Committee (NC) of the expelled 
opposition spelt out its policy for Oehler 'to remain in [the Communist] party; to 
endeavor to build a fraction therein; to establish contacts with certain comrades in the 
Gastonia field; to try to build his way up into party ranks'. A month later, the NC 
reported that Oehler 'stated that the party was demoralized' under Lovestone and that 
it 'was ripe for our work'. 56 
Trotsky also was optimistic. In October 1929, a year after Cannon was 
expelled, he predicted that although in most countries 'the communist left opposition 
represents a fraction that struggles for influence over the proletarian core of the 
official party', his American followers, like their Belgian comrades, 'can exist 
independently and their struggle primarily consists not of a struggle for the proletarian 
core of the CP, but of the Social Democracy' because 'the official party is all but 
insignificant'. Although most sections of the left opposition in the west were largely 
propaganda organisations that oriented towards the official Communists, Trotsky 
53 See introduction to 'Dog Days, 52. 
54 Max Shachtman to Al [Glotzer], 24 November 1928, in Glotzer papers, box 1, Shachtman file. 
53 See Cannon to Young [Hugo Oehler], 13 August 1929, in The Left Opposition in the U. S., 20 1. Other 
letters reprinted in this volume during this time also express Cannon's view towards the Party. 
56 Minutes of Communist League of America National Committee, 24 September 1929 and 28 October 
1929, in Albert Glotzer Papers, box 1. 
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believed that 'the Communist League of America has all the necessary elements to 
develop into an independent party'. 57 However, these early predictions were much too 
optimistic: until the mid-1930s, the American Trotskyists remained, in essence, a 
small propaganda organisation, isolated from the labour movement, and tom by 
internal factionalism. 58 
Lovestone becomes a Lovestoncite 
American Trotskyism's weaknesses originated in changes in the official 
Communist Party begun after Cannon's expulsion. Ironically, Lovestone initiated a 
process which would devour himself and his sympathisers. As Stalin moved against 
Bukharin in 1928-29, Foster sought to exploit Lovestone's well known pro-Bukharin 
sympathies and paint him as part of the 'right danger' haunting the Comintern. 
Cannon and Foster's document, 'The Right Danger and the American Party', 
criticised Lovestone for 'overestimation of the reserve powers of American 
imperialism'; an 'underestimation of the leftward drift of the masses'; a 'lack of 
perspective of struggle'; opportunism in many fields of work, and finally, a 'denial of 
the right danger and militant attack against left' as well as a 'right wing internal 
factional regime'. 59 
At this point, Lovestone, a consummate factionalist, stumbled: he mounted an 
offensive against Stalin. He criticised Losovsky-a key Stalinist ally and Foster's 
patron in the Profintern-as 'making a muddle of everything he touches'. 60 Perhaps 
this was merely a case of Freudian projection, since Lovestone succeeded, not in 
defending Bukharin, but undermining his own position in the Comintem. Making the 
57 Trotsky to Militant, 19 October 1929, in 'Exile Papers of Lev Trotskii', Houghton Library, Harvard 
University, bms Rus 13.19068-72. Original in French; author's translation. 
58 See Dog Days for a documentary record of early American Trotskyism. 
59 This resolution was presented at the Sixth Congress, and signed by Cannon, Foster, Dunne, 
Bittelman, Johnstone, Manuel Gomez and George Siskin. 
60 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 309. 
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mistake of assuming he was the equal of Stalin and the Russian leadership, he 
demanded a meeting of the Comintern's 'Senioren Konven', consisting of the heads 
of the delegations, in order to berate Stalin and defend Bukharin. 
Stalin and the Comintem leadership responded in January 1929 with a draft 
'Open Letter' that signalled their growing dislike of Lovestone. The original draft, by 
Bolshevik Sergei 1. Gusev, was ostensibly directed to the Party leadership to help 
prepare the for the Party's Sixth Convention. Reflecting the Third Period, it foresaw 
fia growth of a leftward trend in the masses of the American proletariat' and 'great 
class conflicts' in the near future. It criticised the fact that the Party was 'still 
inadequately prepared' to deal with the oncoming radicalisation, because it was 
consumed by factionalism that was 'devoid of any political class content' and had 
become 'a struggle without principles and at times unprincipled'. The letter concluded 
that 'the existing leading groups must be SMASHED, SMASHED AND BROKEN 
AT ALL COSTS. ' It called for the 'most determined breaking of both groups' to 
create a 'mass Communist Party of the American working class'. Although the letter 
did not single either faction out for special criticism, and reiterated the Sixth 
Congress' conclusion that the Party's right-wing errors 'cannot be ascribed to the 
majority leadership alone', it indicated that the Comintern had lost faith in 
Lovestone's leadership. 61 
The final version was much more detailed. It judged both factions guilty of 'an 
utter depreciation of the leftward trend of the working masses in other capitalist 
countries' and of right-wing deviations rooted in an inability to gauge the 'relations 
between the American and world economic systems', as well as a tendency to 
overestimate the autonomy of American imperialism. The letter singled out the Foster 
61 Comrade Gussiev, draft of 'Open Letter to the Convention of the Workers (Communist) Party of 
America' nd [February 1929 written on pencil atop draft] in Jay Lovestone papers, box 198, folder 11. 
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minority for 'under-estimat[ing] the Trotskyist danger' and forming factional alliances 
with 'openly right wing elements'. Nonetheless, because Lovestone had been at the 
helm during the Party's drift to the right, the letter damaged his faction more. They 
had 'shown a tendency to underestimate the radicalization as well the process of 
differentiation in the ranks of the working class' and had 'entirely ignore[d]' the Sixth 
Congress' resolution on the advent of the Third Period, and 'great[ly] overestimat[ed] 
the economic might and the powerful technical development of the United States'. 
62 
Upon discovering the draft letter, Wolfe, a Lovestone leader who was 
representing the American Party in Moscow, made such a nuisance that the Comintern 
leadership convened an extra-ordinary one hour presidium meeting. 63 This meeting 
only highlighted his faction's impotency. Wolfe denounced, in English, the Open 
Letter. After a quarter hour, he paused to be translated into German. 'I was shocked to 
discover', he wrote in his memoirs, 'that the translator was making no attempt to 
translate me accurately, indeed, he was making a joke out of what I had just said. 64 
Wolfe continued in Gennan, which he had studied at City College but which was not 
his first language. 65 Suffering from a fever of more than 40 degrees, he denounced the 
Open Letter as ultra-left and sectarian. His description is worth quoting at length: 
Though I tottered uncertainly, out of illness and weariness, I looked at the 
faces of those who had been my auditors. Some seemed to me to look puzzled, 
some shocked, some contemptuous. No one looked at me with sympathy or a 
smile. People whom I had known for years looked as if they feared contact 
with me. Perhaps this is why they didn't step out into the aisles. I fixed my 
eyes on Ercoli (Togliatti), who had been a devoted admirer of Bukharin and 
one whom I had known, it seemed to me intimately, since the Fifth Congress 
of 1924.1 could see him shrink back from his place on the aisle, as if he feared 
62 ECCI 'Open Letter to the Convention of the Workers (Communist) Party of America', 7 February 
1929, in Jay Lovestone papers, box 217, folder 1. For published versions, see Helmut Gruber, ed., 
Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era ofStalin's Ascendancy 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1974), 226 and Degras, The Communist International, vol. 3,9-16. 
For contemporary analysis, see also the Communist International, vol. 6 no. 8 (1929), 236-3 8. 
63 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 392. 
64 Wolfe, Two Centuries, 451-52. 
65 Since the Wolfe papers contain letters written in Yiddish, it is likely that he was fluent in that 
language. 
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that I might grasp his hand and ask something like, 'What did you think of my 
talk? 66 
Based on Wolfe's reports, Lovestone and his allies became increasingly 
worried. They especially disliked the proposal that Bittleman and Lovestone both be 
dispatched to Moscow in order to decapitate the factions. The Comintern again 
recalled Pepper to Moscow, who soon went into hiding in order continue assisting 
Lovestone in the upcoming convention. 67 
Ninety per cent of the delegates to the upcoming Party conference supported 
Lovestone, a fact that he hoped would buffer him from Stalin. Although Gitlow later 
claimed to have urged Lovestone at this juncture to anticipate a split from the 
Comintern, Lovestone attempted to 'reach a satisfactory understanding with Stalin'. 68 
Publicly the Lovestone majority wielded the Open Letter against the Foster minority. 
The Lovestone faction attacked Foster's supporters for 'speculating from the 
very beginning on the differences real or imaginary existing between the Bookman 
s 69 [Bukharin] and the Steelman [Stalin] . In fact, both sides played the same game of 
Russian roulette, even postponing their national convention for four months, one 
delegated recalled, to 'see how the power struggle in Russia would end' . 
70 Finally, on 
I March 1929 the Party-now simply the 'Communist Party, U. S. A. '-held its Sixth 
Convention. Gitlow later described this convention as 'one of the most riotous which I 
had ever participated in', with delegates at time even resorting to fisticuffs. 
At the Convention, two ECCI representatives, Henry Pollitt from Britain and 
Philip Dengel from Germany, officially presented the Open Letter. Although 
Lovestone's supporters accepted the 'political line' of the Open Letter, and even 
66 Ibid., 345. 
67 G itlow, I Confess, 512-22. 
68 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 398-99; Gitlow, I Confess, 516. 
69 Unsigned Lovestoneite letter to 'Dear Comrades', 7 February 1929, in Lovestone papers, box 198, 
folder II- 
70 Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution, 174. 
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hailed it as 'obviously a repudiation of the Opposition platfonn', 71 they could not 
stomach its proposal on Lovestone and Bittelman. Max Bedacht, a Lovestone 
supporter, moved that the Convention appeal to the ECCI 'against some of the 
organizational proposals' as 'not in harmony and not conducive toward' ending 
factionalism; it passed, although Browder put forward a defeated motion to accept 
both the letter and its organisational demands. 72 The convention, disobeying the 
Letter, refused to elect Foster as its head, and instead installed Gitlow. 73 
Foster's supporters denounced the majority's 'open struggle against the 
Comintern' and demanded 'complete and unreserved acceptance of the [Open Letter 
and organisational proposals] as one individual whole'. They noted that the Majority's 
opposition 'puts the Party in the camp of all those within the C1, the open Right wing 
and the concilliators, who are today waging a struggle against the Cl and the line of 
the Sixth World Congress' and 'who base themselves upon Comrade Bucharin's' 
positions in Russia, as well as expelled right-wingers such as Brandler and 
Thalheimer. 'Loyalty to the CI today, the Minority declared, 'demands unqualified 
support for the line of its leading Party, the C. P. S. U. and its Central Committee led by 
Comrade Stalin. ' 74 
In response, the Lovestoneites caucused, and, in accordance with the changed 
climate in Moscow, Lovestone and Gitlow introduced a motion advocating the end of 
Bukharin's leadership of the Comintern, and accepting, 'without reservations', the 
II Unsigned Lovestoneite letter to 'Dear Comrades', 7 February 1929, in Lovestone papers, box 198, 
folder 11. 
72 VI W(C)P Convention minutes, 5 March 1929, in Jay Lovestone papers, box 217, folder 3. 
73 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 400404. See also Gitlow's account of the 
Convention in The Whole oftheir Lives, 159-6 1. 
74 'Statement to the Convention of the Workers (Communist) Party of America', signed by 67 minority 
supporters including Bittelman, Browder, Dunne and Foster, in Jay Lovestone papers, box 217, folder 
4. The 67 signatories is significant because the Lovestoneites mustered 67 votes in the Convention to 
denounce the Open Letter. 
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Open Letter. 75 Nonetheless, Lovestone still disputed the letter's organisational 
demands. Lovestone appealed to Stalin on this point, who personally intervened by 
granting the Americans the right to pick their own leadership, but nonetheless ordered 
Pepper, Bittelman and Lovestone come to Moscow. The convention elected Gitlow as 
its leader, maintaining Lovestoneite domination, but also establishing the precedent of 
direct Moscow control of the leadership. 76 
To bolster their image, the Lovestoneites arranged a 'proletarian' delegation to 
Moscow; it consisted largely of trade-union supporters. 77 Anticipating the worst, 
sensing the danger of having himself and his chief lieutenants Bedacht and Wolfe out 
of the country at once, Lovestone left the Party in the hands of his firm supporters 
Stachel and Minor, with instructions to take over the Party's assets should the trip go 
poorly. The Party's lawyer, Joseph Brodsky, arranged to transfer the Party's assets to 
Lovestone's supporters. 78 
In Moscow, according to Gitlow, Stalin wielded 'the entire weight of the 
Communist world superstructure' against Lovestone. 79 At first glance, it appears odd 
that Stalin gave this factional fight his personal attention: while, by 1929, the 
Comintern increasingly arranged the internal affairs of its sections, Stalin himelf 
rarely intervened in the Comintern personally, and usually left the 'dirty work' to his 
lieutenants, especially in regards to smaller Parties. Lovestone, however, had 
incredibly bad timing since his defiance of Stalin occurred at the same time Stalin 
waged war against Bukharin. Between January and July 1929, Stalin purged Bukharin 
75 VI W(C)P Convention minutes, in Jay Lovestone papers. 
76 See Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 401-402. 
77 Alexander, The Right Opposition, 22. The delegation was: Bedacht, Ella Reeve Bloor, Gitlow, Otto 
Huiswoud, Lovestone, William Miller, Tom Myerscough, Alex Noral, Edward Welsh, W. J. White 
(Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 404); Wolfe, already in Moscow, rounded out the 
Lovestone team. 
78 Gitlow, I Confess, 522. 
79 G itloW, Whole oftheir Lives, 162. 
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from the leadership of the Russian Party and the Comintern, and oversaw the purge of 
his supporters from the foreign parties. 80 
Lovestone was the weakest link in this pro-Bukharin chain, which explains 
why the American Commission was filled with important Russian and Comintern 
leaders: Stalin, Manuilsky, Gusev, Khitarov, Moireva, Losovsky, Bela Kun, Tom 
Bell, Walter Ulbricht and Kuusinen, Molotov and Mikhailov. 81 Stalin wished to make 
an example of Lovestone: those foreign leaders who sided against him were enemies 
of the Comintem. 
Historians know what happened at the Commission because several 
contemporaries took notes, sensing its importance. 82 In general, the Commission stuck 
to the script of the Open Letter and dealt blow upon blow to the entire Party 
leadership. Dengel denounced the last Party convention as the 'worst convention in 
history of Cl' and proposed that the Comintern place its American section in 
receivership since none of the factions was capable of running it. 
83 He proposed a 
6new open letter characterizing [the] convention'; and argued that since 'there is no 
group which can fully carry out line of Cl' that 'there must be a new Party 
convention'. He ended by declaring, 'No part of the party can be the leadership of the 
future' and that 'all caucuses must be destroyed. -)84 Gusev declared that six years of 
unprincipled factional struggle had rendered both factions incapable of leadership, and 
go See Cohen, Bukharin, chapter 9, for a description of the triumph of Stalin over Bukharin; for the 
interrelationship of the Lovestoneite struggle and the anti-Bukharin campaign, see Alexander, The 
Right Opposition, 24. 
81 Draper, 4merican Communism and Soviet Russia, 406. 
" These include a 15 April 1929 resume by an unnamed American, most likely a Lovestone supporter, 
in the Jay Lovestone papers, box 211, folder 8 (hereafter account A); a letter by Henry Wicks to ' Dear 
Louis', from Finland, 9 May 1929, in the Theodore Draper papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University, box 29 (hereafter Wicks); an 'Outline for Discussion on the Comintern Address', undated, 
but shortly after the Commission ended, in Lovestone papers, box 214, folder 10. Finally, portions of 
the official transcript are available in the Lovestone papers, box 211, folder 8. Draper discusses the 
Commission in, 4merican Communism and Soviet Russia, 406-23. 
93 Account A. 
84 Wicks account. 
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85 declared that there needed to be a 'new cadre' of leaders. The Americans seemed 
oblivious: the Lovestone delegation attacked not only Foster, but the Comintern 
leadership as well. Foster and his supporters continued to paint Lovestone as rightists, 
obviously hoping to be handed power. 
Finally, on 6 May, Stalin spoke, 'as if he were the angel of purity', Gitlow 
recalled. 86 He criticised both factions for 'right deviations', declaring that 'when the 
leaders of the majority and the minority accuse each other of elements of a Right 
deviation, it is obviously not without some measure of truth. 987 Both factions-but 
fiparticularly the majority'-were, according to Stalin, 'guided by motives of 
unprincipled factionalism' that 'place the interests of their faction higher than the 
interests of the Party'. Both factions 'base their relations with the Comintern, not on 
the principle of confidence, but on a policy of rotten diplomacy, a policy of 
diplomatic intrigue'. 'Instead of a fight on principles you get the most unprincipled 
speculation on the differences within the C. P. S. U. ' American Communism had 
descended into 'Another game of rivalry-who can spit further. ' Stalin characterised 
this attitude as 'Let them know over there in Moscow that we Americans know how to 
play the stock market. ' 'But', exclaimed Stalin: 
Comrades, the Comintern is not a stock market. The Comintern is the holy of 
holies of the working class. The Comintern, therefore, must not be confused 
with the stock market. Either we are Leninists, and our relations with one 
another, as well as the relations of the sections with the Comintern, and vice 
versa, must be built upon mutual confidence, must be as clean and pure as 
crystal-in which case there should be no room in our ranks for rotten 
diplomatic intrigue; or we are not Leninists-in which case rotten diplomacy 
and unprincipled factional struggle will have full scope in our relations. One of 
the other. We must choose, comrades. 88 
85 Account A. 
86 Gitlow, I Confess, 553. 
97 Joseph Stalin, Stalin's Speeches on the American Communist Party (New York: Central Committee 
of the CPUSA, 1929), 11. 
'8 Ibid., 12-15. 
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Stalin again urged that Lovestone and Bittelman stay in Moscow 'for a time' in order 
to behead the leadership of both factions, although he directed more fire at Lovestone, 
declaring that 'the actions of the leaders of the majority at the [Sixth] Convention of 
the Communist Party of America ... must be condemned. 
89 Wicks, writing before the 
end of the Commission's deliberation, described its goal as 'the overthrow of the 
majority leadership and the establishment of a new leadership' whose nucleus 'will 
not be the minority, but must be selected from the best elements in both groups. '90 
Dengel spoke of the need to change the leadership, in the notes of one observer, to 
ensure that 'no group to take up leadership. Cl itself to lead the Party'. 91 The 
Comintern, following Stalin's lead, seemed intent upon implementing its Open Letter, 
dismantling the factionalism by removing the guilty parties, and in its place 
constructing a stable, pro-Comintern leadership. 
In the eight days between meetings, Gitlow drafted a statement that asserted 
the majority's independence from the Comintern: 'the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International desires to destroy the [American] Central Committee and 
therefore follows the policy of legalizing the past factionalism of the opposition and 
inviting its continuation the future'. 92 On 12 May, the ECCI issued an address to the 
Party membership which criticised the Sixth Convention for not eliminating 
factionalism. It singled out Lovestone and his supporters for 'methods and intrigues 
which cannot be tolerated in any section of the Comintern and which clearly bear the 
imprint of petty bourgeois politiciandom': 
for making use of the convention for factional purposes, for misleading honest 
proletarian members who uphold the line of the Comintern, for playing an 
unprincipled game with the question of the struggle against the right danger in 
the Comintern and in the communist party of the Soviet Union, for 
'9 Ibid., 17-19. 
91 Wicks account. 
91 Account A. 
" Quoted in Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 413. 
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inadmissible personal hounding of the delegation of the Comintern at the 
convention, for the organization of caucus meetings of the delegates of the 
majority in direct contradiction with the Open Letter of the ECCI and in spite 
of the verbal acceptance of that letter, for hounding those comrades who 
departed from the majority faction and unconditionally accepted the line of the 
ECCI, for a campaign against certain responsible comrades of the minority 
who were carrying out the line of the ECCI. 93 
The address called for the immediate cessation of factionalism; the removal of both 
Bittelman and Lovestone from the American Party; reorganisation of the Secretariat; 
rejection of the Fosterite proposal for a special Party convention; and that the 
Comintern Control Commission decide Pepper's case. 94 
The ECCI had circulated its address a day in advance in order to compel 
Lovestone to accept it. Instead, it triggered him to enact his plan to take over the 
Party's assets. Lovestone and Gitlow cabled Stachel and Minor. However, according 
to Gitlow, by this time Stachel had already broken with Lovestone and notified Stalin 
of Lovestone's perfidy. Lovestone's only leverage-his control of the American 
Party-was quickly dissipating. 95 
96 At the 12 May meeting, Kuusinen denounced Lovestone's threats, 
comparing it to previous declarations by 'open oppositionists on eve of a split'. 
Addressing both Foster and Lovestone, he ended: 'We demand statements as to 
whether you will carry out decision without reservations? ' At this point, the 
Americans had to genuflect to Stalin, or rebel. While dickering with the section about 
Bittelman, 97 Foster supported the address. So did Weinstone and Bittelman. Gitlow, 
however, temporised: on the pretext of not having had sufficient time to study the 
address, he 'ask[ed] for a little more time to draw up a statement of views on the 
letter. ' Molotov dismissed Gitlow's answer and Kuusinen denounced Gitlow's 
11 'Address by the ECCI to All Members of the CP of the United States', 12 May 1929, in Gruber, ed., 
Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern, 230-34. 
94 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 415. 
9' Gitlow, I Confess, 555-57. 
9' The description of this meeting comes from Account A. 
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'factional method', and called for a vote on the letter. The Lovestoneites refused to 
vote. After Wolfe asked for more time, Stalin replied that: 
I think the statement of Wolfe is shameful. The leadership of the faction is so 
illiterate, so backward, that they don't understand the significance of the letter. 
You are asked in different words: Do you recognize the discipline of the CI? 
Do you believe the part should obey the whole? There are statutes of the CL If 
it is necessary for you to think over this, then who are you? 
Bela Kun then asked each Majority delegates if he would 'carry out the discipline of 
the CI without reservations'. One after another, the ten delegates refused to answer the 
question. Instead, they attempted to balance a rhetorical loyalty to the Comintem with 
a rejection of its dictates. 
Their declaration announced: 'While still maintaining our disagreement with 
the Open Letter and its Organization instructions, and our conviction that they will not 
prove helpful to our Party, we ... hereby categorically repudiate all charges of 
resistance in the Comintern decisions. 
98 A more substantial 'Appeal to the 
Comintern' criticised the Open Letter once again, claiming it had repudiated the 
decision of the Sixth Comintern Congress. 
99 During Lenin's time, it was possible to 
accept Comintem discipline but disagree with a particular decision, as John Reed had 
over the question of working within the AFL. Now, in the Stalinised Comintern, this 
was not so. Also, during Lenin's time, disputes, and even splits from the Comintern, 
involved principled issues, not questions of organisational loyalty and control. 
On 14 May, the Presidium, the highest body of the ECCI, met. It became clear 
in this meeting that the ten Majority delegates, represented by Gitlow, were isolated. 
By this time, the emphasis of the ECCI had shifted from trying to dismantle both 
97 'We accept the decision in regard to Bittelman, but do not subscribe to the formulation. ' 
9' Memo to the Presidium of the ECCI, undated, signed by the Majority delegation. In Jay Lovestone 
papers, box 198, folder 12. 
99 'Appeal to the Comintern', 14 May 1929, signed by the Majority delegation and Wolfe, issued in 
mimeographed form, 10 July 1929. In Lovestone papers, box 209, folder 16. 
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factions to destroying Lovestone's power. Stalin spoke again. Enraged at Lovestone's 
increasing disloyalty, Stalin labelled Lovestone's faction as traitors: 
The fundamental feature of this declaration is that it proclaims the thesis of 
non-submission to the decisions of the Presidium of the E. C. C. I. That means 
that the extreme factionalism of the leaders of the majority has driven them 
into the path of insubordination, and hence of warfare against the Comintern. 
The crux of the issue, Stalin argued, was if 'the members of the American delegation, 
as Communists, as Leninists, consider themselves entitled not to submit to the 
decision of the E. C. C. I. on the American questionT. He continued: 
You had a majority because the American Communist Party until now 
regarded you as the determined supporters of the Communist International. 
And it was only because the Party regarded you as the friends of the 
Comintern that you had a majority in the ranks of the American Communist 
Party. But what will happen if the American workers learn that you intend to 
break the unity of the ranks of the Comintern and are thinking of conducting a 
fight against its executive bodies-that is the question, dear comrades. 100 
Stalin was more explicit: 'It is said that the Communist Party of America cannot get 
along without Comrade Lovestone, that the removal of Comrade Lovestone may ruin 
the Party. That is not true, comrades. ' Later: 'I doubt it very much that at this stage 
Comrade Lovestone can be a Party leader. "Ol 
At the end of the six hour meeting, early in the morning, the Presidium voted: 
only Gitlow opposed the address. Stalin proposed that each individual American 
delegate declare his position on the decision. Most declared that they opposed the 
ruling, but would nonetheless uphold it as a matter of discipline. However, three 
delegates broke ranks. Bedacht, a leading Lovestoneite, and Noral, capitulated to the 
Comintern. ' 02 Gitlow, however, declared that he would not only oppose, but resist the 
decision. This enraged Stalin even more, and he thundered: 
Who do you think you are? Trotsky defied me. Where is he? Zinoviev defied 
me? Where is he? Bukharin defied me. Where is he? And you? When you get 
back to America, nobody will stay with you except for your wives. 103 
'00 Stalin, Speeches on the American Communist Party., 22,32-33. 
'0' Ibid., 33. 
102 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 420-22. 
103 Wolfe to Draper, quoted in American Communism andSoviet Russia, 422. 
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Stalin, in fact, attempted to prevent even this: he tried to induce Wolfe's wife to desert 
her husband, and tried to prevent the Lovestoneites from even returning to the US 
through both the carrot and the stick. 104 By the end of May, a defeated Lovestone 
realised that Stalin was not going to let him return to the US, and that remaining in 
Moscow would further hinder his power. In a letter to the Comintern, he 'strongly 
insist[ed] to the ECCI that he 'be given work in some other country-outside Moscow 
and outside the United States'. In order of preference, he requested England, France, 
Germany, Argentina or the Far East. 105 The next day, the Comintem approved a 
personal trip for a fortnight to the US, but then the new American leadership opposed 
this. Finally, on 22 July, Lovestone sneaked out of Moscow. 106 Upon arriving in the 
US, Lovestone discovered that his 90 per cent majority was illusory, and like Icarus 
he fell to the earth. As one veteran militant put it, 'I went along with the decision [to 
expel him] on the grounds that the international leadership was more likely to be right 
than Lovestone. ' 107 On the pretext that Lovestone left Moscow without Comintern 
permission, the CP expelled him. 
Key Lovestone allies such as Minor and Stachel joined Bedacht, who had 
capitulated to Stalin in Moscow, and abandoned Lovestone once his fate was clear. 
Bedacht became temporary Party leader, as part of a Secretariat including Minor, 
Weinstone and Foster, as well as G. Williams, a Comintern representative. In 
response, Lovestone denounced these 'degenerated elements from the former 
104 on Wolfe's wife, see Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 425; on the diff iculty of 
returning to the US, see Gitlow, I Confess, 565-67. 
105 Jay Lovestone to Political Secretariat, 30 May 1929, in Lovestone papers, box 198, folder 13. 
" The details surrounding Lovestone's flight from Moscow are told in Draper, American Communism 
and Soviet Russia, 425-29. 
107 Steve Nelson, James R. Barrett and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson: American Radical (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 64. 
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Majority' for deserting him. 108 Just as Stachel and others had purged the Party of 
Cannon and Trotsky supporters for Lovestone a year earlier, they now lent their 
services to purge the Party of Lovestone sympathizers. In mid-August, 1929, the 
Political Committee put an ultimatum to remaining Lovestone supporters such as 
Wolfe and Gitlow to 'dissociate themselves from this renegade to Communism' 
within forty eight hours or be expelled. 
109 
The furore against the fonner Party leadership was so complete that both 
Lovestone and Gitlow were even prevented from removing their personal possessions 
from Party headquarters. The anti-Lovestone purge affected more people than the 
earlier anti-Cannon purge: eleven full Central Committee, five candidate Central 
Committee, and two Control Committee members, along with two hundred others; in 
addition, and some two thousand members voluntarilY quit. The Lovestoneites 
themselves claimed that some 350 members were expelled, and that 'practically all of 
these comrades are functionaries'. Others included Charles Zimmerman, a leader in 
the New York City ILGWU. 110 
Lovestone and his remaining followers organised the 'Communist Party of the 
U. S. A. (Majority Group)' and began publishing aj ournal, Revolutionary Age, a 
reference to the original American Communist paper edited by Fraina. This criticised 
the 'Party-splitting and mass expulsion campaign, outrageous violation of the most 
elementary rights of Party democracy, [and] illegal expulsion' of Lovestone and his 
supporters. 
' 11 Unwilling to attack the Comintern's 'Third Period', Revolutionary Age 
argued that the original concept of the period, as articulated by Bukharin, had been 
`8 'Appeal to the Comintern on the last Comintern Address and the Expulsions Now Taking Place in 
the Party', singed by Gitlow, Lovestone, Miller, Myerscough, Welsh, White and Wolfe, 10 July 1929; 
in Jay Lovestone papers, box 209, folder 16. 
" Max Bedacht for the Secretariat to Benjamin Gitlow, et. al., 14 August 1929, in Benjamin Gitlow 
rapers, box 8, folder 6; cf Gitlow, I Confess, 567-68. 
a 10 Alexander, The Right Opposition, 28; on Gitlow's clothes, see I Confess, 569 
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perverted in an absurd caricature by Stalin positing that revolution was around the 
comer. 
112 
Cannon and Lovestone's oppositions 
In late 1930, the Lovestoneites joined forces with other expelled right-wing 
Communists from around the world, including Gen-nans August Thalheimer and 
Heinrich Brandler and the Indian M. N. Roy, to form the International Communist 
Opposition (ICO). Unlike the International Left Opposition, the ICO lacked a central 
unifying leader with Trotsky's stature, especially after Bukharin capitulated to 
Stalin. 113 Like Cannon, Lovestone's chief orientation was to recruit out of the official 
Party. 114 
It is interesting to compare Lovestone's to Cannon's supporters. The key 
difference is that Lovestone's organisation, unlike Cannon's, had been forged not on a 
clear political basis, but to regain leadership of the Party. Lovestone began his new 
organisation with both more members and a more auspicious political climate. 
Cannon had hoped to capitalise on wide-spread disgruntlement within the Party 
against the right-wing drift of the Lovestone leadership and the Bukharin Comintem. 
Shortly after expelling Cannon, the Party abruptly swung to the left as part of the 
Third Period. Just as in Russia, this shift undercut support for Trotsky. 115 When the 
Party expelled Lovestone, many potential Trotskyists decided to remain the larger, 
official Party. The Third Period, like Bolshevisation, although concocted for Stalin's 
factional needs, seemed to answer the concerns that many rank and file members had 
III Revolutionary Age, I November 1929. 
112 The first five issues of Revolutionary Age serialised an article by Will Herberg on the Tenth ECCI 
plenum which elaborated this perspective; see also Bertram D. Wolfe, 'Is the VI Congress Being 
Revised? ', ibid., 15 November 1929; Jay Lovestone, 'The Crisis in the Communist International', ibid., 
I December 1929. On the TUUL, see Ben Gitlow's running commentary. 
113 Alexander, The Right Opposition, 278-79; Wheeler, 'American Communists', 133. 
114 Gitlow, I Confess, 571-73; Revolutionary Age, 15 December 1929. 
115 The Lovestoneites recognised this, and used it to accuse Stalin of aping Trotsky. Cf. Will Herberg, 
, The Decay of Trotskyism', Revolutionary Age, I December 1929. 
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and confirmed their political impulses. 116 This, along with the popularity of the Soviet 
Union and the onset of the Depression, helped the Party grow dramatically, and 
isolated Trotsky's followers, who entered what Cannon described as the 'dog days of 
the Left Opposition'. 117 Many former Cannon supporters, such as William F. Dunne 
took Stalin's turn to the left as good coin, and remained within the Party, even though 
Cannon believed that they should have been recruited to the Left Opposition. 118 
The Third Period was good for Lovestone, since his group offered a home to 
Communists disaffected by it. As Gitlow put it, 'Our program at the time was 
certainly more sensible and had more reference to American conditions than the 
official Party's adventurist and ultra-Leftist "Third Period" nonsense. " 19 The 
Lovestoneites stressed their opposition to the new Communist unions, their support to 
'American exceptionalism', and their disagreements with the CP internal regime. 120 
The lack of a defined political basis for the Lovestoneites-which Gitlow surnmarised 
as the 'ridiculous position of both trying to reform the Communist International and 
declaring that Stalin's policies are one hundred percent correct, 121 -contributed to 
many Lovestone followers' descent into cynicism and ultimate abandonment of 
socialism altogether. Changing its name several times, the Lovestone organisation 
eventually ceased to have any pretext of socialism. Thus Lovestone himself, while 
denouncing Stalin, tried to hedge his bets by working with Soviet intelligence until 
116 Mathew Worley, 'Class Against Class: The Communist Party of Great Britain in the Third Period, 
1927-1932' (PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 1998), chapter 3, notes that in Britain, too, the new 
line in 1928 'coffespond[ed] to developments in Britain as perceived by the Communist Party' even 
though 'the impetus to realign Party policy undoubtedly came from the Comintem. ' See also Mathew 
Worley, 'The Communist International, The Communist Party of Great Britain, and the "Third Period", 
1928-1932', European History Quarterly, 30: 2 (2000). 
117 Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism, 90-9 1. 
"' See for example, Cannon to Albert Glotzer, 24 August 1929, in Cannon, The Left Opposition in the 
US., 218-19. 
119 Gitlow, I Confess, 571. 
120 Alexander, The Right Opposition, 85-86. 
121 Gitiow, I Confess, 327; Klehr, 'Theory of American Exceptionalism', 12 1. 
Jacob Zumoff 257 
1936.122 Later, Lovestone continued spying, only for the US, including by directing 
the AFL's anti-Communist activities amongst the international labour movement on 
behalf of the CIA. Wolfe became an anti-Communist historian and chief ideological 
advisor of the International Broadcasting Office of the State Department, and Gitlow 
became a witness for the Congressional witchhunt against the CP, and wrote two 
books justifying his anti-Communism. Other Lovestoneites, such as Zimmerman and 
Israel Breslow, merely became conservative trade-union bureaucrats. Will Herberg, 
oddly enough, became an important Jewish philosopher. 
123 
Cannon's opposition, on the other hand, eventually grew into a small but real 
workers organisation, and one of the largest Trotskyist groups in the world. In 1934, 
Cannon and his supporters led a teamster strike in Minnesota, paving the way for the 
development of the Teamsters Union and the growth of the CIO in the late 1930s. 124 
The mendacity of mediocrity: the rise of Browder 
The deposition of Lovestone was part of an international trend in the 
Comintern, starting at the top. Since Stalin no longer wanted socialist revolution 
abroad, and, in fact, opposed it under the rubric of socialism in one country, he had no 
need for an independent, critical, Comintern leadership. Thus he replaced Bukharin 
with V. M. Molotov. Isaac Deutscher described Molotov during this period: 
Molotov was almost a perfect example of the revolutionary turned official; and 
he owed his promotion to the completion of his conversion. He possessed a 
few peculiar virtues which helped him along: infinite patience, imperturbable 
endurance, meekness towards superiors, and a tireless, almost mechanical 
industrial which in the eyes of his superiors compensated for his mediocrity 
and incompetence. 125 
122 Elena Davison, 'A Fierce, Freedom-Loving Man', Hoover Digest 1999 (1). 
123 Alexander, The Right Opposition, 133-34; Morgan, A Covert Life, 141 ff; Klehr, 'Theory of 
American Exceptionalism', 176-78; on Herberg, cf. Diggins, Up From Communism, especially 138-59; 
cf. Seth Lipsky, 'Did Jay Lovestone Win the Cold War? ' (review of Morgan), Forward, 23 April 1999 
one the close relationship between Lovestone, the ILGWU right wing and Vorwaerts. 
124 See Cannon, History ofAmerican Trotskyism, for an account of the development of American 
Trotskyism. 
125 Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1959), 86. 
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Stalin chose his national leaders along the same lines. While the Secretariat was 
useful because it cemented the former Lovestoneites to the post-Lovestone 
organisation at the same time it co-opted Foster, it was not a durable solution to the 
question of Party leadership. 
The American Molotov turned out to be, surprisingly, Foster's lieutenant, Earl 
Browder. In the summer of 1929, Browder attended the Pan-Pacific Trade Union 
Secretariat's conference in Vladivostock. Upon his return in October, the International 
reshuffled the Secretariat, dropping Foster and Weinstone and adding Browder. In 
1932, Bedacht became head of the Intemational Workers Order, the successor the 
foreign language federations. With Browder, Minor and Stachel, the American 
leadership consisted of three rather unimpressive, if competent, apparatchiki whose 
training was as assistants to more independent leaders whom they had been willing to 
betray to improve their standing with the Comintern. In the next couple of years 
Browder became the head of the American Party, leading it until he fell afoul of Stalin 
at the end of World War 11.126 
Like Molotov, Browder represented the triumph of mediocrity in the CP; not 
just personally, but politically. 127 Although he had been a founder of the Party, he was 
not an original thinker: even if he was not the only early Communist trained as a 
white collar office worker, he alone spent his time in prison during the Great War 
writing an accounting manual. 
128 
126 See Draper, American Communism andSoviet Russia, 430-35; James G. Ryan, Earl Browder. - The 
Failure ofAmerican, 37-38. 
127 A contemporary description of Browder's writings, in Current History (October 1936) captures this 
quality: 'With him, the style is peculiarly the man: more plodding than profound, more competent than 
brilliant, more staid and steady than original of imaginative. He seems utterly devoid of humor and 
chockftil of cliches worn thin and dull from duty since 1848'. Quoted in Roger E. Rosenberg, 
, uardian of the Fortress: A Biography of Earl Russell Browder, US Communist Party General ,C 
Secretary from 1920-1944' (PhD thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1982), 52. 
128 Ryan, Earl Browder, 14. To be fair, when he was later incarcerated in Leavenworth, he did make 
use of the time to study politics (pp. 15-16). See also, Rosenberg, 'Guardian of the Fortress', 42. 
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Despite his reputation as a rightist, Browder's rise to power began during the 
leftist Third Period. One key aspect of the American Third Period was the creation of 
new unions. In the autumn of 1929, the Party scrapped the TUEL-which Foster had 
organised to act as a 'militant minority' within the conservative trade unions-at a 
Cleveland convention and inaugurated the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL). 
Reversing eight years of work in the unions, the CP saw the TUUL as a vehicle for 
creating independent unions under Communist leadership. The full history of the 
TUUL-which was dissolved in 1934--is beyond the scope of this study. 129 
Like its Third Period sibling, the theory of self-determination for the black 
belt, the TUUL originated out of the exigencies of Stalin's Comintern. Although there 
had been some impulse for new unions several years earlier, as discussed in the last 
chapter, the TUUL's genesis came during the Ninth ECCI Plenum in early 1928. 
There Losovsky, touting the need for new German trade unions, used the AFL-with 
one of the most right-wing labour leaderships in the industrialised world--as an 
example of 'social fascism' and advocated 'the organisation of the unorganised ... the 
creation of new unions, because the majority of the working class was unorganised, 
because in the main spheres of industry the workers were unorganised' . 
130 At roughly 
the same time, the Comintern pressured the Communist Party of Canada to establish 
the Workers Unity League, an organisation parallel to the TUUL .1 
31 
Unlike the black belt theory, Communists did not universally deride the new 
unions. As the experience with Reed and the IWW illustrates, there always had been 
129 For a history of the TUUL, see Theodore Draper, 'Communists and Miners, 1928-1933', Dissent 19 
(Spring 1972); Edward Johanningsmeier, 'The Trade Union Unity League'; Fraser M. OttanellL The 
Communist Party and the United States: From the Depression to World War 11 (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1991), 21 ff. For one of the few sympathetic accounts of the Third Period, see 
James Green, 'Working Class Militancy in the Depression', Radical America 16: 6 (November-December 
1972). 
130 Communist International, vol 6, no 17 (1929), 65 8. 
131 John Manley, 'Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism and the "Third Period": The 
Workers Unity League, 1929-35', Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 5 (1994), 172. 
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latent tendencies towards dual unionism in American Communism, and the situation 
in Passaic and the New York needle trades made clear that the AFL was not interested 
in organising immigrant, unskilled, mass production workers, and that Communists 
were not welcome in the unions. Whatever its failings, the TUUL partially anticipated 
the fannation of the CIO in the 1930s. The chief difference was that the CIO was 
formed by powerful sections of the AFL bureaucracy-specifically John L. Lewis and 
Sidney Hillman-while the Communist TUUL simply lacked the social weight to 
carry out its 'main task', 'the organization of the unorganized into industrial unions 
independent of the A. F. of L. ' 132 The CIO appropriated this goal, and often former 
TUUL organisers themselves, in order to build the mass industrial union movement in 
the 1930s. 133 In the process, of course, the revolutionary politics of the TUUL was 
dropped in favour of working within the capitalist 'New Deal Coalition' of 
Democratic president Roosevelt. 
The TUUL's National Miners Union led several strikes amongst disaffected 
miners whom the UMW would not touch, including most famously in Harlan County, 
Kentucky. 134 In 1928, after the Passaic strike, Communist textile organisers led the 
Inill workers of New Bedford, Massachusetts, on strike. When that strike ended in 
defeat, they organised the National Textile Workers Union, which, in 1929, organised 
the famous Gastonia, North Carolina, textile strike. 135 It is true that none of these 
132 Quoted in Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union, 78. 
113 Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1989), 133. 
134 Draper, 'Communists and Miners', 380-87; Walter Howard, 'The National Miners Union: 
Communists and Miners in the Pennsylvania Anthracite, 1928-193 1', The Pennsylvania Magazine of 
BiographY and History 125 (January/April 200 1). 
135 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 2-44. On Gastonia, see John A. Salmond, Gastonia 1929: The Story of 
the Loray Mill Strike (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Liston Pope, Millhands 
and Preachers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946). On the New Bedford strike, see Michael W. 
Santos, 'Community and Communism: The 1928 New Bedford Strike', Labor History 26 (1985) and 
Daniel Georgianna and Roberta Hazen Aaronson, The Strike of '28 (New Bedford: Spinner 
publications, 1993). The memoirs of Fred Beal, a Communist organiser prominent in both strikes is 
also instructive: Fred E. Beal, Proletarian Journey: New England, Gastonia, Moscow (New York: 
Hillman-Curl, 1937). For other Communist work amongst textile workers, see also, Walter Howard, 
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strikes was successful and often faced tremendous violence. But like Passaic, both 
strikes established the credentials of Communist organisers, and helped discredit the 
AFL. 
And not all TUUL unions failed so completely. For example, the Transport 
Workers Union not only survived but flourished, becoming the union of New York 
City's public transport workers, which it remains today. 136 Even when they did fail, 
TUUL organisers, motivated by the Third Period concept of 'class against class', 
fought militantly and bravely for workers rights, racial equality and industrial 
unionism. Although Draper may be right that 'they were too few, and they tried to do 
too much', these Communists helped lay the basis for the growth of the CIO in the 
1930s. 137 But the main difference between the CIO and TUUL, besides their leaders' 
politics--despite Communist assistance, 'social fascists' such as Lewis and Hillman 
would lead the new labour movement-was that they had a mass base for a new 
union, whilst the CP did not. 
The TUUL also played a small role in the automobile industry. At the time of 
the Party's formation in 1919, the main union was the Automobile Workers Union 
(AWU), led by right-wing socialists, which the AFL had expelled in 1918 for refusing 
to abide by craft divisions and steer clear of the auto industry. By 1923, however, the 
union was a shell of its former self and the Party began paying attention to it; in 
exchange for being allowed to work within the union, the Party supplied organisers. In 
1926 the Party established various newspapers aimed at workers, and accrued a cadre 
of some 350 car workers a year later. Communists also entered the union leadership. 
"Radicals Not Wanted": Communists and the 1929 Wilkes-Barre Silk Mill Strikes', Pennsylvania 
History 69 (Summer 2002). 
116 See Joshua Freeman, In Transit. - The Transport Workers Union in New York City (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 5 1. 
137 The TUUL's Canadian counterpart, the Workers Unity League, played a similar role in Canada by 
laying the basis for industrial unionisation later in the 1930s; see Manley, 'Canadian Communists, 
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'By the early 1930s', Roger Keeran writes, 'all of the key union leaders either 
belonged to the Communist Party or had close connections with the Party. ' 138 Under 
the Communists' guidance, the AWU would affiliate with the TUUL in 1929. 
Although it never managed to organise the industry, the AWU did help lay the basis 
for the success of the UAW later in the 1930s. Several UAW leaders, from Walter 
Reuther to Wyndham Mortimer, had belonged to the AW. 139 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Communists proved themselves competent 
fighters for the working class, unemployed, and blacks, and as a result recruited. 
Between December 1929 and July 1930, more than 7100 membersjoined the Party. 140 
This allowed the Party to become a real, if small, mass Party, and in the 1930s, a 
junior partner in the CIO. 
Unfortunately, by 1929 the American Party had become Stalinised. While its 
members had, especially during the Third Period, joined because they saw in 
socialism a solution to the apparent collapse of capitalism, the leadership was no 
longer dedicated to fighting for working class power. 
Revolutionary Unionism and the "Third Period", ' 191; Norman Penner, The Canadian Left: A Critical 
Analysis (Scarsborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1977), 133-38. 
"" Keeran, 'Communist Influence in the Automobile Industry', quote on pages 208-209. See also the 
first chapter of his Communist Party andtheAuto Workers Union. 
'" Keeran, Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union, 77. On the CP activities in the car industry, 
besides Keeran, see Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism, 62-75. On Reuther and the CP's AWU, see 
Nelson Lichenstein, Walter Reuther. ý The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1995), 3 1. 
140 Klehr, Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 92. 
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9. The American Communist Party, 
the Comintern, and the 'Negro Question' 
The development of the Communist Party's position on the fight for black 
liberation in the United States illustrates very clearly the complexity of the interaction 
between the Comintern and the American Party. The peculiar racial topography of the 
US helps make it unique. Yet, the early CP neglected this issue; only after the 
Comintern prodded it did the Party begin to grapple with racism, racial oppression, 
and the fight for black freedom. 
This chapter first examines how different historians, including both Theodore 
Draper and newer 'revisionists' have treated the development of the American 
Communist Party's position on what was called the 'Negro Question'. Neither 
framework is adequate to understand this relationship, because both maintain a 
Chinese Wall between Comintern intervention and understanding American society. 
In fact, the early (white) leadership of the CP ignored black Americans a small 
number of black Communists, dissatisfied with their white comrades' neglect of the 
Negro Question, brought it to the attention of the leadership of the Communist 
International which then forced the Party to pay attention to black America. Thus, far 
from making the CP 'alien' to American reality, Comintern intervention actually 
spurred the Party to 'Americanise'. 
Historians have long studied the American Communist Party's work among 
blacks. Among the earliest were 'consensus' historians, who asserted that American 
society is marked by ideological and political 'consensus' instead of dissent. They 
cited the problems the Party had in recruiting blacks-those least likely to accept 
American capitalism--to illustrate the general failure of Communism. ' By the 1970s 
I Wilson Record, Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict (Ithaca: 
Comell University Press, 1964), 1-2. Other prominent example of 'consensus' treatment of the CP and 
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and 1980s, historians had begun to re-evaluate the relationship between blacks and 
Communists, emphasising its positive aspects. 2 
Nonetheless, historians often overlook that for most of the first decade of its 
existence the Communist Party all but ignored the Negro Question. 3 How early 
American Communists came to appreciate the importance of the struggle for black 
rights not only fleshes out our knowledge of this vital chapter in the history of 
American Communism, but also serves as a clear example of the interplay between 
the Communist International and the American CP. 
This chapter is divided into two portions. First, it analyses the early 
develoPment of the Negro Question by the CP and it antecedents on the American 
left, until the Fourth Comintern Congress in 1922. When the Comintern forcefully 
urged the Party to pay more attention to blacks. Special attention is paid to the African 
Blood Brotherhood (ABB) in Harlem, which provided the first black Communist 
cadre. This chapter then traces the changing contours of the Party's work among 
blacks up through the 1928 Sixth Congress of the Comintern, which adopted the 
programme of 'self-determination for the black belt'. 
While it is impossible to avoid examining the changes in the CP's 'line', the 
party's formal position did not change very much until the Sixth Congress. 
Nonetheless, the weight the CP assigned to fighting racial oppression did change. 
Throughout this history of the CP and the Negro Question, it will become clear that 
the relationship between the CP and the Comintern was not the impediment to 
'Americanisation' that some historians have argued, nor was it more or less secondary 
blacks include, Record, The Negro and the Communist Party (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1951); William Nolan, Communism Versus the Negro (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 
195 1); Herbert Hill, 'The Communist Party-Enemy of Negro Equality', Crisis, June-July 195 1. 
2 Naison, Communists in Harlem During the Depression; Kelley, Hammer and Hoe. 
3 In fact, by most accounts, there are probably more pages in this chapter than blacks in the early Party. 
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as newer historians have described it. Instead, the Comintern's intervention was at the 
centre of the CP's changing activities towards the Negro Question. 
In looking at the early years of the Party's position on the Negro Question, I 
explore a 'trinity'-the interrelationship among (1) the founders of American 
Communism, who were almost entirely white; (2) the Communist International; and 
(3) the early black American Communists. 4 Understanding this allows the student of 
the CP to begin to reconceptualise the relationship among the Comintern, the CP, and 
how the party attempted to grapple and understand the United States. 
The Comintern's important role in this regard, furthermore, stemmed from the 
very 'evil' characteristic identified by many historians: its Teninist' perspective on 
the 'party question' which stressed the importance of understanding and fighting 
against all forms of social oppression, especially those not narrowly based on class. In 
trying to forge the American Communist movement on the model that Lenin moulded, 
the early Comintem attempted to make the party become more attuned to conditions 
in the United States, including black oppression. Robert Minor was not altogether 
wrong when he described this process, then, as a 'development towards 
Bolshevization as indicated by the thermometer of the Negro question'. 5 
The importance of the Negro Question for American labour 
From its inception American society has been based upon the exploitation of 
black labour. 6 The Civil War ended slavery and created a unified capitalist economy. 
After the failure of Radical Reconstruction, blacks were no longer subjected to 
4 As William Maxwell's recent study indicates, while traditional views of Communist-black interaction 
tend to depict it as one-way, this was not the case since black Communists shaped the Party as much as 
they were shaped by it; William J. Maxwell, New Negro, Old Left (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999). 
1 Undated, untitled manuscript on development of the Negro Question in Robert Minor papers, 
Columbia University Library, Box 12, folder labelled 'New York Negro 1-3'. This was written shortly 
after the founding of the Trade Union Unity League, which occurred in 1929. 
6 See Michael Goldfield, The Color ofPolitics: Race and the Mainsprings ofAmerican Politics (New 
York: The New Press, 1997). 
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slavery, but neither were they free, since they were economically, socially and often 
legally oppressed. Yet almost since its founding, the labour movement maintained a 
'blind spot' in regards to black oppression. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), 
formed by Samuel Gompers in the 1880s, after a brief and partial attempt at 
biracialism, excluded almost all black workers, with the exception of a few unions 
such as the United Mine Workers had a considerable black membership. 7 
After the Civil War most blacks worked in agriculture in the South rather than 
industry. But as blacks moved away from the rural South in the early twentieth 
century, they were integrated in large numbers into strategic sectors of the American 
urban economy such as meatpacking or steel production-albeit at the bottom, while 
being discriminated against as the 'last hired and the first fired'. Employers 
consciously fomented racial divisions among the working class to obscure class 
divisions within capitalist society, making the fight against black oppression strategic 
for the working class as a whole. 
The immediate post-war period ushered in a strike wave that provoked an anti- 
working-class and anti-radical offensive by the government and employers who aimed 
the most ominous repression not directly at labour, but at blacks. There were 25 race 
riots during what National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) leader James Weldon Johnson called the 'Red Summer' of 1919, and 
lynching increased dramatically in the South .8 The anti-working-class nature of the 
70n the AFL and blacks, see William D. Harris, The Harder We Run: Black Workers Since the Civil 
War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 42-45; David Roediger, Towards the 
Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History (London: Verso, 1994), 
141. 
'See Colin Palmer, Passageways: An Interpretative History, (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1998) 
vol. 2, chapter 16, for a synthetic view of the post-war riots and blacks' responses; David Levering 
Lewis, When Harlem Was in Vogue (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 9-10,17- 
20. On the Chicago riots, see Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor. Black and White Workers in 
Chicago Is Packinghouses, 1904-1954 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 65-69; 
Allen H. Spear, Black Chicago: The Making ofa Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967), 214-219, passim; William M. Tuttle Jr, Race Riot: Chicago in the RedSummer 
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twin offensives of 1919's 'Red Scare' and 'Red Summer' was clear in the case of the 
Klan, which besides being virulently anti-black, was also strongly against immigrants, 
Catholics and Jews-Le., virtually most of the American working class. 9 
The defeated strike wave and the race riots starkly illustrated that black rights 
and union rights would either advance together or fall back separately. Even though 
the development of American capitalism and the integration of both blacks and whites 
into the working class laid the basis for integrated class struggle, this objective 
possibility has remained elusive. Many white workers, following the cues emanating 
from the trade-union bureaucracy, as well as the society at large, remained infused 
with racial prejudice that prevented unified struggle or the understanding of the 
significance of black liberation. Although racism thus damaged the working class, 
many white workers, as David Roediger has illustrated, made their whiteness central 
to their self-identity. 10 Consequently, in reaction to this hostility from the leaders Of 
the organised labour movement, most blacks saw no reason to unite with white 
workers. 
This Negro Question-a distinguishing characteristic of the American labour 
movement-is an example of the question of working-class consciousness under 
capitalism in general. According to Lenin, the working class under capitalism usually 
has a bourgeois or 'false' consciousness, i. e., its ideas are not congruent with its class 
interests. The question, then, for radicals in the labour movement in the US has been 
how to mobilise the working class in its own historic class interests despite its long- 
standing racial divisions. To this question, the Comintern's Bolshevik perspective 
of 1919 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996). On the East St. Louis riot, see Elliott 
M Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 
1966). On the Tulsa race riot of 192 1, see James S. Hirsch, Riot and Remembrance (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2002). 
1 See David A. Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1979), 89-90. 
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provided a framework which the American Communists could not have developed 
themselves. 
The American Negro Question in the early 20th Century 
In the early 20th Century, three areas were central to black life in capitalist 
America: the South, the Northeast and the industrial Midwest. In 1920, some 85 per 
cent of the more than ten million American blacks lived in the South; in 1930, despite 
the 'Great Migration' to the North, almost 78 per cent still did. ' 1 Since the South was 
both predominantly rural and non-industrial, and because the immigrant and radical 
milieux from which the CP developed were weak below the Mason-Dixon line, the 
CP had little presence in the South until the late 1920s. Early in the decade, the Party 
did manage to recruit the Georgia SP organiser, Mary Raoul Millis, but she quickly 
returned to the SP fold. 
12 Similarly, even though the Party did on occasion have other 
members in the South, 
13 Robert Minor was essentially correct when he wrote in the 
mid 1920s that 'In all of the eleven southern states ... it is doubtful whether we could 
find one Communist Party member for one state. ' Even at the end of the decade, a 
report on the Party's 'Negro work' noted that efforts 'to make effective contacts have 
not met with any considerable success'. 
14 And while the Party did carry out work 
among farmers, this was never a central CP arena. As a Political Committee directive 
10 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness (London: Verso, 1991), 8-11, passim. 
I Fourteenth Census ofthe United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 11,69 1; M. 
N. Work, ed., The Negro Year Book, 1937-1938, cited in Henry Williams, Black Response to the 
American Left, 1917-1929 (Princeton: Princeton University History Department, 1973), 30. 
120n Mary Raoul Millis, see Brad A. Paul, 'Rebels of the New South: The Socialist Party in Dixie, 
1892-1920', (PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 1999), 181,192,193,201. A circular 
by Ruthenberg, 4 August 1922, notes that she had been nominated as delegate-at-large for the 
upcoming conference and contains a brief biography, 
in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 146. 
" For example, the minutes of the Central Executive Committee, 7 October 1922, indicate that a 
supporter of the Workers Party stood for election as sheriff (! ) in Birmingham, Alabama, as a member 
of the Social Democratic League, Comintern archives, 5 15: 1: 143. A year later, the CEC approved 
hiring an organiser in Birmingham, CEC minutes, 3 January 1923, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 148. 
14 Untitled, undated manuscript, in Robert Minor Papers, Box 12, folder marked 'Negro 1924-25'; The 
Communist International Between the Fifth and Sbah World Congresses, 1924-8 (London: Communist 
Party of Great Britain, 1928), 348; Kelley, Hammer and Hoe, 13-14. 
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put it in 1927, 'work in the south generally, particularly among the farmers, was sadly 
neglected. "5 
The CP was, however, active in the large Northern urban industrial centres in 
both the Midwest and Northeast with a significant black working class. Harlem was 
the centre of both the 'New Negro' movement and the Harlem Renaissance, and it 
was amongst politicised black intellectuals that the CP found its earliest black recruits. 
This 'Negro Mecca', was, as Harold Cruse noted, 'the pivot of the black world's quest 
for identity and salvation'. 16 Harlem was a destination for migrants from the South, as 
well as from all comers of the African diaspora, especially the British West Indies. 
Between 19 10 and 1920, the number of black New Yorkers increased 66 per cent. In 
the 1920s, a quarter of Harlem's population had been born abroad-almost 40,000 
people. 17 As Alain Locke noted in the New Negro (1925): 'Manhattan is not merely 
the largest Negro community in the world, but the first concentration in history of so 
many diverse elements of Negro life' which contributed to artistic, intellectual and 
political cross-fertilisation. 
18 
Although in the North blacks were not subjected to the South's Jim Crow 
segregation, racism and economic hardship still marked life in Harlem. Cheryl 
Greenberg described life in Harlem in the 1920s as 'depression in the age of 
'Directions for the Party Fractions in the National Executive Committee of the American Negro 
Labor Congress', attached to the minutes of the Polcom, 21 May 1927, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 98 1. 
on the CP's agricultural work, see Dyson, Red Harvest and Kathleen Brown, 'Ella Reeve Bloor', 3 06- 
15. 
16 Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro IntellectuaL From Its Origins to Its Present (New York: 
William and Morrow, 1967), 12. On Harlem, see Cheryl L. Greenberg, Or Does It Explode: Black 
Harlem in the Great Depression (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 199 1), chapter 1; 
Lewis, When Harlem Was In Vogue, Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making ofA Ghett:, Negro New 
York 1890-1930, second edition, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Seth Scheiner, 'Negro Mecca. The 
Negro in New York 1865-1930 (New York: New York University Press, 1963); 
17 James, Holding Aloft the Banner ofEthiopia, 35 8; Osofsky, Harlem, 128-3 1; Fourteenth Census, 11, 
691. 
18 Alain Locke, ed., The New Negro: Voices ofthe Harlem Renaissance (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992), 6. 
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prosperity'19, since residents had to survive expensive, inferior and segregated 
housing, poor and low-paying jobs. 20 
The Party Question and the Negro Question 
The Comintem leadership knew very little about the conditions of blacks in 
the US, but their Leninist perspective provided a framework to analyse 'special 
oppression', i. e., oppression intertwined with but separate from class exploitation. 
Lenin-for instance, in his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917)-- 
had long argued that the structural development of capitalism created deep 
divisions-racial, political, ethnic, religious-within the working class. By not 
recognising these, and attempting to be the 'party of the whole class', pre-war 
European social democracy reflected the political perspective of the upper echelons of 
the working class-the older, more skilled workers-which Lenin termed the 'labour 
aristocracy'. 21 As the Comintern argued at its Second Congress in 1920: 
A sharp distinction must be made between the conception of 'party' and 
6class'.... Owing to certain historical conditions, the working class has 
numerous reactionary groups and strata. The task of Communism is not to 
adapt itself to such retrograde specimens of the working class, but to raise the 
whole of it to the level of the Communist advance guard. 22 
Like the trade unions, social-democratic parties embraced all workers regardless of 
political ideology. They saw sexual, racial, ethnic or national oppression as a 
diversion from 'pure' economic issues. This is one of the reasons that Lenin had 
insisted on a 'vanguard party' composed of dedicated cadre instead of the all- 
encompassing social-democratic 'party of the whole class' that Kautsky and the 
Mensheviks had argued for. Lenin insisted that a Bolshevik militant would not 'be the 
19 Greenberg, Or Does It Fxplode, chapter 1. 
20 Ibid., 20. 
2 'Lenin's classic statements on the 'labour aristocracy' are contained in Imperialism: The Highest Stage 
ofCapitalism (1916). What Is To Be Done? (1903) also emphasises the importance of the divisions 
within the working class. 
221Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in Workers Revolution', in Theses Presented to the 
Second World Congress ofthe Communist International (Petrograd: Editions of the Communist 
International, 1920), 5-6. 
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trade-union secretary, but the tribune of the people' who would 'react to every 
manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears' and 'generalise 
all these manifestations and produce a single picture of police violence and capitalist 
exploitation' in order 'clarify for all and everyone the world-historic significance of 
the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat'. 23 Thus the Bolsheviks denounced 
anti-Semitism and 'Great Russian' chauvinism, instead of focusing entirely on the 
class struggle. This approach was why the Comintern forced the early American CP to 
address the Negro Question. 
American Social Democracy and the Negro Question 
Like most social-democratic parties, the two traditional socialist parties in the 
US ignored special oppression. There is little evidence that either Daniel De Leon or 
his SLP applied his famed theoretical acumen to analysing-much less attempting to 
change-the condition of blacks in American society. In 1879, the SLP nominated 
Peter H. Clark, a black man from Cincinnati, as their first congressional candidate; but 
after that, it is rather slim pickings. Although the SLP-and De Leon particularly- 
regularly voted against anti-immigrant and social chauvinist motions at meetings of 
the Second International, they cannot be said to have been militant anti-racStS. 24 Only 
in 1896, when Plessy v. Fergusson codified 'separate but equal' segregation, did the 
SLP demand 'universal and equal right of suffrage without regard to color, creed, or 
sex'. But then, between 1900 and 1916, blacks did not enter into the SLP's 
platforms. 
25 It was not that De Leon was racist; in fact he had criticised racism within 
23 Lenin, What Is To Be Done? l 423. 24 Oakley C. Johnson, Marxism in UnitedStates History before the Russian Revolution, 1876-1917 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1974), 71; Reeve, The Life and Times ofDaniel De Leon, 130-34. 
25 K. H. Porter and D. B. Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms, 1840-1960 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1961). The 1896 statement is on page I 11. 
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the Socialist Party (Sp), 26 but SLP never saw fighting racial oppression as a strategic 
27 
task. 
The Socialist Party was not much better. The platform of the Social 
Democratic Party-the forerunner of the SP-in 1900 called 'upon wage-workers of 
the United States, without distinction of color, race, sex, or creed' to join in the fight 
for socialism. Only in 1920 did the Socialist platfon-n mention blacks again, this time 
to demand the enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. 28 
According to Morris Hillquit, a founder of the SP, there were three blacks at the 
founding convention of the party who were 'by no means the least intelligent and 
earnest of the delegates'. Perhaps because of this presence, that conference recognised 
that blacks 'occupy a peculiar position in the working class' because of the legacy of 
slavery. Yet even with this singular statement of a specific Negro Question, the early 
SP offered nothing more to blacks than membership. One recent study of race and 
American socialism concluded that 'had no African-American been present, it is 
entirely plausible that no mention of black Americans would have been made'. And, 
in fact, neither Hillquit nor history provides much evidence of any important role 
played by blacks in the early Sp. 
29 
An indication of the low importance the SP placed on the Negro Question can 
be seen in the book Class Struggles in America, published in 1906 by the editor of 
International Socialist Review, A. M. Simons, which purported to be a history of the 
US 'written from the point of view of the working class'. On Reconstruction, it 
26 Coleman, Daniel De Leon, 59; Cf. also Seretan, Daniel De Leon, 252n76. 
"I Johnson, Marxism in United States History Before the Russian Revolution, 72. 
28 National Party Platforms, 240. In contrast, the SP did consistently call for votes for women. 
29 Morris Hillquit; History ofSocialism in the UniiedStates (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965 
[ 1909], fifth edition), 309; Johnson, Marxism in UnitedStates History before the Russian Revolution, 
73; Sally M. Miller, ed., Race, Ethnicity and Gender in Early Twentieth-Century American Socialism 
(New York and London: Garland Press, 1996), 6. The discussion at the 1901 convention, in the 
Socialist Party Papers, Duke University, series 1, part D, provides a fascinating debate over the 
question, although this remained a rather dead letter in the Party. 
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favourably cites future president Woodrow Wilson, and decries that 'the South was 
plundered as though by a horde of Goths and Vandals'. Thaddeus Stevens 'best 
incarnated the theory of plutocracy' and the Radical-dominated Reconstruction 
Congress was merely 'a series of violent illegal subversions of fundamental 
institutions, such as the French designate as coup d'etats'. Since Radical 
Reconstruction was the one period in American history when black people were 
allowed, briefly, the rights of citizenship, and a racially egalitarian society seemed 
within reach, this position would be more attractive to white racists than to blacks. 30 
When it split from the SLP in 1901, the SP, which soon surpassed the SLP in 
membership, emphasised mass appeal rather than doctrinal intransigence. According 
to one estimate, there were between two and three hundred blacks in the pre-war SP 
although at best it paid attention to the Negro question 'in a rather absent-minded 
fashion'. Only in 1903, prodded by the Socialist International, did the SP oppose 
lynching. 31 
At the same time, many Socialists supported restrictions against 'Mongolian 
hordes' and the 'yellow peril', as the pre-eminent Appeal to Reason labelled 
immigrants from Asia. Victor Berger wrote in 1902 that 'there can be no doubt that 
the negroes and mulattoes constitute a lower race. 
32 Berger also advocated 
immigration controls in 1907, lest the US 'become a black and yellow country within 
30 A. M. Simons, Class Struggles in America (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1906), 83,84,87; cf, Eric 
Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideolo of he Repub ican Par before he C vi W, gy II ty IiI ar 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 282, on Stevens. Simons had an interesting career in the SP, 
moving from the left to the right wing and eventually quitting the party during the Great War because 
of its anti-war stance. Shannon, The Socialist Party ofAmerica, discusses Simon's trajectory 
throughout. Cf also Robert Huston, 'A. M. Simons and he American Socialist Movement' (PhD thesis, 
University of Wisconsin, 1965). 
31 Miller, Race, Ethnicity and Gender in Early Twentieth-Century American Socialism, 8,37; Seyler, 
'The Rise and Decline of the Socialist Party in the United States, 97-98. 
32 Milwaukee Social Democratic Herald, 31 May 1902, cited in Seyler, 'The Rise and Decline of the 
Socialist Party', 98. 
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a few generations'. At one debate, Ernest Untermann bellowed that 'I am determined 
that my race shall be in supreme in this country and the world. 03 
On the Negro Question, as well, there were divergent perspectives. 34 One 
historian notes that for the early SP, blacks 'were not important in the party, the party 
made no special effort to attract Negro members, and the party was generally 
disinterested in, if not actually hostile to, the efforts of the Negroes to improve their 
position in American capitalist society. 35 Some of the SP's right wing, exemplified 
by Berger, could fairly be termed 'separate but equal' socialists. An article in the 
Appeal to Reason asked: 
What will Socialism mean for the negro? It will mean a house to live in, work 
with the product of his labor in his own hands, and separate territory in the 
United States to live in, where he can work out his own destiny, undisturbed 
by the presence of the white man. 36 
Where the party had black members in the South, they were either organised in 
segregated locals or as 'members-at-large'. 
37 A study of the SP in Mississippi, where 
in the early twentieth century the party was the only organised opposition to the 
Democrats, makes no mention of black members but notes a 'general trend of "white" 
counties being stronger for the socialists' since this allowed them to avoid altogether 
the question of race. 38 One historian wrote that 'southern socialists believed in white 
"Johnson, Marxism in United States History before the Russian Revolution, 46-50. Reeve, Life and 
Times ofDaniel De Leon, 134. On the debate within the SP over immigration, see Charles Robert 
Leinenweber, 'Immigration and the Decline of Internationalism in the American Working Class 
Movement', 167-77; Ira Kipnis, The, 4merican Socialist Movement, 130. 
34 See Kipnis, The, 4merican Socialist Movement, 130-34, and Sally Miller, 'Socialism and Race', in 
John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Failure ofa Dream? Essays in the History of 
, 4merican 
Socialism (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1984), 218- 
231. 
35 Shannon, The Socialist Party of, 4merica, 52. 
36,4ppeal to Reason, 12 September 1903, quoted in John Graham, ed., 'Yoursfor the Revolution. - The 
Appeal to Reason, 1895-1922 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 53. On 
Victor Berger's racism, see also John R. Martin Jr, 'American Class and Race Relations: An 
Intellectual History of the American Left' (PhD thesis, Rutgers University, 1995), 53. 
37 Shannon, Socialist Party, 52. 
Is Steven Cressnell, 'Grassroots Radicalism in the Magnolia State: Mississippi's Socialist Movement at 
the Local Level, 1910-1919', Labor History 33 (Winter 1992) 1: 85. 
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supremacy as much as their opponents in the major parties. 39 Another study of the 
Southern SP describes an 'internal racist opposition approximating a Jim Crow 
socialism', especially for white politicians who entered the SP because they rejected 
the hegemonic Democracy. And, although some SP organisers did take a stand against 
racism, this cannot be seen as a central theme of the party's work. 40 When Rose Pastor 
Stokes, a future Communist leader, toured the South for the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, she was angered to find that the organisation was segregated. 41 In this 
accommodation to Jim Crow, the SP leadership shared the perspective of Gompers 
and his fellow AFL leaders. 
This is not to say that the entirety-or even most-of the SP was racist. There 
was, in fact, a left wing, led by Eugene Debs, which favoured racial equality. 
Although Debs himself bore the marks of his origins as a Indiana rail way union 
leader-for instance, enjoying dialect jokes-he opposed racism when the issue came 
up. Thus, as the leader of the American Railway Union, in 1894 he unsuccessfully 
fought to abolish the union's colour bar. 42 Nonetheless, operating within a social- 
democratic economist framework prevented the left wing from paying much attention 
to the Negro Question. At bottom, they conceived of the Negro Question-and 
consequently the struggle to alleviate black oppression-as a diversion from 
combating class oppression. 
43 
Based on this social-democratic model, the American SP was confined by the 
concept that a party should embrace all workers regardless of their views on such 
39 Bassett, 'The Socialist Party of America, 20. 
40 Brad Paul, 'Rebels of the New South', 77-78,81,88,89,153. 
41 Rose Pastor Stokes, I Belong to the Working Class: The Unfinished Autobiography ofRose Pastor 
Stokes, Herbert Shapiro and David L. Sterling, eds. (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 
1992), 114; see A. Sharp, 'Rose Pastor Stokes', 67-68. 
42 On the contradictory nature of Debs' attitude towards race and blacks, see Nick Salvatore, Eugene V 
Dehs: Citizen and Socialist (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 104-7,226-28. 
43 John Martin's recent study of the Left Wing argues the opposite, but does not demonstrate left-wing 
appreciation of the Negro Question beyond showing that Debs and other leftists were against racism; 
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issues as race or other forms of special oppression. In fact, in Debs' view, the concept 
of non-class oppression did not exist. Debs was by no means a raciSt. 44 But he also 
argued 'the real issue ... is not social equality, BUT ECONOMIC FREEDOM', and 
that therefore 'there is no Negro question outside of the labor question' 
Our position as socialists and as a party is perfectly plain. We have simply to 
say: 'The class struggle is colorless. ' The capitalists, white, black, and other 
shades, are on one side and the workers, white, black, and all other colors, on 
the other side. 45 
Debs did not his abstract declarations of support for black equality with any action for 
achieving it, because, since blacks were just workers, the SP focused on economic 
struggle, not fighting racial oppression. Thus he argued in 1903 that the SP had 
6nothing special to offer the Negro, and we cannot make separate appeals to all the 
races. The Socialist Party is the party of the whole working class regardless of color- 
the . v1Xo _ NorV,, n% class ot Ift 'Je -le vihoxe 
Not only did open racists such as Berger shareLhe same part_, as anA-Tacisks 
like Debs, but there were also a small, yet significant, number of black Socialists. In 
1917,25 per cent of blacks who voted 
in the New York City mayoral election cast 
their ballots for a (white) Socialist candidate, Hillquit. Black New Yorkers voted for 
the SP, however, precisely because it offered a 'special appeal', articulated by black 
Socialist cadre who worked to win black support. Since only 3 per cent of New York 
City blacks voted for Debs in 1920, this would seem to indicate that it was in fact this 
special appeal that attracted black support, and not the abstract ideals of MarxiSM. 
47 
The most notable, and least noted, black socialist was Hubert Harrison, whom A. 
Martin, 'American Class and Race Relations', chapter 2, esp. pages 64-80. 
44 Eugene V. Debs, 'The Negro: His Present Status and Outlook', The Intercollegiate Socialist, April- 
May 1918. 
45 E. V. Debs, 'The Negro in the Class Struggle', International Socialist Review, November 1903, 
excerpted in Morgan, ed., American Socialism, 71-72. 
46 Quoted in Ginger, The Bending Cross, 277. 
"' Williams, Black Response, 35. That one election was for a local office, where a protest vote might 
have been perceived as having more of an effect and the other for a national office, may account for 
some of the decline (a possibility Williams does not explore), but nonetheless such a drop is notable, 
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Philip Randolph once called the 'Father of Negro Radicalism'. 48 Born in St Croix, 
Virgin Islands, on 27 April 1883, Harrison migrated to New York in 1900. In 1909, he 
joined the SP, became a full-time functionary, and, in James' words, 'one of their 
most effective orators and writers' . 
49He was best known for setting up on street 
comers and, in Claude McKay's words, lecturing about 'free-thought, socialism and 
racialism'. 50 The Amsterdam News called him the 'philosopher of Harlem'. 51 
His writings emphasised the importance of the Negro question to American 
socialism. In 1912 he observed that 'the exploitation of the Negro worker is keener 
than that of any group of white workers in America' and that 'the ten million Negroes 
of America form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American 
group. ' He complained that 'no particular effort has been made to carry the message 
of Socialism to these people, ' and urged his comrades to redress this problem. 52 
Unlike most Socialists, Harrison recognised the need for 6special' appeals to 
blacks, based on the struggle against racism. 53 Yet despite Harrison's path-breaking 
work, the SP evidently did not value him, and 'his articles had fallen on deaf ears', 
according to his biographer. He resigned in 1914 and briefly joined the IWW, in part 
because of its egalitarianism. 54 Harrison exemplified the contradictions within New 
especially since there were five black SP candidates on the 1920 ticket. 
49 Quoted in James, Banner ofEthiopia, 123. 
49 Ibid., 123-24. For biographic information on Harrison, cf Clifton C. Hawkins, "'Race First versus 
Class First": An Intellectual History of Afro-American Radicalism, 1911-1928' (PhD thesis, University 
of California at Davis, 2000), chapter 1; Wilfred D. Samuels, Five Afro-Caribbean Voices in American 
Culture, 1917-1929 (Boulder, Colorado: Belmot Books, 1977), chapter 3; Jeffrey Babcick Perry, 
'Hubert Henry Harrison: "The Father of Harlem Radicalism": The Early Years, 1883 through the 
Foundation of the Liberty League and the Voice in 1917' (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1986). 
There is also a collection of Harrison's writing, Jeffrey B. Perry, ed., A Hubert Harrison Reader 
(Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2001). 
"Claude McKay, A Long Way From Home (San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1970), 41. 
31 Amsterdam News, 7 February 1923. 
52 Hubert Harrison, 'Socialism and the Negro', International Socialist Review, July 1912. 
53 Hawkins, "'Race First versus Class Firsf', ' 5,3 64 8. 
54 On Harrison's struggles within the SP, see Perry, 'Hubert Henry Harrison', 221-22,240 (deaf ears 
quote). James, Banner ofEthiopia, 125-26, argues that Harrison's leaving the SP and joining the IWW 
was because of the fact that the former was worse on the Negro Question than the latter. Hawkins, " 
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Negro radicalism: if he was the father of black socialism, he was also the father of a 
reinvigorated black nationalism, after having been spurned by the SP. Thus, black 
nationalists like Garvey as well as Communists like could equally claim his heritage 
as their own. 55 The social-democratic nature of the SP stifled those like Harrison who 
were sensitive to the Negro Question; further, unlike in the Communist Party a decade 
later, there was no international force in the Socialist movement to compel the 
leadership to head its visionaries like Harrison who emphasised the need to fight 
racial oppression: while the International Socialist Bureau did feel question their 
American comrades about their position on lynching, the Second International was 
neither willing nor able to compel the SP to take up the struggle for black liberation. 56 
Two of Harrison's Socialist progeny were Chandler Owen and Randolph, the 
editors of the Messenger. They met as students in New York City and collaborated on 
the famous socialist newspaper. 57 A taste of the radicalism of the early Messenger can 
be had from a 1919 'Thanksgiving Homily to Revolution' which began, 'we are 
especially thankful for the Russian Revolution-the greatest achievement of the 
twentieth century. ' Linked to this was the 'New Crowd Negro', whom the editors 
celebrated as having 'made his influence in every field--economic, political, social, 
educational and physical force. The Negro has been in the front ranks of strikes. He 
has taken his place in Socialist PolitiCS., 58 They ruthlessly criticised black leaders, 
'Race First versus Class Firsf', ' 50-52, argues that Harrison's departure was related to the broader fall- 
out between syndicalists; and socialists, and the Harrison supported Haywood. 
" James, Banner ofEthippia, 128. CE also, Johnson, Marxism in United States History before the 
Russian Revolution, 68-69. According to the Daily Worker (27 September 1926), Communist Richard 
B. Moore held an event in conjunction with Harrison in 1926. 
56 Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement, 132; see note 3 1, above. 
57 On Randolph's Socialist years, see Manning Marable, 'A. Philip Randolph and the Foundations of 
Black American Socialism', Radical America, May-June 1980, reprinted in James Green, ed., Workers 
struggles, Past and Present: A Radical America Reader (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). 
Cf also Thedore Komweibel, 'The Messenger Magazine, 1917-1928' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 
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Century (New York and London: New York University Press, 1999), 9 1. 
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even leftists such as W. E. B Du Bois as 'old crowd Negroes', and called for 'a new 
leadership-a leadership of intelligent and manly courage'. 59 'The new crowd', wrote 
Randolph, 'must be composed of young men who are educated, radical and fearless. ' 
The early Messenger carried columns by future Communists Ottow Huiswood and 
Lovett Fort-Whiteman, as well as radical leftist W. A. Domingo, supported the 
Bolsheviks strongly. In January 1918 it hailed Lenin and Trotsky as 'sagacious, 
statesmanlike and courageous leaders'-the equivalent of the Russian new crowd- 
and, in July, hailed the Soviet republic because it 'has the lead the world in making a 
concrete application of the principle of self-determination of smaller countries'. 
Perhaps most famously, in May 1919, it editorialised: 'Soviet government proceeds 
apace. It bids fair to sweep over the whole world. The sooner the better. On with the 
dance! 60 
According to Rod Bush, 'during this period Randolph and Owen were known 
as the Lenin and Trotsky of Harlem. 
61 In 1918, both editors became the only blacks 
to be arrested and tried for violating the Espionage Act during the war, and in 1919, J. 
Edgar Hoover argued that they were two of the most dangerous radicals in America 
while the postmaster banned their paper. 
62 In addition to their pro-Bolshevik positions 
and their criticism of more mainstream black leaders, Randolph and Owen provided 
leftist commentary on contemporary events. They endorsed Morris Hillquitt and other 
Socialist campaigns, and occasionally carried articles from the Call. They ran articles 
like 'Lynching: Capitalism its cause; Socialism its cure', 'Why Negroes should join 
59 Messenger, May/June 1919. 
"' Ibid., January 1918, July 1918, May/June 1919. 
61 Bush, We Are Not What We Seem, 92. 
62 See Theodore Kornweibel Jr., 'Seeing Red, chapter 5 for the government's repression against the 
Messenger. Cf also Lewis, When Harlem was in Vogue, 17. On Hoover's obsession with black 
radicalism in general, in addition to Kornweibel, cf. Mark Ellis, U. Edgar Hoover and the "Red 
Summer" of 1919', in Journal ofAmerican Studies 28: 1 (January 1994). 
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the I. W. W. ', and 'Socialism: The Negroes' hope'. They also denounced anti-Semitism 
as well as called for independence for India and Ireland. 63 
Despite this enthusiasm about the debut of black socialists, the Messenger 
'had an extremely modest impact in the Afro-American Community', according to 
David Levering Lewis. 64AIthough many of the Messenger's articles put the paper on 
the left-wing of the SP, and several of its writers later became leading Communists, 
Randolph and Owen remained in the SP. In May 1919, they analysed the factionalism 
in the SP, and although they supported some of the left's programme, criticised its 
65 6amateur enthusiasm' and put party unity at a higher premium than all else. In fact, it 
appears that by 1919 the SP, at least in New York City, was emphasising fighting 
against black oppression in its practical work, if not in its theory. In 1918, the NEC 
had voted to make special attempts to organise Southern blacks, and also began to 
recruit Northern blacks. That year, one New York local recruited 100 black members 
and the SP nominated three blacks for political office. A locus of black Socialists was 
the 21st Assembly District Branch of the SP in Harlem, formed in July 1918. The 
black SP cadre, however, had very little interaction with the SP's headquarters several 
n-ffles downtown. 
66 The SP was still 'colour blind', but it was beginning to try to 
organise blac s. 
67 
Only years later did the new Communist Party reach a similar level. Thus, 
during the faction fight, W. A. Domingo, a former Garvey supporter, prepared a report 
63 on the SP and its election campaign, see Messenger, November 1917, July 1918; for Randolph's 
article on lynching, see ibid., March 1918; on I. W. W., see ibid., July 1919; W. A. Domingo's article on 
socialism is in the same issue, as are the articles on India and anti-Semitism; cf ibid., November 1917, 
for article on Ireland. 
64 Lewis, Vogue, 9. 
65MeSSenger, May/June 1919. 
66 Joyce Moore Turner, 'Richard B. Moore and His Works', in W. Burghardt Turner and Joyce Moore 
Turner, ed., Richard B. Moore: Caribbean Militant in Harlem (London: Pluto Press, 1982), 29. 
67 Weinstein, The Decline ofSocialism in America, 73. 
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to the SP discussing the factions and the Negro Question. He criticised the Lcft Wing 
for not paying more attention to black Americans. 
In order to accomplish world revolution the Bolsheviki have not hesitated to 
encouch in their platform statements that are calculated to attract and gain for 
them the support of all the oppressed peoples of the world.... Since it is the 
avowed object of the Left Wing to establish Socialism through the medium of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, how can they expect to accomplish it with a 
large portion of the American proletariat untouched by revolutionary 
propaganda? 68 
Of course, this approach was the standard social-democratic 'colour blind' perspective 
of the SP, notjust the left. 
As the anti-union 1920s dragged on, and the trade-union leadership became 
more right-wing and hostile to blacks, Owen eventually drifted away from radical 
politics altogether and Randolph focused on organising blacks into the AFL, 
abandoning revolution in favour of a more reformist brand of socialism. From 1919 
till 1923, the paper, although it still carried articles by Domingo and Fort-Whiteman, 
all but ignored the CP while praising the SP. Owen and Randolph stood for off-ice in 
1920 on the SP ticket, and endorsed Debs' presidential campaign. The Messenger 
continued its radical coverage through the early 1920s, but, by 1923, had become 
much less radical. In 1923, it simultaneously began a concentrated campaign against 
Garvey, and also began heavily criticising the CP. Domingo (but not the American- 
bom Fort-Whiternan) stopped contributing to the paper because of its anti-West 
Indian edge in going after Garvey. 69 Although the paper did not become outright anti- 
Soviet (they urged recognition for the Soviets and culogised Lenin as 'one of the truly 
great figures of human history'), the editors began to make barbed attacks on the 
68 Excerpted in Daniel Mason and Jessica Smith, eds., Lenin's Impact on the United States (New York: 
New World Review, 1970), 170-7 1. 
69 See the Amsterdam News, 28 February 1923, for coverage of a talk given by Owen on West Indian 
and American blacks as well as Domingo's negative response. See Daryl Scott, ' "Immigrant 
Indigestion": A. Philip Randolph, Radical and Restrictionist', on the web page of the Center for 
Immigration Studies (www. cis. org/articles/1999/backgrounder699/back699. html), for a (favourable) 
account of Randolph's anti-immigration views. 
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ABB, the CP, Zinoviev, and the Federated Fanner-Labor Party, among other 
Communist efforts. In April 1924, they declared themselves 'in hearty disagreement 
with the Workers' Party of the Communist faith, which has been industriously 
attempting to wreck the American Trade Union Movement, that it holds a solution to 
the much discussed Negro Problem'. Meanwhile, the paper became more mainstream, 
even running articles by Samuel Gompers and, in its 'Negro Business Achievement 
Number', declaring that 'it is perfectly clear to us that the employer and the employee 
have much in common. 70 
The Industrial Workers of the World 
Of the three organisational components of early American Communism, the 
Industrial Workers of the World came closest to racial egalitarianism. It was one of 
the few labour unions that never excluded or discriminated against black workers. 71 
At the IWW's founding convention, Haywood denounced those 'organizations 
affiliated with the A. F. of L. which in their constitution and by-laws prohibit the 
initiation of, or the conferring the obligation of membership on a colored man. ' The 
IWW advocated, instead, 'An open union and a closed shop. 
72 The IWW's 
interracialism was integral to their industrial unionism which-as opposed to the 
AFL's exclusive craft-union approach-was inclusive of all workers in any industry, 
regardless of skill, language, ethnicity or race. 
The IWW bravely fought against racism and segregation within the labour 
movement. In the South, the IWW organised unskilled black workers in the timber 
In the September 1922 Messenger, Owen had called for the deportation of Garvey; the argument 
between Domingo and Owen, over West Indians, is in the Messenger, March 1923; the obituary to 
Lenin is in the March 1924 issue; for various anti-Communist editorials, see for example the 
Messenger, May 1923 (on the SP and the CP), August 1923 (against the Federated Farmer-Labor Party 
and the menace of Negro Communism'), October 1923 (on the Sanhedrin), March 1924 (on the KPD's 
relationship to the Nazis) and April 1924 (quoted above); the September 1923issue has an article by 
Gompers; the November 1923 issue is the business issue. Cf. Bush, We Are Not What we Seem, 92-93. 
71 Myland Rudolph Brown, 'The I. W. W. and the Negro Worker' (D. Ed thesis, Ball State University, 
1968) 
Jacob Zumoff 283 
industry, despite segregation laws forbidding biracial meetings, white hostility and 
black distrust. The lWW also organised black dockers in Philadelphia and 
elsewhere. 73 On a theoretical level, the IWW had the same "colour blind' refusal to 
see racial oppression as something distinct from class oppression, much less as the 
cornerstone of American capitalism. As one historian put it, 'To the I. W. W. there was 
not a race problem. The economic interests of all workers, black, white, or yellow, 
were the same to the 
I. W. W. 04 Nonetheless, on the ground during their organising, 
wobblies bravely took on segregation and racism, and this made them attractive to 
black radicals. 
The wobblies' most important interracial campaign was the Brotherhood of 
Timber Workers' organising drive in Louisiana and East Texas. They actively 
recruited black workers, confronted racism, and refused to segregate its meetings. Out 
75 
of the IWW's estimated one million members at its height, 10 per cent were black. 
For the IWW, racism was not rooted in the special oppression of blacks, but 
constituted nothing more than bourgeois subterfuge and it only saw the Negro 
Question as extreme class exploitation, and not as an issue that transcended mere 
economics. 
The IWW's position on the Negro Question compared favourably to the rest of 
the labour movement's left wing, such as William Z. Foster. His strategy of 'boring 
from within' already existing unions, many of which had racist policies, meant not 
directly confronting the racism of the Gompers bureaucracy. Thus, The Great Steel 
Strike and Its Lessons (1920), contained a chapter called 'National and Racial 
72 The Founding Convention ofthe IWW (New York: New York Labor News, 1905), 1,7. 
73 For a general overview of the IWW's organising of black workers, see Brown, 'The I. W. W. and the 
Negro Worker'38-72. For the IWW's efforts to organise black dockers in Philadelphia, see 
Kimmeldorf, Battlingfor American Labor, 2148. 
74 Brown, 'The I. W. W. and the Negro Worker', 87. 
75 Sterling D. Spiro and Abraham L. Harris, The Black Worker. - The Negro and the Labor Movement 
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Elements' which hailed the solidarity and militancy of immigrant workers, but decried 
the supposed 'indifference, verging often into open hostility, with which negroes 
generally viewed Organized Labor'. Black workers, he wrote, 'made a wretched 
showing' by either not striking with white workers, or because they 'allowed 
themselves to be used freely as strikebreakers'. In fact, he continued, 'Most of them 
seemed to take a keen delight in stealing the white men's jobs and crushing their 
strike. ' During the strike, black strikebreakers were recruited in large numbers from 
the South, and, after the strike, Foster dutifully criticised the union leaderships for 
excluding blacks, demanding that the unions 'must open their ranks to negroes, make 
an earnest effort to organize them, and give them a square deal when they join'. Yet, 
in part stemming from his notorious desire to not offend the official AFL trade-union 
bureaucracy, he also argued that in ending the racial situation among the unions, 'the 
negro has the most difficult part to play', since he must not only withstand racism but 
also stand up to black middle-class leaders who urged him to scab. He seems to have 
not even conceived of the possibility that the labour movement, especially is left 
wing, should fight against the racism of the union leadership. During the strike, Foster 
went even further than his book, asserting that the 'colored worker is not very 
responsive to trade unionism.... He acts as a scab at all times. ' But, in the Chicago 
packinghouse strike led by Foster even more so than the steel strike, fighting to win a 
strike necessarily meant confronting the Negro Question headfirSt. 
76 
The early Communist Party's neglect of the Negro Question 
None of the CP's antecedents had much of an appreciation of the Negro 
question. William Weinstone, an early Communist, admitted half a century later that 
'There was a serious omission in the Left-Wing Manifesto [of 19191 with regards to 
(New York: Atheneum, 1972), 33 1. 
76 Foster, The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons, 204-12;. Johanningsmeier, Forging American 
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the Negro question. ' 77 The report on conditions in the United States at the founding 
conference of the Comintem-held in Moscow in March 1919-is illustrative. The 
report, given by Boris Reinstein, a member of the SLP, made no mention of blacks. 78 
This neglect was, in the first instance, an inheritance of the pre-Communist social 
democracy. 
One of the questions that preoccupied the early CP was the question of 
'Americanisation'. The 'foreignness' of American Communism was one of the chief 
obstacles that the early CP had to overcome. In a party with such a small indigenous 
base, and in which only 50 per cent of the membership spoke English, it is not 
surprising that few blacks rushed to join. 
79 
Insofar as it noticed the Negro question, it maintained a Debsian position. 
According to the programme adopted at the Communist Party of America's founding 
convention: 'The Negro problem is a political and economic problem. The racial 
oppression of the Negro is simply the expression of his economic bondage and 
oppression, each intensifying the other. This complicates the Negro problem, but does 
not alter its proletarian character. The Communist Party will carry on agitation among 
the Negro workers to unite them with all class conscious workers. ' 80 
There is no evidence that-even with this 'colour blind' approach-the CP did 
6carry on agitation 9 on a regular basis. After the 1919 race-riot in Chicago the 
Chicago-based Communist Labor Party published a front page article on the rioting. 
Communism, 144. 
77 William Weinstone, 'Formative Period of the CPUSA, in Political Affairs, September-October 
1969,11. 
79 John Ridell, ed, Founding the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First 
Congress, March 1919 (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1987), 74-79. 
79 The Second Year of the Workers Party of the United States, 3 1. See The 4th National Conference of 
the Workers (Communist) Party ofAmerica, 27-37 for the figures of membership in the foreign 
language federations from 1922-1925. See also, Glazer, The Social Basis ofAmerican Communism. 
"Communist (CPA), 27 September 1919, in Philip S. Foner and James Allen, American Communism 
and Black Americans: A Documentary History, 1919-1929, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
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Although it decried the violence, it offered no programme to combat the racism 
pervasive in Chicago; nor did it register that the question of racism went beyond pure 
economics. Here is the meat of its argument: 
The workers, both negro and Caucasian, must realize the fact that their misery 
is not due to race antagonisms, but to CLASS Antagonisms; and the reason 
conditions of employment are becoming worse is because the capitalist class 
owns the means of production. The capitalist class--not the workers who 
belong to another race--is the only enemy of all the workers and the workers' 
problems can only be solved through the elimination of the capitalist. 81 
The CPA j ournal, Revolutionary Age, edited by Louis Fraina, for its part wrote that 
'The Negro ... constitutes a vital problem of our revolutionary movement. The race 
problem is simply a phase of the general social problem, which the Communist 
revolution alone can solve. ' 
82 Fraina's Class Struggle (edited by Debs and Ludwig 
Lore as well) in an article titled 'The Negro Problern-A Labor Problem' declared 
that 'the white man must understand that there is but one alternative-either 
competition to the utmost or a common fight of all workers, without regard to color, 
race or creed, against the common enemy, the capitalist class. ý83 Although these were 
inspiring words in the midst of the 'Red Summer', they still reduced the question of 
fighting against racial oppression entirely to 'class antagonisms' or 'the general social 
problem' and offered only a 'common fight of all workers'. 
Not until the Second Comintem Congress, in 1920, did the Party pay real 
attention to the Negro Question. There, John Reed gave a short presentation on the 
condition of American blacks. Lenin had prompted Reed to give this presentation, 
responding to Reed's question if he should make it with a hand-written note: I Yes, 
absolutely necessary. ' Reed argued: 'As an oppressed and downtrodden people, the 
Negro offers to us a double or twofold opportunity: first, a strong race and social 
movement; second, a strong proletarian labor movement. ' He criticised the SP for 
"Communist (CLP), 9 August 1919. 
92 Revolutionary Age, 9 August 1919. Cf also ibid, 2 August and 23 August 1919. 
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having 'never seriously endeavored to organize the Negroes', and attacked black 
nationalism, noting the lack of support for 'national independence' amongst blacks. In 
his notes for the presentation he wrote 'not a trace of nationalist movement' and that 
blacks 'feel [they] are Americans'. Reed reverted to the old Debsian formula: 'The 
only proper policy for the American Communist to follow is to consider the Negro 
first of all as a laborer. ' Nonetheless, he had done what no American Communist had 
done before-he argued that the Party should at least pay attention to blacks, that it 
6 must not ... stand aloof 
from the Negro movement'. Thus the Negro question at least 
had achieved some rhetorical importance. 84 The next speaker, Louis Fraina, argued 
implicitly that immigrant workers were equally as important as blacks-thus returning 
to the standard leftist view. 85 
After Reed's death in 192 1, his interest was not matched by any of his 
successors. The Party programme of that year did pledge to 'support the Negroes in 
their struggle for liberation', including for 'economic, political, and social equality'. It 
also strove to unite the struggles of black and white workers. This led Philip Foner 
and James Allen, two scholars sympathetic to the Party, to argue that this programme 
&marks an important step forward'. 86 But in fact, despite its verbal concession, in 
practice the Party still did not think that the Negro Question was very important. 
On occasion, the Party was able to verbally argue that, as one 1921 article put 
'The efforts of the Negroes to throw off the yoke of the white capitalist imperialists 
cannot fail to react favorable on our fight against the same enemy': 
93 Class Struggle, August 1919. 
84 Pravda, 8 August 1920, in ACBA, 7-8. See also The Second Congress ofthe Communist 
internationab Minutes ofthe Proceedings (London: New Park, 1977), vol. 1,120-24; John Reed, 
'Notes on Negro Problem', July 1920, John S. Reed papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, 
bms AM 1091: 1228; Reed's note to Lenin, with Lenin's hand-written reply, ibid., fins Am 1091: 533. 
8' Second Congress, vol. 1,124-26. 
86 program and Constitution, Workers Party ofAmerica (192 1), ACBA, 9; commentary by Foner and 
Allen on page 8. 
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Every blow struck for Negro liberation will be a blow struck for the world 
Proletariat, since whether the Negroes consciously will it or not, the effects 
will be the weakening of the capitalist foe of both the 'subject peoples' and the 
exploited white workers. 87 
But in tenns of concrete action, there was no understanding that the CP itself should 
attempt to strike some of these blows. 
R. M. Whitney's classic anti-Communist Reds in America (1924), based on 
documents seized at the August 1922 Michigan underground Communist convention, 
argues that the 'Communists' earliest program in the United States included the use of 
the Negro masses in its campaign to bring about the overthrow of the government of 
this country by violence. ' Yet despite his contention that 'During the first year of 
organized activity by the Communists in the United States a great deal of attention 
was paid to the Negro question, ' Whitney was unable to produce any documents 
proving his point beyond some articles from the Messenger and the Crusader, neither 
of which was a Communist paper. 
88 As if to reinforce this point, the chapter's piece de 
resistance is a rather long (I I -page) letter to the early CP signed by Comi ntern 
leaders Bukharin, Radek and Kuusinen, which, among other criticisms, urged the CP 
to pay attention to 'the Negro mass movement for racial betterment' since it 'must 
include great masses of toilers'. Three pages later, the letter also suggested as a 
demand for the CP to use in its work, '[tjhe liquidation of the Ku Klux Klan'. 89 That 
such an intrepid red-hunter as Whitney was reduced to such 'proof speaks for itself. 
Similarly, J. Edgar Hoover, newly employed by the Justice Department to sniff out 
subversion, maintained an almost pathological obsession with the supposed radical 
roots of the race riots in 1919, arguing that communism was 'the cause of much of the 
racial trouble in the United States at the present time'. Yet, Hoover's own extensive 
87 Toiler,, 10 December 192 1, in ACBA, 15. 
98 Whitney, Reds in America, 197. 
'9 Ibid., 205,208. The bulk of the letter concerns itself with the tactics of the CP, including towards the 
question of creating a legal party organisation. The original letter can be found in the Comintern 
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network of agents were telling him the exact opposite-90 This paranoia, however 
fanciful, of a red-black conspiracy indicate the potential power of a Communist 
struggle for black liberation. 
Black politics in the 1920s 
The World War greatly changed American race relations. A combination of a 
labour shortage and a crisis in Southern agriculture propelled more than 300,000 black 
farmers, unskilled labourers and domestic workers to flee the South before 1920 
alone. 91 Despite the poverty and discrimination in most urban ghettos, blacks in the 
North still had more opportunities than in the Jim Crow South. 
Thousands of blacks had served in the military, in segregated units. Those 
who served far from home, especially in France where they were treated better than in 
the South, learnt that segregation and oppression were not inevitable. The war also 
created a sense of entitlement to black veterans, who returned less willing to accept 
the American racial system. 92 Furthermore, many black intellectuals felt betrayed 
when they realised that Wilson's post-war talk of 'self-determination' and 
'democracy' excluded black people throughout the world. 93 Thus, when Haywood 
Hall returned to Chicago from military service in France, he began to search for 
answers to the problems facing American blacks at that time. As he wrote later, on the 
national level there were not many avenues for politicised blacks since 'the political 
scene in the United States in the early 20's offered three alternatives: The National 
archives, 515: 1: 38. 
'OEllis, 'J. Edgar Hoover and the "Red Surnmer"of 1919', (quote on 54); Kornweibel, 'Seeing Red, 
passim. Ellis argues that Hoover's later obsession with the Civil Rights movement and the Black 
panther party-which resulted in numerous assassinations against black radicals-must be seen in the 
context of his role in 1919. 
" Lewis, Harlem, 20-2 1. 
92 See Steven Reich, 'Soldiers of Democracy: Black Texans and the Fight for Citizenship, 1917-1920', 
journal ofAmerican History 82 (March 1986); Lewis, When Harlem Was in Vogue, 13. 
9' See Michelle Ann Stephens, 'Black Empire: The Making of Black Transnationalism by West Indians 
in the United States, 1914 to 1962' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1999), 53ff. 
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Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Garvey's Back to Africa 
Movement (UNIA), and the Communist Party. 94 
Founded in 1910 largely by liberal whites, the NAACP was led at this time by 
W. E. B. Du Bois, the editor of its newspaper, the Crisis. Despite his reputation as a 
radical alternative to Booker T. Washington's 'accomodationism' to racial oppression, 
in the early 1920s Du Bois and the NAACP were relatively moderate. He argued for 
increased black political power, an end to discrimination and segregation, and the 
creation of a black professional class through increased education of black youth. 
9' 
Du Bois's gradual approach had led him to support the war, and to see it as an 
opportunity for black Americans to finally prove their suitability for freedom. 
96 
After the war, the Crisis was optimistic about an improvement of the 
conditions of black people across the world, including in the US. 
97 As with any 
national organisation, there were tensions between the local NAACP branches and the 
national leadership. 98 Nonetheless, in the face of the 1919 'Red Summer', the 
Northern NAACP's gradual, legal strategy for gaining black rights seemed, to young 
blacks like Haywood Hall, to be predicated upon a 'reliance on [the] white rulers'. 
Thus he recalled that it had 'let us down'. 99 
Against the 'old Negroes' such as Du Bois, radical black intellectuals formed a 
new, militant 'New Negro' movement, refusing to idly accept American racial 
94 Harry Haywood dictation, 16 March 1970, in Harry Haywood Papers, Schomburg Center, New York 
Public Library. For a general overview of black politics in the 1920s, see Adam Lively, 'Continuity and 
Radicalism in American Black Nationalist Thought, 1914-1929' in Journal ofAmerican Studies, 18: 2 
(1984), 207-35. 
95See David Levering Lewis, WEB. Du Bois: Biography ofa Race, 1868-1919 (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1993). 
96 His famous editorial is in the Crisis, July 1918. On Du Bois and this editorial, Lewis, Biography ofa 
Race, 556-58; Mark Ellis, "'Closing Ranks" and "Seeking Honors": W. E. B. Du Bois in World War F, 
journal ofAmerican History 79: 1 (June 1992).. 
17 See the Crisis, April 1919, for the purest expression of this optimism in the United States. By May, 
Du Bois proclaimed: 'Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the Great Jehovah, we 
will save it in the United States of America, or know the reasons why. ' 
98 Reich, 'Soldiers of Democracy'; Mark Robert Schneider, 'We Return Fighting': The Civil Rights 
Movement in the Jazz Age (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2002). 
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oppression. Many supported the much more militant Universal Negro Improvement 
League (UNIA) led by Marcus Garvey. This was a contradictory movement, drawing 
upon several traditions. One of the strongest was Pan-Africanism, an appeal to the 
entire black diaspora-from Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, as well as the 
US-for black liberation. Founded in 1914 in Jamaica, the UNIA was a truly 
international movement, having branches throughout the black diaspora. In part, this 
internationalism was rooted in Garvey's own history; before founding UNIA, Garvey 
was active in almost a dozen countries on three continents, and many of his followers 
had similar experiences. According to one historian, 'their broad experience helped 
dispel racial myths and prepared them to developed original ideas and programs. ' 
Thus UNIA was more attractive to the masses of Northern blacks instead of the more 
elite NAACP. ' 00 
By August 1921, the UNIA had 859 branches. 101 While Garvey's rhetoric 
appealed to black workers, his actual programme-especially the creation of a 'Black 
Star' steamship line based on investment-suited the same professional class which 
made up the NAACP's base. As Judith Stein put it, 'Garvey attempted to enlist the 
masses behind the elite model of progress' since whatever 'Garvey's self-promotion, 
novel methods, and genuine charisma, his underlying social philosophy and goals 
were shared by the leaders of the Urban League and the NAACP. All acted upon 
(even if they did not acknowledge) the theory that an expanding capitalism provided 
blacks with opportunities for bourgeois achievement, which was to them the 
prerequisite for black liberation. ' 
102 
99 Haywood dictation, 16 March 1970, Haywood papers. 
100 Theodore G. Vincent, Black Power and the Garvey Movement (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 
1972), 91,1034. 
101 Bush, We Are Not What We Seem, 96. 
102 Judith Stein, The World ofMarcus Garvey: Race and Class in Modem Society (Baton Rouge and 
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Similarly, Garvey accepted the existence of white supremacy because he 
viewed the US as a 'white man's country', and therefore was willing to appease the 
most reactionary elements of white supremacy. In this regard, Garveyism was similar 
to Washington's perspective of accomodationism-except, while Washington 
advocated blacks to 'cast down your buckets where you are', Garvey believed that it 
was in Africa where fresh water flowed. In the South, Garvey praised Jim Crow, 
attacked social equality and even attempted to achieve d6tente with the Klan. 103 
Garvey's ideology essentially accepted 'separate but equal' and the continued 
oppression of blacks. 104 For these reasons, Haywood Hall recollected that he 
considered Garveyism 'totally at odds with world reality, but definitely dangerous' for 
blacks because it placed the locus of struggle away from the US. 
Garveyism must not be viewed simply as a conservative nationalism. While 
locating the centre of black struggle in the fight for self-determination in Africa, 
Garvey also demanded power for blacks throughout the diaspora as well. And 
certainly, rank-and-file Garveyites did not join an organisation to further 'separate but 
equal'. By politicising masses of blacks during the reactionary post-Reconstruction 
period, UNIA served as a bridge to more left-wing politics of the mid- I 900s. Several 
early black Communists had been friendly towards Garvey, and much of the early 
work of the CP in Harlem later consisted of trying to win over this base from Garvey 
to Communism. 
opposite, that 'Garveyism was a complete break with the vision of (future) social and economic 
equality advocated by the NAACP and the Urban League, ' as well as with these groups' white 
supporters. Bush continues: 'Whether or not the white supporters of the NAACP were sincere (which 
Garvey strongly denied) in their belief in the social equality of African Americans, the UNIA's 
argument was posed on an entirely different plane. For these emergent African American or Affican 
nationalists, developing a separate and powerful Black society was more important than winning the 
right to participate in white American society. ' Bush, We Are Not What We Seem, 98. 
113 Stein, World ofMarcus Garve chapter 8. Y, 
'04 Lively, 'Continuity and Radicalism in American Black Nationalist Thought', 211-12. 
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For Haywood Hall, since these alternatives were not promising, Communism 
was 'where the action was'. 105 However, he was unique since very few blacks noticed, 
much less supported, the Party. Whatever the Party's positions on racial oppression, 
its status as a persecuted, small, sect-like group populated by non-English-speaking 
white immigrants would have made it an unlikely candidate for all but the most 
determined (or foolish) black militants. And since the early Party ignored them, most 
black militants tended to ignore it as well. 
Probably only three blacks joined the early CP, and these had been Socialists. 
Otto E. Huiswoud, an immigrant from Dutch Guyana, had been on the editorial board 
of the Messenger and the Harlem branch of the SP before he was the only black 
delegate to the 1919 New York left-wing conference. He was a delegate from the CP 
to the 1922 Fourth Comintern Congress and served as the chainnan of its Negro 
Commission. Another black Caribbean, Arthur Hendriks from British Guiana, was 
also an early supporter of the left wing, although he died before the CP's founding. 
The third black member, Lovett Fort-Whiteman, also joined the party in the early 
1920s from the left wing of the SP. 106 
Another early black Communist was Claude McKay. Bom in Jamaica, McKay 
was primarily a poet who was active in both the Harlem and Greenwich Village 
bohemian literary milieux and wrote for the Masses. McKay's journey to 
Communism (and away again) illustrates the CP's inability to grapple with the Negro 
Question. Although McKay was familiar with socialism while in Harlem, it was only 
after moving to London in the early 1920s that he actively joined the Communist 
movement. Reacting against the racism of the official British Labour Pary leadership, 
McKay became a staff writer of Sylvia Pankhurst's Workers'Dreadnought, the 
`5 Haywood dictation, Haywood papers, 16 March 1970. 
'06 Draper, American Communism andSoviet Russia, 320,326; James, Banner ofEthippia, 88; Turner, 
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newspaper of one of the most left-wing organisations competing to become the 
Comintern-sanctioned British Communist Party. In London, McKay also met future 
Communist leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh. 107 
At this time McKay believed that 'socialism should step in to bridge the gulf 
that has been created between the white and coloured workers by Capitalism and its 
servant, Christianity. ' While McKay's conversion to Communism illustrates the 
power of the Comintem's programme to speak to blacks, his circuitous 'road to 
Damascus' indicates the weakness of the early American CP on the Negro Question. 
McKay's years in London fell in the middle of the post-war radicalisation, but the fact 
that his conversion occurred there reflects the existence of a Communist movement 
that explicitly opposed the dominant English social-democratic Labour movement. 
Thus, one of the most famous early American black Communists was not actually 
recruited by the Party, and consistently was at odds with the official leadership. 
108 
Blacks and the early CP: 
The African Blood Brotherhood 
Beyond these early socialists, the CP recruited its first black cadre through the 
African Blood Brotherhood (ABB). The ABB's founder-leader was Cyril Valentine 
Briggs, a Caribbean immigrant, and former editor of the influential Amsterdam News. 
As a writer for several black newspapers, he consistently expressed radical politics. 
Although prevented from explicitly opposing the war because of censorship 
restrictions, Briggs' Amsterdam News had, according to one censor, 'a peculiar talent 
for saying the most fervently patriotic things in the most irritating unpatriotic 
'Richard B. Moore and His Works', 46. Solomon, The Cry Was Unity, 11. 
107 Wayne F. Cooper, Claude McKay: A Rebel Sojourner in the Harlem Renaissance (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1990), 109. 
101 Cooper, Claude McKay, especially chapter four (quote is on page 116). Pankhurst's group was 
actually considered 'ultra-left' by Lenin for its refusal to do work within the Labour Party. See Lenin, 
, Left- Wing'Communism-An Infantile Disorder (1920), in Collected Works vol. 3 1, especially section 
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manner'. 109 He opposed the war not out of pacifism, but from a black nationalist 
hatred of Western (especially British) imperialism, and his belief that black 
Americans should be guaranteed the same 'self-determination' Wilson promised 
Europe. Finally, however, the paper's publishers, upset at his antiwar stance, fired 
him. 
Briggs' next project was a new paper, the Crusader, which first appeared in 
September 1918, and allowed Briggs to continue where he left off, mixing black 
nationalism with community news. The early Crusader had much in common with the 
Messenger; in fact, the two shared contributors for several years, and they offered a 
joint subscription! 10 The frontispiece declared: 'Onward for democracy. Upward with 
the race, ' and the paper called for 'Africa for the Africans'. Briggs continued to 
combine feigned patriotic calls for allied victory with a subtle undercurrent of antiwar 
themes. Thus an early editorial declared: 'Victory for the allies must usher in 
Democracy for the people-regardless of race, creed or color.... We therefore look for 
a free Africa, as well as a free Poland, Serbia and Belgium as one of the guaranteed 
results of the Allied victory. ' Free Africa meant 'Africa will no longer be exploited by 
a ruling caste of European overlords. ' 
III While not calling for the defeat of the 
Americans, French or British in the war-and even at times pushing Liberty Bonds 112_ 
-Briggs did not call on blacks to put aside their grievances during the war as had Du 
Bois. 
9. 
101 Quoted in Richard A. Hill, 'Racial and Radical: Cyril V. Briggs, The Crusader Magazine, and the 
African Blood Brotherhood, 1918-1922', introduction, in Robert A. Hill, ed., The Crusader: A 
Facsimile ofthe Periodical, 3 vols (New York and London: Garland Press, 1987), I: xvi. 
110 in a December 1919 editorial, the Messenger wrote that 'with a few notable exceptions we agree on 
the whole with the policy of the Crusader'while the Tbanksgiving editorial already quoted equated 
both journals as expressions of the 'New Crowd Negro'. For the joint subscription offer, along with the 
Emancipator, see the April/May 1920 issue. 
III Crusader, September 1918. 
112 Ibid., October 1918. 
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Briggs' politics can best be described as radical black nationalism or pan- 
Africanism. The Crusader was very internationalist, and not only printed articles 
about blacks in New York and the South, but also in Latin America, the Caribbean 
and Africa. Briggs saw the struggle for black liberation as part of an international 
struggle against imperialism and colonial domination. As a British subject coming 
from the black Caribbean-whose population one writer dubbed 'anglicized Afro- 
Caribbeans' and whose entire identity was integrally connected with the British 
Empire 113 -Briggs identified with the fight against British colonialism. In the period 
after the Easter Uprising, that meant Ireland's struggle against British colonialism. 
Ironically, then, the Irish struggle and not the Russian Revolution first galvanised 
these future 'Black Bolsheviks'. 
An early Crusader editorial declared: 'There is little doubt that the Irish 
principle of "when you fight, FIGHT! " is soon to be vindicated and Irish sacrifices for 
liberty crowned with great and important, if not complete, success. ' This editorial 
justified the 'strikes, riots, rebellions and other forceful means' that the Irish had 
'forced the world to take cognizance of British misrule and oppression' and forced 
Britain to realise that 'Irish people have rights which the English are bound to 
respect. ' That last phrase, of course, was a reference to the 1857 Dred Scott decision, 
in which the Supreme Court ruled that blacks had no rights that a white man was 
bound to respect. The lesson from the Irish struggle, implied the Crusader, was that 
blacks should adopt the Republicans' methods since 'There is no middle course when 
dealing with the oppressor. ' 114 
113 See Dilip Hiro, Black British, White British: A History ofRace Relations in Britain (London: 
Paladin, 199 1), chapter 2. Cf. James, Holding Aloft the Banner ofEthippia, 73-74 for the paradoxes of 
'Britishness' on black Caribbeans. 
114 Crusader, August 1919. 
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Briggs explained his position on the Irish struggle against England: 'It should 
be easily possible for Negroes to sympathize with the Irish fight against tyranny and 
oppression, and vice-versa, since both are in the same boat and both victims of the 
same Anglo-Saxon race. " 15 Another early Crusader editorial similarly attacked 
'British "law and order" in black men's countries from Cairo to the Cape and from the 
Indian Ocean eastwards to the Atlantic swell' for 'civilizing-off the face of the 
earth-millions of Black and Brown men in different pads of the world. " 16 
According to Robert Hill, Briggs was 'representative of a black Fenianism inside the 
New Negro movement' and modelled the ABB on Sinn Hin. 117 
The first issue of the Crusader ran a 'Race Catechism' which argued that 'the 
Negro Race is of all races the most favored' in creativity and courage and advocated 
what it called 'Race Patriotism'. It answered the question, 'What are one's duties to 
the RaceT 'To love one's Race above one's self and to further the common interests 
of all above the private interests of one. " 
18 Locating Harlem within the black 
diaspora, Briggs also raised the banner 'Africa for the Africans'. He sought 'to 
awaken the American Negro to the splendid strategic position of the Race in the South 
American and West Indian Republics, ' in this fight, as well as 
'carry on' here an uncompromising fight for Negro rights to the end that it 
may be known once and for all time whether the nation stands with the Negro 
for an equitable solution of the Race problem that shall be fair alike for both 
races, or with the South for the intolerable, unjust, inhuman and humiliating 
solution. 119 
115 Crusader, February 1921. See also, March 1921; Claude McKay also viewed Irish independence as 
the first step in 'the dissolution of the British Empire and the ushering in of an era of proletarian states 
[which] will give England her proper proportional place in the political affairs of the world. ' Quoted in 
Cooper, Claude McKay, 154. 
116Crusader, June 1919. 
117 Hill, 'Racial and Radical', xxxii-xxxiii; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 11. See Matthew Pratt Guterl, 
'The New Race Consciousness: Race, Nation and Empire in American Culture, 1910-1925' Journal of 
World History 10: 2 (1999) for an exploration of the relationship between black militancy and Irish 
nationalism. 
I 19 Crusader, September 1918. 
119 Crusader, September 1918. 
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Two issues after this declaration, the 'Aims of the Crusader' 'dedicated [itselfl to the 
honorable solution of the "Negro Problený', and to a renaissance of Negro power and 
culture throughout the world. ' 120 What this entailed was not exactly clear, although it 
evidently contained elements of radical pan-Africanism and black nationalism. 
Declaring as the Crusader's goal 'to achieve for Ethiopia a place among the nations', 
Briggs argued that the only two choices for blacks in America were 'complete 
equality or complete annihilation'. Short of acquiescing to oppression, blacks' only 
answer was 'the creation and existence of an independent Negro Nation'. 121 At 
various times the Crusader focused on blacks in Brazil, Central America, the 
Caribbean as well as Africa and the US. 
Similarly, Briggs asserted that blacks could find no justice in a white- 
dominated US and that the 'solution of the race problem' was 'in "government of the 
Negro, by the Negro and for the Negro".... And that government can best be attained 
and secured in our sunny motherland: Africa! 
"" 
casual reader of the November 1919 Crusader could be excused for 
overlooking the inaugural announcement of the formation of the ABB. Sandwiched 
between advertisements for a tailor and the Messenger, it read: 
Mr. Cyril V. Briggs, Editor of The Crusader announces the organization of 
The African Blood Brotherhood for African Liberation and Redemption. 
Membership by enlistment. No dues, fees or assessments. Those only need 
apply who are willing to go to the limit. 
123 
Despite this small beginning, 124 the next several issues of the Crusader contained 
correspondence by people who, unclear of the exact nature of the ABB, were 
nonetheless 'willing to go to the limit'. These included writers from Washington, DC, 
120Crusader, November 1918. 
121 Crusader, April 1919. 
122 Crusader, August 1919. 
123 Crusader, November 1919. 
124 Carl Offord, in a Federal Writers Project manuscript, claimed on the basis of a 1939 interview with 
Briggs that the ABB was founded in the fall of 1917; however, there is no evidence of this; manuscript 
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Atlanta, Chicago and Panama. While this small notice was repeated, it was four 
months before a full page advertisement announced that 'over a thousand red-blooded 
negro patriots' of both sexes had joined. The advertisement, in addition to asking 
people to join, announced that 'Ethiopia Expects That Every Negro This Day Will Do 
His Duty, ' including donating money. 125 By the end of 1920, the Crusader was 
claiming a distribution of '(on average) 33,000 copies per issue', a figure that, 
although probably exaggerated, is still impressive nonetheless. 126 
Several early ABB members had roots in the SP, including W. A. Domingo, 
Richard B. Moore and Grace P. Campbell. Moore had been a supporter of the 
Messenger and of the Harlem Socialist Party, and Campbell (one of the few women in 
the masculine movement for 'New Negro Manhood') had stood as an SP candidate for 
State Assembly in 1919 and 1920. Domingo had been editor of Garvey's Negro 
World, before being purged for his Marxist sympathies, after which he wrote for the 
Messenger and edited the Emancipator and lectured at the SP's Rand School. 127 
Briggs later wrote that the ABB began with 'less than a score' of members, all in 
Harlem, and never attained even three thousand at its peak. Nonetheless, because of 
its talented cadre and its branches in the North, the South, and the Caribbean, its 
influence extended beyond its membership. 128 
in the Theodore Draper Papers, Hoover Institution archives, Stanford University, box 3 1, folder 
'Negro-Briggs'; the original is in the Schomburg Center. 
125 Crusader, February 1920. 
126 Crusader, December 1920. In a 17 March 1958 letter to Theodore Draper, Briggs claimed some 
3 6,000 subscribers; Draper papers, box 3 1, folder marked 'Negro-Briggs'. 
1270Scar Berland, 'The Emergence of the Communist Perspective on the "Negro Question" in America, 
19 19-193 1', part one, Science and Society 63: 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 414; Draper, American 
Communism and Soviet Russia, 326; James, Banner ofEthiopia, 174-75,270-7 1; Joyce Moore Turner, 
'Richard B. Moore and His Works'; see also Linden Lewis, 'Richard B. Moore: The Making of a 
Caribbean Organic Intellectual', Journal ofBIack Studies 25: 5 (May 1995). 
128 James, Banner ofEthippia, 156. On SPers in the early leadership of the ABB, see Cyril Briggs to 
Theodore Draper, 14 April 1958 and 4 June 1958, Theodore Draper papers, box 3 1, folder 'Negro- 
Briggs'. 
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One catalyst for forming the ABB was the 1919 Red Summer. Reflecting the 
'New Negro' attitude, the ABB advocated self-defence, and even claimed credit when 
blacks resisted attack during the Tulsa Race Riot. The core of the ABBs early 
perspectives was a litany of ' "suggestions" [that] have been issued for the guidance 
of members and for the race in general' . 
129 These confirm Winston James' argument 
that the ABB during it brief existence always operated in the New Negro continuum 
between black nationalism and socialism, steadily moving towards socialism. 130 The 
6suggestions' included, among encouragement to patronise black businesses and learn 
African history, the following: 
Affiliate yourself with the liberal, radical and labor movements. Don't mind 
being called 'Bolsheviki' by the same people who call you 'nigger. ' Such 
affiliation in itself won't solve our problems, but it will help immensely. 
Another 'suggestion' was to 'Encourage the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association movement as the biggest thing so far effected in surface movements. ' But 
perhaps, the eighth 'suggestion' best summed up the early ABB's perspective: 'Adopt 
the policy of race first, without, however, ignoring the useful alliances with other 
groups. ' 
131 
Despite the mention of 'Bolsheviki', the early Crusader was more interested 
in the Socialist Party than Bolshevism, either in New York or Russia. The Crusader 
regularly carried advertisements from the Rand School, 
132 reprinted articles from the 
New York Socialist press, and endorsed Socialist candidates. When the Crusader 
endorsed the SP, it did so usually not from loyalty to the SP (although it often 
expressed sympathy) but because the New York SP did not ignore Harlem and also 
represented an alternative to the two main political parties. The Crusader's first issue 
declared that 'while this magazine is neither pro-Socialist, pro-Republican nor, least 
Crusader, June 1920. 
James, Banner ofEthiopia, 157. 
131 Crusader, June 1920. 
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of all, pro-Democratic, it is distinctly pro-Negro! The Party that gives the Negro a 
square deal is the Party that the Crusader is going to support. ' Since the SP stood three 
black candidates that year, the Crusader 'advocate[d] the support by the Race of the 
entire Socialist ticket'. 133 A year later, the Crusader was more explicit: 'Just as, by 
joining the I. W. W. in large numbers, we forced the A. F. of L. to open its doors to us, 
so by joining the Socialist Party, we can force belated justice and consideration from 
the Republicans. ' 
134 
However, a series of editorials showed that the Crusader's interest in 
Socialism was not merely to pressurise the Republicans. They emphasised 'that no 
color line is drawn in the class struggle, ' and that 'there is no power on earth that can 
keep permanently apart these two sections of the world proletariat for after all is said 
and done the interests are preeminently the interests of the Negro and vice versa. ' 135 
Increasingly, the Crusader began to write of the world in socialist terms, with the 
important addition of including racial oppression within its analysis. 
The African Blood Brotherhood and the Communist Party 
Historians dispute the relationship between the ABB and the CP. Draper 
argued that the ABB was 'organized in 1919 in complete independence of the 
Communist party'. 136 Hill, on the other hand, explicitly disagreed, stating that 'By 
keeping these two processes mutually separate, historians have failed to comprehend 
the unfolding of what was, in reality, a simultaneous and organic process of political 
radicalization, even if the phenomenon appeared to express itself as two different 
processes. ' 
137 Hill largely based this conclusion on Briggs' recollections some forty 
132 See for example, the Crusader, October 1919. 
133 Crusader, September 1918. 
134 Crusader, October 1919. 
115 Crusader, April 1919, June 1919. 
136 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 326. 
137 Hill, 'Racial and Radicalism', xxiv. 
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years later-recollections which, furthermore, he had already shown to be inaccurate 
in several ways. 138 In the end, while the scenario advocated by Hill is not impossible, 
neither is it very likely. 
The dispute is less arcane than it appears at first. The recruitment of key ABB 
cadre-which consisted of a large portion of the SP's black leadership in New York- 
illustrates the importance of the Comintern in the Party's gaining black members. 
There are several indications that Hill is wrong. The simplest is that there is no 
evidence of an organisational link between the ABB and the early CP. Indeed, most of 
Briggs' partners were around the SP, which was much more influential among black 
Harlernites than the CP. If the ABB was a secret 'front group' of the CP, why then did 
the Crusader carry advertisements for the despised SP, reprints from its various 
papers, and notices about the Rand School? Why did the Crusader endorse SP 
candidates? Furthermore, there were fewpolitical links between the Crusader and the 
CP. Instead, the ABB's founders saw themselves as part of the developing 
international movement for black liberation, not a part of the international Communist 
movement. When the early Crusader did look to white revolutionaries, it was to the 
Easter Uprising and not the Bolshevik Revolution. 139 
The most important to reasons to doubt Hill is the Communists' demonstrated 
incapacity to understand the importance of the Negro Question. To have set up the 
ABB to attract militant blacks would have been far beyond the political capabilities of 
138 In a 14 April 195 8 letter to Draper, Briggs typed that he had joined the CP 'prior to 1919 ... before the 
Palmer raids of 1919'. In both cases, '1919' was crossed out and somebody, presumably Briggs, wrote 
'2 1'. (Theodore Draper papers, box 3 1, folder marked 'Negro-Briggs') 
139 Cf. Michael C. Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political 
Ideologies (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 18 1. One recent study concludes 
that the ABB was an ideological hybrid of socialism and black nationalism, and links the black protest 
movement in the nineteenth century with black radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s. See Ronald A. 
Kuykendall, 'African Blood Brotherhood, Independent Marxists During the Harlem Renaissance', 
Western Journal ofBlack Studies 26: 1 (Spring 2002). 
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the Party-and probably too taxing on its organising abilities as well. 140 Instead, Rod 
Bush was correct when he argued that the ABB 'developed organically out of the 
New Negro or manhood rights movement'. Bush however continued that the ABB 
'developed this thought to its logical "conclusion". ' While the inverted commas are 
somewhat confusing, the transformation of the early ABB leadership into 
Communists was not 'logical' so much as one possibility that was consummated only 
because of Comintern intervention. 141 In fact, according to Briggs, only Northern 
ABB members, in Chicago and New York, joined the CP; in the South they did not. 
The West Virginia branch continued to exist for a time, independent of the Party. 142 
By mid-1921, Briggs hadjoined the Party, and increasingly made the ABB 
available to the CP to carry out propaganda amongst blacks. The minutes of the 
Central Executive Committee reveal that in August 1921, the Party established a 
'Negro Committee' consisting of Briggs, Billings (Huiswood), Kelly (Ashkenudzie) 
and Griffith (Zack), and also agreed to subsidise the Crusader. Although the CP 
finally officially absorbed the ABB in late 1923, it is incorrect to argue that the CP 
'bought' the cash-starved ABB. The reason that the ABB leadership moved close to 
the party was, ultimately, political agreement. But, it is logical to ask, if the CP in 
1923 still largely ignored blacks and the Negro Question, what common political 
ground would Briggs and the other ABB leaders share with the Party? Briggs and the 
other ABB recruits did not want to join the American CP, but saw themselves 
enlisting in the American branch of Communist International. 
143 In this regard, they 
"' Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 10. 
14 1 Bush We Are Not What We Seem, 103. To suggest otherwise is to come dangerously close to a 
leftist version of the 'Whig theory' of history, in which groups like the ABB existed only to inexorably 
form part of the Communist Party. 
142 Briggs to Draper, 17 March 195 8, Draper papers, box 3 1, folder marked 'Negro-Briggs'. 
143 James, Banner of Ethiopia, 178-8 1; Solomon, Unity, 9,10 (quote); CEC minutes, 2 August 192 1, 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 5 1. The original motion put forward at the meeting was to advance $200 to 
the Crusader; the agreed upon sum was $ 100. Griffith was voted onto the committee at the CEC 
meeting of 15 August 192 1. At that meeting, the financial report indicated that the Party had an income 
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were similar to William Z. Foster's Trade Union Educational League which joined the 
CP at the same time because of the power of the Russian Revolution. 
Later, Briggs explained that he had not been 'interested in socialism per se". 
Instead, 'My sympathies were derived from the enlightened attitude of the Russian 
Bolsheviks toward national minorities. ' 144 He wrote to Draper that 'I was at the time 
more interested ... in the national liberation revolution than the social revolution. ' 
145 
W. A. Domingo, in an early piece in the Messenger, approvingly noted that 'When 
Czardom was overthrown and Bolshevism was established the first thing done by the 
new government was to proclaim the absolute equality of all the races that occupied 
that vast territory. ' 146 In 1922, the ABB praised 'the marked policy of friendship 
Moscow has shown, under Soviet rule, toward the colored peoples of the world'. 147 
Lenin had long stressed that Russian Empire was a 'prison house of peoples' forcibly 
subjugated by the tsar. In 1915, he wrote that of 'the 170 million inhabitants of 
Russia, about 100 million are oppressed and denied their rights. ' Securing these 
rights-including language rights and even independence-figured centrally in the 
Bolshevik programme. 148 
The Third International, unlike the Second, uncompromisingly opposed 
imperialism and colonisation. The right wing of the Second International-already 
anticipating entering the government in European countries where they enjoyed 
strength-had argued for a 'socialist' colonial policy as far back as 1907.149 Amidst 
during July of $26,421 but was still $15,000 in debt. George Baldwin, 'Statement of the Communist 
Party of America to the ECCl', August 192 1, Comintern archives, 5 15: 139, also notes that 'the entire 
executive committee' of an unnamed 'Negro society of resistance to lynching and peonage' had joined 
the CP- 
144 Quoted in Vincent, Black Power, 79. 
145 Briggs to Draper, 17 March 1958, in Draper papers, box 3 1, folder marked 'Negro-Briggs'. 
146 Messenger, September 1919. 
147 Crusader/ABB press release, II December 1922, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 91. 
148 Lenin, Socialism and War (1915), in Collected Works, vol. 31,306. 
149 See the debate at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 reprinted in John Riddell, ed., Lenin's Strugglefor 
a Revolutionary International: Documents: 1907-1916, The Preparatory Years (New York: Pathfinder 
Jacob Zumoff 305 
the World War, while most of the international labour movement had fallen behind 
their 'own' national war aims, Lenin had oPposed the war, declaring: 
the Social-Democratic parties of the oppressor countries ... should recognise 
and champion the oppressed nation's right to self-determination, in the 
specifically political sense of the term, i. e., the right to political secession. The 
socialist of a ruling or a colonial nation who does not stand for that right is a 
chauvinist. 150 
After founding the Comintern in March 1919, the Bolsheviks stressed anti- 
imperialism and anti-colonialism. The Comintern's 'Manifesto' declared that 'the 
colonial question in its fullest extent has been placed on the agenda' and that 'small 
peoples can be assured of a free existence only by the proletarian revolution', which 
would end national oppression and create an international socialist economy and 
'afford even the smallest and weakest people the opportunity of conducting their 
national cultural affairs freely and independently, without detriment to the unified and 
centralized European and world economy. ' It proclaimed: 'Colonial slaves of Africa 
and Asia! The hour of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will also be the hour of your 
own liberation! 15 1 This was attractive to the ABB, whose 1921 'Program' declared: 
the important thing about Soviet Russia ... is not the merits or demerits of the 
Soviet form of government, but the outstanding fact that Soviet Russia is 
opposing the imperialist robbers who have partitioned our motherland and 
subjugated our kindred, and that Soviet Russia is feared by those imperialist 
nations and by the plunder-bunds of the earth from whose covetousness and 
murderous inhumanity we suffer in many lands. 
For this reason, the Program further explained, this 'element is led and represented by 
the Third Internationale [sic] which has its sections in all countries. We should 
immediately establish contact with the Third Internationale and its millions of 
followers in all countries of the world. ' 152 Briggs recalled his interest in Communism 
6 was sparked by its hostility to imperialism and specifically by the Soviet solution to 
Press, 1984), 1-53. 
'50 Lenin, Socialism and War, 316. 
151 [L. Trotsky], 'Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletariat of the Entire World', in 
Gruber, International Communism in the Era oftondon, 95-96. 
152 Crusader, October 192 1. 
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the national question, its recognition ... of the right of self deten-nination of nations 
formerly oppressed by Tsarist Russia. ' 153 Although the situation of blacks in America 
was not synonymous to Jews or Georgians in Russia, the changes made by the 
Bolsheviks were appealing nonetheless. A Crusader advertisement written by Briggs 
urged readers to 'STAND BY SOVIET RUSSIA and thereby stand by your own 
cause and make it possible for her to give further aid to the LIBERATION 
STRUGGLE of the darker peoples. Ask the Persians who gave them freedom! Ask 
the Afghans, ask the Egyptians, the Indians how Soviet Russia has helped them and 
let them tell you what they think of Soviet Russia. ' 154 
The ABB and UNIA 
An important of the early activity of the ABB, now linked to the CP, was to 
attempt to win Garvey supporters to Communism. In August 192 1, Briggs invited 
Garvey to 'a conference on those major questions in the work for African liberation in 
which both yourself and I, and our respective organizations[J are intensely 
interested'. The cordial tone is notable: Briggs claims '-we both of us give each other 
credit for being in deadly earnest in the work of African liberation'. Even if the ABB 
and UNIA 'are moving in different spheres' they had 'the same aims and ideals' and 
approached 'our object by somewhat different, though always parallel roads' which 
made them 'bound to help each other-and that whether we consciously co-operate or 
not'. 
155 
Yet this approach soon came to nought when, within the month, the ABB 
attempted to intervene at a UNIA 'Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World' 
Rose Pastor Stokes, a white Communist spoke, and was warmly, if somewhat 
I" Quoted in Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 9. 
154 Crusader, December 192 1. 
155 Briggs to Garvey, 15 August 192 1, in Crusader, November 192 1; also reprinted in Richard A. Hill, 
ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers (Berkeley, Los 
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patronisingly, received-perhaps because her speech did not criticise UNIA but only 
spoke against racial oppression and imperialist subjugation of Africa. Nonetheless, the 
conference tabled the motions the ABB had prepared, and Garvey and Briggs had a 
very bitter falling out. Briggs soon sued Garvey for libel (for having called Briggs 
white), and encouraged the government to look into Garvey's finances, which fed into 
a campaign eventually leading to his deportation. By 1922, the ABB programme 
called for 'solid foundations' in the fight for black liberation, not Garvey's 'titled and 
decorated tomfoolery'. ' 56 
In 1922, the government indicted Garvey for fraud, although the prosecution 
was politically motivated. 157 By 1923, Garvey had polarised the radical intelligentsia 
in Harlem. The Messenger, quickly moving to the right, led a campaign against him. 
W. A. Domingo resigned from that journal in protest, and Du Bois also opposed this 
anti-immigrant crusade. 
158 While Briggs and the other immigrant ABB leaders 
avoided such scurrilous attacks, they increased their polemics against Garvey. 
159 In 
August 1924, the Party once again focused on UNIA's convention in New York. 
There, a Communist, Olivia Whiteman, attempted to speak against UNIA's refusal to 
support social equality. The chairmen ruled her out of order. 
160 Then, when the same 
convention refused to take a hard line against the Klan, the Workers Party sent a letter 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1986), vol. 3,667-668. 
156 Stoke's speech is in Garvey's Negro World, 27 August 192 1, and reprinted in Hill, ed., Marcus 
Garvey Papers, vol. 3,675-8 1. See Naison, Communists in Harlem, 8; Arthur Zipser and Pearl Zipser, 
Fire and Grace: The Life ofRose Pastor Stokes, 227-28. See also, Stephens, 'Black Empire', 71-87. 
The quote is from 'Program of the African Blood Brotherhood', in Foner and Allen, ACBA, 23. 
157 On Garvey's legal travails, see Stein, The World ofMarcus Garvey, chapter 10. 
"" See theAmsterdam News, 28 February 1923, for coverage of a talk given by Owen on West Indian 
and American blacks as well as Domingo's negative response. See also W. A. Domingo to W. E. 13 Du 
Bois, 17 January 1923 and Du Bois' next-day reply, in W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst), microfilm edition, reel 11, file 836. On Randolph's anti-immigration views, 
see Scott, 'Immigrant Indigestion'. 
119 The ABB did, however, align themselves with the conservative publisher of the New YorkAge in 
denouncing Garvey; see Vincent, Black Power and the Garvey Movement, 192-94. 
'60 See Robert Minor's coverage in the Daily Worker, 18 August 1924; reprinted in Hill, Garvey 
papers, vol. 5,754. Of course, Minor neglected to mention that only two years earlier the Party had 
itself reftised to call for'social equality', as Claude McKay angrily pointed out in Negroes in America. 
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protesting. In receiving the letter, Garvey was polite, but argued that it was white 
workers, and not the Klan, who were responsible for must racist atrocities and that 
blacks' allegiance should be with their race, and not white workers. He predicted that 
'when the Communists shall have come into power and destroyed the democrats and 
republicans and the socialists, I think their attitude will be the same toward the black 
man' as the other parties. 'We have sympathy for the Workers Party', Garvey 
declared, 'but we belong to the Negro party, first last and all the time. ' 161 
Interestingly, in the next few years, as Garvey moved closer to imprisonment 
and deportation, his relations with the Communist movement thawed. In January 
1924, upon Lenin's death, Garvey called him 'one of the Russia's greatest men, one 
of the world's greatest characters and probably the greatest man in the world between 
1917 and the hour of 1924 when he breathed his last and took his flight from this 
world'. As with other blacks, his support was not based on Lenin's American 
followers, but Soviet achievements. 'We as Negroes, mourn for Lenin', he told a New 
York crowd, 'because Russia promised great hope not only to Negroes but to the 
weaker people of the world. ' 
162 In 1925, the CEC of the Party protested the 
prosecution of Garvey, and called upon 'all class conscious workers, both white 
workers and the Negro workers everywhere, to join together in protests and 
demonstrations against the persecution of the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association and against the imprisomnent of Marcus Garvey'. Of course, the 
statement neglected to mention Briggs' own support of persecution. 
163 
161 See Robert Minor, Daily Worker, 23 August 1924; reprinted in Hill, Garvey Papers, vol. 5.768-72. 
Interestingly, the 12 February 1924 Daily Worker carries a short piece on a speech by Cannon about the 
Klan; while correctly attacking 'anti-foreign-bom and anti-union activities of the Ku Klux Klan', there 
is no indication that Cannon even mentioned the anti-black activities of the Klan. 
162 Marcus Garvey in New York City, 27 January 1924, in Hill, ed., Garvey Papers, vol. 5,549,55 1. 
163 This statement is to be found in the Daily Worker, 23 April 1925; the Negro World, 9 May 1925; 
and in Hill, ed., Garvey Papers, vol. 6,141-43. 
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The importance of the ABB 
The handful of ABB cadre, along with Claude McKay, became the main black 
Communist leaders. ' 64 These early recruits provided the leadership that opened the 
road to black recruitment in the 1930s, even though there were at most 75 blacks 
members of the Communist Party throughout most of the 1920s. 165 This recruitment 
of even such a small layer of blacks gave expression to black concerns within the 
party. Now, there was somebody to consistently bring up the issue of racial 
oppression-and take the Party leadership to task for its neglect of the issue. 
Haywood Hall once again can serve as an example. In 1922, Hall told his brother 
Otto, who was already in the Party, that he wanted to join the CP. While Otto was 
pleased, he advised his brother to not join the Party directly but instead sign up with 
the local ABB because of 'an unpleasant situation' in the Southside CP branch. 
Recent black recruits had quit because '[t]hey resented the paternalistic attitude 
displayed toward them by some of the white comrades who' according to Otto Hall, 
'treated Blacks like children and seemed to think that the whites had all the 
answers. ' 166 
Briggs, in a 1963 letter to Haywood Hall (then known as Harry Haywood) was 
still attempting to figure out, 'aside from the factors of white chauvinism, why was 
there such a big turnover in our Negro membership larger than that of others'. 167 
Nonetheless, the former ABB cadre acted to make sure that the Party as a whole did 
not ignore the Negro Question and thus kept turnover lower. 
168 Briggs later claimed 
161 Williams, Black Response, 36. 
165 Keith P. Griffler, What Price Alliance? Black Radicals Confront White Labor, 1918-1938 (London, 
Garland Press, 1995), 44. 
'66 Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik: A utohiography ofan Afro-American Communist (Chicago: 
Liberator Press, 1978), 12 1. According to an ABB/Crusader press release, II December 1922 (in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 91), McKay was a member of the ABB, although it must be noted that he 
took a different route than did other members. 
167 Briggs to Haywood, 10 June 1963, correspondence files of Haywood papers. 
168 Although Haywood claims in his autobiography to have joined the ABB explicitly as a way of 
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that the ABB's 'main weakness' was that it was not independent enough and 
speculated that 'had the ABB been better organized, had a truly mass base, things 
would have been different' 169 Still, that the ABB cadre became an integral part of 
American Communism allowed them to force the Party leadership to address the 
Negro Question. Harry Haywood recalled a discussion with his brother about the 
problems in the Chicago Party branch. According to Otto, 'It was only a temporary 
situation. ' The disaffected black comrades could appeal all the way up to the Party's 
central leadership. But when asked by Haywood what would happen if such an appeal 
failed, Otto answered: 'Well, then there's the Communist International! It's as much 
our Party as it is theirs. ' 
170 
Comintern intervention 
For the early international Communist movement, the Comintern represented 
the highest authority. Its Congresses heatedly debated Communist theory and tactics. 
While certain parties received more attention than others, the Comintern sought to 
transform all its members into Leninist parties in their own national terrain, capable of 
leading proletarian revolutions. This attention made the early CP address the Negro 
Question. James P. Cannon, an early leader in the American Party later recalled that 
, CP policy on the Negro question got its initial impulse form Moscow, and also that 
all further elaborations of this policy-came from Moscow., 
171 
Unlike American Communists, as early as 1919, the Comintern had a greater 
appreciation of the importance black people in the struggle against capitalism. After 
describing the anti-black pogroms engulfing the US that year, the Communist 
entering the CP, in an 1970 interview with Bill Strickland, he argued 'I didn't know at that time that it 
[the ABBI was influenced by the Communist Party, which didn't matter a damn anyway. In Haywood 
papers, Haywood/Strickland file, transcript of 10 January 1970 interview, p. 20. 
169 Briggs to Haywood, 22 July 1962, in Correspondence files of Haywood papers. 
170 Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 120. 
171 Cannon, The First Ten Years ofAmerican Communism, 229. 
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International noted 'that the coloured population of the U. S. is estimated at 2,000,000 
and that two of the revolutionary watchwords: "Equality before the Law" and 
"Humane Treatment" are greatly appreciated by these oppressed millions. ' 172 
In his 'Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions', 
written on 28 July 1920 for the Second Comintern Congress, Lenin solicited 
information on a number of national and colonial experiences. 'Negroes in America' 
was between 'Turkestan, its experience' and 'Colonies'. 173 Not much happened on 
this score-although this brief mention was later to be a cornerstone of the 'black 
belt' support to black nationalism-and the American Commission of the Conference 
concerned itself with uniting the Americans' several factions. Also at the Second 
Congress, in 1920, at Lenin's urging, John Reed argued for the Party to pay attention 
to the American blacks. Huiswoud also was a delegate, and argued that the CP did not 
pay enough attention to the Negro Question. After meeting with Huiswoud, Lenin 
himself insisted that the CPs in the imperialist centres owed assistance to the peoples 
and nations oppressed by their 'own' imperialism. Lenin included American blacks in 
this category of oppressed peoples. 174 
At its Third Congress, held over the summer of 192 1, the Comintern 
established a Negro Commission to deal with the Negro Question in the US and 
elsewhere. The South African CP had proposed the commission as a way of deflecting 
criticism from its own, much more malign, neglect of the Negro Question. 175 The 
" Communist International, old series no. 5, no date [September 1919? ]. 
173 Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International, 76. 
These are also reprinted in Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31: 152ff. 
174 Griffler, What PriceAlliance? ' 42. 175Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 326-27; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 40. The SACP 
was primarily made up of European (i. e., unionised) workers who all but ignored the African majority 
of South Africa. See Luli Callinicos, Working Life, 1886-1940: Factories, Townships, and Popular 
Culture on the Rand (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 106-15,166-68; A. Lerumo, Fifty Fighting 
years: The South African Communist Party, 1921-1971 (London: Inkululeko Publications, 197 1), esp. 
chapts. 2 and 3; Edward Roux, Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Strugglefor 
Freedom in South Africa (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1948), 133,156,206. 
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problems of the CPSA illustrate the pitfalls of only emphasising class, and of a labour 
movement consisting largely of European immigrants. In pandering to the fears of 
striking white miners afraid of being replaced by lower-paid black workers, the South 
African CP urged white workers to be 'for the workers as workers, white, brown, 
yellow, black and all-and against the capitalists as capitalists-the only real black 
man'. An article in the CP's paper concluded with the grotesque statement that: 
'Communism alone can make South Africa a white man's country' 176 South Africa 
was not the US, and the American Party leadership were not nearly so bad as their 
South African comrades, but nonetheless they maintained a similar distance and lack 
of interest in American blacks as the South Africans did to South African 'natives'. 
The most substantive discussion of the Negro Question occurred at the Fourth 
Congress, held in 1922, in which Claude McKay played a pivotal role. The 
importance of the Comintern soliciting McKay's views on American race relations 
can be seen by the fact that the Amsterdam News ran a front-page article called 
'Negroes' Wrongs Aired at Moscow. ' 177 The story of how he came to attend, once 
again, illustrated the CP's neglect towards the Negro Question. After returning to 
New York from London in 1921, McKay had started writing for the Liberator, 
founded by Max Eastman-by then, very close to the Communist Party-after the 
Masses failed. When Eastman resigned to pursue his own literary career, McKay 
became co-editor along with Michael Gold, the future Communist literary 6star', 
although they did not get along very well. Primarily, the trouble centred on their 
differences over the relationship of art to politics. Gold, who had just joined the 
176 Quote from International, 27 January 1922, in Baruch Hirson and Gwyn A Williams, The Delegate 
forAfrica: Davidlvon Jones, 1883-1924 (London: Core Publications, 1995), 228-29; 235; CC also 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, 156. Thus, the early CPSA, while not translating its propaganda into 
African languages, did do so into Yiddish: see Israel and Simon Adams, ' "That Spells Trouble": Jews 
and the Communist Party of South Africa. 
177 Amsterdam News, 6 December 1922. The article, reprinted from the Crusader Service, also 
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Communist Party, argued for a 'proletarian art' which was a weapon in the class 
struggle. McKay on the other hand 'preferred to think that there were bad and 
mediocre, and good and great, literature and art, and that the class labels were 
incidental' . 
17813ut beyond this soon to be classic left-wing aesthetic debate lay 
McKay's belief that the Liberator's editorial staff-composed largely of 
Communists-did not assign the proper significance to the Negro Question. 179 
Upon leaving the Liberator in 1922, McKay decided to attend the upcoming 
Fourth Comintern Congress in Moscow. He received no help from the American CP, 
and after finally making his way to Moscow, received a cold shoulder from the 
American delegation. He had taken the 'wrong' position-later endorsed by Lenin 
and Trotsky themselves-that the CP should emerge from the underground. In any 
case, the CP already had a black representative, Huiswoud. 180 Refused a franchise by 
the official American delegation, McKay was seated by the Comintern as a special 
fraternal delegate after the intervention of Japanese Communist Sen Katayama. 181 
Besides becoming quite popular among ordinary Russians, most of whom had 
never met a black person, McKay participated in the Negro Commission along with 
mentioned Huiswood as speaking, but not by name. 
178 McKay, A Long Way From Home, 139; Cooper, Claude McKay, 160-64. 
179 Cooper, Claude McKay, 162. In 1929, after McKay had already renounced Communism, Gold, 
according to Foley, 'asserted that McKay's Banjo, while praiseworthy for its gritty depiction of 
Marseilles street life and its repudiation of the culture of the "educated fringe", evinced too much 
"racial patriotism" and dwelt too little on proletarian themes': Barbara Foley, Radical Representations: 
politics and Form in U. S. Proletarian Fiction, 1929-1941 (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1992), 187. On McKay's tenure at the Liberator, see Antoinette Galotola, 'From Bohemianism 
to Radicalism: The Art and Political Context of the Liberator, 1918-1924' (PhD thesis, City University 
of New York Graduate Center, 2000), 15,44. Cartoonist Robert Minor, who was a CP expert on the 
'Negro Question' was also an editor at the Liberator. 
'80 Tellingly, McKay never mentions Huiswoud by name in his autobiography, instead despairingly 
calling Huiswoud (whose name McKay would not have forgotten) as 'the mulatto' since the his skin 
was lighter than McKay's. 
"' See, in addition to McKay's own memoir, the Crusader/ABB press release of II December 1922, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 9 1. Cf. Solomon, Cry was Unity, 4 1. Katayama had attended university in 
the American South, and had developed a sensitivity to racial oppression; cf Kublin, Asian 
Revolutionary, 56. 
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comrades 'Billings' (Huiswood) and 'Sasha' (Rose Pastor Stokes). ' 82 Huiswood 
articulated the Party's position, that 'Although the Negro Problem as such is 
fundamentally an economic problem, it is aggravated and intensified by the friction 
which exists between the black and the white races. ' He criticised the exclusionist 
AFL and noted the 'rebel rank and file element' of UNIA, but retained the traditional 
colour blind approach. ' 83 
In contrast, McKay, asserted that 'the negro race in the economic life of the 
world to-day occupies a very peculiar position. ' Race relations in the US were very 
ugly-worse, even, then that of Jews in tsarist Russia-but the left had not done 
anything to address this: 
The Socialists and Communists have fought very shy. of it because there is a 
great element of prejudice among the Socialists and Communists of America. 
They are not willing to face the negro question. 184 
McKay put forward an 'internationalist' approach to black liberation, placing it within 
the context of the international struggle against imperialist domination. While this 
approach had the benefit of emphasising the international significance of the black 
struggle, it confounded the struggles of blacks in Africa, North American, the 
Caribbean and Latin America. While these struggles resonated with each other, they 
were quite different. 
185 
At this time, Trotsky commissioned McKay to study the Negro Question, after 
he received a letter from McKay asking how Communists should agitate against 
France's use of black colonial troops in its occupation of Germany. While Trotsky 
182 See 'The Communist International and the Negro', the Worker, 10 March 1923, in Foner and Allen, 
ACBA, 30-32; McKay, A Long Wayfrom Home, 160-61; Zipser and Zipser, Fire and Grace, 237. 
Pastor Stokes had been an important liaison between the ABB and the CP in the early 1920s. 
10 Fourth Congress ofthe Communist International (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 
[1923? 1), session 22. 
184 Ibid. 
I" Griffler, What Price Alliance, 33-34. On McKay's literary writings' attempt to 'internationalize the 
American race question', see Madhuri Deshmukh, 'Modernism and the Black Diaspora: The 
international Contours of the Harlem Renaissance' (PhD thesis, Loyola University Chicago, 1999), 
chapter 2. 
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believed that 'The Negroes themselves must offer resistance to being so employed, ' 
he assigned to the 'working class of Europe, and particularly of France and Gennany' 
the task of 'enlightening the colored peoples'. In terms that could have been written 
about the American Party, Trotsky noted that: 
The day of general resolutions on the right of self-determination of the 
colonial peoples, on the equality of all human beings regardless of color, is 
over. The time has come for direct and practical action.... A Communist Party 
confining itself to mere platonic resolutions in this matter, without exerting its 
utmost energies towards winning the largest possible number of enlightened 
Negroes for its ideas, within the shortest possible time, would not be worthy of 
the name of Communist Party. 186 
Unfortunately, the original English version of McKay's study, The Negroes in 
America, no longer exists. But even after being retranslated from the Russian, 
McKay's eloquence-and his anger at his white comrades' neglect of the Negro 
question-is clear. 
187 He argued that 'the whole white American nation', which 
pointedly included white workers, 'is, in a strange way, possessed by a Negro 
neurosis'. 188 McKay pointed out to Trotsky the importance of the Negro question- 
an importance that white Communists could not highlight since they understood it so 
little themselves: 
Labor, tragically, is divided itself. It conducts a shameful, half-hearted 
struggle against capitalism, since it does not extend a fraternal hand to the 
black working class, historically the most exploited class in American life. 
Capitalism knows this perfectly well and successful exploits it in the struggle 
against organized labor. 189 
The pamphlet is a skilfully written history of blacks in America, and their 
contributions to labour, politics, sport and art. Throughout, McKay did not pull any 
punches in his polemics against the Communist Party leadership. Quoting a New York 
Times article that claimed that, at the Workers Party's second convention, 'Efforts by 
186 Trotsky to Claude McKay, 13 March 1923, in Trotsky, The First Five Years ofthe Communist 
International, 354. 
"' Claude McKay, The Negroes in America, Alan McLeod, ed., and Robert J. Winter, tr. (Port 
Washington, NY and London: Kennikat Press, 1979). The Russian edition was originally published in 
1924 by the State Publishing House in Moscow. 
"' Ibid., 82. 
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some delegates to make a fight for the social equality of the negro were 
overwhelmingly defeated', McKay wrote: 'If that report is accurate, then it only 
indicates once more the inability on the part of vast majority of American 
revolutionaries to fully understand the Negro question. 
"90 Again and again, McKay 
explained to the Bolshevik leadership that 'With the birth of American democracy in 
1776, the Negro question became the main question' in the US. The Party would 
never recruit blacks if it continues to ignore them, since, as 'every Negro worker 
knows ... whatever the party, when 
it refuses to take a stand on social equality, to that 
extent it also refuses to approach the Negro qucstion. "91 More damning than any of 
McKay's polemics against the Party, however, was that Trotsky, and not the 
American Party had commissioned this study, and that the Party never translated, 
distributed or published it. 
If nothing else, the Negro Commission at the Fourth Congress made clear that 
the Negro Question was of decisive importance for the American CP. But more than 
that, 'The Negro problem has become a vital question of the world revolution. ' The 
resolution passed at the Fourth Congress declared that 'The history of the Negroes in 
America qualifies them to play an important part in the liberation struggle for the 
entire African race. ' Finally, the Comintern had spoken: 
The fourth congress recognizes the necessity of supporting every form of 
the Negro movement which undermines or weakens capitalism, or 
hampers its further penetration. 
"' Ibid., 23. 
190 New York Times, 26 December 1922; McKay, Negroes in America, 37. The 'Program of the Second 
Convention of the Workers Party', published before the convention, declared that 'The Workers Party 
will help them [blacks] in their fight for economic, political and educational equality' (Worker, 2 
December 1922, in ACBA, 28). The previous WP programme, in 192 1, however declared 'The Workers 
party will support the negroes in their struggle for liberation, and will help them in their fight for 
economic, political and social equality', in Socialist Party Papers, Duke University, series IV, part J, 
section 5. In 1924, a Communist denounced UNIA for refusing to support social equality: "'Social 
Equality"? Well, what is social inequality? That means Jim Crow! % in Daily Worker, 19 August 1924, 
reprinted in Hill, Garvey Papers, vol. 5,754. 
191 McKay, Negroes in America, 3 8,4 1. 
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2. The Communist International will fight for the equality of the white and 
black races, for equal wages and equal political and social rights. 
In addition, the resolution called for blacks to unionise (and for unions to accept 
blacks) and for 'a world Negro congress or conference'. 192 
After the Congress, the French Communists, whom the Comintern also 
criticised for lackadaisical work amongst colonial and immigrant workers, began to 
attack French imperialism more systematically, and began publishing a newspaper 
aimed at the colonies and immigrants. 193 But the American Party was not so 
responsive: in March 1923, its representative to the ECCI, Israel Arnter, reported little 
headway amongst blacks. The 'small number of Negro comrades in the Party', he 
complained, 'make this work difficult. ' 194 In his next report, Amter declared that the 
'Workers Party has started work among the Irish and Negroes', without providing 
details or recognising that Irish immigrants were different than blacks. He also spelt 
out that 'the Party does not agree with the thesis adopted by the Fourth Congress on 
the Negro Problem. ' At the same time, three leading Communists wrote to the ECCI 
that the 'resolution of the Fourth Congress does not give a satisfactory solution of this 
problem, especially from the trade union standpoint. ' Max Bedacht, in his report to 
the leadership of the Party, complained that the resolution 'gives no analysis, contains 
only general phrases and ends with the proposal for a world negro congress. ' 195 
The leadership also seems to have opposed this congress. Shortly after the 
Fourth Congress, the ECCI sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CP which 
indicated that the Comintern Presidium believed that 'the question yet is too 
192 Tbeses of the Fourth Comintern Congress on the Negro Question', 30 November 1922, in Degras, 
ed., Communist International, vol. 1,399-40 1. 
191 CL Ian Birchall, ' "Le Paria": The French Communist Party, Migrant Workers and Anti- 
Imperialism, 1920-24', unpublished paper presented to 'Workers Unity in a World Economy' 
conference, University of London, 12 May 2001. 
194 Report by I-Amter to Comintern, 7 March 1923, Comintern archives, 5 15: 1: 174. 
19'1. Amter, 'Report on the United States to 20 March 1923', in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 174; Pogany, 
Ruthenberg and Jakira to ECCI, 9 March 1923, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 20 1; Max Bedacht report to 
Executive Committee of WP, 30 November 1923,515: 1: 20 1. 
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unprepared' for the scheduled conference and it would be discussed at a meeting 
about the British CP, to be held in Moscow that April. However, the ECCI made the 
American CP responsible to 'take care of the propaganda' and to 'prepare the ground' 
for a Negro congress. Later, the CP leadership passed a motion requesting the 
congress be held in London, as if to wash their hands of it. They later passed another 
motion, asking the Comintem to postpone the conference altogether until the Fifth 
Congress; by his August 1923 report on the Fourth Congress, Amter blithely 
mentioned that the conference would take place at the Fifth Congress, without 
mentioning the dispute. 
196 At the same time, Tom Bell of the British Party continued 
to pass the buck, this time suggesting that the conference be held in Paris., 
97 Finally, 
the International Conference of Negro Workers was held in Hamburg, in June 1930, 
prior to the Fifth Congress of the RILU. 
198 
While the evidence is scattered, it also appears as if leading members of the 
Party, especially followers of Ruthenberg and Pepper, resented the ABB. Thus, at one 
point, Ruthenberg accused the ABB of supporting emigration from the South, touting 
blacks' scabbing against white strikers, and advocating 'race hatred of whites'. 199 A 
month later, Briggs wrote to the leadership complaining of rumours of his being a spy; 
the Political and Organization Committee took no action, it claimed, because it did not 
have enough information. 200 In December 1923, after hearing from Gitlow, the 
19' O. W. Kuusinen to WPA CC, 23 February 1923, in Comintern archives 515: 1: 164; Minutes of 
Political and Organization Committee, 14 August 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 197; Minutes of 
organization Committee, 29 March 1923, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 204; I. Amter, 'The Communist 
International: The Emancipator of the Whole People', I August 1923 press release, in Comintern 
archives 515: 1: 212. 
'97 Tom Bell to Israel Amter, in Comintern archives 495: 155: 27, cited in Marika Sherwood, 'The 
Comintern, The CPGB, Colonies and Black Britons, 1920-1938', Science & Society 60: 2(Summer 
1996), 140. 
198 Susan Campbell, "'Black Bolshevike' and Recognition of African-America's Right to Self- 
Determination by the Communist Party USA', Science & Society 58A(Winter 1994-95), 456. Cf. James 
I- Hooker, Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Pathfrom Communism to Pan-Africanism 
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 17-1 S. 
I" Minutes of Political and Organization Committee, 24 July 1923, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 197. 
200 Ibid., 23 August 1923. 
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Executive Council passed a motion that 'we will not in the future carry on any work 
among the Negroes thru Briggs and Huiswood'. In March, Huiswood was deemed 
competent enough to be put in charge of a 6-week-long course to train black 
propagandists, but the Organization Committee deemed it extravagant to allocate a 
part-time stenographer for Briggs. 201 In April, Huiswood was obviously disturbed 
enough to write a document, distributed via the Workers Party press service, called 
'The Negro Problem is Important'. 202 Haywood, who joined the CP in 1925, recalled 
in his autobiography that at that time there were no black members of the Central 
Committee (Minor was in charge of work amongst blacks), and that when Lovett 
Fort-Whiteman was selected to replace Minor, 'his selection was the cause for some 
disgruntlement among the Black comrades' such as Briggs, Moore and Huiswood. 203 
Even without a Negro congress, the period between the Fourth and the Fifth 
Comintern Congresses saw increased CP activity amongst blacks. To begin with, the 
Second National Conference of the Workers Party, held at the end of 1922, passed a 
motion that recognised the special quality of black oppression: 'The Negro workers of 
this country are exploited and oppressed more ruthlessly than any other group. 204 A 
year later, the Third National Conference reiterated that blacks were 'an oppressed 
race, and as such they require and demand special attention'. 
205 A CP pamphlet 
stressed that the Party fought for full social equality for blacks while noting that the 
201 Minutes of Executive Council, 14 December 1923, in Comintern archives, 515: 1: 190; Organization 
Committee minutes, 29 March 1923, Comintern archives, 515: 1: 204. 
202 Huiswood, 'Negro Problem is Important', 30 April 1923 press release, Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 211. 
203 Harty Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 139. 
204 Program passed at Second National Convention of Workers Party, 24-26 December 1922, 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 141. 
205 Resolution on Negro Question, passed at Third National Convention of Workers Party of America, 
30-31 December 1923 and I January 1924, Comintern archives 515: 1: 188. The final form of this 
resolution is also in The Program and Constitution of the Workers Party ofAmerica (Chicago: 
Literature Department of the Workers Party of America, 1924), 9. 
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Negro question was more than an economic question. 206 By the Fourth National 
Convention, the CEC had organised a commission to supervise work among blacks. 207 
All this would have remained a dead letter, except that they marked one of the 
few attempts by the early CP to actively intervene in the fight for black rights, the All- 
Race, or Sanhedrin conference. In 1922, William Monroe Trotter, editor of the Boston 
Guardian and a co-founder of the Niagara movement in 1905, advocated a council of 
black leaders. A supporter of the conference, writing in the Amsterdam News, recalled 
similar meetings held by European Jews and by Indians under the British, and noted 
that 'the Negro needs most of all the stimulation of a race conscientiousness and the 
formulation of a race ideal' in order to 'furnish inspiration to every' black. 208 
In April 1923, the Workers Party supported such a conference because 'An all- 
race conference will stimulate the confidence and powers of the Negro people and 
with that stimulation will come the greater awakening of class consciousness. 209 
Accordingly, the CP sought to take part in this conference, which finally took place in 
Chicago, on II- 15 February 1924. The leadership of the conference was firmly 
dominated by middle-class organisations, ranging from churches to professional, 
fraternal and social organisations, but the CP still presented a number of resolutions 
against segregation, miscegenation laws, and 'real estate sharks'. 210 In general, the CP 
advocated a labour-centred perspective, which the conference's largely middle-class 
leadership did not appreciate. 211 In the end, the Party was edged out of the movement, 
206 C. E. Ruthenberg, The Workers (Communist) Party: What it Standsfor, Why Workers ShouldJoin 
(Chicago: Workers Party, [1923? ]), 13. 
207 The Fourth National Convention ofthe Workers (Communist) Party ofAmerica (Chicago: Daily 
Worker Publishing Co., 1925), 17-18. 
208 Amsterdam News, 31 January 1923. 
209 Jeanette D. Pearl, 'Negro Organizations Present United Front', Wl? press release, 27 April 1923, in 
Comintern archives, 515: 1: 2 10. 
2 '0 For a list of participating organisations, see the 13 February 1924 Daily Worker, reprinted in ACBA, 
56. The WP published a mimeographed pamphlet containing the resolutions its delegates raised. See 
Minor papers, Box 13, folder 'Negro Sanhedrin, 1924'. 
21 1 The Daily Worker carried daily reports on the conference, which described the Party's intervention 
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but only after it made clear to the conference that they thought that Communism 
offered the only solution to the Negro Question. But it is significant that even this 
modest debut was possible only because of the Party's handful of black cadre. 212 
The Fifth Congress, held in the summer of 1924, discussed the Negro 
Question as part of the 'National and Colonial Question. The American Party had 
three representatives: the untiring Pepper, who was the Comintem representative to 
the CP; 'Jackson' (probably Fort-Whiteman, then a student in Moscow); and Amter. 
Pepper, speaking about the 'National and Colonial Question' in general, agreed with 
the main reporter who had 'emphasis[ed] the revolutionary significance of the self- 
determination slogan' but stressed that in the US, where blacks intermingled with 
many other ethnic groups, 'the other slogan which we need is the slogan of complete 
equality between nations and even [! ] races. 213 The only other notable intervention 
was by Jackson, who stressed, 'The negroes are not discriminated against as a class 
but as a race.... The same newspapers do not satisfy the needs of the negro worker 
which suit the needs of the white. The same speeches, propaganda, literature will not 
suffice. ' Ile argued that 'The ideas of Marx have spread only slowly among the 
negroes, because the Socialists and even the Communists have not realised that the 
problem must be dealt with in a specialised way. ' This explicitly contradicted the 
standard Debsian 'colour-blind' approach. Jackson criticised the CP for not carrying 
out the necessary work to win blacks to the Party: 'The Negroes are destined to be the 
most revolutionary class in America. But Communist propaganda among the Negroes 
is hampered by the lack of publicity carrying a special appeal. 1,214 
and their hostile reception by the conference organisers; see ibid., 53-65. 
212 Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 29-33. 
213 Foner and Allen, ACBA, 69. 
214 Fifth Congress ofthe Communist International (Abridged) (London: Communist Party of Great 
Britain, [ 1924? 1), 200-20 1. Cf. 1. Amter, 'The Black Victims of Imperialism', Communist International 
nos. 26/27 [1924? ]: 'The Communist International is the only international of workers that has squarely 
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In November 1924, Jackson published an article in the ECCI's monthly 
joumal, the Communist International, which criticised the CP in the same vein. He 
noted that the achievements of the Party amongst blacks 'are but slight, because 'the 
Communists have not recognized and accepted as a starting basis the peculiar social 
disabilities imposed upon the race. ' Jackson ended with a warning: 'the Communist 
Movement cannot afford to overlook the Negro in America. ' The editors added a note, 
calling Jackson's article 'a testimony that our American comrades of the ruling race 
have not yet been able to approach the Negro question in a right and proper manner' 
in their work among either blacks or whites. In light of the later Comintern-inspired 
line-change, it is worth noting that while the editorial explicitly supported self- 
determination for the black masses in Africa, it said nothing about self-determination 
for American blacks. 215 
The one concrete step that the CP took towards rectifying its neglect of the 
Negro Question was its convocation of the American Negro Labor Conference 
(ANLC). Assimilating the remnants of the ABB, the ANLC aimed 'to bring together 
the most potent elements of the Negro race for deliberation and action upon those 
most irritating and oppressive social problems affecting the life of the race in general 
and the Negro working class in particular'. Its 'Call', written in the spring of 1925, 
was signed by 17 people including at least six Party members. 216 The ANLC sought to 
attract important black leaders such as Du Bois to the conference which opened on 25 
October 1925 with forty delegates. Although he was guardedly positive towards the 
CP, Du Bois did not attend the conference, which was severely criticised by William 
faced the issue of the coloured races and sought a solution. The Second International has always evaded 
the question since it has been an international of the white workers alone and has not succeeded even in 
uniting them in international action. ' 
215 Foner and Allen, ACBA, 86-89 
216 Ibid., 109; Solomon, The Cry Was Unily, 50. 
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Green as a Communist plot. 217 Despite the cheering in the Daily Worker for the 
ANLC's convention, the Communist leadership itself was less sanguine. A circular 
designed for CP spokesmen reminded them that this meeting 'did not have a wide 
mass representation' and 'had for us significance only as a good beginning'. 218 
Despite Party and TUEL efforts, 219 the ANLC never fulfilled the hopes its 
founders invested in it. It issued a paper, Negro Champion, but never sold more than 
400 subscriptions at one time. Until 1927, Lovett Fort-Whiteman headed the ANLC. 
That year, amid disappointment among the CP's central leadership, he was replaced 
by Richard B. Moore because of his supposed 'leftist sectarian policies and 
incompetent direction' in leading the ANLC. According to the minutes of the Political 
Committee, the ANLC had been guilty of a 'failure to initiate and develop concrete 
struggles of negro masses on the basis of immediate political issues' such as lynching, 
segregation or the plight of Southern farmers. The crux of the 'left-sectarian' errors of 
the ANLC appeared to be that it 'was operating on too narrow a basis' and failing 'to 
draw in non-party left-wingers and progressives'. Alexander Bittelman, the secretary 
of the CECs 'subcommittee on Negro work', in explaining why Fort-Whiteman was 
being replaced, described the state of the ANLC as 'very bad': 
Its organization is vague and indefinite. Its membership is negligible. There 
are barely more than about half a dozen local branches functioning and the 
membership is difficult to define, being not more than about 300. 
And even though Bittelman deemed Fort-Whiteman unsatisfactory, he recommended 
that a 'Negro comrade be placed on incoming CEC' and that more black Communists 
be sent for training in Moscow. (After serving as a delegate at the Sixth Comintem 
217 Foner and Allen, ACBA, 116. On DuBois, see Lovett Fort-Whiteman to W. E. BurghardtDu Bois, 
25 September 1925, and Du Bois' reply, 8 October 1925, in the Du Bois Papers, reel 14, files 1237-38. 
CE David Levering Lewis, 1Y. E. B. Du Bois: The fightfor Equality andtheAmerican Century, 1919- 
1963 (New York: Ilenry [Jolt and Company, 2000), 196. 
219 'Outline for Party Speakers on Subject: The American Negro Labor Congress and Its Background', 
no date and no author, in Robert Minor papers, box 12, folder 'Negro, 1924-25'. 
219 On these attempts to gain support from trade unions, especially black trade unions such as the 
Chicago Negro Painters, see the minutes of the TUEL National Committee, 20 May 1925, in the 
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Congress, Fort-Whiteman stayed in Moscow and died in the late 1930s, most likely in 
the Stalinist purges. ) 220 
In the late 1920s, the ANLC focused on struggling against attacks on blacks. 
In 1928, for example, it organised the Harlem Tenants League which militantly fought 
against poor housing conditions and high rents; and which had some 500 members by 
June 1929.221 It is notable that the core cadre of the ANLC were the Communists who 
had been recruited from the ABB earlier in the decade. However, the ANLC did 
recruit two future leading black Communists. These were James Ford, future 
spokesman for the Party during the late 1930s 'Popular Front', and George Padmore, 
who became known as first a Comintern leader in the anti-colonial struggle and later, 
an anti-Communist Pan-Africanist. 222 The ANLC's letterhead featured a strong black 
worker breaking the chains binding Africa and the US, and, in fact, the organisation 
sought 'to aid the general liberation of the darker races and the working people 
throughout all countries' and participated in the international struggle against 
imperialism, especially, in the Caribbean. 223 
At the Sixth Congress, James Ford denounced the ANLC as a 'pitiful parody' 
of a mass working-class organisation. 224 In March 1929, there were only five active 
collection of the PRL. 
220 'Directions to the Party Fraction in the National Executive Committee of the American Negro Labor 
Congress', attached to PolCom minutes, 26 May 1927; Alexander Bittelman, 'Report and 
Recommendations on the Conference of the Party Fraction in the General Executive Board of the 
American Negro Labor Congress', attached to PolCorn minutes, 26 May 1927, Comintern archives, 
515: 1: 98 1; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 57-59. Klehr, flaynes and Anderson, The Soviet Worldof 
American Communism, 218-27, argue that Fort-Whiteman was sent to a Stalinist gulag in the mid- 
1930s for his alleged Trotskyist sympathies, where he died in 1939. They cite 'Minutes of the Sub- 
Committee CPUSA Meeting on Organisational Question', 25 August 1935, Comintern archives 
495: 14: 1 and a copy of his death certificate. 
221 See Naison, Communists in Harlem, 19-23. 
222 See Solomon, Cry was Unity, 177-83, for the career of Padmore in and out of the Communist 
movement. Cf. I looker, Black Revolutionary. 
223 See Joyce Turner Moore, 'Richard B. Moore and I-I is Works', in Richard B. Moore: Caribbean 
Militant in Harlem, 54-55; Christine Lutz, 'The Ilorn of Africa and the American Left', paper 
presented at the Southeastern Regional Seminar in African Studies Conference, March 2002, Georgia 
State University (www. ecu. edu/african/sersas/papers/lutzchrisspring2002. htm). 
224 Statement by Comrade Ford at the Negro Commission, 3 August 1928, in Jay Lovestone papers, 
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ANLC chapters with at most 180 members. In the aftermath of the Sixth Congress, it 
was disbanded and the CP replaced it with the League of Struggle for Negro Rights 
(LSNR). Thus, entering the Sixth Congress in the sunu-ner of 1928, the CP's record on 
work among blacks was less than sterling. At the same time, it had recruited a core of 
black leaders and had at least dipped its big toe into the struggle against black 
oppression. 225 The Bolsheviks were also becoming popular amongst black 
intellectuals. In 1926, Du Bois travelled to the Soviet Union and, while admitting that 
he might be 'partially deceived and half informed' declared that 'if what I have seen 
with my eyes and heard with my years is Bolshevism, I am a Bolshevik. ' Shortly after 
Du Bois visited Russia, NAACP field organiser William Pickens also travelled there 
and, if more guarded than Du Bois, was impressed. Yet both men remained aloof from 
the CP (although Du Bois would join the Communist Party in the 1960s), 
demonstrating, as did Debs earlier, that it was possible to sympathise with the 
Bolsheviks while steering clear of their American comrades. 226 
The Sixth Congress, held in 1928, was the penultimate Comintern, Congress 
and was one of the more important Congresses for the American Party. In its 
aftermath, the Stalinist leadership of the Party was consolidated over the destruction 
of the previous factions. The Sixth Congress also qualitatively changed its line on the 
Negro question for the first time since the Party's inception. Like much else, the 
discussion on the Negro Question was subsumed by the factional battles. Black 
Communists tended to support Lovestone, but this was not absolute. In their 
document submitted to the ECCI at the Sixth Congress, 'The Right Danger in the 
American Party', Foster and Cannon argued that 'The Lovestone majority has 
Hoover Institution archives, Stanford University, box 224 folder 29. 
225Moore, 'Moore and II is Works', 66. 
226 Lewis, The Fightfor Equality, 194-203; Schneider, 'We Return Fighting, 387-88. CE the front- 
page article in the 20 January 1927 Daily Worker about Du Bois' favourable impressions in Russia. 
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systematically and continuously neglected work among the Negro masses. ' It claimed, 
'For two and a half years the Negro work of our Party has been bankrupt. 227 
However, Foster's emphasis on working almost exclusively within AFL unions, many 
of which discriminated against blacks, alienated many black cadre. 
In preparation for the Congress, Communist Parties produced reports that 
summarised their work. 228 The section detailing 'Negro work in America' contained 
the self-criticism that 'T'he Party has made a number of attempts to develop this work, 
but has not always met with any significant success. ' Looking for successful 'Negro 
work', the report rather absurdly lauded the 'Save the Union' campaign among the 
United Mine Workers, while a weakness was the fact the party had 'shown little 
initiative' in the Brotherhood of Pullman Portcrs, and had garnered little support in 
the South. The section ended with the critical yet optimistic assessment: 
The Party has established a national Negro department and has also 
committees for work among Negroes in all districts. Work among Negroes 
remains one of the most important tasks of the Party. The experience of the 
past shows that new ways and new methods must be found to approach the 
Negro masses and to carry on among them a more campaign than hitherto. 229 
What is most striking, however, is the lack of any programmatic, i. e., ideological 
analysis, of the importance of 'Negro work', or any real reasons for the previous 
failings in this fields. The report read in many ways like criticism/self-criticism, 
without any rcal undcrstanding. Also striking was that it did not mcntion the ANLC. 
Self-determination for the Negro nation 
At the Sixth Congress, the CP bowed to Comintern, pressure and accepted the 
policy that blacks in the American South formed a nation and therefore had the right 
227 'The Right Danger in the American Party', by James P. Cannon, William Z. Foster, William F. 
Dunne, Alex Bittelman, J. W. Johnstone, Manuel Gomez and George Siskin. The document was 
serialised in the Militant, 15 November, I December 1928,1 January 1929 and 15 January 1929. The 
section on the Negro Question appears in the I January 1929 issue. 
228 The Communist International Between the Fifth and Sixth World Congress, 1924-1928 (London: 
Communist Party of Great Britain, 1928). 
229 Ibid., 348. On the 'Save the Union' campaign see Johanningsmeir, Forging American Communism, 
23642. 
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to self-determination, just as Ireland or India had from British imperialism. The story 
of how the Party adopted this new line has been told by several historians. 230 
Therefore what follows is less a 'blow-by-blow' description of this process, than an 
attempt to analyse and place this change in political context. 
It is notable how unexpected the change was. In an issue of the Communist 
International prior to the Congress, an article on 'The Comintern programme and the 
race problem' criticised the Fourth Congress' resolution on the Negro question, noting 
that 'it is clear that it is impermissible simply to identify racial oppression and 
exploitation with national-colonial oppression, that it is impennissible to deal with the 
racial [sic] under a clause on the national question. ' Later, the author, A. Shiek, 
affirmed Reed's statement against separatism at the Second Congress and argued that 
the Comintem 
should put forward demands on behalf the oppressed American negroes not as 
a nation but as a race ... and they should demand not the right to national self- determination (self-determination has no practical meaning here! ) but 
complete political and social activity. 231 
Yet this is exactly what the Comintern did not do. The resolution adopted at the Sixth 
Congress insisted that the CP fight for self-detennination for Southern blacks. Or, as 
the Comintern resolution put it: 'The various forms of oppression of the Negro 
masses, who are concentrated mainly in the so-called "Black Belt", provide the 
necessary conditions for a national revolutionary movement among the Negroes. 232 
This idea did not come from the Party itself, but from the Comintern. 
According to Browder, the CP 'could not have arrived at our program only upon the 
230 See, for example, Draper, American Communism andSoviet Russia, chapter 15; Harvey Klehr and 
William Tliompson, 'Self-Detennination in the Black Belt: Origins of a Communist Policy', Labor History 
30 (Fall 1989), 354-366; Oscar Berland, 'The Emergence of the Communist Perspective on the "Negro 
Question" in America: 1919-193 V, part two, Science & Society 64: 2(Summer 2000); Hill, 'Tbe 
Communist Party-Enemy of Negro Equality', 365. Solomon, The Cry was Unity, chapter 5, presents a 
more accurate description, based in part on Comintern archives. 
231 Communist International, IS August 1928. On this article and its author, the Hungarian Communist 
Andre Shick, see Berland, 'Tbe Emergence of the Communist Perspective', part two, 198. 
232 Resolution of the ECCI on the Negro Question, 26 October 1928, in Degras, ed., The Communist 
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basis of our American experience'. 233 Briggs told Draper that while the ABB had at 
one point advocated self determination for American blacks, nobody had raised such a 
proposition within the Party, in part out of fear of not being taken seriously. 234 
The immediate inspiration for this change in line was one N 'Charlie' 
Nasanov, a Comintern official who had previously been a representative of the Young 
Communist International in the US. 235 In Moscow, Nasanov floated the idea of 'self- 
determination' and eventually won Harry Haywood, then a student at the Lenin 
School, to it. Haywood would become the firmest advocate of the theory. 236 In June 
1928, Haywood argued that 'the Negro movement, which is nationalistic in character 
and based upon the peasantry, is a vital factor for the American [Communist] 
revolution and that this movement must be supported, utilised and directed by the 
American Communist Party particularly since potentially revolutionary it is yet easily 
liable to be directed into reactionary channels. 237 Interestingly, however, Haywood 
did not claim that blacks were a nation since 'they do not comply fully in the 
requisites set forth in the above [Stalin] definition, nevertheless there are present 
among them many features in common with a nation. ' Indeed, Haywood spent several 
pages proving that 'the Negroes in the United States are not a national but a racial 
minority which through historical development in the peculiar American environment 
has inevitably taken on certain nationalistic features. ' Seizing upon the strength of 
Garvey's UNIA, I laywood argued that there was an impulse towards nationalism 
amongst blacks, but that the Party must intervene to turn this in a revolution direction, 
International, vol. 2,554. 
233 Quoted in Klehr, Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 325. 
234 Cyril Briggs to Theodore Draper, 24 March 1958, Theodore Draper papers, box 3 1, folderNegro- 
Briggs'. 
235 Solomon, The Cry Was Unity, 70. 
236 See Haywood, Black Bolshevik, chapter 8. 
237 Harry I leywood, 'The Basis for Nationalist Movements among Negroes in the United States, and 
What Should be the Attitude of Our Party towards Them', 10 June 1928, in Jay Lovestone papers, 
Hoover archives, box 214, folder 3. 
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towards socialism, instead of towards a reactionary direction, towards 'back to Africa' 
nationalism. 238 Haywood, however, was unique in his acceptance of the theory, since 
almost all other CP representatives in Moscow, black and white, opposed it. 239 James 
Ford, a Foster supporter, argued that the debate, while about important issues, was 'a 
waste of time' because the Party had no 'serious contact with the Negro masses [or] 
any influence upon them'. 240 The Lovestone leadership, in addition, perceived it as an 
attack on them. 241 
Some complained that the new line brought Southern 'separate but equal' 
politics into the Communist movement. The resolution stated: 
While continuing and intensifying the struggle under the slogan of full social 
and political equality for the Negroes, which much remain the central slogan 
of our Party for work among the masses, the Party must come out 
unreservedly for the right of Negroes to national self-determination in the 
- 242 Southern States. 
Since Reconstruction, blacks had striven for equality and integration into American 
society, not separation. Minor, a white Communist from Texas who later became a 
sort of expert on the Negro Question, exemplifies this unease. In his prior career as an 
editorial cartoonist, Minor had acquired skills which he put to use by doodling notes, 
njany of which are still extant. One read, ' "National" Question-as a question of 
"Self-Determination [sic] for Slave States. ' Another posited that if this theory was 
correct, 'Then Marx and Engels would have been wrong. Jef. Davis, then, would have 
239 Ibid. 
21' See Carl Jones, 'Is there a Basis for a Nationalist or Separatist Movement in the United States? ', 14 
June 1928, and his 'Against the Slogan for Self-Determination among American Negroes', 22 June 
1928, in Lovestone papers, box 214, folders 7 and 11, respectively. 
240 'Statement by comrade Ford at the Negro Commission', 3 August 1928, in Lovestone papers, box 
224, folder 29. 
241 Solomon, The Cry Was Unity, 73. For the complex factional wrangling over this question, see the 
minutes of the American Delegation meeting, Thursday 23 August 1928, in Lovestone papers, box 213, 
folder 19. 
242 ECCI resolution on the Negro Question, Degras, The Communist International, vol. 2,554. 
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been right. 1,243 Nonetheless, despite this disgruntlement, the new programme was 
pushed through by the Comintern, with the assistance of Haywood. 
The first thing to note about the concept of a 'Negro Nation' is that it is false, 
at least as Marxist-Leninists understand the concepts of 'nation' and 'self- 
determination'. For Lenin, a nation was a people which could be viable as a 
independent political economic unit. Thus, each oppressed group within society is not 
a 'nation'-for example, youth and religious minorities. Lenin insisted that all nations 
have the right to self-determination, i. e., national independence. Lenin never saw this 
as an end-in-itself, but a means of moving national antagonisms 'off the agenda'. In 
the post-Reconstruction US, blacks became more and more integrated into American 
capitalism, albeit at the bottom economically and socially segregated. Certainly, by 
1928, blacks formed an integral party of the American nation, especially in the 
Northern working class. To speak of separation-self-determination-for blacks was 
historically impossible, just as it would be for women, another oppressed group. 
Even according to Stalin's own earlier definitions, blacks in the US could not be 
considered a nation. In his Marxism and the National Question, written under Lenin's 
tutelage in 1913, Stalin began, in his rather ponderous style, by asking 'What is a 
nationT He answered that a nation 'is not racial or tribal, but a historical constituted 
community of people ... 
formed on the basis of a common language, territory, 
economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture. 
244 
Even though it is far from evident that American blacks fulfilled Stalin's 
definition of a nation, he-basing himself on Lenin's off-hand comments in the 1920 
'Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions'-nonetheless 
243 Robert Minor papers, Box 12, folder 'Negro New York, no. 7-9'. By this point Minor, once the most 
famous American political cartoonists, had given up art in favour of politics; for a discussion of 
Minor's artistic background, see Galotola, 'From Bohemianism to Radicalism', 88-91,119-3 1. 
244 J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, in Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing 
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designated them such. Thus, at the behest of the Comintern, black Americans in the 
Southern 'black belt' should fight for 'self determination' from the United States. 245 
The change, however, did have a certain appeal. It was the first decisive theoretical 
break in the Party from the Debsian colour-blind perspective. 246 Also, although the 
concept of a 'black nation' was, in a Marxist sense, absurd, the idea of a democratic 
South with a largely black government was not, especially for those who recalled 
Radical Reconstruction. 247 
Origins of the 'black belt'92 
The reason that the Comintern developed this theory is a mystery thatDraper 
labelled 'the most obscure and puzzling chapter in the story of American 
Communism'. 248 Strangely, historians tend to view this change in isolation from 
developments in the Comintern as a whole. This change was part of an international 
shift on the national and colonial question throughout the Comintem. Also at the Sixth 
Congress, the Comintem forced the CPSA against the opinions of its leadership to 
adopt the slogan 'an independent native South African republic as a step towards a 
workers and peasants republic with full equal rights for all races, black, coloured and 
white'. 249 During the 'Third Period', the Brazilian Party demanded 'the rights of 
Indians and Negroes to have full autonomy, even to form separate nations'. Noting 
House, 1953), vol. 2,303,3 07. 
245 See Nick Dicken and Leon Day's position paper distributed at the 1969 convention of SDS for an 
attempt to analyse the 'black belt' theory from a Marxist perspective, making use of Stalin's work. 
(, Mike Klonsky versus Brother Stalin', reprinted in Spartacist 13 (August-September 1969). 
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William A. Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York: Harper 
Brothers, 1962 [1907]), 216 
248 Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 315. 
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3(JulY 1989), 60. For the opposition of the CPSA's representative to the Sixth Congress, S. P. Bunting, 
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that there were 12 million blacks in the Americas, a Mexican delegate to the Congress 
argued that the Negro Commission should provide 'una programa de accion para la 
conquista de este ejercito de seres desventurados'. Other Latin American sections of 
the Comintern also advocated independent states of indigenous regions. At the same 
time, one author noted, within Canada, 'the reference to self-determination [for the 
Quebecois] began appearing in Communist documents in 1929 and the early 1930s. ' 
While the Quebecois, American blacks, South Africans and blacks throughout Latin 
America all experienced different forms of oppression, various Communist Parties 
began stressing the right to self determination-no matter if it fit the particular 
situation-during this period. 
250 
In discussing the change in South Africa, Baruch Hirson-who was quite 
hostile to the Comintem. and the Soviet Union-argued that the shift in line must be 
viewed as part of the attacks on Trotsky and the Soviet Left Opposition. Certainly, 
having this line successfully adopted allowed Stalin to strengthen his ideological grip 
on the Comintern, as well as bolster his credentials as a Marxist theoretician against 
Bukharin. More importantly, by emphasising what were, in Marxist terms, 
'bourgeois-democratic' tasks, Stalin was able to have adopted the pre-October 
Revolution theory of the 'democratic dictatorship of the proletarian and peasantry,, 
which argued that socialists should struggle first for 'democracy', and then for 
Press, 1992), 177-190. 
250 PCB theses of April 193 1, quoted in John W. F. Dulles, Anarchists and Communists in Brazil 
(Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1973), 473. It is unclear how central this slogan was 
for the PCB. A statement of the PCB political bureau on 19 July 1930, i. e., after the beginning of the 
, Third Period', in between sections dealing with soldiers and sailors and Indian declared only: 
'Trabalhadores negros! -a vossa escravidao continua! Lutai em conjunto com os demais trablhadores 
contra a exploracao feudal, por vossa I ibertacao definitiva! ' A Classe Operaria, excerpted in Edgard 
Carone, ed., 0 P. C. B, 1922-1943 (Sao Paulo: Difusau Editorial, 1982). It is also unclear how or when 
this theory was adopted by the PCB. The quote from the Mexican delegate is taken from VI Congreso 
de la internacional Comunista (Mexico City: Pasado y Presente, 1978), vol. 2,3 72. On the Com intem 
and the 'Indian Question' in Latin America, see Marc Becker, 'Ethnicity, The Indian Question, and the 
communist International in South America', research outline on Internet, 
(httpj/www. yachana. org/research/comintem. html). On Canada, see Avakumovic, The Communist 
party in Canada, 254; Penner, The Canadian Left, 91-112. 
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socialism. Since Lenin's return to the Finland Station in 1917, and his advocacy of the 
'April Theses', the Bolsheviks had essentially adopted Trotsky's theory of 'permanent 
revolution'-i. e., that the bourgeois-democratic tasks of the revolution could only be 
achieved through the working class taking power as part of an international 
revolution. Stalin disputed this as in his anti-Trotsky campaign to implement the 
theory of 'socialism in one country'. By creating a 'national question', Stalin was thus 
able to insist that this needed to be answered before socialism was on the agenda. In 
fact, the call for self-determination for blacks in the South was spelt out in the Sixth 
Congress resolution dealing with this new programme for the 'revolutionary 
movement in the colonial and semi-colonial world' . 
25 1 This explanation is at best 
imperfect, however, especially since at least during the 1930s Stalin's main adversary, 
Trotsky, accepted both 'self-determination' for Southern US blacks and South African 
blacks. 252 What Trotsky objected to was the idea that these democratic tasks could be 
separated from the struggle for socialism. 
One student of American Communism has warned that, when discussing the 
'black belt', 'it is important not to dismiss out of hand a doctrine that may strike many 
as chimerical at best and segregationist at worst. 
253 It would be wrong to blithely 
assert, as does Klehr, that 'Despite accepting the theory of self-determination, 
Communists never got many benefits from it., 254 Instead, its effects were paradoxical. 
Although it did not make very much sense on its face, it did spur the CP into 
251 See section thirty nine of the 'Theses for the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial and Semi- 
Colonial World'. These theses are excerpted in Degras, ed, The Communist International, vol. 2,530- 
48. However, the passages dealing with blacks in the US has been edited out; cf V1 Congresso de La 
Internacional Comunista, vol. 1,23 6-3 8 for the entire resolution. 
252 Theodore Draper's The Rediscovery ofBIack Nationalism (London: Secker and Warburg, 197 1) 
describes Trotsky as 'the most tenacious advocate of Negro "self-determination" ' (66). For Trotsky's 
position towards US blacks, see Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on Black Nationalism (New York: 
Pathfinder, 1973); on South Africa, see his 'Letter to South African Revolutionaries', 20 April 1935, 
reprinted in The Fightfor a Revolutionary Vanguard Party: Polemics on the South African Left (New 
York: Spartacist Publishing Company, 1997), 7-9. 
253 Foley, Radical Representations, 18 1. 
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addressing black oppression. As Haywood put it, 'The new theory was to sensitize the 
Party to the revolutionary significance of the Black liberation struggle. 255 But this 
positive effect was despite its official programmatic content. 
Not only was black national self-determination empirically inaccurate, it was 
also rejected by most black Americans. As Klehr argued, 'Almost from the day it had 
been promulgated by the Comintern, the self-determination doctrine had been an 
9256 albatross isolating the Party from virtually every Negro organization. Naison, 
ironically, used similar language, calling the policy 'an albatross' which 'would be a 
257 
singularly poor mobilizing device in the North or the South' . Consequently, the CP 
tended to downplay the self-detennination slogan. In the Daily Worker, Earl Browder 
described the campaign to free the Scottsboro Boys as a 'magnificent success for the 
party' while decrying 'the weakness with which we have carried out the 
popularization ... of the slogan of self-determination'. 
258 This is the paradox of the 
self-determination theory: the theory itself was, as has been amply documented by 
anti-Communist historians, 'made in Moscow', and did not correspond with American 
reality. Yet, at the same time, it helped ground the Party in the 'American question' 
par excellence, the struggle for black freedom, as Robin Kelley and Mark Naison's 
research illustrates. 
259 
By placing the Negro Question in the context of fighting against colonialism 
and imperialism, the Comintern made it important. 
260 As in South Africa, the concept 
2" Klehr, Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 327. 
2'5 Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 234. 
2" Klehr, The Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 343. 
257 Naison, Communists in Harlem, 18. 
"s Quoted in Klehr, Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 337. 
219Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 350; See also: Klehr, Heyday of American 
Communism, 324-25; Klehr and Thompson, 'Self-Determination in the Black Belt: Origins of a 
Communist Policy'; Hill, 'The Communist Party--Enemy of Negro Equality', 365. Both Naison, 
Communists in Harlem, and Kelley, Hammer and Hoe, document the contradiction between the Party's 
official position of seperatism, and its activities on the ground, which tended towards integration. 
260 Naison, Communists in Harlem, 18-19. 
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of 'self-determination' for blacks coupled with the theory that the immediate task of 
socialists was to fight for national liberation prevented Communists from ignoring 
racial oppression by subsuming it into class in a colour-blind manner. This change 
intemationalised the fight against black oppression, making it more than just a 
provincial problem in the American South. After all, the programme of the Third 
International, adopted at the Sixth Congress in 1928, stressed that, as against the 
Second International, the Comintern struggled for 'wide and determined struggle 
against the imposition of any kind of limitation and restriction upon any nationality, 
nation or race. Complete equality for all nations and races., 
26 1 Later, the programme 
emphasised that 'Colonial revolutions and movements for national liberation play an 
extremely important part in the struggle for the conquest of power by the working 
class. 262 While, as we have seen, the struggle for black liberation in North America 
was different from struggles against colonialism and national oppression, the 
Comintern's attention did force the Party to address the issue by taking it out of the 
exclusive realm of the American comrades. 
Stalin himself-even in 1928 virtually the voice of Communism itself- 
stressed that 'the point is that the programme of the Comintern cannot be the 
programme of any one national party, or, say, a programme for only the "civilised" 
nations. The programme must cover all the Communist Parties of the world, all 
nations, all peoples, both black and white. 
263 Making the Negro Question a national 
question also internationalised the fight for black rights, placing it on the same plain 
as the Irish or Jewish Questions. 
261 The Programme ofthe Communist International, together with the Statutes of1he Communist 
International (London: Modem Books, 1929), 29. 
262 Ibid., 42. 
263 j. V. Stalin, speech on 5 July 1928, in The Program ofthe Communist International. - With 
Introductory Notes andSpeech on Amendments by JVStalin (Calcutta: Radical Book Club, 1944), 77. 
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Finally, even if the 'black belt' did not reflect American reality, it did 
recognise that black people would play a key role in any struggle for socialism-or 
even just basic democratic rights. Thus the new theory forced the CP to place the 
Negro Question at the centre of its work. Robin Kelley remarked that even though the 
self-determination theory met opposition, 'for many black Communists, particularly 
those in the urban North' the new line 'indirectly confirmed what they had long 
264 believed: African Americans had their own unique revolutionary tradition. It was 
during this period that Communists courageously fought for black rights. On the 
ground, Communists often downplayed 'self-determination' in favour of fighting 
racist oppression. 
265 Thus, in the winter of 1929, Party militants campaigned against a 
Manhattan restaurant's racist practices. Six Party supporters-three black, three 
white-and, briefly, Briggs, were arrested for, in the Daily Worker's words, 'carrying 
placards denouncing the Jim Crow policy of the Tip Toe Inn and calling for full racial 
equality, economic, political, social, for the Negro. The Daily Worker's coverage did 
not mention the concept of 'self-determination' for blacks. 
266 
As Kelley's Hammer and Hoe documents, in the Third Period the Party began 
extensive work in the American South. But by March 1929, the minutes of the Negro 
Commission note that Southern comrades had requested a full-time organiser to help 
organise black farmers. 
267 By 1929, Huiswood claimed, the Party had increased its 
black membership to between 150 and 300 members; still very small, but more than 
double the 75 black members the Party claimed throughout the decade. 268 
264 Robin D. G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics and the Black Working Class (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994), 109. 
265 In Minor papers, folder'Notes by Minor', box 13. 
266 See the Daily Worker, 2 February 1929 for the initial story, and 5 February for the conclusion. 
Briggs was briefly arrested while taking pictures of the demonstration, but then released; the six other 
demonstrators received suspended sentences. 
267 Minutes of meeting of the Negro Commission, 26 March 1929, in Lovestone papers, box 224, folder 
29. 
269 H. M. Wicks to 'Dear Louis', 9 May 1929, in Draper papers, Hoover Institution, box 29. This letter 
Jacob Zumoff 337 
It was in the early 1930s that the Party dramatically increased its base among 
American blacks, largely because of their Third Period stance. The Party championed 
the case of the Scottsboro Boys, black youths framed-up on bogus rape charges in 
Alabama, who without the Communist-led campaign would have certainly have been 
quickly executed. Communists organised textile workers in Gastonia, including racial 
equality in their demands. And in the North, they fought forjobs, relief and against 
evictions. 
269 Perhaps most important, they refused to support the Democratic Party, 
historically the party of slavery and white supremacy-indeed, the party of the Klan 
itself. While many historians view the Third Period as a disaster, many black 'fellow 
travellers' remember it much more fondly. David Montgomery, a labour historian and 
former Communist militant, recalled that: 
every place where I ever worked, there was a number of older black workers 
who had never joined the Party, or if they did, were only in it for a short time, 
but had a considerable respect for it, and would for the most part think of the 
Third Period--the very one that most of us think of as the most outrageous--as 
the one in which these guys proved themselves, in the unemployed movement, 
and in the Scottsboro campaign. This was the period in which the generation 
of older Blacks looked upon with greatest respect. 270 
Internationally, the Third Period was marked, above all, by the German Communists' 
inability to organise against Hitler, their declaring the Social Democrats 'social 
fascists', and Ernest Thaelmann's idiotic slogan, 'After Hitler, Us. ' But closer to 
home, for American blacks, it meant the last time Communists employed the rhetoric 
of 'class against class' militancy regularly, the last time the Party strenuously opposed 
the Democratic Party-which in the South, did have close links to the fascists-and, 
above all, the only time when Communists made black liberation their central 
is a report of the American Commission meeting in the Spring of 1929, and reports Huiswood's 
remarks. According to this note, Losovsky severely criticised the Party for such a small number. 
269 on the Party's campaign to defend the Scottsboro boys, and more generally black rights in general, 
see. Martin, 'The International Labor Defense and Black America', 169-79. On the Scottsboro case, see 
Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy ofthe American South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1979). The best description of the CP's activities amongst blacks in the South during the third 
eriod is Kelley, Hammer and Hoe. 1 V70 
Interview with David Montgomery by Mark Naison and Paul Buhle, Radical History Review 23 (Spring 
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message. Although many historians and (white) ex-Communists often fondly recall 
the Popular Fronts of the late 1930s and World War II, for many blacks these meant 
rapprochement with the racist, capitalist Democratic Party, and class-collaboration 
became the norm. 271 While it is true that this eventually led to a realignment within 
the Democratic Party, with the Southern 'Dixiecrat' wing eventually defecting to 
Republicans, 272 the 1930s, when the Party supported Roosevelt, the racist South 
remained integral to the Democratic Party, and the Party often subordinated the 
interests of both black and workers in order to maintain this, often inharmonious, 
alliance. During the Second World War, the Party did the same, in the name of 
supporting the war effort. 
273 
These aspects of the Third Period, not its official line of 'self-detennination, 
made the CP attractive to blacks. Thus, for example, in 193 1, almost a quarter of the 
Chicago Party was black, even though blacks made up less than 7 per cent of 
Chicago's total population. 274 The Party local in Baltimore fought for black rights, 
one historian concluded, becoming 'a major catalyst for the revival of the local Black 
freedom movement' while making 'racism a central issue within the re-emerging 
275 
working-class movements of the region' precisely because of the Third Period . This 
1980), 41 
271 For one of the few sympathetic accounts of the 'Ibird Period, see James Green, 'Working Class 
Militancy in the Depression'. Both Robin Kelley, Hammer and Hoe, and Michael Goldfield, The Color of 
politics, sympathise with this period because of the Party's role in the fight for black rights. 
272 See Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill and 
London: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
273 Thus one historian who is sympathetic to the CP, wrote of the Party during the Second World War: 
'Determined Communist opposition to civil-rights militancy-at a time when the NAACP was 
increasing its membership five-fold and Blacks were struggling aggressively for equal treatment in the 
military and in the defense industries-bred hostilities that would compromise postwar Communist 
appeals to the Negroes' (Norman D. Markowit7, The Rise and Fall ofthe People's Century: Henry A. 
Wallace andAmerican Liberalism, 1941-1948 [London: Collier-Macmillan Publishers, 1973], 206- 
207). 
274 Randi Jill Storch, 'Shades of Red', 45; on the perception of the third period amongst blacks, 
especially in the black media, see Christopher E. Linsin, 'Not by Words, but by Deeds: Communists 
and African Americans During the Depression Era' (MA dissertation, Florida Atlantic University, 
1993), 29-31. 
275 Andor Skotnes, 'Tbe Communist Party, Anti-Racism, and the Freedom Movement in Baltimore, 
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is why many early black Communists were disappointed when the Party abandoned 
the Third Period in favour of the Popular Front. 276 Although the Party deepened its 
roots in Chicago and other heavily black areas by building a 'Negro People's Front' 
as an 6auxiliary to the Popular Front meant to promote a synthesis of communism and 
black cultural and political work', it did so on an explicit non-revolutionary basis in 
order 'to attract a reform-minded constituency eager for participation in a liberal 
democratic capitalism'. 277 
Another example of the new emphasis on black liberation for the Party was the 
1931 'white chauvinism' trial of August Yokinen. While the actual facts are buried 
beneath Party propaganda, several black youth were mistreated at a dance at the 
party-owned Finnish Workers Temple in Harlem in December 1930. Although most 
implicated Party members recanted their white-chauvinism, Yokinen, a janitor at the 
club, did not, arguing that he did not wish to bathe with blacks. In response, the Party 
staged a spectacular trial to highlight its determination to root out chauvinists from 
within its own ranks. Yokinen, who spoke only Finnish, and his 'defence counsel', 
Richard Moore, argued for leniency and denounced white chauvinism; in the end, the 
&court'-consisting of seven white and seven black comrades-expelled Yokinen, but 
allowed him to reapply for membership if he vigorously struggled against white 
chauvinism. By itself, the trial was largely a cynical stunt, and it spawned a series 
similar trials. 
278 Although Yokinen was allowed to rejoin the Party, the story had an 
unhappy since the Immigration Department, aroused by the Party's propaganda, 
193 0-34', Science & Society 60: 2 (Summer 1996), 166. 
276 Vincent, Black Power and the Garvey Movement, 233n 
277 Bill Mullen, Popular Fronts: Chicago andAfrican-American Cultural Politics (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 4,26. 
278 Richard Fraser, a long-time Trotskyist critic of the Communist Party, observed in 1955 that 'The 
hectic internal life around the race question, is caused primarily by the fact that the basic theory of the 
Stalinists on the Negro struggle does nothing to liberate white workers from prejudice, but on the other 
hand corresponds to their backwardness and tends to confirm them in it'; R. S. Fraser, 'For a Materialist 
Conception of the Negro Question', in Marxist Bulletin 5 (New York: Spartacist Publishing Company, 
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deported him to Finland within a year. But, as with the black belt theory, actual facts 
of the case were less important than symbolism. The Party gained the reputation 
amongst blacks as seriously and honestly fighting for black rights, within and without 
its own organisation. Equally important, however, the 'trial', by finding for black 
Americans and against a Finnish immigrant, highlighted the ongoing 
'Americanisation' of the Party 279 
Conclusion 
The 1920s were important in the Party's increasing appreciation of the Negro 
Question. Even if the Party itself did not see mammoth organisational gains among 
blacks, its influence extended far beyond its actual membership. A striking example 
of this is Paul Robeson, long a favourite of the Communist left, who never actually 
joined. Many activists in the post-war struggle for black rights had been influenced by 
the Party. In his study of the civil rights movement in the 1920s, Mark Schneider 
concluded that by the end of the decade, the CP had displaced the NAACP as the 
dominant national, militant interracial organisation. The Party, he wrote, 
, fundamentally and forever changed the attitude of white radicals toward African- 
American rights' by making it impossible to ignore the struggle for black freedom. 
1994), 16. 
279 The campaign is covered in the Party pamphlet, Race Hatred on Trial (New York: Workers Library 
Publishers, 193 1), which is reprinted in Philip S. Foner and Herbert Shapiro, American Communism 
and Black Americans: A Documentary History, 1930-1934 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
199 1), along with responses by black newspapers. See also Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 353-58; Klehr, 
Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 328-30; Naison, Communists in Harlem, 4649 Solomon, Cry Was 
Unity, 13942. On the support the trial had amongst blacks, see Dawson, Black Visions, 190. The 
Yokinen affair certainly was not the first of its kind; the minutes of the Political Committee, 14 June 
1928, contain a reference to a very similar situation at a meeting of the Detroit Miners' Relief Dance 
, where our comrades pennitted the manager of the hall in which the Dance was held, to put the Negro 
workers who were present out of the hall, and refuse entrance to other Negroes, because the manager 
feared some of the regular dancing crowd would start a fight if Negroes were permitted to remain in the 
hall'. The Central Committee endorsed the local leadership's censure of those in charge and declared 
that 'the proper tactics would have been to that immediately upon the attempted enforcement of the 
exclusion of the Negro workers from the Dance, [Communists] should have at once marched out en 
masse in protest and forcibly demonstrated their solidarity with the Negro workers against race 
discrimination' (in PRL collection). 
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Inversely, black America's struggle for freedom profoundly affected the Party as well, 
becoming important both in the public view of the Party and its own self-definition. 280 
In the mid-1960s, Robert F. Williams, then in exile in Cuba for his insistence 
on the right of black self-defence, wrote to Haywood that although he had become 
disillusioned with the Party, he 'once... had great sympathy for them and I considered 
their cause to be the cause of the Negro also'. He was not alone: other, more 
moderate, black leaders such as Bayard Rustin had also once been linked to the Party. 
Stokley Carmichael, in his youth in New York City, had been on friendly terms with 
several Communists, and Angcla Davis, whose parents had been around the 
Communists in Alabama in her youth, remained a supporter of the Party until the 
early 1990s. The Civil Rights movement was, obviously, not a Communist creation 
(much less 'plot'), and by the time they assumed leading roles in the movement, many 
former Communists or sympathisers had broken their ties with the Party. Yet often it 
was the Party which had articulated a political vision for many radical black 
intellectuals: the vision changed over time, but the Party's role in sparking it cannot 
be denied. 
281 
Had the Comintern not intervened, repeatedly, into the Party, the Party would 
have remained aloof from one of the most important struggles in American society. 
The Comintern's interventions illustrate the beneficial role that the Comintem could 
play: instead of making it more difficult for the Party to understand American reality, 
this interventionforced American Communists to understand the United States. 
280 Schneider, 'We Return Fighting'. 389; see William J. Maxwell, New Negro, Old Left, 6,8, for the 
importance of the 1920s in the black-Communist interaction, and the two-way nature of this exchange. 
on Robeson, see Klehr, Heyday ofAmerican Communism, 348. On the Party's influence in the later 
civil rights movement, see Kelley, Hammer and Hoe. 
" Robert F. Williams, letter to Harry Haywood, no date [1963-66? 1, in papers of Robert F. Williams, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (microfilm reel 1, frames 54-55). 
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Conclusion: The Party, the Comintern, and American Society 
In 1919, American Communists, mostly non-English speaking immigrants 
organised in several competing and hostile groups, were ignorant of the struggle for 
black rights and remained isolated from most of the nation's organised workers on 
principle. It is no wonder, then, that as the initial hopes for immediate revolution 
inspired by Bolshevik Revolution faded, tens of thousands of Socialists who had been 
sympathetic to the Communists quit the movement. 
A decade later, Communists, now largely organised into one unified, legal 
Party, although still much smaller than their European counterparts, were poised to 
play important roles in the labour movement, among blacks, in the cultural field and, 
in some areas of politics as well. While at the time of the movement's founding, 
American Communists were at best aloof from the society around them, in the 1930s 
they began to not just to understand it better, but to change it as well. 
This demonstrates that, contrary to traditional historians such as Theodore 
Draper, as well as newer 'revisionist' historians, the intervention of the Communist 
international did not hinder the Party's Americanisation, but rather encouraged it. 
In its early years, the Third International sought to build a revolutionary 
movement throughout the world to get rid of capitalism and spread the gains of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Since Lenin, Trotsky and the entire Bolshevik leadership 
believed it was not possible to sustain the rule of the working class in one, backward 
country indefinitely, this was also 
integrally linked to defending Soviet Russia itself. 
The Comintem sought to construct its sections out of the left wing of the labour 
movement; however, they also wanted to 
do more than found a renovated Second 
international: as the conditions for entry into the Comintem make clear, they believed 
that sections of the Comintern, while drawing on the traditions of struggle against 
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capitalism, had to be founded on a new model, namely the Bolshevik concept of a 
revolutionary vanguard party. 
In the United States, the Comintern sought to assemble the disparate pro- 
Bolshevik elements, including immigrant social democrats, IWW syndicalists, radical 
intellectuals, black nationalists and left-wing Socialists, and transform them into a 
Party that would be able to lead an American socialist revolution. The early 
Comintem laid the basis for both the organisational and political foundation of the 
American Communist Party. It prodded American Communists to unite in one 
organisation, to take advantage of their right to organise legally, to work among 
unionised workers, and, most importantly, to grapple with the role of black oppression 
in maintaining capitalist rule. In this period, the Comintern guided the Party to better 
understand American society. 
By the end of the 1920s, however, the relationship between the Comintem and 
American Communism had changed, because the Comintern itself had changed. As a 
result of developments in Soviet Russia, the Third International came under the 
control of Stalin who no longer wanted revolutions abroad, but instead insisted on 
socialism in (only) one country. Consequently, the leadership of the Comintern 
increasingly intervened into its member parties from this perspective. 
Yet, this was not an overnight process. For several years, Trotsky and, for a 
time, other leading Bolsheviks, struggled against the Stalinisation of the Russian Party 
and the ECCI. Furthennore, even once Stalinised, the Comintern was unable to 
impose its will on all of the national parties at once. In the American Party, it was not 
until 1928-29 that the Party finally expelled Cannon's Trotskyist opposition and 
Lovestone's Bukharinist group, and consolidated a stable, non-factional leadership. 
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By 1929, then, the leadership and political programme of American 
Communism had become Stalinised, and the Comintern intervened into the Party to 
assure that this situation continued. However, once again, this was not a simple 
process. Many of these interventions had positive effects as well. Partly, this was by 
design: in order to create a pro-Stalin Party, the Comintern needed to finally eliminate 
factionalism and subdue the language-federations. Although the majority of the 
membership would continue to be immigrants for a long time, and although the Party 
would still experience internal tensions, these would not threaten Party unity again, 
even as it followed the changing Comintern line throughout the 1930s and 1940s. 
Partly, however, the Comintern interventions had unintended consequences. 
This was most obvious in the case of the 'Negro Question'. Stalin had forced the 
American Party, like others, to place basic democratic questions (in this case, the 
absurd call for an independent black nation in the South) ahead of the struggle for 
socialism. This was in keeping with Stalin's attack on Trotsky's theory of permanent 
revolution. Yet, American Communists, especially black Communists, took this new 
line and used it to become champions of the struggle for black liberation. This 
highlights a key contradiction in the Stalinised Party: an increasingly non- 
revolutionary programme and leadership, and a membership still recruited to the idea 
of making a socialist revolution. Even as the Party became more and more right-wing 
under the Popular Front and, later, during the War, this contradiction remained. While 
it would prevent the party organising effectively for social revolution, it would allow 
it to have some successful outcomes in organising for more short-term gains. 
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